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ABSTRACT 
 
Revolutions and  Rough Cuts: Bodily Technologies for Regulating Sexuality 
in Contemporary Iran 
 




Studies on the regulation of sexuality in the Islamic Republic of Iran are often 
focused on the regulatory tool of criminalization in relation to sex and sexuality. More 
recently, popular academic debates have centered on the revolutionary sexual practices 
among a subculture of upper-middle class Tehrani youth. Yet the scope of practices, 
methods, and technologies used to regulate and express sexuality in contemporary Iran 
are manifold and diverse, conflictive and collaborative, and seldom reflective of the 
state’s ideological imperative of an “Islamic sexual morality.”   
This dissertation examines the regulation of sexuality in Iran from 1965 to 2012,  
a period beginning with the launching of modernization reforms under the Pahlavi 
dynasty and ending well into the third decade of the Islamic Republic. As seen through 
state, religious, juridical, popular cultural, and public health discourses on sexuality, this 
project examines the construction and application of bodily technologies —meaning the 
physical and conceptual modes of regulation enacted to discipline and/or control 
“immodest” and “deviant” expressions of men and women. This project concentrates on 
five unique sites: a popular women’s journal, a red-light district, temporary marriage, 
iconic public statues, and a HIV-AIDS advocacy organization in Tehran. In each site, I 
identify, compare, and contextualize the methods of regulation, posing the following 
questions: how are bodily technologies constructed discursively and socially in Iran? 
And, in particular, what values and perspectives are incorporated in them, serving to 
dictate what kinds of realities, lifestyles, and desires are both permissible and accessible? 
By tracing the construction and strategic application of both old and new modes 
of regulation, I discuss how each mode engages with the forces of modernity, 
consumerism, prostitution, and religious discourse. Also, I examine how sites and modes 
of regulation mutate into each other, breaking form to join with other disciplinary 
methods to condition a similar kind of isolation, concealment, and stigmatization.  
I argue that even despite the change in regimes, from the secular, pro-West 
Pahlavi monarchy to the clerical-led Islamic Republic, there are shifts and continuities in 
the modes of regulation. This is especially evident during periods of economic, social, 
and political crises. Moreover, I contend that in most of these sites, the body is one of the 
ways through which sexuality is regulated; in others, sexuality is disciplined through the 
spatial cleansing of brothel sites and, after 1979, in the official promotion of temporary 
marriages to assist in controlling the rise of prostitution. I establish that through the 
processes of sexualization and desexualization, modification and erasure, and denial and 
acceptance, sexuality is regulated not only through the disciplining of women and their 
bodies, but also through the dispersing and internalizing of positive ideals about health, 
family, marriage, modesty, and pleasure for the Iranian citizen and the general body 
politic.   
The impetus for my project stems from what I believe to be a necessity in 
reviewing and challenging the dominant, scholarly discourse on gender and sexuality 
within the discipline of Iranian studies, which tends to (re)present Iranian women as 
political and/or religious subjects, in lieu of women attempting to navigate and construct 
meaning for themselves in such a complex sociological terrain.  In academic, state-
sponsored, and Twelver Shi’a religious discourses, the tendency is to focus on 
medicalizing, gendering, and anatomizing Iranian women through the paradigms of 
modernization and nationalism. My work is an intervention in these debates, as I 
incorporate sociological fieldwork conducted in Iran over a five-year time period, when I 
interviewed a cross-section of Iranian women about issues of health, body image, 
maternity, and sexuality—among many others .  This research offers valuable 
ethnographic material not only for studies on sexuality, but also for sociological studies 
on the complex construction of identity, personhood, and power in the contemporary 
Middle East. 
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In Iranian society, sexuality comes to be a cultural cynosure, because of which, it is 
simultaneously perceived as precious and treacherous to its original master.  
(Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire, 1989)1 
 
This dissertation project effectively began in the summer of 2007, when I first 
noticed the mutilated breasts of mannequins in Haft-e Tir Square, one of Tehran’s 
bustling clothing districts. The female mannequins were wrapped in exquisite designs and 
adorned with faux jewels and Louis Vuitton patterned scarves. Yet, they appeared oddly 
deformed. The breasts of every mannequin had been cut crudely from different angles, 
apparently by saws and knives ill-suited to the task of modification.  Peeking out as 
jagged plateaus covered in fabric, the breasts were unlike anything I had seen in window 
shop displays. Some breasts looked like cut-off spherical mounds. Others resembled 
miniature tree stumps. Equally alarmed and amused, I asked friends and relatives if they 
had noticed anything peculiar about these displays. One friend joked darkly, “Oh, the 
mannequins have breast cancer!”   
 Documentary filmmaker Firouzeh Khosrovani has described the mutilation of 
mannequins in Tehran’s shop windows as a “rough cut.”2 By 2008, such rough cuts were 
becoming widespread in shopping districts across the capital, the result of a government 
campaign that began in 2006. Under the crackdown, curvaceous mannequins, particularly 
those dressed in any way revealingly, were forbidden, while boyish body shapes with 
minimal curves were preferred. Over the last five years, I have observed mannequins in 
                                                
1 Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd,  
1989), p. 70. 
 
2 “Rough Cut,” directed by Firouzeh Khosrovani (Tehran: n.p. 2007). See also Nina Power,  “Mannequins, 




various states of alteration: many sported half-heads, or no heads at all; most mannequins 
had flattened chests; and, in some instances, the mannequins were completely replaced 
with wire frames shaped into crude human forms. 
The state-mandated alteration of mannequins and other representations of women 
was the impetus for this research project.  Indeed, an emerging trend was taking shape, 
whereby women, and the representational art depicting them, were being widely and 
publicly derided by leading clerics. They characterized the female form as naked, 
obscene, and scandalous, possessing an insidious power to provoke spontaneous arousal 
in men. As a result, mannequins were not the only representations of the female form 
being deliberately modified into supposedly modest forms. Statues and other three-
dimensional public art works had part of their figures covered or veiled to hew more 
closely to official definitions of modesty.  
The simultaneous threat and allure of women —even in their mutilated and 
isolated forms— have occupied pivotal places in the formulation and implementation of 
Iran’s social policy. The notion that merely gazing upon the physical features of a woman 
will lead to societal corruption has caused, in recent years, the state to accelerate its 
censorship and reform of representations of women in public space. No longer are 
depictions of women —especially those perceived to be dressed immodestly— tolerated 
for display, lest they entice onlookers’ desire.  These provisions have triggered cultural 
and political clashes, unfolding on city streets and in towns and villages across Iran. For 
many Iranians, acting, dressing, and speaking out against social policies and restrictions 
have come at a heavy price—for men and women alike. From public admonishment to 
fines and lashes, this range of disciplinary practices is reasoned to help control and 
  
3 
modify social conduct in private and public spaces.  Enacting policies to reform male-
female interactions and physical appearance are necessary steps in maintaining the family 
unit and protecting public morality in Iranian society.  
The Islamic Republic’s constitutional dictum, “good moral values based on the 
Islamic faith,”3 formed the conceptual rubric guiding Ayatollah Khomeini’s reformation 
of Iranian society into an Islamic society. For three decades, the core values of this 
dictum have endured but the policies and methods of regulation have shifted in content 
and expanded in scope. Government bodies, such as the Supreme Council of the Cultural 
Revolution, began devising policies in which the state’s ideals of Muslim women, as 
pious, modest, and self-sacrificing mothers and wives,4 were socially, religiously, and 
legally enforced.5 Underlying these very ideals was the notion that a woman’s femininity 
and sexuality could potentially endanger the preservation and maintenance of public 
morality.6 In countless treatises, essays, and speeches, Shi’a religious scholars (ulama) 
and Iranian officials have stated, as a matter-of-fact, that the female body stirs both 
desirable and undesirable emotions in men. A woman’s body, as a catalyst for arousal, is 
                                                
3 See Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Article 3.   
 
4 Saeed Rahnema and Haideh Moghissi “Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of ‘Democracy’ in Iran,” Iran 
Chamber, 2001, accessed 25 July 2011, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/clerical_oligarchy_democracy_iran.php. 
 
5 Zohreh T. Sullivan explains: “Gradually, as evidenced by the writings of Khomeini and Motahari, all 
differences withered into a single truth: the only acceptable woman in the Islamic state was the Muslim 
woman who was the ‘pillar of family,’ and who abided by all the laws laid down in the shari’a, who would 
accept the misogynist gender coding prescribed for her by the new government’s version of Islam.” See 
Zohreh T. Sullivan, “Eluding the Feminist, Overthrowing the Modern? Transformations in Twentieth-
Century Iran,” in Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East, p. 233.  
 
6 See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions:  Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press,  1999; Camron Michael Amin, “Selling and Saving ‘Mother Iran’: Gender and 





taboo-laden, and therefore must be appropriately managed, controlled, hidden, and in 
certain cases reformed. 
This dissertation is engaged with the fundamental question: how are bodily 
technologies constructed discursively and socially in Iran, and in particular, what values 
and perspectives are built into them, serving to dictate what kinds of realities, lifestyles, 
and desires are both permissible and accessible?7 By “bodily technology,” I mean in its 
broadest sense the physical and conceptual modes of regulation enacted to discipline 
and/or control the physical, emotional, and sexual expressions of men and women. 
According to Gill Valentine, bodily technology is "the solution to the problem of the 
deviant body.”8 In Social Geographies: Space and Society, Valentine explains that the 
purpose of a bodily technology, such as physical and sensory aids (he uses the examples 
of a hearing aid and wheelchair), is to help “‘disabled’ individuals… categorized as 
socially inferior and a ‘problem’ for society.”9  
That a bodily technology holds the power to improve a “deviant body” resonates 
with the reasons , provided by Iran’s clerical authority, why certain policy measures are 
enlisted to control and reform social relations and sexuality in the Islamic Republic.  As 
the case of the disfigured mannequins attests, representations of the female body, 
according to Iran’s morality police, provoke an uncontrollable sexuality in the 
                                                
7 The inspiration for this question comes from a similar question posed by technological theorist Thomas 
Jenkins in an unpublished paper on the usage of technological devices and interventions onto the body.  See 
Thomas Jenkins, “Emotional Prostheses: Bodily Technologies for Emotional Expression,” 
ThomasJenkins.net, 2008, accessed September 9, 2011, 
http://www.thomasjenkins.net/prostheses/EmotionalProstheses.pdf.    
 
8 Gill Valentine, Social Geographies: Space and Society (Essex:  Pearson Education Ltd., 2001), 
p. 45. 
 




heterosexual male gaze and body. Even a woman’s hair is viewed as a catalyst for 
arousal, for it is symbolic of female sexuality and hence must be appropriately managed, 
controlled, hidden, and in certain cases, reformed.10  
What are the exact disciplinary methods employed to control societal and sexual 
“deviance”? How do these regulatory modes impact particular social groups who are 
associated with “problematic” or “deviant” behavior in society? For example, are there 
any connections and similarities discernible in how social policy and regulations impact 
prostitutes, temporary wives, and HIV-positive women—women who are heavily 
stigmatized and face discrimination— along with the mutilation of dress window 
mannequins? Moreover, do bodily technologies change form and purpose, depending on 
shifts in objective, target audience, and political agenda? Lastly, in state and religious 
discourses on female sexuality, how is a woman’s body constructed as the site and source 
of sexual deviance?   
As Elizabeth Bernstein and Laurie Schaffner have pointed out,  “Sexuality is 
regulated —governed, directed, and made more uniform— through the rule of law as 
well as through media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), educators, and others 
engaged in the ‘helping professions.’ Sexuality is also regulated by diffuse state policies 
seemingly unrelated to questions of gender and erotic intimacy.”  The regulation of 
sexuality in the contemporary Iranian context, in many respects, exemplifies this 
statement. However, what is unique to Iran is how these regulatory modes are 
constructed, implemented, rejected, and remodeled during moments of social, political, 
                                                
10 Ashraf Zahedi, “Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian Regimes,” Journal of 




and economic crises throughout Iran’s modern history, from the rule of Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi (1941-1979) to the present-day Islamic Republic. 
This dissertation concentrates on the regulation of sexuality in five unique sites: a 
popular women’s journal, a red-light district, temporary marriage, iconic public statues, 
and a HIV-AIDS advocacy organization in Tehran. In each site, bodily technologies 
employed to prohibit, modify, and/or regulate sexuality are identified, contextualized, and 
placed in juxtaposition to each other.  Each site represents one aspect of the politics of 
intimacy, illustrating the distinct ways that the Iranian state facilitates the sexual and 
social control of men and women.11  
In this dissertation, I argue that even despite the change in regimes, from Pahlavi 
dynasty to clerical-led Islamic Republic, there are shifts and continuities in the modes of 
regulation. This is especially evident during periods of transition, whether from a 
monarchy to an Islamic government or in the course of a decade of post-war 
reconstruction and economic liberalization after an eight-year war with Iraq. In most of 
these sites, the body is one of the ways through which sexuality is regulated; in others, 
sexuality is disciplined through the spatial cleansing of brothel sites and, after 1979, in 
the official promotion of temporary marriages to assist in controlling the rise of 
prostitution. Moreover, I establish that through the processes of sexualization and 
desexualization, modification and erasure, and denial and acceptance, sexuality is 
regulated not only through the disciplining of women and their bodies, but also through 
the dispersing and internalizing of positive ideals about health, family, marriage, and 
pleasure for the Iranian citizen and the general body politic.   
                                                
11 Elizabeth Bernstein and Laurie Schaffner, eds. Regulating Sex:  The Politics of Intimacy and Identity 




Review of Scholarship: Mapping the Theoretical and Ethnographic Fields 
In Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity, Bernstein and Schaffner 
advise: “In order to understand the regulation of sexuality, we must situate it within its 
broad political context, exploring the mutual constitution of public and private, family 
and nation, and sexual and social life.”12 Bernstein and Schaffner’s assessment speaks to 
the necessity of identifying factors that, despite their apparent opposition to each another, 
are equally consequential in impacting social policies and social tensions emerging from 
debates around sexuality.13  
Because this dissertation topic is located temporally in contemporary Iran, I have 
consulted the extensive body of literature focusing on the aftermath of the 1979 
Revolution, which is indeed vast and substantive. Ervand Abrahamian, Hamid Dabashi, 
Asef Bayat, Ali Ansari, Nikki Keddie, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Said Amir Arjomand, Minoo 
Moallem, Afsaneh Najmabadi, and Parvin Paidar have each produced pioneering 
analyses on the Islamic Republic’s main political and social actors, its economic 
structure, and institutional changes taking place immediately after the Revolution.14 Most 
                                                
12 Bernstein and Schaffner, p. xiii. 
13 Ibid., p. xiii. 
  
14 See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); 
Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997); Kashani-Sabet  (2011); Ali Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad:  The Politics of Confrontation 
(Abingdon:  Routledge, 2007) and Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: 
Chatham House, 2006); Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) and The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1988); Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran (1997);  Nikki 
Keddie and Yann Richard, Modern Iran:  Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The 
  
8 
of these studies, however, privilege the role of politics and the economy over the inner 
dynamics and experiences of the social domain. Furthermore, they rely primarily on 
textual and visual sources, such as government documents and photographs, respectively. 
Although these scholars have applied various levels of analysis, rarely have they studied 
sexuality in terms of the disciplinary methods applied to regulate and modify social 
relations. They neither factor ideals of health and modesty nor consider spatial constructs 
into their analyses of the legal and political transformations taking place during the post-
revolutionary period.15 Moreover, this body of literature is typically divided between pre- 
and post-Revolution; there are few authors who trace the ruptures and connections 
between these periods, comparing these movements by increments of decades.16  
One of the prime issues addressed by scholars writing on “the women question” 
in the Islamic Republic is the infringement and modification of women’s civil and 
political rights after Ayatollah Khomeini and his legion of supporters came to power in 
1979.17 Janet Afary, Valentine Moghadam, Minoo Moallem, Hamideh Sedghi, and 
Afsaneh Najmabadi individually discuss different aspects of the state’s social and 
                                                                                                                                            
Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 2006) 
and Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: New Press, 2008).  
 
15 See Arjomand (1988, 2009); Dabashi (2006); Mir-Hosseini (1999). 
 
16 As a side note, in the following paragraphs, I speak about Kamran Talattof’s research, which I believe 
does focus on tracing shifts in sexuality discourse from the 1970s until present day. Moreover, I highlight 
the works of scholars Paidar and Misagh Parsa. Paidar studies the historical development of the role and 
place of women in Iranian society since 1900 until the first ten years since the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic. Parsa concentrates on the social causes of the Iranian Revolution, looking at the major 
participants, such as merchants, artisans, workers, the clergy and secular organizations, in the revolutionary 
conflicts until the formation of a theocracy in 1981. See Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian 
Revolution. New Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 1989.  
 
17 See Minoo Moallem, Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the 
Politics of Patriarchy in Iran (Berkeley: University of California, 2005); Valentine Moghadam, 
Modernizing Women:  Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., 2003); Haleh Esfandiari, Reconstructed Lives: Women & Iran’s Islamic Revolution (Baltimore: Johns 




political intolerance, highlighting gender discriminatory passages in Iran’s civil and 
criminal codes, as well as in Shi’a doctrine and jurisprudence.18 Afary, Moghadam, and 
Moallem have written extensively on the usurpation of women’s rights in the face of 
government restrictions, such as compulsory hejab and sex segregation in the public 
sphere.19  
The subject of sexuality is a recent scholarly enterprise within Middle Eastern 
studies and Iranian studies. Within the field of Middle Eastern studies, there is landmark 
research on the study of gender and sexualities in conversation with scholars working on 
Euro-American lesbian/gay/queer studies.20 Although these interventions were penned 
within the past five years, they have contributed significantly to challenging 
universalizing treatments of sexuality, situating the discourse within larger colonial and 
imperialist contexts. Kathryn Babayan, Joseph Massad, and Afsaneh Najmabadi have 
initiated a crucial dialogue on the different genealogies of sexuality, questioning 
                                                
18 See Afary (2009); Moallem (2005); Moghadam, (2003); Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: 
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of the best analyses on these topics from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence and civil and penal laws.  
See Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989); Ziba 
Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (Princeton: Princeton 





theoretical and epistemic assumptions about the knowledge and knowledge production of 
sexuality for peoples of the Middle East.21 Babayan and Najmabadi’s Islamicate 
Sexualities: Translations across Temporal Geographies is a pioneering anthology on “a 
new field of historical knowledge and site of knowledge production—that of Islamic 
sexuality studies.”22 Attempting to broaden gender and sexualities studies to include 
Islamicate sexuality studies, the anthology marks the launching of a conceptual 
movement away from the dichotomous, Foucauldian conceptualization of the discourses 
of desire —between the western scientia sexualis and the Eastern ars erotica.23 By 
interrogating these taxonomies and highlighting moments of entwinement and mutual 
complicity between these discourses (which the authors describe as “kindred histories of 
power relations),24 Islamicate Sexualities offers alternative models for studying 
Islamicate sexuality by “crossing paths” between Middle Eastern studies and sexuality 
studies, employing sources from medieval literature, history, psychoanalysis, 
comparitivisms, and translation.25 Likewise, Massad’s intervention, Desiring Arabs, 
examines Orientalist scholarship on Islamic and Arabic homosexuality, asserting that the 
notion of sexual identity was a function of modernity. Massad critiques Euro-American 
attempts to universalize the term “sexuality,” arguing that the term is itself an 
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epistemological and ontological category. And, it is a product of specific social 
formations and histories of the Euro-American cultural and political experience, which 
traveled to the Middle East by way of European colonialism.26  
Most scholarship on gender and sexuality in modern Iran highlights the significance 
of hygiene, nationalist symbols, and religious beliefs, which were pervasive in the late 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, during the formative years of the 
modern, Iranian nation-state.27 For example, Najmabadi’s Women with Mustaches, Men 
without Beards is a study of the centrality of gender and sexuality, exploring the shaping 
of Iranian modernist culture and nationalist discourses from the late nineteenth century, 
fostering an anxiety-ridden, heteronormalized patriarchal order.28  Similarly, Sexual 
Politics in Modern Iran, written by historian Janet Afary, is a historical survey of two 
hundred years of diverse sexual practices from the Qajar period to the first term (2005-
2009) of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Analyzing European traveler 
accounts, print media, contemporary women’s magazines, literature, and oral testimony, 
Afary chronicles the evolution of the discourse of sexuality, maintaining that the 
construction of heterosexuality in Iran was greatly impacted by modernizing, political, 
and social interventions taking place domestically and influenced by western notions of 
sexuality.  She explains that in the late nineteenth century, a notion of “normative 
                                                
26 See Massad (2007). 
 
27 See Najmabadi (2005), Mir-Hosseini (1999, 2000), Moallem (2005), and Kashani-Sabet (2011). 
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sexuality” occluded homoerotic practices in Iran, leading to new sexual norms and 
practices.29 
The literature on the construction of sexuality discourse in the Islamic Republic is 
in its nascent stages, consisting of a handful of works on the following subjects: shifts in 
the sexual norms of Iran’s urban populations; the success and failures of popular, modern 
artists before and after the Revolution; and permanent and temporary marriage practices 
during the Republic’s formative years. Kamran Talattof has studied developments within 
the discourse of sexuality in Iran by tracing the histories of non-elite and popular cultural 
actors prior to and after the Revolution.  In Modernity, Sexuality and Ideology in Iran: 
The Life and Legacy of Popular Iranian Female Artists, Talattof contends that since the 
Revolution, the process of modernity was hindered by the silencing and stigmatizing of 
an open, intellectual discourse on sex, sexual health, and sexuality in the Islamic 
Republic. He maintains that official discourses of liberals and reformists, among others, 
excluded a modern view of sexuality, leading to dichotomous notions of sexuality 
between the mind and body.30 
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Although these scholarly works on gender and sexuality in Iran are 
groundbreaking, their methodology is based on analyzing textual material, such as print 
media, photographs, and official documents. Perhaps their distinction in the field is 
based, in part, on the fact that there is a dearth of sociological literature on the subject.  
For a research area that is often passed over is sexuality as a site of empirical 
investigation. The reasons for this neglect are both political and logistical, as concrete, 
reliable, and extensive qualitative research studies have been hard to come by.31 This 
research would require conducting fieldwork in Iran, and thus extant literature on gender 
and sexuality must enter an interdisciplinary dialogue with this sociological and 
ethnographic material. 
There are indeed exceptions to this predicament.  Haeri’s Law of Desire is a 
pioneering anthropological study on temporary marriage arrangements (in Arabic, mut’a) 
discussed in Twelver Shi’a ideology and experienced by Iranian women.32 Interviewing 
women and high-ranking ayatollahs in Qom, Haeri discusses the legal and experiential 
understandings of mut’a  (in Persian, sigheh) to understand how sexuality is constructed 
in religious and public discourses. Shi’a ulama, in maintaining that mut’a is intended for 
sexual pleasure (unlike permanent marriage, which is intended for procreation), justify its 
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practice based on a masculine understanding of what female sexuality ought to be, “not in 
and of itself, but always in relation to male sexuality.”33 Although published in 1989, this 
work is still the authoritative text on mut’a in practice, and by extension, on the discourse 
of sexuality from the perspective of Shi’a legal and ideological paradigms.34   
Since the publishing of  Law of Desire, there have been a few, albeit vital, 
contributions from anthropologists and sociologists based in Europe and the United 
States who study gender and sexuality and integrate fieldwork into their research. They 
have researched indigenous women’s movements, women’s participation and resistance 
during the Iran-Iraq war, and social customs and rituals in urban spaces. In this group, I 
underscore the works of Shahla Haeri, Roxanne Varzi, Shirin Saedi, and Pardis 
Mahdavi.35 In the past three years, academic debates have stirred over Mahdavi’s 
controversial claims regarding the sexual practices of a subculture of upper-middle class 
Tehrani youth, whose customs and attitudes according to her demonstrate the existence of 
a burgeoning “sexual or sociocultural revolution.”36  
For recent and important sociological research in Persian, which pertains to the 
discourse of the body and sexuality in Iranian society, we have thus far relied on a 
handful of social scientists based in Iran, namely Soheila Shashahani, Shirin Ahmad-Nia, 
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and Fatemeh Sadeghi.37 (Their research methodology, thesis objectives, and research 
findings are often scrutinized —for the purposes of being accepted for publication— by 
officials within Iran’s Ministry of Education and Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance.) There are, additionally, many researchers in the public health sector who have 
written extensively on prisoner populations, drug addiction, and sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs) in Iran for the purposes of acquiring statistical data and analysis.38  
Notably Fatemeh Sadeghi39 has explored the discourse of sexuality by examining 
shifts in sexuality discourse of young, urban Iranian women.40 Although observing 
changes in their private and public lives, Sadeghi attests that these changes do not testify 
to radical breaks in social conventions of the past. She has however observed the Islamist 
state’s politicization of sexuality in the second decade of the Islamic Republic, noting, 
“The Islamist project [in Iran] has been also inclined to homogenize and discipline 
sexuality on the basis of what is legitimate and illegitimate in the Sharia.”41 According to 
Sadeghi, the morality police’s scrutiny of heterosocial relations has replaced the 
guardianship duties of traditional families in this domain.42 Consequently, relations have 
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become privatized, moving courtship from public spaces to homes and cars, for example. 
This shift into private spaces has resulted in younger generations participating in a 
“precocious sexuality.”43 
Looming large within this work are writings on space, power, sexuality, 
prostitution, stigma, and gender that, individually and in conversation with each other, 
have helped theoretically ground this topic—on the bodily technologies for regulating 
sexuality— within a global matrix of ideas, persuasions, identities, and desires. One 
cannot consider the regulation of sexuality without taking into account how flows of 
capital, labor, technology, information, drugs, and culture impact the implementation and 
efficacy of certain policies. By examining the construction and strategic application of 
old, new, and recycled modes of regulation, I observe how each mode is engaged within a 
matrix of forces where modernity, consumerism, prostitution, and religious doctrine meet 
and often clash. As a case-in-point, consider Iran’s policy on prostitution. Even though in 
1979 prostitution was banned, its criminalization has neither halted the rise in prostitution 
nor has it prevented the trafficking of women and children in urban areas and across 
Iran’s borders. Iranian women, for reasons of economic stability and/or because they 
were forced, are reported to be working as prostitutes in neighboring, oil-rich Gulf states, 
while women from Afghanistan and Pakistan, are brought to Iran for similar reasons, 
including escaping war and political upheavals in their own countries.44 In this example, 
economic woes, regional conflicts, exploitation, and covert drug and sex trafficking 
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circuits have thwarted anti-trafficking legislation and initiatives. Officially, however, 
government officials downplay or even deny the problem even though there has been a 
push among certain clerics to bring prostitution into quasi-legitimate status within an 
Islamic legal paradigm. 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the discourse of prostitution has been traditionally 
and uniquely couched in Shi’a ideological frames of reference. At the same time, the role 
and figure of the prostitute has featured in Iran’s nationalist rhetoric on reform, hygiene, 
maternity, citizenship, and health throughout the last century. For the Pahlavi state, the 
regulation of prostitution involved policing prostitutes’ behavior and not their clients. 
Many prostitutes were quarantined in red-light districts under both police protection and 
Ministry of Health supervision as preventive measures to curb the spread of STDs. Two 
days before Ayatollah Khomeini’s return from exile on February 1, 1979, Tehran’s red-
light districts were set ablaze; by month’s end, provisional revolutionary courts outlawed 
prostitution and ordered the demolishing of brothel sites. Even still, as mentioned above, 
prostitution continues to be a pressing domestic and international issue for the Iranian 
government and clerical leadership.  
In many countries around the globe, prostitution is an extremely controversial 
subject, stirring many debates on sexual exploitation and appropriate government 
response —specifically, whether or not to condemn or rehabilitate prostitutes.45 In India, 
many NGO advocacy groups have pushed for the legalization of prostitution to 
circumvent the spread of AIDS and other STDs and to eliminate the role of middle men. 
In the Netherlands, prostitution is accorded legal sanction in an effort to curb the 
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exploitation of sex-workers; policies towards prostitution have been traditionally guided 
by a “positive, tolerant and open attitude regarding sexuality,” says Ine 
Vanwesenbeeck.46 In Mexico, prostitution, which is an urban phenomenon, is tolerated 
and unregulated. As understood by Rosario Esteinou, this is the case because prostitutes 
are viewed as necessary and useful to society, for they provide “a sexual outlet for lustful 
men, thus protected decent daughters and wives.”47 
According to Belinda Carpenter, “for western feminists, prostitution seems to 
engender some of the most difficult, and yet central issues of feminism.”48 There are 
many levels of tension, regarding the victimization of prostitutes or their empowerment.49 
There are also debates focusing on the elements of choice, economic stability, geography, 
culture, deviant behavior, promiscuity, pleasure, among many others, in determining the 
negative or positive analyses of prostitution and sex work, and the people involved in it.  
By investigating and tracing the shifts, gaps, and continuities in regulatory 
policies on prostitution, one discerns the salient tensions preoccupying state, clerical and 
popular discourses on sexuality. One demonstrable tension is a demarcation of normative 
from abnormal human behavior, impacting both the Shi’a ideological and popular 
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conceptualizations of sexuality and the men and women involved in prostitution—who 
enter by choice or by force.50Are prostitution and other forms of sex work considered 
deviant work?  Is there a conceptual space for such practices to be conducted and 
accepted?  What positive ideals are emphasized to ensure that men and women embrace 
regulatory policies on their sexuality, health, and social relations, subsequently 
internalizing these ideals?  Moreover, how do women perceive, experience, and confront 
these bodily technologies and its impact— especially in cases when they encounter 
additional discrimination and stigmatization because of government regulation? 
 
Interventions and Methodology 
As both a contribution to and an intervention in the study of gender and sexuality 
within the discipline of Iranian studies, this dissertation traces how sites and modes of 
regulation mutate into each other, breaking form to join with other disciplinary methods 
to condition a similar kind of isolation, concealment, and stigmatization. At the same 
time, this dissertation engages with the sites of exclusion —both physical and 
conceptual— where certain women, such as prostitutes and women living with HIV, are 
forced to remain in crisis and face societal ambivalence and stigmatization.  
This dissertation project necessitated that I consult a diverse collection of primary 
and secondary sources. Moreover, in order to ground my analysis of the material, I 
conducted sociological fieldwork in Tehran over a five-year time period, between 2006-
2011.  Before expounding the interview methodology for this project, I will first explain 
the sources I examine. For the project, I analyze magazine articles, photographs, and 
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official portraits published since the mid-1960s, when Iran underwent modernization 
reforms under the second Pahlavi regime (1941-1979).   I also analyze official and 
government-funded reports, including Ministry of Health documents on prostitution 
living conditions from 1969. I survey pamphlets on the subjects of breastfeeding, STDs, 
and human sexuality.   In addition, I review the Islamic Republic’s policies on modesty, 
clothing, and veiling, as well as scour articles and images in women’s journals and 
fashion magazines that were popular in the past forty years (e.g., Zan-e Rouz and 
Ettela’at Banevan). I also review  ministry and media programs on women’s health, 
sexual education, and HIV/AIDS. Finally, I examine the speeches and writings of 
religious officials —some of whom have held or presently hold leadership positions in 
government— to supplement the extant literature on policies of compulsory hejab and 
“Islamic modesty,” as well as the writings on the subject of human sexuality from high-
ranking Shi’a ulama.   
The ethnographic section of this dissertation includes four in-depth interviews 
with Iranian women, who offered their opinions about individual bodily perceptions and 
even provided interesting commentary about their daily experiences, relationships 
histories, and health practices. I include this valuable ethnographic material not only 
because it provides useful information on diverse interpretations of sexuality and sexual 
practices, but also because it illustrates the very complex construction of and experiences 
with social custom, identity, personhood, and power in contemporary Iran. Indeed, I was 
awed by the magnitude of their accounts and the diversity of viewpoints I encountered.  
The immediacy and potency of these individual accounts, which expressed personal 
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navigations around the Islamic Republic’s “red lines,” were invaluable in my attempts to, 
as Marnia Lazreg states, “explode the constraining power of categories.”51 
The selection of interview participants was based on their interest, comfort, 
availability, safety, and willingness to answer my questionnaire. To find willing 
participants, I relied on word-of-mouth, private and professional contacts, and the 
snowball effect, whereby previous interviewees suggested to me other women who would 
like to be interviewed for this study. Before commencing this project, I was certain that I 
knew enough female participants to approach for an initial interview, as I had many 
contacts in Tehran and have lived and worked, intermittently, in Iran since 2003.  
Most of these interviews were conducted in Tehran —save three interviews in the 
neighboring suburb of Kharaj. Each interview took about thirty to forty-five minutes to 
complete, as discussion often segued into tangential topics. Interviews were conducted in 
private homes and offices. I interviewed Persian-speaking women whose ages ranged 
from eighteen to eighty-five. I spoke with women from across the socioeconomic and 
religious spectrum —from high-society housewives to women who travel three hours to 
clean their homes; from the very pious to the nonreligious. I interviewed secretaries, 
physicians, office workers, researchers, lawyers, accountants, nurses, social workers, 
students, and professors. I spoke with clothing shop managers in Haft-e Tir Square about 
the government and morality police’s policies on mannequins. I discussed HIV-related 
issues with social workers, researchers, and medical professionals. In total, I interviewed 
81 women about body perception and breastfeeding experiences, touching on issues of 
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sexuality, marital relations, modesty, and health. Of the 100 persons I originally sought to 
interview, ten were men. 
Throughout the interview process and thereafter, I considered and respected the 
participants’ individual sensitivities to their reputation, honor, family, social status, and 
political affiliation. I vowed to not disclose any personal information and anecdotes that 
would jeopardize their safety and/or make them feel discomfort. I took every possible 
step to safeguard the women’s identities and answers. For those interviewees who 
granted me permission to record our conversations, after the interviews, I quickly 
transcribed them and erased the encrypted files.  I also altered their names in the 
transcriptions.  
For the majority of participants, I asked them the same twenty-two questions in a 
semi-structured interview format.52 The questions were printed in a questionnaire, which 
I handed out to each participant before each interview. The question set provided me with 
an open framework to consult as I followed topical trajectories in our conversations. 
These questions covered topics of motherhood, health awareness, and breastfeeding 
practices. In certain cases, I was not permitted to ask specific questions due to security 
and personal reasons —which I discuss in depth in the relevant chapter. (During the 
interviews, I avoided political subjects related to the regime and the domestic economic 
crisis.) For each female participant, I asked, for example, “What is your opinion of your 
body?” or “In your opinion, what do you imagine or feel about the male or female body?”  
As a way to both clarify and focus the interviews, I asked women specific 
questions about their breastfeeding experiences, asking them to comment on their 
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perceptions of their breasts. I also inquired about their personal health maintenance, a 
topic that compelled some of them to recall stories on intimate encounters and to explain 
their feelings towards their spouses.  I found that the concept and topic of breasts served 
as a common denominator for the majority of women, generating stories of intimacy, 
sensuality, pain, marital relations, motherhood, and childhood memories.  It elicited a 
variety of anecdotes, many of which revealed a woman’s particular understanding of her 
self-worth, personal relationships, and desires. Plus, it served as a good conversation 
starter for, as I mentioned earlier, mannequins’ breasts were being sawed off and then 
displayed in window shops throughout the city. 
At this point, it is useful to expound the chapter divisions of this dissertation.  
 
Synopsis of Chapter Divisions 
In Staging a Revolution, Hamid Dabashi and Peter Chelkowski suggest that the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 was  “in full semiotic control of the representation of 
itself.”53 According to images produced by active organs of the opposition, a new 
political reality had taken shape. Pictures began to “talk” of dissent, of people’s 
mobilization against the Pahlavi regime. Chapter One, “Breasts, Hands, and Faces:  
Gazing at Iran’s Mediascape,” discusses the methods of  “semiotic control” that originate 
in the mid-1960s, encouraging Iranian women to become modern citizens. This chapter 
traces how Iranian women and their bodies are represented through the processes of first, 
modernization and second, Islamization.  This chapter analyzes a selection of recurrent 
and illuminating drawings and advertising images from Zan-e Rouz, a women’s weekly 
                                                




magazine published from the late Pahlavi era (1966-1979) until the present day.  Zan-e 
Rouz was once the popular soapbox of the Pahlavi royalty, advertising consumerism and 
modern lifestyles until 1979-1980, when it was re-launched as a lifestyle magazine 
catering to Muslim women supportive of the Islamic government.  
Through the comparison of different images of women photographed in various 
domestic and public settings in both versions of the magazine, what becomes evident is 
the continuity in the modes of regulation. In each version, the advertising of specific body 
types and lifestyles are fundamental to the reform of Iranian women, be she a citizen of 
Pahlavi Iran or of the Islamic Republic. Each attempt to culturally transform women into 
boundary-making objects of the Iranian nation —be she a westernized, modern woman or 
a veiled, pious daughter of the Islamic Revolution— was based on the expectation that 
women would be naturally receptive to reform. Female sexuality occupies a pivotal role 
in both of these characterizations. Either through the process of sexualization or de-
sexualization, a woman is instructed how to behave, act, and relate to others. Chapter One 
identifies how this method of cultural reform was also a form of regulation —one that 
was re-codified by government officials and media institutions in the Islamic Republic to 
promote the values of modesty, family, and piety to Iranian women. 
The next two chapters move the reader to a two-part exploration of the discourse 
of prostitution in Iran, analyzing the role of the prostitute in satiating male sexual desires 
from the Pahlavi period to the present-day Islamic Republic. Chapter Two “Red-lights in 
Parks:  A Social History of Park-e Razi” investigates the inner dynamics and spatial 
transformations of a red-light district in southern Tehran, which was once a societal 
landmark called the “citadel” of Shahr-e No. During the Pahlavi years (1925-1979), it 
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operated quite openly as a government-regulated brothel district. In 1979, it was 
demolished and later developed into a large family park, Park-e Razi. Before its 
transformation, government health reports and interviews with patrons and social workers 
familiar with this space verified the vibrant activities inside Shahr-e No. When the area 
was under threat of fire, a popular Shi’a cleric even came to its defense, insisting that 
prostitution played a necessary role in society— similar to that of a toilet in a house. This 
comment is prescient in that it intimated what would necessarily transpire following the 
sex district’s destruction and despite the site’s cosmetic conversion.  Prostitution is still 
an ongoing problem, according to government and park officials and patrons of Park-e 
Razi, where transactions for paid sex are arranged on the park’s premises.  
Chapter Two explores the social history of this site, when it was once a century-
old red-light district. Key figures in Shahr-e No’s history, such as brothel madams and 
high-level clerics and politicians, are highlighted, along with the shifting inequalities and 
interactions of this space.  Special attention is paid to the network of gender and labor 
relations, in the historical setting of Iran’s development into a modern nation-state, ruled 
by Pahlavi monarchs.  The movement from brothel district to park is treated not as a 
moment of rupture, but one of transition, whereby the practices and conduct of that site 
remain the same, despite its reconstruction into a different form. By outlining the social 
and historical processes of this space, the reader arrives at the entrance of a much larger 
debate over the role of prostitution and the expectation of female sexuality. These issues 
are engaged in the following chapter and are accompanied by a discussion on the social 
realities of prostitution and temporary sexual arrangements in contemporary Iran. 
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Chapter Three, “Post-revolutionary ‘Prostitution’ and its Discontents” returns to 
the site of Shah-re No and begins with the criminalization of prostitution in 1979. Despite 
being banned, prostitution appears to have increased under the policies of the Islamic 
government. This is attributed, in part, to several shifts in the official position towards 
prostitution in moments of economic crisis and in the midst of postwar rehabilitation. It is 
also due, in large part, to the patriarchal, heteronormative assumptions held by Shi’a 
ulama about male sexuality. During the first two decades of the Islamic Republic, to 
solve the problem of high unemployment, a rise in the number of unmarried veterans, and 
the anxiety of unbridled sexual activity among the youth, government officials began 
suggesting that Iranians enter sigheh arrangements (temporary marriage in Shi’a Islam). 
Sigheh is interpreted legally to be a morally acceptable means to satisfy men’s sexual 
appetite. The ulama justify this practice on the basis of human nature, which they explain 
is a man’s uncontrollable sex drive that should be contained so as to prevent social 
disorder.54 By publicly endorsing sigheh, officials proposed a religious framework to 
control prostitution —meaning that prostitution and prostitutes are accommodated into 
the framework of Islamic marriage. This unique method of regulation contrasts how 
prostitution was controlled during the Pahlavi era, when districts like Shahr-e No were 
supervised by the Ministry of Health and guarded by the police. From criminalization to 
regulation, the change in policy enables the “sites” of prostitution to mutate and thus be 
absorbed by other spaces and paradigms. Subsequently the concept of sigheh expands in 
definition from a temporary contract between a man and an unmarried woman for the 
purposes of satisfying sexual urges, to a temporary contract between a client and a 
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prostitute. Many critics have interpreted this expansion in definition and usage of sigheh 
as a religious justification for the practice of prostitution.  
 The penultimate Chapter Four, entitled “Naked Modesty and the Reformation of 
Statues in Post-revolutionary Iran,” explores the regulatory methods of erasure and 
modification through the handling of artistic representations of women under the Islamic 
Republic. Hard-line supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini have deemed statues depicting the 
human body (which were erected in major squares and in front of municipal buildings) as 
immodest and contrary to Iran’s revolutionary, Islamic norms and principle. 
Subsequently, many of these objects were subject to reform or destruction in accordance 
with new policies on modesty and hejab. The removal and/or modification of statues 
depicting women illustrate the great lengths to reconfigure public space as a sexually-
regulated and modest setting. As concrete examples, this chapter highlights the 
modification of select public monuments, landmarks, artworks, and mannequins in 
Tehran. These cases illustrate not only the precarious process of reform, but also how 
public space is re-designed to express and reinforce positive “Islamic revolutionary 
values” in the face of growing domestic opposition and the pressure of global forces, 
such as the Internet and consumerism. 
  The fifth and final chapter, “HIV/AIDS and the Problem of ‘Taboos’ Talking,” is 
the last site of inquiry for this dissertation project, exploring the experiential side of 
bodily technologies from the perspectives of Iranian women living with HIV. Qualitative 
studies, opinion pieces, and government reports testify that this particular health 
diagnosis is regarded as a social taboo; as such, HIV-positive women encounter major 
stigmatization. Many choose not to disclose their health status for fear of losing their 
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jobs, families, friends, and medical care.  For many HIV-positive women and their 
children, there are enumerable impediments that retard efforts to provide and improve 
medical care and treatment.  In Iran, public health efforts to meliorate the living 
conditions and health care of HIV-positive women are in a nascent stage. This 
predicament means that those who carry the virus face a particularly unique dilemma: 
how to break down a social taboo when one is generally perceived to be the physical 
manifestation and carrier of that taboo.  
Chapter Five is divided into two parts.  The first section is a historical overview of 
HIV/AIDS discourse in Iran, situated at the intersection of state, religious, and public 
domains.  The second part is the ethnographic section, wherein I include interviews, 
commentaries, and analyses from fieldwork conducted in 2010 and 2011. Among the 
many women I interviewed, I spoke at length with several women living with HIV, all of 
whom were members of a HIV-positive support group for mothers and widows based in 
Tehran. Their reflections on their bodies, life experiences, health status, social circles, 
families, sexuality, and medical care illustrate individual negotiations of a stigmatized 
health status while overcoming and maintaining the usual pressures, joys, challenges, and 
interests of almost any woman living in Iran. 
Indeed, the scope of practices, methods, and technologies used to regulate and 
experience sexuality in contemporary Iran are manifold and diverse, conflictive and 
collaborative, and seldom reflective of the state’s ideological imperative of an “Islamic 
sexual morality.” This dissertation is an intervention in the current debates on the 
discourse of sexuality in modern Iran, examining specific regulatory methods —their 
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design, implementation, target audiences, continuities and shifts in content and usage, 
and social histories behind these disciplinary technologies since the mid-1960s. 
In discussing the bodily technologies for regulating sexuality, one sees the 
extensive network of government “red lines” being formed and tested. In this process of 
inclusion and exclusion, those objects and persons considered deviant, taboo, immodest, 
and obscene are constantly being reformulated, readjusted, and redefined.4 The state’s 
tendency, via its public policy and morality campaigns, has designated the human body 
(and its representations) as something shameful.  The isolation of certain body parts as 
taboo, in particular those belonging to women, has undoubtedly led to three outcomes: 
certain bodies go into hiding; they become absent; or they resort to a kind of mutilation. 
In the forced excavation of immorality, indecency, and immodesty that had allegedly 
plagued the pre-revolutionary body/place dynamic, women’s bodies became the overt 
expression by which an Islamist state would commence its disinfection or paksazi or 
cleansing process. This means that moral jurisdiction of the state designates which bodies 
are clean, pious, favorable, and worth memorializing. This also means that whatever 
potency the state possesses can be administered through vast manipulations and erasures 
of the public (social) memory, the public (social) body and the private (physical) body. 
Thus “bodies,” in their many states of representation, compliance, and resistance, can be 
physically and publicly forgotten through legal and extra-legal policies, structures, 












In the theater of Iran’s rapid modernization program, known as the White 
Revolution, almost anything was subject to reform.35 Reforming the state’s economic and 
agricultural infrastructure to the shape of a woman’s body, modernization was achievable 
for both the profane and spiritual. Figure 1 is a perfect example: even the holy month for 
fasting is updated. Accompanying the article, “Fasting: The Best Regime for Achieving 
Health and Balance of the Body,” it featured in weekly magazine Zan-e Rouz’s (Today’s 
Woman) Ramadan special edition, commemorating the Muslim holy month. Does this 
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pairing of a beauty regimen with fasting, one of Islam’s pillars of faith, provoke social 
and political tensions among readers —especially during the 1970s in Iran? From the 
article’s tone and content, it appears that the presentation of fasting as a method of dieting 
is a common association —and one openly discussed. “Fasting,” the author quips, “is the 
best medicine for one’s struggling with weight gain.”36 Written in a first-person narrative, 
the article's opening sentence reads, “Man dokhtar-e chaghi hastam” (I am a fat girl).  
Following this proclamation, the author informs the reader about fasting rituals across the 
globe.37 
In the accompanying article, fasting is stripped of most of its ritual and spiritual 
tones and rendered a dieting fad that accommodates the desires of a modern, Iranian 
woman.  For the author’s primary assumption is that she is a weight-conscious believer, 
and as such, dieting during Ramadan is a useful method and opportune moment to slim 
her burgeoning waistline. For when she fasts, her body physically would improve. The 
author claims that pimples vanish; the pounds melt off. The skin begins to take on a dewy 
appearance, potentially shaving five to ten years off the dieter.39 Indeed, by practicing 
self-restraint, she will learn to eat less and can achieve ta’adol jesmi (physical or bodily 
balance) —the union between her spirit and body. In this way, fasting is articulated as a 
modern dilemma summed up in this question: what are the physical benefits to fasting 
during Ramadan? A desirable body.  
 Thus Figure 1 illustrates this predicament: a woman’s struggle in choosing 
between sweet indulgence and spiritual obligations and rituals. Yet how this message is 
conveyed is through the author’s engagement with certain tropes and stereotypes about 
femininity, body image, female sexuality, and piety, as practiced by women.  These are 
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disciplinary tactics, encouraging the female reader to reform her physical body for a dual 
objective: desirability and religious observance.  
Upon closer inspection of the drawing itself, these themes become more obvious.  
Notice the suggestive position in which the female subject—presumably the main 
character from the article— sits; her body is half covered in what appears to be a prayer 
chador.38 Lush, pinkish hues are contrasted by the dark and light shadows, a visual effect 
which accentuates her physical shape underneath the cloth. Though the woman’s body is 
not fully visible, its contours are. The viewer’s gaze focuses in on her perfectly round 
breasts; they pop out of her v-neck blouse, held in place by a green garnet nestled 
between them. Hovering behind her is a portrait of a bearded guru, ostensibly in 
meditative pose. He sits in the center, above her, as an ideal guide for her spiritual self. 
She is also flanked on both sides by two different vices. Edible desires linger in the 
background to her left; to her right, there is an open room to serenity, illustrated by 
snowcapped mountains perching over valleys. In this scene, the projection of edible 
desires is mixed into a sexually suggestive piety.  
Indeed, the overall depiction of this woman implies that beneath any Muslim-
Iranian woman’s chador is the voluptuous body of a believer.  More so, her 
representation as being simultaneously open, sexually suggestive, desirous, and 
religiously observant does not appear to be problematic —given the subject and target 
audience, offensive to pious Muslim women. But fast forward to the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution; magazine images of this sort are banned, let alone tolerated. In their stead is 
an iconography of Iranian women as veiled Muslim women who are regarded as 
  
33 
“authentic.” 55 Within two years after the Revolution, women are pictured wearing loose 
overcoats, trousers, and veils, exposing just their hands, feet, and faces. Photographs and 
other visual media herald the success of the Revolution, commonly featuring the 
following visual motifs: wives in domestic settings; grieving mothers of veterans; and 
militant women marching in demonstrations, clad in chadors, “with their hands held high 
in exhortation.”40  
This revolutionary period in Iran’s modern history is analyzed as a watershed 
moment animating drastic political, economic, and social changes. It is often defined as a 
time of great historical ruptures, exemplified by the return from exile of charismatic 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), who upon his return to Iran took the helm of 
a popular movement against the inaccessible, pro-Western dictator Muhammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi.56 Once revolutionaries secured control of state institutions and commenced 
the project of institutionalizing Khomeini’s doctrinal concept of veyalat-e faqih 
(Guardianship of the Jurists), some scholars have regarded this period as a breakaway 
point from Iran’s modern course —from the progressive, liberal initiatives of the Pahlavi 
state to the radicalism and fundamentalism of an Islamist government run by high-
ranking Shi’a ulama.57   
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The same dramatic script documenting epistemic shifts is cast onto the narrative 
of Iranian women’s status after the Revolution, especially with regard to their civil and 
political rights. Analysts contend that compulsory hejab (Islamic head covering), enacted 
gradually within three years after the Revolution, set in motion the curbing of women’s 
rights and the disciplining of their femininity and sexuality, to the chagrin and protest of 
many.58 During anti-Shah demonstrations, the Islamic hejab became an important symbol 
of resistance to the imported “culture” and a symbol of rejection of Pahlavi values.59  
Ayatollah Khomeini had designs to reform Iran into an Islamic Twelver Shi’a society 
with a theocratic government. In this Islamic republic, compulsory veiling was reasoned 
as a beneficial method of protection for women. For Khomeini insisted, “As for women, 
Islam has never been against their freedom.  It is, to the contrary, opposed to the idea of a 
woman-as-object and it gives her back her dignity.”60 Women were thus encouraged to 
dress modestly if they sought to be respected, honored, and no longer subjected to the 
objectification they experienced under the Pahlavis.61  
After the successful elimination of political opponents among the anti-Shah 
opposition movement, Ayatollah Khomeini and his hard-line supporters sought to 
consolidate their power even further through what Paidar refers to as a “rapid 
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Islamization” — a strategy intended to “strengthen the Islamic features of society whilst 
the clergy was in leadership position and popular, and to delegitimize pre-revolutionary 
secular concepts.”62 Since 1981, when the Islamic Republic adopted a constitution 
intended to foster an “Islamic society,63 one whose rules were enforced to comply with 
religious law, certain aspects of social life came under direct supervision of the state.64 
Arzoo Osanloo writes, “One of the effects of the Revolution was the reinvigoration of 
Islam in political and social life.”65 The process of excising Iran from its predecessor 
involved a massive campaign of revolutionary, cultural adjustment —ostensibly starting 
from scratch— by a Khomeini-appointed, cultural revolutionary council which began 
strategizing how to execute this plan. This extra-judicial organ of the state, known as the 
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (Shora-ye Aali’ye Enqelab-e Farhangi), 
began shaping the nation’s politics and cultural policies. A priority on this agenda was 
the creation of an “Islamic social infrastructure” to ensure the “continuation of the 
Revolution at home and abroad.”66 A key objective of this committee was to guide 
Iranians on how to become better Muslim citizens; to achieve this, new norms of 
sociability, translated as modesty in dress, speaking, and lifestyle, were made transparent 
to the Iranian public.  State policies began to reflect the notion that “women were the 
markers of the boundaries of the Islamic community and the makers of Islamic 
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identity.”67 An ideal, Islamic image of womanhood emerged from this discourse, 
modeled on the lives of iconic women in early Islam, such as Fatimeh al-Zahra (daughter 
of the Prophet Muhammad), and representing Iranian women as pious, modest, and self-
sacrificing mothers and wives.68 Parvin Paidar notes, “Women were constantly reminded 
by Islamic leaders of their duty to society and the Revolution and warned against taking 
their motherhood role lightly.”69 
In order to carry out this policy, several disciplinary techniques were employed by 
state authorities in order to transform Iranian society. For example, the criminalization of 
gender relations and the regulation of sexuality via ordinances of sex segregation and 
compulsory hejab became two facile, albeit contentious, methods by which to implement 
the Islamic Republic’s ideological imperative of an  “Islamic sexual morality.” Moreover, 
the parameters of male and female relations were outlined in accordance to religious and 
Shi’a legal commentaries on family, marriage, sexuality, and kinship. Notably, one 
month after his return from exile, in March 1979, Khomeini issued a series of decrees, 
one of which encouraged and later obliged women to behave and dress in ways that were 
consonant with the Islamic Republic and its values of faith, piety, revolution, and 
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In the spirit of Hamid Dabashi and Peter Chelkowski, who delve into the rich 
iconography of the Iranian Revolution in Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, I too follow the visual images and symbols of this historic 
period. My research however navigates different territory: tracing the pictorial 
representation of Iranian women fifteen years prior to the Iranian Revolution into the 
transitional years of the Islamic Republic through the editorial and visual transformations 
of a popular, Iranian women’s magazine, Zan-e Rouz. The question pervading this 
chapter is, did the 1979 Revolution mark the cessation or continuation of certain bodily 
technologies for regulating women—their sexuality, in particular—as a method of both 
reform and discipline? 
In this first chapter, I have chosen a selection of typical and illuminating images 
from the late Pahlavi era (1966-1979) and the current regime of the Islamic Republic. 
Some of the images are informational, propagandist, comedic, consumerist, and pop 
cultural in nature. In this study, I contend that what was arguably a transformative 
moment in the conceptualization and re-imagination of the Iranian female citizen —from 
the alleged consumerist, sexualized specimen of Western deviance of the Pahlavi years to 
a post-revolutionary de-sexualized, pious, genderless yet maternal woman— was, in fact, 
not so transformative.  How women’s sexuality and femininity came to be regulated and 
desired in the policies and visual imagery of the Islamic Republic bore striking 
similarities to how they came to be reformed, disciplined, and conceptualized during the 
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Pahlavi years.  Identifying both unique and similar modes of regulation to corroborate 
this “un-transformative trajectory,” so to speak, is this chapter’s purpose. 
In emphasizing this non-transformative process, I discuss the state enterprise of 
transforming women and their bodies into malleable, consuming objects that require 
radical change —whether by a “westernized” public culture during the Pahlavi regime or 
by Islamist ideology in the Islamic Republic. In this chapter, I document how this notion 
commenced well before 1979 and manifest, as a disciplinary technology, through the 
shaping and re-shaping of women’s desires, interests, and femininity during the Pahlavi 
era.  
Alongside modernization reforms initiated by Mohammed Reza Shah in the 1960s 
came the flourishing of a revolutionary and forceful visual culture. Through the 
development of the celluloid and advertising industry in Iran and the proliferation of 
color-magazines targeted to female audiences, Iranian women were given visual proof of 
the sheer possibilities of being and looking modern. Yet pivotal to women’s acceptance 
of modernization was their education in its style and content: from fashionable hairstyles 
and appropriate hand gestures while smoking to household chores and perfection of 
marital responsibilities, women were instructed how to “better” themselves through their 
caricatures and articles that appeared in Zan-e Rouz. By these means, the state succeeded 
in imposing a species of disciplining women’s bodies through their reform. 
After the Revolution, the same notion —that women would be immediately 
receptive to reform by both public culture and ideology— was circulating despite 
remonstrations to their implementation.71 As Iran’s newly drafted constitution spoke of 
                                                




“drawing inspiration from the revolutionary and fertile teachings of Islam…to [raise] the 
level of ideological awareness and revolutionary consciousness of the Muslim people,” 
great steps were taken to introduce and institutionalize Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of 
Islamic government to the Iranian public, of whom a large percentage were unaware as to 
how this would manifest as state policies.72 What resulted, in part, was the formulation 
and implementation of ordinances and public statements on model citizenship that 
reflected what were loosely defined “Islamic values.”  Through the state’s emphasis of 
modesty, sex segregation, appropriate attire in public space, and the sanctified family 
unit, state policy had a direct and fundamental impact on the lives and lifestyles of many 
Iranian women.73  
Looking to primary visual sources on the representation of women in a popular 
women’s magazine published between 1966 and 1986, I sought evidence of the 
transformations and subtle shifts in the above-mentioned “revolutionary consciousness”-
raising of the Iranian people. In both periods, many of the images I analyze convey a 
unitary conceptualization of women as abstracted, sexualized, consumerist, and desirous. 
In fact, under both regimes, women are depicted as identifiable personality types ready 
for legal, educational, consumerist, and cultural reforms. In many instances, women were 
encouraged to accept the novel shaping of their bodies and the overhauling of their 
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interests and identifies as prerequisites to their entrance into a “better life.” This 
undertaking was initiated, defined, and refined through collaborative efforts of state 
institutions, with varied assistance from editorial boards of major magazines, to 
communicate the message of progress, reform, and ideology for a wide audience.  One 
such magazine that contributed to this enterprise in both the Pahlavi era and transitional 
years after the establishment of the Islamic Republic was the influential women’s 
magazine Zan-e Rouz.  
 
A Brief History of Zan-e Rouz 
The year 1966 marked Zan-e Rouz’s inaugural year of publication, when the 
weekly entered the panoply of print publications targeting female audiences and 
showcasing Iran’s modern course.74 The founding of Zan-e Rouz was closely tied to the 
auspicious growth of Kayhan (The Universe), an evening paper, which later became a 
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publishing magnate and institute within a span of thirty years.75 Both Kayhan and Zan-e 
Rouz were the brainchildren of academic Mostafa Mesbahzadeh, a Sorbonne-trained 
jurisprudence scholar and former senator under Mohammad Reza Shah. 76 Mesbahzadeh 
dreamt of turning Iran into a news-making, journalistic tour de force by broadening 
Kayhan’s general audience and training Iranian journalists in European institutions.77 In 
obituaries published following his death in 2006, former colleagues described how 
Mesbahzadeh had the French-language newspaper, Le Monde, in mind when creating 
Kayhan.78 Reporting on world news in lieu of just domestic affairs,79 Kayhan began to 
expand in a manner that reflected Iran’s growing independence from British and Russian 
interference (in the nineteenth century, both powers divided Iran into spheres of influence 
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in order to consolidate the position of Iran as a buffer zone between their competing 
interests.)80 Mesbahzadeh sought to cultivate an Iranian newspaper milieu in which 
Iranian publishers and journalists were no longer under pressure from pro-British and 
Soviet forces, which at the time were subsidizing the distribution and publication of many 
of Iran’s dailies.81 Kayhan distinctly reported on events important to Iran’s ruling 
constitutional monarchy, which simultaneously led to favorable advertisement for the 
Pahlavi regime.82  
In the midst of the publishing industry’s domestic expansion, Kayhan evolved 
into a semi-autonomous publishing company, known as the Kayhan Institute. After the 
success of Kayhan, the Institute subsequently launched a range of magazines that targeted 
different generations and genders of audiences, in Iran and abroad.83 The English-
language newspaper Kayhan International, created and based in London, was followed 
by Kayhan Varzeshi (Sport), Kayhan Farhangi (Cultural), and Kayhan Bacheha 
(Children).84 Zan-e Rouz was the last to be launched, focusing on a seemingly under-
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81 See Haleh Esfandiari, My Prison, My Home: One Woman’s Story of Captivity in Iran (New York: 
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represented audience within the general readership of Kayhan: Iranian women.85 (This 
business venture into magazines for female audiences proved fruitful. By 1979, the 
average circulation of Zan-e Rouz had reached 250,000 while newspaper Kayhan was 
reported at one million.86) 
As the benevolent, guiding brother-figure to its lesser-known sister Zan-e Rouz, 
Kayhan Institute offered a ripe gestational space in which the women’s magazine would 
generate itself and find purpose. However, after its unveiling, the editorial direction Zan-
e Rouz pursued was circuitous.  As the next section demonstrates, the editorial board 
behind Zan-e Rouz first identified itself as a journalistic space dedicated to improving 
Iranian women’s social and political status. Yet, within a few issues, the magazine 
content began to underscore fashion and popular culture, alongside advertisements of 
different household commodities and beauty regimens. This quick transition is deliberate 
in the context of a reform-minded Pahlavi leadership.  For Iran in the mid-twentieth 
century is developing itself into a modern, capitalist society, moving away from its 
agrarian roots and into urban development and economic restructuring via the White 
Revolution. Images of commodities representing modern Iran —gleaming kitchen 
appliances, perfumes, makeup, and fashionable European clothes, for instance— are a 
central aspect of commodity culture; they help construct cultural ideas about modern 
lifestyle, self-improvement, glamour, and how things “should be.”87 Hence in order to 
cultivate the concept of a “modern Iranian women,” the enterprise of modernization 
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necessarily entailed the reforming of men’s and women’s desires and interests —in this 
case, using advertising images and magazine content to construct transformative cultural 
ideas about a modern woman’s manner and style of dress, or her social habits. As a 
popular magazine under the direct guidance and sponsorship of the Pahlavi state, Zan-e 
Rouz is more than a women’s journal. As these next few sections will illustrate, it is both 
an instrument by which to construct a consumer society, and by which to designate and 
regulate a novel kind of femininity and sexuality consistent with Pahlavi Iran’s paradigm 
of modernity. 
Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker note, “Well into the twentieth century, 
modernization was widely viewed as a uniquely Western process that non-Western 
societies could follow only in so far as they abandoned their traditional cultures and 
assimilated technologically and morally ‘superior’ Western ways.”88 The Pahlavi regime 
“promoted a pseudo-modernist orientation that equated Westernization with 
modernization, and which increased technological, economic, political and cultural 
dependence upon the West.”89 According to the modernization paradigm in which the 
Pahlavi-era project of reform operated, women had to “become” westernized in order to 
be more socially desirable and acceptable.  The process would necessitate their bodies’ 
submission to particular codes of conduct and styles of dress as an expression of the ideal 
and modern Iranian women.  
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Through state-funded apparatuses (such as radio, television, and publishing), 90 
which promoted an upper-class lifestyle, the Pahlavi shahs’ new aspirations for a modern, 
informed Iranian populace seemed achievable —given the state-administered facilitation 
of “the new mood of a consumption-oriented environment.”91 With the aid of advertising 
images and print and broadcast media, the Pahlavi regime sought to emphasize raising 
Iranians’ “social knowledge” to enhance the public’s reception of its modernization 
policies.92  To do so would involve an overt collaboration among government, 
consumerist, and corporate interests.93 Investing in the publishing industry, for example, 
meant that the Pahlavi government would not only become a substantial source of 
revenue for magazines, but it would also dictate the limit and scope of their editorial 
content.94 Underlining this union of forces was the threat of financial doom, which bore 
consequences for news editors and influenced magazine content and editorial direction. 
                                                
90 Kayhan, October 4, 1958.  Quote in Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, Small Media Big 
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But first came a hiatus in the strong state, which allowed an opposition to develop.” Ibid., p 79. 
 
91 Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution, p. 63. 
 
92 Ibid.  The shah’s emphasis of improving “social knowledge” was first published in Kayhan, October 4, 
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Haleh Esfandiari recalls this very tension in her memoirs. Reflecting on her tenure as a 
journalist at Kayhan, she writes, “The government was a source of advertising revenue, 
and it set policies that could affect everything from Kayhan’s ability to purchase 
newsprint abroad to Mesbahzadeh’s considerable land holdings.  Increasingly the shah 
and the government showed less tolerance for even the mildest criticism, and the grip on 
the media of the emboldened Information Ministry grew tighter.”95  
 
Emancipating Women through Shahbanu’s Image 
By the mid-1960s the Pahlavi family had initiated both extensive reforms and a 
countrywide campaign promoting their imperial heritage as successors to dynastic 
conquerors of Asia Minor from the 6th century BCE.96 Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
and his third, childbearing wife Farah Pahlavi —“Shahbanu” (meaning “Empress,” a 
Sassanid title), as she was called by the moniker-loving Iranian press— co-opted the 
majestic narrative of Cyrus the Great, acclaimed hero of the Achaemenid Empire, to 
promote this royal lineage to the Iranian public.97 Abrahamian writes, “[The Shah] 
declared that Iran was at the gates of the Great Civilization; its future would be more 
glorious than its past – including the Achaemenid, Sassanid, and Parthian empires; its 
standard of living would soon surpass that of Europe; it would produce a way of life 
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superior to both capitalism and communism; and indeed within a generation it would be 
the world’s fifth most powerful country – after the USA, Soviet Union, Japan, and 
China.”98 The metonymic association of the modern Pahlavis with ancient Persian kings 
and their beloved queens, despite the passage of more than a dozen centuries, was recast 
into a contemporary fantasy of a modern, westernized, and Persian king and queen. 
Ancient grandeur became contemporized for a female audience through the iconic figure 
and presentation of Empress Farah, whose daily schedule became news fodder and thus a 
matter of public concern.  
In her tenure as queen, there are many images portraying Farah Pahlavi as loving 
wife, mother, charity worker, and leader. Unlike her husband, who was often 
photographed in military regalia, she is pictured wearing modern fashions popular among 
the elite classes.  “The Queen represented the ideal stereotype of the emancipated Iranian 
woman,” the late historian Parvin Paidar comments, “and, as such, had everything that 
the Shah desired in a woman. As a woman she was beautiful, feminine and elegant; as a 
wife she was loyal, subservient and caring; as a mother she was devoted and 
conscientious.  She believed that her prime responsibility in life was looking after her 
husband and children but her role as the Queen required her to take an interest in extra-
familial affairs.  She left the serious business of the state in the hands of her husband and 
took up ‘feminine’ pursuits such as a social welfare, education, art and culture.”99  
Women’s magazines like Zan-e Rouz projected her ideational force onto a mass 
audience. The capture of an intimate moment with Farah Pahlavi inside the palace walls 
shortened the distance between the monarch and her people. In the pages of this 
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publication, both the state and editorial board communicated to its target audience the 
characteristics of a modern lifestyle, calling attention to Western fashions, motherhood 
roles, and household responsibilities. Yet, the articulation of modern life was wrapped in 
women’s citizenship duties to the nation-state. Since the Constitutional Revolution 
(1905-1911), a new formation of the model Iranian citizen was being constructed and 
subsequently promoted among the country’s diverse population of Azeris, Baluchs, 
Persians, Kurds, and many others.100  In a modernized Iran, tribal and spousal affiliations 
would be secondary and tertiary identity markers; instead, women would owe their 
progress and allegiance to a larger institution, the Iranian state. As I demonstrate in this 
section, the emancipation of women was attributed to state feminism during the White 
Revolution; yet, the groundwork for improving women’s status was achieved through 
advertising a different way of dress and behavior, which was believed to help women 
transition from traditional to modern ways of living.  
In its first greeting addressing Zan-e Rouz’s readers, the weekly’s editorial board 
praised “Her Majesty the Royal Highness Pahlavi” for inspiring its efforts to elevate 
women’s status:  
In this present era when Iranian women face great purpose, with abundance of 
freedom and equality, they should now  endeavor to elevate themselves, their own 
status, and personal sense of what they should provide for their country.  
Her Royal Highness Farah Pahlavi is hopeful that this journal, Zan-e Rouz, would 
guide and advise Iranian women to reach their goals. We hope to try, using as 
much power as we have in this path, to make ourselves proud and honored before 
the society of Iranian women.  Her Excellency Shahbanu (Farah Pahlavi) is our 
greatest supporter in this endeavor.101 
 
                                                
100 See Camron Michael Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Women: Gender, State Policy and 
Popular Culture, 1865-1946 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002). 
 
101  Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1 (1344/1966) “Introduction.”  
  
49 
When this statement is analyzed within its historical and political contexts, there are 
many messages being communicated about women’s status in modern Iran. In addition to 
the obvious textual messages, there are a number of subtextual messages. First, women 
are greeted as a collective entity; second, their aspirations are treated as communal, and 
they are referred to as a “society.” Third, Zan-e Rouz’s royal ties, especially the queen’s 
approval of their mission statement, are a determining factor in Zan-e Rouz’s success as a 
popular publication. From this brief introduction, it is clear the weekly acknowledges its 
semi-autonomous status. Explicit is its praise of the freedoms bestowed upon Iran’s 
women, assumedly granted by the monarchial state; absent is any mention of real 
criticism directed at the Pahlavis. Upon closer inspection, this introductory greeting is 
also a written pledge in support of Iran’s modernization efforts.  Evidently, Iranian 
women are not sufficient as they are; with the assistance of this weekly and the queen, 
they must also strive to improve their status. Moreover, as the above greeting infers, 
Iranian women need Zan-e Rouz without whose editorial guidance they would 
conceivably be led astray from their objectives of national service and socioeconomic 
development.  
Becoming modern would also involve cultivating a consumer breeding ground on 
which both Pahlavi reforms and consumer marketing campaigns could meet a wider 
Iranian audience. Along with the expansion in radio and television programs and sales, 
publishing in general and women’s magazines in particular were apt forums to advertise 
Iran’s integration of global capital. The language of this integration, however, was in the 




Framing the Queen from Different Angles  
In the pre-revolutionary issues of Zan-e Rouz, Farah Pahlavi is presented as a 
fashionable and glamorous Iranian woman. As a publication geared toward women, Zan-
e Rouz gives access to the pomp and circumstance as well as behind-the-scenes coverage 
of the life of the Pahlavi monarch.  Several issues of the magazine are dedicated to the 
queen’s interaction with the public; in one particular photo spread, the queen is 
photographed meeting with chador-wearing provincial women —her designer outfit 
contrasting their regional dress. An empress “of the people,” she embodies a majestic, yet 
approachable persona, and thus through her symbolic figure, the Pahlavi state initiates 
reforms of Iranian women via her image. 
Consider the photographs from Figures 2a and 2b —both taken circa 1966.  
Figure 2a is a photograph of the inaugural cover page of Zan-e Rouz. The same scene is 
replicated in Figure 2b, yet was shot from another angle and was not published in the 
magazine. Without any contextual information, the identities of these three subjects are 
not apparent. For an older generation of Iranians, their identities would be easily 
recognized. They are in fact former Empress Farah Pahlavi and her young children, 
Farahnaz and Ali Reza. Absent from this family photograph is a male presence —
meaning there is no father or male spouse in the scene’s foreground or background. The 
omission of Muhammad Reza Shah from this portrait reinforces that the central focus of 
this photograph are the queen and her children. How they are seated, what they are doing, 
and how they are presented offer an intimate peek not only into royal life but also into 
how to live as a modern, Iranian family. As the first cover page of Zan-e Rouz, it is a 
provocative illustration projecting the image of perfect domesticity with the Queen 
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Mother. The image is also an anomaly, for subsequent cover pages feature a variety of 
models, singers, and cultural icons.  
 
Figure 2a and Figure 2b 
Through the photographer’s lens, the viewer observes what appears to be a 
precious moment between the queen Mother and her youngest children. Curiosity 
encapsulates this scene, evidently set in a family salon or library. While tucked into each 
other’s arms, daughter Farahnaz is photographed sucking her thumb, leaning on her 
mother’s lap while her brother Ali Reza, dressed in a light blue V-neck sweater, sits next 
to her. The bouffant-haired queen is seated, crossing her bare legs. She holds a book in 
her lap and appears to be guiding her children through a story. Both children peer into the 
book’s contents as if this is an occasion marking a habitual activity between parent and 
child. In this moment, the observer learns something important about this particular 
family —of intimate details of their lifestyle, their familial habits, their interests, and the 
projection of their modernity. 
Positioned next to each other, both images reveal subtle and marked differences in 
tone, effect, and narrative structure. In Figure 2b, the viewer’s central focus is the three 
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individuals because the photograph is shot at a side-angle; as a result of this positioning, 
the scene feels more intimate. Additionally, there is more contrast in the black-and-white 
image; their faces are brighter and the background is darker, creating a heightened, 
dramatic effect.  Because the image is both visually stark and a medium shot, the main 
characters in this scene are in full frame.  The viewer’s interest is narrowed, and the shot 
provides more details about the Pahlavis’ facial expressions and gestures.  
In both photographs, the queen appears equally engrossed in reading, yet in 
Figure 2b, she is depicted pointing to something on the book’s page.  In both images, she 
wraps her children in her arms, and they seem mutually transfixed, undisturbed by the 
fact that reading time is being photographed. Figure 2a is a mid-shot of the family, 
enabling the viewer to perceive more details of the subjects’ surroundings. Unlike the 
dimmed background lighting of Figure 2b —which prevents more details of the setting 
from being seen— Figure 2a appears to have an equally lit foreground and 
background.102 Note the decorative accoutrements enhanced by the color hues:  a wooden 
entertainment center is staffed with books, handicrafts, and vases. To the right of the 
figures, a fuller view of the TV screen gleams in the background; to the left, several 
books align the shelves, tilted ever so slightly as if to signal their daily usage and 
haphazard placement. There is also a sense of balance between foreground and 
background; the subjects and the setting occupy roughly equal areas in the frame.  
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In Photography: A Middle-Brow Art, Pierre Bourdieu analyses the social practice 
of taking pictures among the French social classes.103 He charts the development of 
photography as a cultural pastime, observing how photography became a structured 
cultural activity promoting social norms and codes of conduct among the bourgeoisie. 
Focusing on case studies, he analyzed the way people are positioned in photographs; he 
argues that their positioning illustrates prestige, nostalgia, and class-consciousness. 
Bourdieu explains, “The photograph itself is usually nothing but the group’s image of its 
own integration.”104 He explains that a photographic image is not an objective illustration 
of a group of people at a particular event; it has a didactic and instructional purpose: to 
project an image of social cohesion through a produced collective memory of an event.  
  In this analysis of Zan-e Rouz’s photographs and advertising images, I integrate 
Bourdieu’s discussion of the staging of characters in photographs to configure how 
pictures of the queen with her children help cultivate an image of Pahlavi upper-class life 
and promote to the public its consumerism, fashion sense, and embrace of technology. 
For example, observe the household objects that surround the queen and her children, 
which are clearer in Figure 2a.What appear to be decorative accents found in any home 
library or family salon are, in actuality, luxury goods not yet present in a cross-section of 
Iranian households. At the time, “media images began to reflect growing foreignness of 
the physical and social environment, including architecture, clothing, food, social values 
and mores, and the growing social class divisions of consumption and attitudes,” explains 
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Sreberny-Mohammadi. 105 The television, in particular, is a distinguishing feature in this 
scene; its style is appropriate for the era, but its presence would have been a rarity in 
Iranian households.106 Figure 2a can be perceived as an advertisement for the products 
and comforts of modern-day kingship. Unlike advertisements for household appliances 
published in newspapers, these images depict the activities and lifestyle of an upwardly 
mobile royal family. Thus these images carry a unique, ideational force of luxury that, on 
the surface, is intricately modern, consumerist, intimate, active, and tacitly Iranian. 
This image also offers instructional cues for Iranian women on the importance of family 
pastimes in modern Iran. A queen reading to her children is turned into a special event, 
worthy of a front-page feature. This very image becomes a visual souvenir for mass 
consumption.107 As such, the Iranian public peers into her life, observing the idyllic 
setting of her household. They witness her family pastime, conducted in an orderly, 
peaceful, and refined setting.  
 
Surveying Zan-e Rouz’s Images: Advertising Lifestyles 
After surveying all pre-revolutionary issues of Zan-e Rouz published before 1979, 
the first issue is noticeably an anomaly.  While the inaugural cover page of Zan-e Rouz 
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extols a quiet, intimate moment of Pahlavi domestic life and motherhood, the second 
issue follows a different course: depicting fashionable Iran through a non-Iranian cover 
model. Dressed in brightly-colored, 1960s Western fashions, a light-skinned, green-eyed 
model appears exuberant and carefree; the image depicts an attachment-free existence.  
After the first issue, gone is the valorization of pristine, family-centered home-life 
intimated the previous week.  
Given the change in aesthetic direction and feature content, Zan-e Rouz’s editorial 
direction suggests it catered to a small niche of Iranian women’s interests. The 
preponderance of articles emphasizing high society life indicates that its true target 
audience was in fact Iran’s upwardly mobile —the small network of urban elite and 
aristocratic families with direct ties to the Pahlavi regime. In editions of the magazine 
from the late 1970s, many of the articles appeal to the interests of this upper class —that, 
or the desire to promote an upper bourgeois life to the general Iranian public.108 In one 
illuminating example, an article describes the societal pressures for Iranian female 
tourists visiting boutiques in London and Paris.109 Iranian tourists are depicted as lavish 
spenders who shop extensively in order to prove, upon their return to Iran, that they could 
afford luxurious travel—much to the envy of their peers. As a solution, the author 
suggests that female tourists cut back on their shopping to enjoy sightseeing on their 
vacations. In no part of the article does the author discuss how infrequent international 
travel and shopping are for the majority of Iranians.  
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Interestingly, there are a few sections of the magazine that stand out for their 
recognition of non-elite Iranian women.110 In a short-lived column111 asking the opinions 
of women inside the country about their career interests, lifestyles, and romantic 
inclinations, nine women are asked sixteen questions about their lifestyle habits and, 
specifically, their hobbies.112 The grainy black and white photographs of each Iranian 
respondent contrast the stylized advertisements of the European and American models 
and actors leaping from the pages. Though some respondents differ in their descriptions 
of their pastimes —some describe dancing, living simply with their parents, or achieving 
academically—  there is little difference in their descriptions of their hobbies. According 
to their answers, these kinds of leisurely activities —shopping, entertaining, and 
beautifying— are ones that the majority of Iranian women share. Thus Zan-e Rouz’s 
content is reflective of this specific audience and its lifestyle preference. 
 
Styling the Body to Achieve Etiquette  
By showcasing ads from German and American beauty products and featuring 
articles on the rising stardoms of actresses Sophia Loren and Elizabeth Taylor, Zan-e 
Rouz positioned itself within in the glitz and glamour of an advertising, celebrity cosmos. 
113 Image and body image awareness are consistently featured in Zan-e Rouz’s pre-
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revolutionary days, and sections on beauty and self-improvement are commonplace.114 In 
the late 1970s, the weekly published numerous articles on the importance of beauty 
maintenance, body language, and etiquette. Feature articles on hairstyle trends, from the 
beehive to the bouffant styles, provide Zan-e Rouz readers with advice on the most 
appropriate occasions to wear them. 115 Likewise, readers are advised on how to better 
maintain their skin, via the application of requisite vitamins and creams, to ensure a 




Other articles promote beauty maintenance and include diagrams of exact body 
measurements of the ideal female form, further reinforcing the objectification of women. 
                                                                                                                                            
113 See Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1 (1344/1966). 
 
114 Ibid., pp. 20-21. In one section in particular, an Austrian hairdresser informs readers how to apply 
makeup on faces that possess short noses, broad chins, chubby faces, to name a few. 
 
115 Articles on beauty regimen included the maintaining the right hairstyles specific to the shape of one’s 
face and changing one’s hair color according to European trends and Vogue magazine fashion advice. See 
Zan-e Rouz, Issue 597 (2535/1977), pp. 12-13. 
 




As demonstrated in Figure 3, a color-coordinated diagram accompanied the article “Chic, 
Beautiful and Cute.” It describes the ideal hand to elbow and waist to buttocks ratios to 
educate women on the most beautiful body composition and forms.117 A similar article 
explores different styling techniques, such as dyeing one’s hair color a lighter shade to 
match the popular European and American styles of the period.118 Additionally, Zan-e 
Rouz integrates advertisements into its articles, showcasing new consumer goods and 
providing readers with commentary on how these products, from household appliances to 
new kinds of makeup, tested in homes. What is newsworthy is translated into what sells. 
Advertisements about bodily improvement—the maintenance of a slim body, as found in 
Figure 4— demonstrate the simple ways to maintain an attractive form through the 
purchase of stylish brassieres and undergarments —items that were imported from 
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Joking about Breasts in Caricatures 
Previously, I mentioned that the target audience of Zan-e Rouz was likely the 
small population of upper class and aristocratic women. There was, however, an 
additional audience fundamental to the Zan-e Rouz’s mission of emancipating women 
through style and consumerism —an audience that could not be pinpointed to any 
demographic of women.  It was the heterosexual, male gaze— which was, un-
coincidentally, both absent and looming in Zan-e Rouz editions from the revolutionary 
period and beyond.   
In pre-1979 issues, the male gaze is not explicitly mentioned in any of the content 
of Zan-e Rouz. Yet, through advertisements on breast and body perfection to joke 
sections on the seduction of men, its presence is heavily felt. In this pre-revolutionary 
period, the figure of a woman is assumed to be a desirable object of this gaze. Although 
Iranian men were not likely included as the target demographic of Zan-e Rouz’s 
readership, pleasing them and understanding what social and beauty norms give them 
pleasure were being communicated through the magazine’s content. Women’s bodies are 
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described as not only receptive to reform, but they also anticipate the male gaze.  Once 
this gaze falls upon their breasts or other bodily parts, the possibilities for sexual arousal 
and activity between a man and woman increase. I argue that Zan-e Rouz editors were 
cognizant of this dynamic and thus conveyed the modernizing of Iranian women as 
inclusive of this prerequisite: that Iranian women exhibit a consistent sexual vulnerability 
and desirability to modern Iranian men.  
In a magazine that aimed to present material consonant with the goals of  “today’s 
women,” especially in their desires to improve their social status, there are numerous 
caricatures of women that promote misogyny by criticizing women’s physical features. In 
the area of jokes, specifically, the force of the male gaze exerts pressures on women to 
maintain certain physiques deemed attractive by men. Zan-e Rouz includes caricatures 
that, on the surface, appear to make light of male-female relations yet simultaneously 
illustrate awkward situations of sexual disappointment between men and women.  In 
many of these caricatures, women’s bodies are the prime target of admiration, shame, 
ridicule, and desire, and yet there is no expressed critique of their objectification by Zan-e 
Rouz’s development-minded editorial board.   
In the following examples, as illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, men’s expectations of 
women’s bodies are the main themes behind male-female interactions. Breast perfection 
—manifest by the appearance of ample breasts— motivates male expectations of the 
perfect, desirable female body and shape. No figure better illustrates this perfection than 
Figure 1.  In fact, Figure 5 is her bosom revealed.  Figure 5, a black-and-white caricature 
printed in 1978, tells a one-scene story about a man’s deflated expectations in the 
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presence of a naked woman. 120 In this scene, a portly, middle-aged man appears 
confused, after entering a bedroom. 
 
Figure 5 
In his mind, he envisions the torso of a buxom, naked woman awaiting his arrival. 
Standing at the doorway, he realizes his illusions contrast what he actually sees.  Before 
him sits a small-breasted woman and her lithe figure; the sight of her deflates his 
expectations of what he imagines her body to be. Though the woman looks eagerly at 
him, the expression on his face conveys two stories:  the first, of disappointment; the 
second, of the insignificance of the woman herself. Even in his imagination, he does not 
envision a full-bodied woman; instead, he expects an ample bosom greeting him in the 
bedroom. 
                                                





This focus on breasts is repeated in a caricature found in another issue’s joke 
section.   In Figure 6, the narrative is illustrated in two scenes, which are in effect a 
before and after shot. The caricature is meant to be comical:  in one scene, a bespectacled 
man, dressed in a tuxedo, smiles admiringly at a buxom female.  Unlike the male’s 
features, the woman’s features are exaggerated in their size and proportion, and her 
cleavage is partially visible. Her face is nose-less; it features only two doe-like eyes and 
provocatively pouted lips. Standing in front of each other, the man appears to listen 
intently, his eyes directed at hers. This intent listening is only strategic. In the adjacent 
scene, the man, holding a horseshoe magnet in his hand, has successfully exposed what 
little her clothing covers in the first scene. The magnet’s force is so strong that the dress’s 
jeweled pendant pushes her gown forward, revealing her breasts. The magnet only makes 
visible what one supposes his gaze has already imagined:  her erect nipples.  
In pre-revolutionary issues of Zan-e Rouz, a woman’s appearance was just as 
important as her behavior. The magazine published numerous articles on etiquette, often 
including instructions on appropriate conduct for social settings where others would 
observe (and likely judge) women’s behaviors. How a woman maneuvers her body, even 
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in the slightest movement of her hands, is material for observation and analysis. For 
instance, when hosting a successful dinner party, a woman should project the image of 
reputable wife and homemaker who excels in the domains of family, cooking, household 
chores, and etiquette.121 
  In another example, long before smoking was considered both a social taboo and 
public health hazard, Zan-e Rouz was advising women on how to decipher the body 
language of a man or woman holding a cigarette. From the positioning of a cigarette in 
one’s hand, it is possible to extend norms of sociability to an Iranian public. This advice 
featured in the article “Chehreh-ye Penhani va Seri-ye Shoma: Az Posht-e Cigar,” as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.122 The author implies that smoking cigarettes expresses a 
glamorous lifestyle, especially when the hand is extended and its silhouette is elongated 
by the presence of a slender white stick.123 Yet if the cigarette were held incorrectly, the 
character of the cigarette owner would be understood and the viewer would have been 
forewarned.124 
                                                
121 Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1 (1344/ 1966). A section on improving homemaking skills featured in Zan-e Rouz’s 
very first issue. 
 
122 “Chehreh-ye Penhani va Seri-ye Shoma: Az Posht-e Cigar,” Zan-e Rouz, Issue 599 (Aban 
2535/November 1976), pp. 18-19. This title roughly translates to “[Getting to Know] Your Hidden and 
Secret Face: From the Back of a Cigarette.”  
 
123 For example, if held in an upright position, this means that the person should be viewed as having a 
nervous character and is weak. In another example, when the cigarette is held in between the pointer finger 
and thumb, this means that the person is considered unreliable. Zan-e Rouz, Issue 559 (Aban 2535/ 
November 1976), p. 18. 
 
124 Iran banned smoking scenes in film and television productions in 2011. Deputy director of the IRIB 
(Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) urged managing directors of TV stations and film directors to 
emphasize the health setbacks of smoking). “IRIB Bans Smoking Scenes in Iranian Productions,” Mehr 






Transitioning into an Islamic Republic 
The association between high-life Tehran and upward mobility led to a grand 
concealment of the truth —of unsightly slums; of surmounting poverty on the peripheries 
of modernized reform; and of a dictatorship that eventually thrust Iran towards 
revolution. By the 1970s, the Pahlavis were the richest entrepreneurial family in Iran.125 
In the midst of an agrarian reform-driven White Revolution, an oil boom brought a gamut 
of changes that drastically adjusted the standard of living for many Iranian families.126 A 
village flight from rural to urban sites ensued.  Tehran was unprepared for the influx of 
                                                
 
125 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 436. The  
Pahlavis had a vast wealth, partly owning two machine-tool factories, two car plants, two brick-
manufacturing companies, three mining firms, three textile mills, and four construction companies.  A 
nephew, Prince Shahram, was a “majority shareholder in eight large companies that specialized in 
construction, insurance, cement, textiles, and transport.” See Abrahamian, p. 437. 
 
126 Ibid., p. 447. 
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migrants and the housing necessary to settle into metropolitan life. As Abrahamian has 
noted, “The sudden fivefold increase in the oil revenues inflated people’s expectations 
and thereby widened the gap between, on one hand, what the regime promised, claimed, 
and achieved, and, on the other hand, what the public expected, obtained, and considered 
feasible.”127 According to Paidar, “[The Pahlavi regime] had always suffered from a 
degree of externality to society...[because it] managed to alienate most sections of society 
as a result of ruling through a combination of authoritarianism, favoritism, and 
patronage.”128 
Critique of the Pahlavi regime also focused, in part, on the growing moral and 
economic degradation of Iran; the modernizing plans of the Pahlavi monarchs were 
argued to have “ingratiated Iran to Western corporations and had imported a western 
mode of life,” writes Shirin Deylami.129 It was claimed that Iranian society had 
subsequently become stricken with a western malaise, or “westoxified” (in Persian, 
gharbzadeh or stricken by Western culture).130 The issues of women’s presence and roles 
in society were particularly contentious for certain intellectuals and prominent religious 
scholars of the revolutionary period. As Valentine Moghadam writes, “The idea that 
                                                
 
127 Ibid., p.  446. 
 
128 Paidar, p. 147. 
 
129 See Shirin Deylami, “In the Face of the Machine:  Westoxifcation, Cultural Globalization, and the 
Making of an Alternative Global Modernity,” Polity 43 (2011): pp. 242-263.  
 
130See Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (Oxford: One World, 
2000), p. 296. Other translations of gharbzadegi are “west-struckeness,” “westitis,” “Occidentosis,” and 
“Euromania.” The term “westoxified” is translated from the Persian adjective gharbzadeh, a descriptive 
term for a person, culture and identity that has become stricken by Western exploitation, consumerism, and 
cultural hegemony.  Although he did not coin the term, the concept was made popular by modernist writer 
and intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad. According to Said Arjomand, Al-e Ahmad borrowed the terminology 
from his mentor, a philosophy professor at the University of Tehran, Sayyid Ahmad Fardid.  See 




women had ‘lost honor’ during the Pahlavi era was a widespread one.”131 The manner 
and style in which women dressed and behaved in public became scrutinized and thus 
identified as a typical characterization of a “westoxified” woman. According to Afsaneh 
Najmabadi, the gharbzadeh woman, in particular, “in its crudest form, she was identified 
with a woman who wore ‘too much’ make-up, ‘too short’ a skirt, ‘too tight’ a pair of 
pants, ‘too-low-cut’ a shirt, who was ‘too loose’ in her relations with men, who laughed 
‘too loudly,’ who smoked in public.”132   
Prominent social, literary, and political writer and critic Jalal Al-e Ahmad (one of 
the few secular intellectuals to be praised by Khomeini133) proposed a cultural alternative 
to this gharbzadeh woman: the concept of a “modern-yet-modest” woman who was 
unlike the “painted dolls of the Pahlavi regime.”134  Al-e Ahmad argued that 
Westoxification had resulted in, according to Shirin Sedigh Deylami, a “libertine culture 
of sexuality without developing a juridical and political role for women.”135 Although he 
died a decade before the Revolution, many of his ideas on gharbzadegi (Westoxification) 
were in harmony with those of the leading Shi’a clergy who became increasingly critical 
of the Shah and Iran’s westernization. Prominent revolutionary ideologues such as 
                                                
131 Valentine Moghadam, “Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women:  Gender Politics in Iran and 
Afghanistan,” in Social Text 22 (Spring 1989): p. 45. 
 
132 Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity and Morality:  Women, State and Ideology in 
Contemporary Iran,” in Women, Islam, and the State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991), pp. 65. 
 
133 Ervand Abrahamian, A Modern History of Iran (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
xvii. 
 
134 Paidar, p.168. Quoted in Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity and Morality:  Women, State and Ideology 
in Contemporary Iran,” in Women, Islam, and the State, pp. 65-66. 
 
135 Shirin Sedigh Deylami, “Strangers Among Us: The Critique of Westoxification in Perso-Islamic 
Political Thought” (PhD  diss., University of Minnesota, 2008), p. 50. 
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Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, for example, called for a modest 
direction and more respectful treatment of Shi’a women.136  
During Reza Shah’s reign, Muslim women’s modesty —equated with their 
wearing the veil— was regarded by the state as a sign of national cultural backwardness. 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic of Iran, however, revered modesty as a marker of 
resistance against the sexual objectification of women.137 Modesty discourse of the 
Islamic Republic was indeed state-imposed, as Shi’a ulama used the language of 
protecting women from being exploited through by leading them to a morally virtuous 
path.138 Within the purview of Shi’a Islamic thought, modesty is considered a quality of 
forbearance that believers should aspire to embody and manifest in their appearance, 
behavior, and reflections. To express modesty does not mean the simple limitation of 
one’s wealth or acquisition of material goods. It also necessarily entails the development 
of social virtues in trusted human institutions, such as the family. In the Qur’an, 
Motahhari argued, Shi’a women’s natural positions were defined by their familial roles, 
as wives and mothers. Assuming these responsibilities would ensure society’s overall 
well-being and help define men’s familial roles, too.139 Outside the family domain, 
                                                
 
136  Although Ayatollah Motahhari (1920-1979) was assassinated in 1979, he is considered the chief 
ideologue of Islamist groups in the revolution. He forged a friendship with Ayatollah Khomeini in the mid-
1940s until his death. Khomeini referred to him as “The fruit of my life” at his funeral. See Dabashi, 
Theology of Discontent, p. 150. In the early 1960s and 1970s he became a prolific writer, penning The 
Structure of Women’s Rights in Islam (1978) and a work for which he is most well known, Causes of 
Attraction to Materialism in 1969, wherein he attacks Iranian secular intellectuals and begins to lodge a 
defense against Marxism.  His writings were widely read during the revolutionary period.  See Hamid 
Dabashi, Theology of Discontent (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), chapter 3. 
 
137 I discuss the Islamic and state discourses of modesty in Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
 
138 See Lila Abu-Lughod, “Modesty Discourses,” in Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures:  Family, 
Law and Politics, ed. Suad Joseph and Afsaneh Najmabadi (Leiden:  Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), p. 496. 




Motahhari argued that the hejab was an “important device created to preserve the 
separation of the sphere of the ‘family’ from ‘civil society’ and it was women’s 
responsibility to preserve it.”140 
After Khomeini’s clerical followers consolidated power, a massive enterprise in 
eradicating traces of the westernized government and its network of secular institutions 
ensued.141  In institutions of the military, government agencies, and mass media, swift 
changes took place virtually overnight. The new Islamist government purged members of 
the ancien regime and began to employ a volunteer corps of revolutionaries who sought 
to radically transform Iranian society into a more just, independent, and Muslim country. 
After the Pahlavi government fell, the calls to strengthen the institution of the family —
and specifically facilitate women’s roles within the domestic sphere— reverberated in the 
halls of state institutions, which were undergoing radical, cultural revolutions of their 
own.142 Certain semi-autonomous companies, like Kayhan Institute (publishers of the 
magazine Zan-e Rouz), though not a direct apparatus of the state, such as the national 
television and oil companies, underwent drastic changes in staff, membership, and 
institutional objectives. On the national level, revolutionary clerics and their supporters 
emphasized the establishment of a mass media that was both informative and expressed 
the ethical values defined by the constitution of the Islamic Republic.143 At the same 
                                                
140  Ibid., p. 177. 
 
141 Arjomand, After Khomeini, pp. 22-23. 
 
142 I explore the topic of public morality in greater detail in Chapter Four.  At this point, I concentrate on 
contextualizing and analyzing the visual representation of a modest Muslim female character in post-
revolutionary Zan-e Rouz editions. 
 
143  For discussion on Khomeini’s suspicions of the international press, see Sreberny and 
Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution, p. 134.  Of Iran’s domestic media, Khomeini wrote, “…I have 
seen a number of them engaged in implementing the evil designs of the right or the left, most unjustly, in 
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time, a national constitution was being drafted, insisting that in an Islamic Republic, 
women would not be treated as  “an object or instrument in the service of promoting 
consumerism and exploitation.” She would, instead, “recover her momentous and 
precious function of motherhood, rearing of ideologically committed human beings,” and 
“[assume] a pioneering social role and becomes the fellow struggler of man in all vital 
areas of life.”144 
While other women’s magazines were closed down (due to diverse reasons, such 
as government pressure or lack of staff and funding), Zan-e Rouz survived after having 
overhauled its editorial board and overall objectives.  The weekly reformed itself in the 
1980s as an Islamic lifestyle magazine, entering the revolutionary enterprise. Editor 
Shahla Ansari took the helm of the journal in 1980, followed by Firuzeh Gol-
Mohammadi and then feminist Shahla Sherkat until 1991. 145 The new editorial board 
initiated a drastically different agenda from its pre-revolutionary past. Iranian human 
rights lawyer Mehrangiz Kar recalls, “The weekly Zan-e Rooz (Today’s Woman), had, 
like a modern woman who had suddenly become pious and weighted down with 
the hejab, transformed.”146 She observes, “It continued to be published, only now its 
                                                                                                                                            
Iran…I hope that they will engage in service to God and the people.” Ruhollah Khomeini, “We Shall 
Confront the World with Our Ideology,” MERIP Reports, no. 88, Iran’s Revolution: The First Year (June 
1980): p. 25.    
 
144“Women in the Constitution,” Preamble, Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, adopted October 24, 
1979, amended July 28, 1989. 
 
145 Shahla Sherkat wrote about her experiences as a journalist and chief-editor for Zan-e Rouz. She says the 
semi-public organization behind Zan-e Rouz terminated her contract for “promoting modernist, 
Westernized and feminist tendencies.” She later became founder and editor-in-chief of influential feminist 
journal Zanan. See Shahla Sherkat, “Telling the Stories of Iranian Women’s Lives,” Nieman Reports, 
Summer 2009, accessed May 4, 2012, http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101473/Telling-the-
Stories-of-Iranian-Womens-Lives.aspx. 
 
146 Mehrangiz Kar, Crossing the Red Line: The Struggle for Human Rights in Iran (Costa Mesa: Blind Owl 
Press, 2007), p. 99. Kar writes that many women’s publications after the revolution were published under 
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cover seemed tired and dark.”147 No longer would magazine articles report on Googoosh 
and beauty pageant contestants. Photographs published in Zan-e Rouz incorporated an 
Islamic coding into its visual topography of women’s bodies. Veiled women were 
photographed at work, in village settings, engaging in handicraft, wearing traditional 
clothing, or in their homes.  They were depicted in stereotypically traditional settings 
deemed more suitable and representative of the lifestyle that a Muslim, Iranian woman in 
the modern Islamic Republic would have. 
In post-revolutionary editions of the Zan-e Rouz, content features the methods in 
which to foster Islamic social virtues, including sections on respecting women and their 
roles as Muslims, wives, and mothers and maintaining chaste and modest relations 
between the sexes. Moreover, the magazine’s advertisements have changed considerably 
in content, design, and look; they no longer include photographs highlighting lingerie, 
American appliances, and fashion trends. Instead, a typical print ad would feature 
wedding attire, sewing classes, daycare, real estate, and potential marriage suitors. Arts 
and crafts sections, such as khayati (sewing), were too expanded. Content-wise, articles 
are focused on novel methods to enhance women’s spiritual health, reporting on topics 
such as “rouh-e zan” (woman’s soul) and establishing a new column entitled “women in 
the family,” to highlight their unique role within this social unit. The number of photo 
spreads and news reports on Islamic attire and clothing typically worn by Iran’s 
indigenous, tribal communities were also increased.  
                                                                                                                                            
the supervision of Qom and Mashad-based seminaries, encouraging the “myth of Fatemeh, which had been 
transformed in the patriarchal minds of men who directed these publications into an order of obedience, 





The new direction for Zan-e Rouz—as a magazine catering to a distinctly Muslim 
female audience— was meant to reinforce the notion that the newly-coined Islamic 
Republic was promoting a nativist, spiritually-inclined and family-oriented version of 
Iranian woman. Moreover, the magazine also showcased certain theological debates, 
discussing Qur’anic exegesis, and publishing feature articles on particular ulama 
interpretations of hejab and women’s rights in Islam.148 Regarding the latter, the 
incorporation of rights discourse from the Qur’an in post-1979 editions of Zan-e Rouz 
offered a popular and literary platform on which to promote the Revolution’s ideological 
tenets, which were enumerated in both its national constitution and in the mission 
statement of its Cultural Revolutionary Council.  This committee, established by the 
Islamic Republic’s ideological founder Ayatollah Khomeini, began setting expectations 
for state media, stipulating that it should reflect and support good morals based on faith 
and also raise public awareness through the proper use of mass media. For these 
reasons, the majority of post-revolutionary Zan-e Rouz’s content highlights Muslim 
women’s piety and family roles.  
 
Ideological Subjects in the Islamic Republic of Iran:  From Bodies to Body Parts 
Ashraf Zahedi has argued, “To revive authentic Islamic beliefs as the foundation 
of a new society, it was necessary to re-educate Muslims, particularly women.”149 The 
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following illustration, printed within one year after the Revolution, best exemplifies 
Zahedi’s point regarding the types of instructional methods and material created to 
instruct and guide women, specifically. Figure 8 is an illustration that accompanied a 
February 1980 article in Zan-e Rouz entitled “Woman, in Three Mirrors” from the 
section, “Knowing the Right Islam in the Domain of Women.” 150  The drawing is meant 
to depict how women operate in different socioeconomic and ideological systems —in 
this case, those of capitalism, communism, and Islam. Moreover, it conveys positive 
values for women representing the Muslim faith —and to some extent, how women 




As understood by reading the article accompanying this drawing, the three female 
figures are not meant to depict women as they appear in human form; in fact, they portray 
                                                




symbolic and generic prototypes. Each figure is a representative member of a distinct 
ideological system that is practiced in different geographic areas. The left-most figure is a 
generic American woman, followed by her Soviet counterpart in the middle, and lastly, a 
woman from a Muslim country. While it is not certain this last country represents Iran 
(for its country flag bears different features), it is clear that the inclusion of Arabic and 
the message it communicates, via the shahada, which is the most important Muslim 
proclamation of faith meaning “There is no God but God,” suggest that this female figure 
is a member of the ommat (the worldwide community of Muslims bound by their 
faith).151 Assuming that each flag corresponds to a particular ideological system or way 
of life, then it is surmised that the American woman heralds from a capitalist system, and 
her Soviet and Muslim counterparts represent the systems of communism and Islamism, 
respectively. 
Viewed in juxtaposition, these figures reveal two underlying assumptions about 
women’s participation in certain ideological systems:  first, that their roles, values, and 
worth can be both limited to and depicted through the use of their requisite body parts; 
second, that women are represented as the boundary-making objects of a state’s 
ideological system and political agenda. In each figure, symbolic body parts are 
blackened to emphasize the values associated with a particular ideology. For the 
American, her values are expressed through the exploitation of her physical appearance, 
which is illustrated in the illustrator’s accentuation of her bodily shape. The article 
supports this claim, referring to American women as easily “usable,” especially in a 
capitalist system that encourages them to project their sexuality into the public domain. 
By comparison, the Soviet prototype and the Iranian/Muslim prototype are more 
                                                
151 The Persian pronunciation of the Arabic term ummah is ommat, also transliterated as ummat.  
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favorably depicted. While the Soviet woman uses her arms, representing her labor power, 
the Muslim figure uses both her intellect and emotions, depicted in the drawing of her 
brain and heart. 
Indeed it is the Muslim female subject who is exemplary among this group. In an 
Islamic system, she is able to exploit her mental and emotional capacities, which 
distinguishes herself from her counterparts. Moreover, standing next to the shahada, she 
is supported by a community of faith that endows her with these specific capabilities and 
values. The inclusion of the Qur’anic injunction of the shahada means that she, too, has 
“Truth” on her side, signifying her obedience to God’s absolute words.152  As such, her 
strengths lie not in her physical appearance, but in the union of her head, heart, and God 
to determine her value and worth. This message is thus conveyed to any Zan-e Rouz 
reader, who becomes engaged in a one-way conversation about the benefits of 
membership in an Islamic society. 
Beyond the primary meaning conveyed by both the illustration and article, there 
are many underlying messages that register a darker reading of this representation of 
women.  Clearly the juxtaposition of female prototypes demonstrates an underlying 
assumption about women’s worth —that its significance is best expressed by its 
association with a particular system or ideology, be it of Western origin or not. Likewise, 
the figure of woman is constrained by the expectations and details of these three prisms, 
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or “mirrors,” as the article’s title suggests.  Hence, women do not represent themselves; 
they represent entire systems. As an example, the Muslim woman is depicted as a 
collective entity and not as an individual. Thus women are presented as having an 
absence of choice, in moving fluidly between each system and more so, to variegate 
which mental and physical capacities they wish to exploit.  
This restrictive articulation of women as possessing a symbolic body presents 
special challenges for Iranian women in particular— especially in post-revolutionary Iran 
when the transformation from a westernized, capitalist-leaning woman of the Pahlavi era 
to an ideal Muslim woman was expected to happen posthaste. In this paradigm, an 
Iranian-Muslim woman does not navigate different ideological structures. Both her 
exclusion from and inclusion into a particular ideological community are dependent on 
how she proves her worth in relation to the ideal character imagined by that Islamist 
system. 
  
Demonstrating Modesty through Caricature 
The process of transforming a woman’s westernized body into a modest  
configuration involved applying several visual and editorial techniques to construct and 
style a prototypic image of a Muslim female subject. Islamist-lifestyle magazines were 
optimal forums to spotlight a new visual reality for the figure of a Muslim woman.  
As a way to signal Zan-e Rouz’s non-exploitative treatment of women, article content 
integrated many of the motifs popular among Iran’s clerical authority: piety, modesty, 
family, and morality, among many others.  Evoking these values would mean modifying 
societal behavior by introducing and, in many cases, emphasizing norms of conduct.  
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For example, early editions of post-revolutionary Zan-e Rouz published several articles 
against makeup usage, discontinuing coverage of beauty products and hairstyle trends. 
Interviews with regime representatives were included in the magazine’s content, which 
can be interpreted as the government’s endorsement.  In one particular article, a Zan-e 
Rouz journalist interviewed a female parliamentarian from the Islamic Council. (In the 
article’s photograph, a quarter of her face is shielded by a chador.) In the interview, she 
connects makeup usage to the pitfalls of American imperialism and consumerism and 
lambastes women in “Third World countries” who wear makeup. She claims their 
emphasis on their physical appearance has made them vulnerable to exploitation by 
consumerist nations, and thus encourages Iranian women to lift themselves up.153 To 
reject the trappings of a consumerist society, women are advised to become 
“unaccustomed” to makeup usage in order to promote their inner spiritual capacities.154 
Another method of communicating Islamic values to Iranian women was achieved 
through standardizing the way they should appear in public. How this manifests in action 
was through modifying women’s bodies in images using various techniques. A favored 
method was streamlining contours of the body. Essentially the process of transforming 
women’s bodies into Islamic versions entailed manipulating with pictorial depictions of 
their figures to prevent any scenario whereby they would be viewed as sexually desirable. 
A woman’s breasts, hips, arms, posterior, and legs were especially scrutinized; according 
to some religious scholars, they are considered awrat, an Islamic term denoting sensitive 
                                                
153 Zan-e Rouz, Issue 851 (1361/1982) pp. 46-48. 
 




or intimate body parts that must be covered in order to prevent sin.155 The areas of a 
woman’s body that are perceived to provoke illicit desire if they should be exposed, they 
are subject to modification as a way to return to a modest form. I discuss the subject of 
awrat in greater detail in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. At this point, I focus on the 
techniques used in print publications to cover a woman’s awrat. 
Of the Zan-e Rouz issues I reviewed, dating from 1980 until 1986, photographs 
(whose original negatives feature European and American models in western attire) are 
extensively doctored. Almost every image (and every female featuring) in the magazine 
has undergone some kind of reconstruction. Awrat areas in particular are usually covered 
by extra clothing, which is often superimposed onto the original image. In many cases, 
veils and trouser legs are added on bar legs, and skirts and sleeves are elongated.  Save 
the feet and hands, arms and legs are no longer exposed, as they are considered naked and 
thus inappropriate for public viewing.  Additionally, print models are given “Islamic” 
makeovers. They wear hejab and have minimal make-up on their faces. The lack of 
accent to their facial features can be read as an attempt to convey a woman’s 
disinclination to beautify herself for the admiration of men, other than her husband.156  
In many images, the natural curves of her body shape, such as the hip and 
posterior areas, appear to be flat or downsized. Certain anatomical features of the body 
                                                
155 The concept of awrat (in the singular ‘awra) appears in the Qur’an to to describe the private parts of 
men and women not to be exposed and the moment during the day when male servants or children could 
not enter homes without permission.  See Chapters Four and Five, for a more detailed description of awrat. 
156 There was no pamphlet or guidebook to demarcate the “look” of a modest iconography of women’s 
bodies on the pages of magazines. The techniques for projecting modesty happened as a process of trial and 
error, which meant that initially, there were no standard representations of the figure of woman in the first 
years after the revolution.  For instance, in 1980 issues of Zan-e Rouz, women are pictured without 
a hejab and are photographed with men, to whom they are unrelated. In issues from 1985 to 1986, women 




are also removed or obscured, such as nipples and navels.157 In cases when no photograph 
exists, simplistic drawings are used to depict female figures or specific body parts. In 
certain instances, when body parts are excised and thus missing from the original figure, 
a cartoon is superimposed onto it. In the next three illustrations, I document each of these 
techniques, starting with the design method used to reduce a woman’s bodily curves. 
Figure 9 demonstrates this very technique.  
Reconvening its columns on health and body maintenance after the 
Revolution, Zan-e Rouz’s editors continued publishing step-by-step exercise regimens to 
promote healthy lifestyles and physiques of its readers. Figure 9, for example, is a 1980 
illustration of a husband and wife team posing in various stretch positions.158 The 
captions accompanying each exercise pose provide narrative snippets about a married 
couple seeking to lose weight. As a solution, the author suggests working out together to 
achieve both marital unity and weight loss.  
The drawing in Figure 9 is an atypical illustration found in the “Varzesh” 
(exercise) section from post-revolutionary editions of Zan-e Rouz. Subsequent 
illustrations found here depict an individual man or woman exercising separately, holding 
different stretch poses; they are no longer portrayed exercising as a couple. In 1985 
editions of the “Varzesh” section, women’s bodies are depicted in outline form and 
                                                
157 Other techniques detected in post-revolutionary issues of Zan-e Rouz involved anatomizing women’s 
bodies; instead of illustrating the body as it appeared from the outside, the body was broken down into 
anatomical parts, using detailed representations of women’s internal organs.  The effect of this 
representation is that the body is treated as an object of science, and it is prevented and disassociated from 
being an object of desire.  In a section dedicated to “Medical Advice,” found adjacent to the section 
“Family Health,” anatomical drawings of a woman’s orbital area and of a male figure’s thyroid gland are 
illustrated.  See Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1041 (16 Farvardin 1365 / April, 1985), pp. 26-27.  
 




illustrated with less detail in the face and body, as shown in Figures 10 through 12.159 A 
year later, in 1986, characters are no longer presented wearing full-bodied leotards as an 
example of exercise attire. Female characters in particular are depicted wearing 
appropriate Islamic dress, such as headscarves, manteau  (long overcoat), and in many 




                                                
159 Figure 10 and 11, see Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1093 (24 Aban 1365/ November 15, 1986), p. 23.  Figure 12, 












In Figure 9, specifically, many of the techniques used to modify women’s figures into 
ideal representatives of an Islamist system are evident, especially in the streamlined 
presentation of a woman’s curves. Notice how the woman’s breast area is variously 
represented in different scenes. When the female character is seated, with one leg raised, 
her chest is evident in the twisting of her body. In one specific pose, both man and 
woman’s bodies join to form an upside-down heart, evidenced by the empty space 
formed between their legs.160 As shown in Figure 9, in which the female subject pushes 
her body up off the floor, her breasts vanish.   Her body is streamlined to look like that of 
her male exercise partner. This depiction results in the de-sexualization of her body —her 
body shape is rendered formless, appearing linear. As shown in Figure 12, the woman is 
depicted as a faceless, veil-wearing caricature that performs exercises with an automatic 
motion. 
                                                
160 This heart formation pose reminds us of the heart in Figure 8, drawn inside the figure of the Muslim 
female prototype to symbolize her spiritual and emotional core. 
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Moallem contends that the veil became an immediate visual marker for staging 
difference between men and women and more so, between the westernized woman and 
her purported opposite: the modest, pious Muslim subject.161 For women entering public 
and official spaces, compulsory hejab became nationwide policy almost two years after 
the Revolution.162 Zan-e Rouz editors appeared to have anticipated this policy change 
because by 1980, the hejab —or some version of a headscarf— featured in many of its 
photo spreads and illustrations. Effectively any image or representation of a woman 
meant for public display was held to the same standard as that of a woman on the street: 
both would observe Islamic hejab to preserve public morality. 
 
Figure 13 
As an illuminating example of how the hejab is incorporated into the project of  
staging difference, consider Figure 13. When photographs could not be easily doctored 
given the rudimentary graphic design technology of the early 1980s, artists drew in 
                                                
161 Moallem, p. 28. 
 
162 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “The Conservative: Reformist Conflict over Women’s Rights in Iran,” p. 42. In 
1983, appearing in public without a hejab was considered an offence against public morality, as stipulated 




feminine-like features to obscure the appearance of exposed heads of hair and limbs. 
However the end result often looked like an awkward caricature with non-human 
features. An example of this technique is found in Figure 13.  This is a Zan-e 
Rouz illustration of female characters dressed in contemporary coat fashions for the 1980 
fall season.163 Departing from colorful photo displays from the Pahlavi era, Zan –e 
Rouz introduces cartoon renditions of models to illustrate the upcoming fall season line of 
women’s jackets. Here, fashion enters the realm of the imaginary:  the illustrator has 
obscured the female figures’ faces by superimposing butterfly hats to convey that their 
heads are appropriately modified —and ultimately covered.164   
As shown in Figure 13, the headline “Ba Yek Kot” (With One Jacket) runs across 
the photo spread. The title denotes a message of fashionable frugality.  As the illustration 
depicts, cartoon models pose in different outfits while wearing the same jacket. The main 
idea being expressed is that a modern Muslim woman need not buy many clothes; by 
buying the right jacket, she can wear one item of clothing in a variety of styles.  Now this 
economical message cannot be registered without realizing the irony behind this 
advertisement: with the rising tides of anti-consumerism, Zan-e Rouz editors endeavor to 
promote a non-extravagant lifestyle —in this case, to accommodate one’s wardrobe with 
what one already has and not with items that one does not necessarily need.  
Indeed, switching from the pre-revolutionary marketing of makeup and couture 
designs from European companies to then promoting goods and behaviors perceived to 
be reflective of an Islamic lifestyle was not executed without compromise and thus 
                                                
163 Zan-e Rouz, Issue 735 (1358/1980), pp. 52-53. 
 
164 Notice, too, that their legs are exposed, although this is understandable given that, in the first year after 
the Revolution, wearing trousers and overcoats was not yet standard practice among Iranian women. 
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reveals a contradiction. By “Islamicizing” illustrations, Zan-e Rouz continues promoting 
the accents of a more pious lifestyle. Yet, the very fact that the magazine advertises 
products to potential customers means that the consumerism, lambasted as a corrupting 
force in Iranian society prior to the Revolution, was not eradicated with the founding of 
the new state.  Advertising was a major source of revenue for the magazine, as was the 
case during the Pahlavi era. The notion that Iran becoming an Islamic Republic would 
mean the cessation of this need for revenue or that Iranian women would stop buying and 
dressing in a certain way is not supported by the evidence found in the journal itself. 
Interestingly, in post-revolutionary issues of Zan-e Rouz, the outpouring of print 
advertisements for beauty and weight regimens —bearing no pictures of women yet still 
advertising weight loss and plastic surgery programs— are published on pages in which 
handicraft and religiosity are also presented. The magazine’s fashion exhibitions may 
have conveyed that they were catering to a Muslim readership; however, they were also 





By 1986, butterfly-esque hejab no longer featured in Zan-e Rouz fashion spreads; by the 
early1980s, female models wearing veils was the visual marker for women featured in 
advertisements, regardless of their origin or religious dispositions.  In effect, all visual 
representations of women printed in images and advertisements for public consumption 
did not differentiate between which women should and should not wear the veil. It is an 
automatic insertion, and, as shown in Figure 14, the hejab acts as a cover-up stamp, 
marking the female subject’s transformation into a default post-revolutionary Muslim 
subject.  Figure 14 is a photograph of an advertisement for male and female robes from 
Zan-e Rouz’s sewing section. The photograph is obviously doctored—where a female 
model’s head should be, a cartoon head with a veil is drawn in.165  
When comparing both male and female models, the starkness in their 
presentations suggests an extra sensitivity towards the depiction of the woman’s body. 
While the male model appears at ease, as if dressed in a luxurious bathrobe, the female 
model is both rigid and out-of-scale. The man’s figure remains untouched, and upon 
closer inspection, there are even chest hairs visible in the opening of his robe. Wearing a 
bulky jacket, the female model is not in the original form she was photographed. Her 
“real” head is completely cut off. The positive space —in art, the space that is occupied 
by an element or a form that is the intended focus of that image— is filled-in with a 
depiction of a hejab-wearing caricature. In effect, the female figure is depicted as part-




                                                
165 Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1098 (29 Azar 1365/ December 20, 1986), p. 4. 
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Reforming Contentious Women’s Bodies 
For the Zan-e Rouz images highlighted in this post-revolutionary period, the body 
of any woman is a site of contestation in need of editorial and visual transformation. This 
is demonstrated not only in the technique of presenting women’s bodies as abstract 
prototypes, but also in the in the didactic articles and advertisements teaching Iranian 
women how to become modest Muslim women via changing their appearance and 
behavior.  
There have been numerous studies on compulsory hejab and its historical 
contestation, acceptance, and usage among women in different social classes, ethnic 
groups, education levels, and religious backgrounds.166 At this moment, I do not seek to 
add to this extensive scholarship, especially to the valuable reflections on the concept of 
hejab as it has been articulated in the Iranian political context.  What I draw attention to 
is its inclusion as a design technique in the collection of disciplining tools of women’s 
bodies. Earlier, I mentioned the method of minimizing natural curves of women in 
photographs to diminish the hint of their sexual appeal to the desirous male gaze.  When 
the contours of breasts and buttocks are pared and trimmed, there is little way of 
distinguishing between the bodies of men and women in different scenes. The effect of 
streamlining women’s bodies is the construction of ostensibly genderless bodies, which 
purportedly are no longer viewed as sexually explicit or sexually arousing. What are 
other conceptual pitfalls and repercussions to this re-sculpting of women’s body shapes to 
reflect an ideological point-of-view?  By depicting women’s figures as contourless 
abstractions, bodies become stand-in representatives for women who do not communicate 
                                                
166 See Najmabadi (1993), Moallem (2005), Varzi (2006), and Valetine Moghadam (1993, 2003, 2004); 
Fatemeh Sadeghi (2008). 
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difference. Instead, it reveals compliance to particular norms outlined by that ideological 
disposition, applied in a one-directional, ahistorical manner.  In other words, when 
transforming “to” an Islamic subject, one is expected to abandon her origins and identity 
prior to that metamorphosis.   
As these images demonstrate, representations of women’s bodies in post-
revolutionary editions of Zan-e Rouz are doctored and re-constructed to reflect an ideal, 
Islamic female subject. Often through subtle didactic methods, modesty is drawn onto 
female figures, in cartoons, advertisements, and photographs. With the addition of a 
hejab and articles on family values to accompany these images, new norms of sociability 
are being reinforced to Zan-e Rouz’s audience.  However these tactics should be 
perceived, too, as examples of disciplinary technologies, outlining the Islamist regime’s 
parameters for modest conduct and appearance specifically for the female subject. 
Underlining this strategy is the anticipated fear of arousal in the face of female sexuality; 
ostensibly, there are many unforeseen consequences if photographs and illustrations of 
women’s bodies are left unaltered, their heads unveiled, or their limbs exposed. The 
viewer will assumedly be confronted with an array of indecent thoughts. 
 
Piecing Together Pre-and-Post 1979 Hegemonic Narratives of Women’s Bodies  
The era of the late 1960s until the final steps into the 1979 Revolution mark a 
momentous period in the evolving, visual landscape of Iranian women’s bodies. The 
state-administered techniques of modernizing women in the 1960s and 1970s were very 
similar to the reform techniques applied in the re-designing of the female subject during 
the inaugural years of the Islamist regime. What appears to be a stark contrast in the 
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representation and treatment of women and their bodies from the pre-revolutionary to 
post-revolutionary periods was, as I have documented, only skin-deep.  
The post-1979 modification of the figure of woman as a modest rendition did not, 
in essence, signal a structural change or reversal in the conceptual treatment of women. 
Indeed, more Iranian women were visually (and compulsorily) veiled after the 
Revolution.  In the domain of women’s magazines, the novel iconography of Iranian 
women in the Islamic Republic speaks only to the appearance of new norms of 
sociability defined by an Islamist ideological framework.  However, the representation of 
Iranian women’s bodies as veiled, all the while fulfilling ideal prototypes subject 
to fundamentalist control of women’s gender roles in Islam, was merely a reactive 
adaptation of a Pahlavi-era leitmotif. The techniques used to construct a post-
revolutionary Islamic female subject were in fact crafted during the modernization reform 
period of the Pahlavi era.  The conceptual foundation underlying women’s liberation and 
improved social status was that women were both malleable and receptive to reform by 
popular culture and Iran’s revolutionary Islamist ideology. The notion itself was indeed 
revolutionary, for it initiated Iranian women’s entrance into a modern, westernized 
lifestyle —one that they had not previously known existed and thus were shown by 
various state apparatuses, including Empress Pahlavi herself.   
When looking at the sample of post-revolutionary images from Zan-e Rouz, one 
can easily argue that a verifiable “Islamic coding” of the figure of woman is evident in 
the post-1979 stylization of women’s bodies as veiled and streamlined.  In other visual 
media, this term has been used to define the representation of the figure of woman in 
post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. In the 1998 article “Body-less Faces: Mutilating 
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Modernity and Abstracting Women in an ‘Islamic Cinema,’” Dabashi notes, “Veiled 
women who had participated in the evolution from its earliest stages…Soon after the 
revolution…posters began to propagate an ‘Islamic’ code on the emerging vision of a 
revolutionary woman.”167 In post-revolutionary Iranian “Islamic cinema,” he argues that 
the figure of woman is the “site of relentless contestation between a metaphysics of 
concealment and an aesthetics of revelation.” 168 According to Dabashi, in this aesthetic 
paradigm, “danger” and “Truth” are integrated into constructions of the figure of woman 
as taboo.169 This culminates in anxieties and fears about the exposure of women’s bodies, 
which in turn leads to the mutilation or erasure of representations of women from public 
space and, in its most visual example, it leads to the hejab visually overtaking women’s 
bodies by fully covering them. To ensure that a woman’s body is not the source of social 
disorder —in that it evokes illicit desires in the viewer— women’s bodies are “absented,” 
covered by “layers and then more layers of dark and prohibitive scarves.” Dabashi 
observes:  
Behold the forcefully absented presence of the Iranian woman on the wide but 
ever narrower screen of an "Islamic" cinema, the post-Islamic-revolution      
impossibility of being feminine, the censorial brutality of mutated bodies, 
carefully cut off and concealed from faces that must now speak and envision, act 
and convey, the entire task of a denied body.170 
 
Though film is not visual media that I analyze in this discussion, Dabashi’s usage of 
“Islamic coding” is a useful segue into the conclusion of this chapter. As I mentioned 
                                                
167 Dabashi and Chelkowski, Staging a Revolution, p. 88. 
 
168 Hamid Dabashi, “Body-less Faces:  Mutilating Modernity and Abstracting Women in an ‘Islamic 
Cinema,’” Visual Anthropology 10, no. 2-4 (1998): p. 361. 
 
169 Ibid., pp. 362-363. 
 




earlier in the introduction of this chapter, year 1979 is regarded as a watershed moment in 
Iranian history, when a revolution fundamentally changed the political, social, cultural, 
and economic institutions.  Because I pushed back the timeline, so to speak, into the 
1960s, I was able to cast a wider frame of reference for the purposes of reading, both 
visually and contextually, the many representations of women from before and after the 
Iranian Revolution.  
 
What should by now be transparent is that the dual state and media enterprise of 
producing norms and values entails the heavy investment of women. This is true for 
issues of Zan-e Rouz published under the direction of the Pahlavis and under the editorial 
leadership of Khomeini’s supporters.  Although this magazine does not account for the 
whole range of publications that constitute Iran’s print media industrial complex, it 
nevertheless provides a linear terrain on which to pinpoint the shifts and similarities in 
each regime’s method of reform on a popular level.  From how a woman is positioned on 
a chaise to the way she holds a cigarette; from her modest style of dress to how she 
stretches her limbs, these are all examples of the methods of socialization and regulation 
pursued by successive regimes. What they similarly demonstrate is that the projection of 
an idealized, normalized Iranian female character is in need of instruction on how to 
dress; how to socialize; how to be informed; and how to properly “become” a true 
modern woman —regardless if she is an Iranian citizen before or after 1979.  
Central to many of these reform and advertising campaigns —be they campaigns 
to sell a product to a modern consumer or to endorse a pious way of life to a female 
believer— is that in order for women to understand how to reform, one must guide and 
frame the parameters for how they should improve. As a visual and material platform 
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upon which to promote a new Iranian female citizen, Zan-e Rouz was perhaps an ideal 
medium. In presenting to a female audience a stylized construct of the modern Iranian 
woman, Zan-e Rouz operated as a visual guide for mapping out a modern woman’s 
interests, fashion sensibilities, and political inclinations. Under the Pahlavis, the self-
promotion and “modernization” of Iranian women were manifest in the updating of their 
physical appearances and through the imposed transformation of their hobbies, interests, 
and desires.  The inclusion of Empress Farah Pahlavi in its inaugural edition was the 
photographic moment of naissance for the modernization of women during the White 
Revolution. Indeed, the enterprise of constructing a modern, Iranian woman had found a 
perfectly fashionable, female citizen to convey to the Iranian public new norms of 
sociability.  
Though the physical appearance and ideal characteristics of this female citizen 
change come 1979, the rationale behind their need for reform, in fact, remains the same. 
That women subsequently were subject to an “Islamic coding” —for instance, their heads 
covered by hejab or their arms sleeved— is an important, albeit relatively minor detail 
given Iran’s extensive history of introducing and implementing reform measures 
designed to educate, re-educate, and/or underestimate women in order to compliment a 
particular political or ideological persuasion.  A continuous motif among the Khomeini-
inspired reforms was the notion that Iranian women would require and subsequently 
embrace their transformation during the formative years of the Islamic Republic into 
idealized, religiously pious and maternal characters.  Despite the outcome of these 
measures, the reasons behind these methods of reform and regulation seemed eerily 
similar to those of the Pahlavis. In an effort to prevent women’s exposure and 
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objectification, Zan-e Rouz editors after 1979 operated on the same assumption from the 
Pahlavi-era: that women could learn from prototypes how to embrace certain values; how 
to understand their roles in a particular religious system; and how to restructure their 
desires in order to match an overtly patriarchal authority and national project of cultural 
revolution. 
Hence this chapter’s discussion of specific Zan-e Rouz images, published during 
these two regimes, is a critical analysis of the problematic construction and illustration of 
Iranian women during two similar projects of reform. From this sample of images, 
women are depicted through cartoons and photographs of abstraction; they are abstract 
because their representation is never truly real. It is often staged, mutilated, and 
illustrated as a nonhuman prototype —stylized in a way to attract and/or deflect the gaze 
of the reader, the bystander, or the consumer.  
The next chapter is the first half of a two-chapter exploration of the discourse of 
prostitution in contemporary Iran, analyzing the construction and application of 
regulatory methods to satiate male sexual desires and control illicit sexual relations, 
dating from the second Pahlavi period to present-day Islamic Republic. Chapter Two also 
examines the special personages and spatial transformations of a red-light district in 





Red-lights in Parks:  A Social History of Park-e Razi 
"The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space.  We are in the epoch of 
simultaneity:  we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the 
side-by-side, of the dispersed.  We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the 
world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that 
connects points and intersects with its own skein." –Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” 
 
 Introduction 
In the middle of the night, Iranian security forces raided a downtrodden area of 
East Tehran’s District Four.171 This was March 2000, three years into Muhammad 
Khatami’s first presidential tenure. For almost twenty years, authorities had tried in vain 
to quell the area’s black market activities; a place notorious for rampant drug use and the 
illicit sex trade, it had evolved into a makeshift red-light district. In an effort to paksazi 
kardan (cleanse the district), police forces rounded up residents living in sub-par 
conditions, many of whom slept in cardboard boxes and lived among trash. District 
Four172 —known colloquially as Khak-e Sefid  (White Dust)— had a notorious 
reputation.173 Locals were described as behaving in a particularly intimidating street 
manner, often in line with the area’s notoriety as a den for criminal activity, prostitution, 
and drug use. This only aggravated the authorities’ suspicions of the area, for this 
behavior was said to rub off on new residents. With little warning, the area disappeared 
into the night. Homes were destroyed. Though some residents were financially 
                                                
171 Akbar Varvayyi, “Barrasi-ye Avamel-e Rouspigari-ye Kheyabani dar Tehran-e Bozorg/The 
Investigation of the Causes of Street Prostitution in Greater Tehran.” PhD diss., University of Tehran, 
School of Law and Political Science, 2008, p. 51.   
172District Four is the northeastern suburb of Tehranpars in Tehran, Iran. 
 
173Varvayyi, “Barrasi-ye Avamel-e Rouspigari-ye Kheyabani dar Tehran-e Bozorg/The Investigation of the 
Causes of Street Prostitution in Greater Tehran.”  
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compensated, those remaining lived in provisional shelters; others suspected of black 
market activity were transferred to detention centers.   
 Midnight raids were not out of the ordinary in the seedy districts of the capital, 
where drug usage and knife crimes were often reported. More than ten years earlier, in 
1989, authorities had raided the Mahal-e Jamshid (Jamshid District), in the southwest 
area of central Tehran; reportedly around 4,000 persons were arrested. Though the 
identities and occupations of the apprehended cannot be confirmed, the few available 
reports suggest the existence of an unmanageable sex trade in urban areas of Iran. Of 
those detained in the Jamshid district, 800 were apprehended for suspicion of being 
prostitutes.174 In 2003 alone, forty-one brothels in Tehran were also raided, of which 
seventy-two men and eighteen women were apprehended for participation in the sex 
trade.  The same year, 1,080 brothels were shut down countrywide, and almost 6,700 
people were arrested for prostitution-related charges.175   Although not openly discussed 
by authorities, eradicating former sites of societal corruption was instrumental to the 
policy of defining and maintaining public morality.176 Women referred to colloquially as 
coming from najeeb-khaneh177  (prostitute’s home) were particularly targeted, rounded 
                                                                                                                                            
 
174 Ibid., p. 45. 
 
175 Ibid. 
176 The “concept of ‘corruption,’ has shifted since the 1979 revolution to include adultery, prostitution, 
homosexuality, drug trafficking, alcohol consumption, and common crimes such as murder and theft,” 
explains Parvin Paidar. This concept of moral corruption will be discussed further in this chapter.  See 
Paidar, p. 345. 
177In Persian, najeeb khaneh is an ironic term, often expressed sarcastically, to mean a prostitute's home. Its 
literal meaning refers to a place in which women are chaste and morally sound, as the term najeeb literally 
means chaste. The literal meaning appeals to the image of a woman who seeks her sexual desire within a 
family setting and framework; she is committed to her husband and typically her actions do not arouse 
gossip or suspicion.  When a woman is referred to as najeeb in the context of najeeb-khaneh, then she is 
being humiliated for her supposedly unchaste behavior.  It is a pejorative comment meant to discredit 
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up en masse so that suspected prostitutes could be separated from everyone else —
apparently, the morally inclined. Yet despite these efforts to demolish enclaves of 
prostitution, the sex industry is itself nowhere near its end.   
Before Khak-e Sefid and other makeshift vice areas were forming in eastern 
Tehran and long before the 1979 Revolution, red-light districts were already well-known 
fixtures. Official maps, government reports, and social worker and historian accounts 
document that a nascent brothel district had formed in the late Qajar period (1785-1925). 
In March 1786, Tehran—at the time, a group of villages that were selected by the founder 
of the Qajar dynasty Agha Muhammad Khan for his capital— was en route to becoming 
a metropolis.178 The lure of industrial jobs brought rural migrants pouring into the city, 
forcing the expansion of the city limits.179 In a location known as a pastoral residence for 
royal officials, women of varying ages and mostly from rural, economically depressed 
backgrounds were brought to the area to live and work as prostitutes in ‘azab-khaneh  
(private brothels).180 By the 1920s, these brothels formed a sizable group of houses, 
known as Shahr-e No (New City), which was the largest red-light district in Tehran.181 
                                                                                                                                            
and/or question the woman’s commitment to her family and husband, meaning that she cannot maintain a 
chaste role if she sells her body. By referring to her home as najeeb-khaneh, the utterance debases not only 
the woman’s character, but also the home environment in which she lives—ultimately humiliating the 
female and the family.  
178 “The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period,” Cambridge History of Iran, p. 543. For more 
information on the historical development of Tehran, see Ferydoon Firoozi, “Tehran:  A Demographic and 
Economic Analysis,” Middle Eastern Studies 10: 1 (January, 1974): pp. 60-76. 
 
179 According to Asef Bayat, Tehran in 1905 was a walled city of nineteen square kilometers with 160,000 
inhabitants; it grew to over 300,000 in the early 1930s.  The wall was destroyed in 1930, and soon modern 
streets were constructed.  See Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 25. 
 
180 Willem Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran (Washington D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2008), 
p. 257. 
 




For almost a century, the area housed Iranian female sex workers in a barricaded 
district.182  During the Pahlavi regime, the government came to regulate the sex district. 
University researchers, doctors, social workers, and ministry health officials were sent to 
Shahr-e No to register and check for venereal infections among its inhabitants. However, 
government regulations did little to ameliorate these women’s lives; in fact, it 
institutionalized an industry built upon the notion that male sexual desires need a 
relieving space. 
Before the fall of the monarchy, much of the opposition’s criticism against the 
Pahlavi government was based on claims that the regime had supported “dens of moral 
corruption”—meaning cinema houses, private brothels, red-light districts, and 
entertainment clubs in cities across Iran.183 The area in southwest central Tehran —which 
constituted Shahr-e No quarter— was reportedly set afire for that very reason.184  Only 
                                                
182  The establishment of Shahr-e No was not unprecedented. According to Floor, Tehran had a special city 
quarter for prostitutes during Fath ‘Ali Shah’s reign (1798-1834), which was closed by Muhammad Shah 
(1834-48).  See Willem Floor, “Venereal Disease in Iran (1855-2005):  A Public Affair,” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26, no. 2 (2006):  p.  263.   
 
183 The destruction of cinemas is also part of the discourse on the destruction of sex districts in Iran. Mob 
attacks on cinema houses had previously been reported after they were accused of showing foreign “sex” 
films. In August 1978, controversy swirled around the deathly blaze of Cinema Rex, a cinema house in a 
poor district of Abadan, Iran. While watching the film “The Deer,” starring Behrouz Vossoughi, 
cinemagoers found themselves trapped inside the movie house.  There were more than 430 reported 
casualties. Soon accusations flew over the perpetrators’ identities and political motivations. The Pahlavi 
regime pointed to anti-regime Islamists and the anti-Shah opposition blamed SAVAK for “arranging a 
'Reichstag fire,”' by " locking the cinema doors, and sabotaging the local fire department,” done to discredit 
Islamic militants.  See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1982), p. 513. In August 1980, twenty-six people were tried, leading to six executions. The 
revolutionary courts condemned Captain Monir Taheri as being the main arsonist, however Amnesty 
International deemed the trial unfair and without due process. See “One Person’s Story: Mr. Monir Taheri,” 
Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, 2012, accessed August 15, 2011, 
http://www.iranrights.org/english/memorial-case--3246.php. For an investigative report on the fire, see 
Amnesty International, “Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” February 1980, accessed 
January 3, 2012, http://www.iranomid.com/en/ARCHVS/TheIRIReport.pdf. 
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Shodand/Shahr-e No on Fire and Prostitutes Killed,” Radio Zamaneh, 9 Bahman 1387/ January 29, 2009, 




after Khomeini’s supporters consolidated and increased their own power did special 
revolutionary courts emerge, ordering all brothels closed, demolished, or both. In 1979, 
prostitution became illegal, and future perpetrators were tried in these courts, with their 
punishments determined by an Islamic criminal code.185 Yet the criminalization of 
prostitution did little to halt the industry’s growth in the post-revolutionary period. For 
the services provided in the red-light district and other brothel areas went both 
underground and into plain sight. In many of Tehran’s parks, deals for prostitute sex were 
arranged in public, often in front of and, at times, with the complicity of police and 
government forces. In the former site of Shahr-e No, which is now a public park, 
prostitutes and potential customers easily interact, alongside families picnicking on 
lawns. 
The re-manifestation of prostitution in this park is the culmination of many 
factors.  Notwithstanding the economic reasons, there is a more nuanced aspect for why 
prostitution has spread in Iran since being banned in 1979. According to popular and 
high-ranking Shi’a clerical discourses on the subject, prostitution is generally understood 
as a key practice in maintaining social order. At the same time, in Shi’a ideology, there is 
an understanding and expectation that female sexuality is reactive and yielding to male 
sexuality.186  In the presence of a woman, a man cannot help but desire her, and thus it is 
the “woman’s nature to want to be taken.”187 The responsibility hence falls upon the 
                                                
185 Article 138 of the Iranian Islamic Republic of Iran constitution administers the punishment for a 
convicted man is 75 lashes and exile where the offense took place for at three months to a year.  A 
convicted woman is typically sentenced with 70 lashes.  See Iranian Penal Code, Book 2, Hadd 
Punishment, Part 4, Article 135. 
 





woman to satiate his desires, reining in his “animal”188 sexual urges.  Sex with prostitutes 
is therefore justified in the face of rampant male promiscuity. Historically, this has been 
the case. Under Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, prostitution was regulated through Ministry of 
Health-mandated health checkups of prostitutes and the supervision of Shahr-e No. Under 
the spiritual and political leadership of the late Ayatollah Khomeini and presently 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regulation of prostitution has been vehemently rejected, yet 
legal exceptions are allowed to accommodate sexual relations conducted outside of a 
permanent marriage. As I will discuss later, social and economic circumstances are 
identified as the reasons for pursuing new modes of regulation.  
What is unique about the historical narrative of this space, in particular, and 
discourse of prostitution, in general, is not that sex sells in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Rather, it is that the sex industry continuously mutates itself moments after its brothels 
are destroyed and prostitutes are arrested. The reasons for this regeneration are 
institutionally and conceptually-based and perhaps best exemplified by the following 
idiosyncratic statement made famous in the revolutionary period. At the time of the 
Gomrok fire, a popular Shi’a cleric and contemporary of Ayatollah Khomeini came to 
Shahr-e No’s defense. Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani is widely known to have uttered 
the oft-repeated line: “Every house needs a mosterah (toilet).”189 Its meaning is 
                                                
188 Ibid. 
 
189Foundational revolutionary figure, Imam Jom’eh (leader of Friday public prayer appointed by 
Khomeini), and senior Shi’a cleric Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmoud Taleghani made this powerful, 
idiosyncratic comment in the first days of the revolution, after the red-light district in Gomrok district, 
Tehran was set ablaze. This comment was often repeated in interviews I conducted in Tehran during the 
summer months in 2010 and 2011. However, not all interviewees were aware of the phrase’s original 
source. For more information about Taleghani, see “Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani: The Father of the 
Revolution” in Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran (New Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 2006).   
  
99 
commonly interpreted as such: that in every society (or house, as Taleghani states), a 
space of excess must exist as an output for human aggression, sexual release, folly, or, 
sin.190 In other words, prostitutes conceptually embody the toilet, acting as a repository 
for the discharge of male sexuality. In the case of Shahr-e No, Taleghani was speaking 
metaphorically about Iranian society’s need to have brothels and prostitutes in order to 
maintain some level of social order.  For many Iranians, Taleghani’s phrase speaks to the 
societal necessity for prostitution —albeit an activity conducted in private. Not only is his 
comment a spatial reference to the embodiment of prostitution in the figure of a woman, 
but it also recognizes the almost century-old existence of a government-regulated red-
light district in Tehran.   
After 1979, with the main site of prostitution eliminated and prostitution 
criminalized, it is commonly reported that the sex industry goes underground, operating 
under different conditions. Yet does the physical eradication of a well-known district 
represent the triumph of one moral authority and political elite over another? In this 
chapter, I discuss how a societal landmark is demolished and transformed, both 
physically and conceptually, in contemporary Tehran. I show that even despite this site’s 
makeover from a red-light district into a family park, prostitution actively continues in 
this site.  The reason for its visible presence perhaps lies in the continuity of a particular 
                                                
190 The phrase is often found on Persian-language blogs and heard in street conversations. Taleghani’s 
comment was made in early 1979 when asked about the fires destroying red-light districts in southern 
Tehran. In many ways, Iran was a country set ablaze during its transition from the active protest period of 
1977 until spring 1979; salvaging brothel districts from the rubble was the least of the Iranians’ problems. 
Public protests were daily occurrences, whereby demonstrators attacked banks and government offices. In 
December 1978, the Shah had just fled Iran, leaving an American-backed Prime Minister Bakhtiar in his 
stead. His legitimacy tarnished in the eyes of the public, Bakhtiar ceded control to an Islamic revolutionary 
council that independently formed a provisional government, led by new Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. 
Soon a power struggle between the provisional government and the formerly exiled Ayatollah Khomeini 
went into full throttle over issues concerning Shi'a clerical authority, women’s rights, opposition parties, to 
name just a few. 
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conceptualization of human sexuality: there is a recognition of the need for a site in 
which male desire is afforded an outlet for sexual expression. In what follows, I lay the 
pre-revolutionary historical foundation of this site, focusing on what used to be Iran’s 
most controversial red-light district, Shahr-e No, in the pre-revolutionary period. I begin 
in the late nineteenth century, detailing Pahlavi-era government regulations of brothels 
until their banning and demolition in 1979. I examine the players and powers operating in 
this area.  I discuss the history of regulation to prevent the spread of venereal disease. I 
highlight the story of a savvy brothel madam, and I include interviews with former male 
patrons of the district. Thereafter, I follow the narrative of this particular space’s 
transformations since 1979, focusing on is modern-day configuration, Park-e Razi (Razi 
Park). In this section, I also include field research conducted in the park, from visitors 
who were knowledgeable of the park’s pre-revolutionary history and discussed the 
current status of prostitution in parks.  
By describing the historical development and demise of this red-light district, I 
weave together many of the political, social, and economic factors that brought about the 
institutionalization of prostitution first as a government-regulated industry and second   
—which is the subject of the next chapter— as a religiously sanctioned safety valve for 
the preservation of male sexuality and social order. These two incarnations of the site of 
prostitution —as a red-light district and as a public park— are examples of disciplinary 
methods employed to contain a seemingly out-of-control sex industry. However, as this 
chapter illustrates, there are many inter-related forces of hygiene, bio-power, space, 
poverty, and sex that sustain, while also transforming, prostitution into various sites —
both physical and conceptual— from the Pahlavi era into present day.  
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In what follows, I deliberate over these main questions: When a well known vice 
district space is purposefully developed into a recreational, family-oriented park, does its 
transformation represent the triumph of one moral authority and political elite over 
another? Likewise, when brothel areas are publically forgotten and also systematically 
denied by authorities, do the conditions under which prostitution was conducted and grew 
disappear given the site’s erasure? Furthermore, per Ayatollah Taleghani’s 1979 usage of 
the metaphor of a “toilet,” does the analogy reflect what is, in fact, the main reasoning 
behind the regulation of prostitution and sexuality in the Islamic Republic of Iran? 
 
Regulation of Prostitution during Reza Shah Pahlavi Reign (1925-1941)  
In the first half of the twentieth century, the infamous Shahr-e No district was 
publically regarded as a zone where prostitution, drug abuse, khalafkari (deceit and 
mischief),191 and sexually transmitted diseases were rampant. According to one social 
worker’s account, most of the women prostitutes were addicted to opium and arak.192 
Controlling the spread of venereal diseases (VD) 193 in particular was one of the main 
reasons for the regulation of Shahr-e No’s prostitutes. During Reza Shah’s reign, syphilis 
outbreaks were commonly reported here194 as it had become more widespread by the turn 
                                                
191 The term khalafkari denotes delinquency and wrongdoing in one. 
192 Sattareh Farman Farmaian, Daughter of Persia (London: Bantam Press, 1992), p. 301.  Arak is a highly 
alcoholic spirit, often homemade.  
 
193 In Persian, there are a variety of terms used to describe sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), or amraz-e 
mogharebati.  Floor’s translation of venereal disease is bimariha-yi jeldi.  A more common term is amraz-e 
mogharebati.  Typically bimariha-yi jeldi refers to diseases that affect the skin.  As for specific kinds of 
venereal diseases, syphilis is translated as seflis, and gonorrhea is known as suzak. 
 
194 “Shahr-e No: Mazhar-e Fesad dar Qabl az Enqelab/Shahr-e No: The Symbol of Moral Corruption before 
the Revolution,” Tahrikh-e Moaaser-e Iran, 22 Ordibehesht 1387/  May 11, 2008, accessed November 21, 
2011,  http://bahman18.blogfa.com/post-11.aspx. 
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of the nineteenth century and was steadily increasing.195 The spread of certain diseases, 
like syphilis, was the fault of prostitutes, who were blamed for the rising infection 
rates.196 In the late nineteenth century, an Iranian doctor surmised, "[T]he prostitute 
carries the poison of this dangerous disease [syphilis], and death is considered the best 
end to it."197 By the mid-twentieth century, syphilis and gonorrhea were common 
afflictions among Iranians, for whom condom use was both costly and a social stigma.198 
Gonorrhea in particular was a cause of much concern, for it potentially caused sterility 
and affected young couples hoping to expand their families.199 Moreover, women of all 
social classes were affected by rising VD rates. Not only were increasing numbers 
becoming infected by their husbands (having extra-marital sex), but children were also 
being born with syphilis-related disabilities.200 “To put the problem of VD in 
                                                                                                                                            
 Floor explains, “In fact, venereal disease (bimariha-yi jeldi) was rampant in Iranian cities. It was 
estimated, for example, that 20–40 percent of the entire population of Tehran was affected. It may have 
been less prevalent in the rural areas.” See Floor, pp. 261-262. 
 
195 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “The Politics of Reproduction:  Maternalism and Women’s Hygiene in Iran, 
1896-1941,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): p. 14.   The most common 
venereal diseases of the pre-revolutionary era, specifically the late 19th century until the mid-1950s, were 
syphilis and gonorrhea, both of which Iranian doctors could not distinguish until the end of the 19th century 
(neither did the Europeans). See Floor, “Venereal Disease in Iran (1855 – 2005): A Public Affair,” pp. 260-
261.  
 
196 Syphilis was reported to have spread in Iran’s urban areas, affecting 20 to 40 percent of the population 
and increasing in villages. According to Cyrus Schayegh, it was believed that the increasing rates were due 
to European armies in World War I who were having sexual relations with prostitutes. See Cyrus 
Schayegh, “A Sound Mind Lives in a Healthy Body’:  Texts and Contexts in the Iranian Modernists’ 
Scientific Discourse of Health, 1910s-40s,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 2 (May 
2005): p. 173.   
 
197 Kashani-Sabet, “The Politics of Reproduction:  Maternalism and Women’s Hygiene in Iran, 1896-
1941,” p. 13. 
 
198 Floor, "Venereal Disease in Iran (1855-2005): A Public Affair," p. 269. 
199 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 389. 
 
200 Kashani-Sabet, “The Politics of Reproduction:  Maternalism and Women’s Hygiene in Iran, 1896-




perspective,” said investigative reporter Hedayatollah Hakim-Olahi, “three hundred 
thousand inhabitants of Tehran, or forty percent of its population, had VD in 1946.”201 
Concerns over the spread of VD were especially high among soldiers, whose 
leaders blamed prostitutes for spreading venereal infections among their officers.202 
According to Willem Floor, the Pahlavi government attempted in 1933 to register the 
prostitutes themselves in Shahr-e No, while also threatening to banish brothels and arrest 
any officer found with a prostitute.203 In October 1933, it was reported that a law was 
passed, though not signed by the shah, to make brothels illegal and have them shut down 
in three months’ time.  These regulations required prostitutes to carry identification with 
their signature and the date of their last hospital visit. This order was soon revoked. It was 
only in 1941 that a parliamentary-approved law on the prevention of venereal and 
contagious diseases was passed; however, it was, evidently, poorly enforced due to lack 
of funding and training.204 By the 1960s, the number of venereal diseases had not abated. 
According to a 1963 report, venereal disease cases were as high as eighty percent in rural 
areas.205  
The Pahlavi-era method of regulation for prostitution was shaped, to some extent, 
by European contagious disease legislation and influenced by public health regulatory 
                                                
201Hedayatollah Hakim-Olahi was an investigative reporter who based his findings on hospital data in the 
report, Ba Man beh Shahr-e No Biyaid/Come with Me to Shahr-e No.  Floor refers to his report on VD as 
well as others, in said article. Quoted in Floor, "Venereal Disease in Iran (1855-2005): A Public Affair," p. 
269.  
202Floor, "Venereal Disease in Iran (1855-2005): A Public Affair," pp. 268-270.  See also Cyrus Schayegh, 
Who is Knowledgeable is Strong (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p. 140. 
203 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 386. 
 
204 Ibid., p. 388. 
 




measures enacted by European and Ottoman governments during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, a policy of “regulationism” of prostitution 
commenced in continental Europe and spread throughout the British colonies. As Muge 
Ozbek has observed, “The regulationist regimes targeted prostitutes, not their clients, as 
the primary conduits of venereal disease within a gender-biased discourse of social 
hygiene.”206 These policies were justified as pragmatic responses “to the threat of 
venereal diseases and the problems of security and social order.”207 European 
governments began abandoning polices of toleration in favor of regulationism —save 
Victorian-era Britain— and legalized prostitution by “allowing brothels legal or quasi-
legal status and giving prostitutes special licenses.”208   
Regulatory policy in general meant registering prostitutes, mandatory health 
examinations, and administrative surveillance.209 Ozbek contends, “The existence of 
prostitution was accepted as a ‘necessary evil’ that should be tolerated as toleration 
allowed the state stricter control of prostitutes in order to protect public health and social 
order.”210 For example, in the late 1870s, the Turkish municipal government initiated a 
policy of requiring prostitutes to carry unique identity cards, which designated their 
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special status among the general population. Brothels were also obliged to register as 
licensed businesses with municipal commissions.211 
Across continental Europe, the regulation of prostitution was initially based on 
concerns over the spread of sexually transmitted infections among the armed forces in the 
nineteenth century. In France, Napoleon I ordered the inspection of prostitutes following 
his armies in an attempt to control venereal diseases.212 During France’s Second Empire, 
his step-grandson and nephew, Napoleon III, ordered the establishment of a national 
registry of prostitutes and that their health be regularly inspected.213 In Victorian 
England, vagrancy laws criminalized prostitution. Certain behavior considered as morally 
unacceptable—believed to be the conduct of “fallen women,” or women who were 
perceived as social outcasts and sexual deviants—was outlawed in 1824. If prostitutes 
and beggars were caught idle or acting disorderly in public, they were charged with 
vagrancy. In such cases, punishment was one month of hard labor; in other cases, 
prostitutes were sent to Anglican penitentiaries for social reform.214 Nascent social purity 
campaigns pushed for the abolition of prostitution and deviant sexual acts, as they were 
claimed to be an affront to family values and led to widespread social corruption.215  
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1986), p. 24. 
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(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), p. 171. 
 
214 Britain’s Vagrancy Act of 1824 found that “every common prostitute wandering in the public 
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In 1864, the British Parliament passed the Contagious Diseases Acts intending to 
curb the spread of sexually transmitted infections in the military.216  The Acts led to 
arbitrary police arrests and compulsory medical examinations of women to check for 
venereal disease. Following the repealing of these Acts, British military and civilian 
officials introduced a series of restrictions that recognized women as “disloyal conduits 
of sexual infection, and men in the armed forces as their victims.”217 Worried that 
sexually transmitted infections would reach its troops stationed in British colonies and 
naval bases, the British government encouraged Singapore, the capital of the British 
Straits Settlements and a main British naval base in East Asia, to legalize a system of 
segregation and isolation of Japanese and Chinese prostitutes. The ordinance was 
designed to protect British troops from the “ravages of uncontrolled sexually transmitted 
diseases.”218  
For the Pahlavi state, regulation of prostitution involved policing prostitutes’ 
behavior; in lieu of scrutinizing their customers or addressing the subject of male 
promiscuity, the authorities regarded prostitutes with suspicion and thus subject them to 
                                                
216 Opposing public campaigns were launched to extend and repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts. 
Proponents of the Acts sought to extend its provisions to the civilian population while repeal organizations 
argued that the Acts were gender-biased, effectively demonstrating the double standards between men and 
women. Suspected of spreading venereal disease, women underwent mandatory health checks only to be 
quarantined for several months if they were found carrying a venereal disease. By 1886, the Acts were 
repealed, as a result of efforts by moralist and feminist organizations concerned about human rights 
violations.  See Judith Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mary Poovey, Uneven Developments:  The Ideological 
Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): p. 199; Margaret 
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mandatory health examinations. Prostitutes were quarantined in a red-light district, where 
police supervision could be conducted in specific sites.219 To continue working in the sex 
industry, prostitutes were ordered by the Ministry of Health to get monthly medical 
checkups and procure identity cards.220 However, the medical examinations of prostitutes 
were not conducted regularly.221 In any case, underlying Pahlavi policy was the 
protection of public health by curtailing the spread of sexual disease among prostitutes 
and not among their customers.222 These efforts were reasoned as necessary measures to 
control the “necessary evil” of prostitution and thus considered pragmatic. Remarkably, 
absent in this policy was encouraging preventive health measures, such as condom usage, 
among the general public.223  
 
                                                
219 Hakim-Olahi, Ba Man beh Shahr-e No Biyaid, vol. 2, pp. ii-iv.  Quoted in Floor, A Social History of 
Sexual Relations in Iran, pp. 390-391. Floor mentions this 1946 book by Hakim-Olahi, who implored the 
Shah’s government to contain the syphilis outbreak in Tehran.  Hakim-Olahi recommended that the red-
light district be relocated to a new site under direct police and public health provision.  Prostitutes and their 
homes would be examined daily and would require health cards.  
 
220 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 277. As researched by Floor, a 1945 article in 
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221 Ibid., p. 392. 
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Schayegh, “Criminal-Women and Mother-women: Sociocultural Transformations and the Critique of 
Criminality in Early Post-World War II in Iran,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 2, no. 3 (Fall, 
2006): pp. 5-6.   Kashani-Sabet includes one exceptional, “forward-thinking” instance when an Iranian 
doctor contributed to a hygiene journal, suggesting that infected persons use condoms. However he 
dismissed, in part, the method, stating that it was not a completely trustworthy method.  He also did not 
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Regulation of Prostitution during Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Reign (1941-1979) 
While Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was in power, the regulation of prostitution 
became integrated into the modernization reform agenda of the White Revolution. 
Earlier, in 1949, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi announced that his goal as king was “the 
restoration of dignity and a better life to the people of Iran.”224 By the early 1960s, he had 
translated “a better life” as progress and development of the nation in a six-point 
executive order outlining the government’s objectives and addressed them to the Iranian 
people.225 A few years after, state-administered land and cultural reforms commenced. 
The reforms ostensibly were also designed to improve Iranian women’s status.226 This 
entailed eliminating illiteracy, extending suffrage rights to women, revamping public 
health policy, and setting up vocational training programs for poorer women. Initially, 
these progressive reforms did not address prostitution or include social welfare programs 
for female prostitutes. Princess Ashraf Pahlavi227 figure-headed a program funded by the 
government’s Fourth Development Economic plan to provide educational assistance and 
training for a small number of female prostitutes in the late 1960s and early 1970s.228 By 
                                                
224Kurush Shahbaz, “Iran’s White Revolution,” World Affairs 126, no. 1 (Spring 1963): p. 18.   
 
225 Shahbaz, “Iran’s White Revolution,” p. 19. In this executive order, the Shah asserts the government’s 
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226 Shireen Mahdavi, “Women and the Shii Ulama in Iran,” Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 1 (Jan. 1983): p. 
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228 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 265. The Fourth Development Plan was 
implemented from 1968-73.  For more information on the development programs of the Shah’s White 
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improving their literacy and teaching them domestic trades, such as sewing, the aim was 
to enable trainees to return to society as functional, socially accepted citizens.229 
Nevertheless, these policy measures did little to break the cycles and conditions of 
poverty in which they lived.230 Khosrou Mansourian, a former social worker who 
contributed to official reports on living conditions at Shahr-e No, contends that these 
reform programs did not significantly ameliorate the conditions of poverty nor did they 
improve prostitutes’ literacy rates.231 According to one report, prostitutes who attended 
vocational workshops had left the red-light district only to continue the same activities in 
other parts of Tehran.232  
 
The Brothels of Shahr-e No 
Uneven socio-economic development in the 1960s and 1970s fueled a growing 
city population in which giant slums popped up to match the urban construction boom.233 
The influx of rural migration fueled by Iran’s demands for domestic, industrial 
                                                                                                                                            
Revolution era, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, Land Reform and Social Change in Iran (Salt Lake City: 
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229 Ibid., p. 264. 
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Twentieth- century Iran, p. 125. 
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development meant that a thriving sex industry grew to cater to the labor force.234 
Especially in poorer quarters of Tehran, prostitution was becoming rampant.235 Alongside 
this wave flourished a sexual vocabulary about women in the sex trade; for the word 
prostitute, the terms jendeh, fahesheh, rouspigar, and zan-e marufe were all variants of a 
gendered terminology primarily dependent on male promiscuity and the demand for paid 
sex.236At the time, red-light districts were unspoken enclaves located not only in the 
capital but also in provincial cities such as Abadan, Bandar Abbas, Ahvaz, Esfahan, and 
Shiraz. Save Tehran’s district, most prostitution areas were located on the outskirts of 
cities and had “virtually no street lights at all, red or otherwise,” notes Kamran 
Talatoff.237 
The “toilet” of Taleghani’s day was once known colloquially by the general term 
Shahr-e No or “New City.” These designated spaces of sexual transaction and 
transgression were nominally accepted, albeit not discussed candidly. Despite this 
reticence, there was no denying the tacit acceptance and presence of prostitution in 
Iranian society.  For the most famous of the Shahrha-ye No (New Cities) was located in 
                                                
234 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 263. Although this is beyond the scope of this 
paper, I would like to highlight that scholars such as l Valentine Moghadam have written about the 
capitalist mode of production’s influence on women’s work in Iranian society. For information related to 
the historical industrialization of Iran from the late Qajar period to the Pahlavi regime, see Valentine 
Moghadam’s article  "Hidden from History? Women Workers in Modern Iran," Iranian Studies 33, no. 3/4 
(Summer - Autumn, 2000):  p. 380.  Moghadam states, “In the late Qajar period, Iran experienced a slow 
transition from a pre-industrial, traditional, and predominantly feudal society and economy to one where 
capitalist relations were emerging along with the appearance of modern factories. Issawi's economic history 
of Iran (Issawi, 1971) documents the kinds of factories that were built during this period, including many 
that failed (e.g., Issawi, 1971: 47 and chapter 6).”  
235 Floor, "Venereal Disease in Iran (1855-2005): A Public Affair," p. 263. This is also verified in Paidar, 
Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-century Iran, p. 41. 
 
236 Ibid., p. 263. 
237 Kamran Talattof, Modernity, Sexuality and Ideology in Iran:  The Life and Legacy of Popular Female 




what is now central Tehran —its name differentiated from other brothel districts by the 
terms Qal’eh (fort or castle) Shahr-e No or Qal’eh Zahedi, a name attributed to a Pahlavi 
statesman and general Fazlollah Zahedi.238  
By the mid-1960s, Qal’eh239 Shahr-e No became a designated heterotopic space 
—separate from Iranian society, yet integrated in the underbelly of public life. In 
Foucault’s analysis of space, heterotopia is a philosophical concept of “other” spaces, 
meaning relational spaces constructed by societies to house, contain, and deal with 
“otherness.”240 When space is perceived as heterotopic —in the case of prisons, nursing 
homes, or brothels, for instance— the site can function as both an escape from a society’s 
real self and also an illusion of its best self. And in this heterotopic domain, those bodies 
considered weak, undesirable, vulnerable, or “in crisis” remain separate from normative 
society.241 As a physical site of exclusion, it is generally reserved for individuals in a 
state of crisis, such as adolescents and the elderly. Foucault distinguishes brothels as an 
“extreme type of heterotopia.”242 The contradictions and dualities of these ideal selves 
become evident once these sites are investigated for their sustaining of discrimination, 
gender segregation, and unequal power dynamics.  That the sex trade finds itself 
reforming in new “sites,” reappearing in other Tehran districts, means that the same set of 
                                                
238 General Zahedi (1897-1963) was Mohammad Mossadeq’s former Minister of the Interior and an 
instrumental coup leader during the October 1952 American and British-led overthrow of Mossadeq.  See 
Ervand Ebrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran,” Science & Society 65, no. 2 (Summer, 2001): pp. 182-215. 
pp. 199-201.   
 
239 Hereafter I will use the terms Qal’eh, Qal’eh Shahr-e No and Qal’eh Zahedi interchangeably. 
 
240 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” Diacritics 16, no. 1 (Spring, 1986): pp. 22-27. 
 
241 Ibid., p. 24. 
 




relations—money, power, gender, and ideology —are constantly active in the 
propagation of an Iranian heterotopia.  
In Shahr-e No, prostitutes worked and resided in a government-regulated vice 
district. Shahr-e No became a microcosm of urban city life with its own hierarchical 
system of madams and pimps, cafes, theaters, groundskeepers, police protection and 
government health examinations. A citadel-like enclosure on Jamshid Street in the 
Gomrok district (where Razi Square now stands), Qal’eh Shahr-e No housed at one time 
an estimated 4,000 prostitutes243 living in squalid, cramped quarters.244 From north to 
south directions, the area was made up of approximately twelve alleyways; from west to 
east, it covered the space of three major streets—in total a surface area of about 135,000 
square meters.245 This town-within-a-city was initially a pastoral haven of the political 
elite, for during the late Qajar period, the land was known as a retreat for the Qajar royal 
family.246 At the time, a well-known local named Zal Muhammad Khan reportedly 
managed the area.247  
 
                                                
243 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 258. 
244Information about Tehran’s qal’eh or red-light district, in the area known as Shahr-e No, is available 
through various reports, documentaries, newspaper clippings and photojournalist documentation of both 
underground and state-administered sex trafficking during the Pahlavi-era.  A two-part, black and white 
documentary film, entitled, Qal’eh, directed by Kamran Shirdel and produced by the Iran’s Ministry of 
Culture and Art from 1966 until1980 and the “Shahr-e No 1975-1977” exhibition of photographer Kaveh 
Golestan were referenced for this section. See Qaleh 1965-1980/ Shahr-e No Quarter 1965-1980, directed 
by Kamran Shirdel (Tehran:  Ministry of Culture and Art, 1980).  
245 The north side of the area was located near Farabi Hospital, which is still located south of Ghazvene 
Square. Surface area estimate provided by Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 259. 
246 Floor states that Shahr-e No was founded in 1881. This cannot be independently verified by Persian 
sources from the era. Ibid., p. 259. 
247 Dr. Mehdi Montazarqha’em, Rouspigari dar Iran/ Prostitution in Iran (Tehran: Daneshgah-Ulume 





Figure 1:  1969 map of Qal’eh Shahr-e No district248 
Famed social historian Ja’far Shahri writes that Shahr-e No was not yet an 
identifiable brothel district in the late nineteenth century. But by the turn of the century, it 
was well known where to find the best prostitutes  —women who were considered the 
cleanest  (paktizetarin)— and they were located in the district.249 He writes, “Indeed the 
official number of brothels was 850 of which 4421 prostitution rooms were attributed to 
the Shahr-e No area.”250 The worst prostitution houses, located in payeen-e shahr (poorer 
downtown areas), were found in the areas of Chaleh Meydan and Chaleh Silabi (See 
Figure 1). Brothels were scattered across Tehran, and their protection by the police 
                                                
248 Sattareh Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 
49/6/25 (Tehran:  Amuzeshgah-e Aliehi Khadmat-e Ejtimaii, 1349/ 1970), p. 15. 
249 Ja’far Shahri, Tarikh-e Ijtimai-e Tehran dar Qarn-e 13/ The Social History of Tehran in the 13th Century 
(Tehran: Rasa Publishing, 1368/1989), p. 469.  
250 Ibid, p. 470. 
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ensured their ongoing business. According to Shahri, police contracts with brothel 
owners made certain that prostitution rings would survive.  
By the time Reza Shah seized power in 1925, the number of brothels ballooned as 
ownership fell increasingly into the hands of private citizens. The district’s reputation 
worsened as young women, the majority of whom originated from Iran’s central 
provinces, were brought to Shahr-e No for sex work.251 By the time Mohammed Reza 
Shah Pahlavi was re-handed his throne by British and American intelligence on August 
18, 1953, Qal’eh Shahr-e No was already a well-known local institution. The area gained 
its “citadel” status around 1958 once national Chief of Police Fazollah Zahedi (who later 
became Iran’s 63rd prime minister) ordered the construction of a brick wall around Qal’eh 
Shahr-e No’s premises to separate the prostitutes from the rest of Tehran society.252 By 
this very act, Shahr-e No becomes a designated heterotopic space —separate from Iranian 






                                                
251 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 263.  It is doubtful that these young girls and 
women were brought into the district of their own volition.  Najmabadi wrote a seminal book  on the 1905 
raiding of villages, in the Quchan province, where young girls were sold into sex slavery by villagers who 
had trouble paying their taxes.  Other girls were reportedly stolen by Turkmen tribes.  The event caused a 
public outcry after the villagers attempted to seek help from the parliamentary government to no avail. See 
Afsaneh Najmabadi, The Story of the Daughters of Quchan (Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1998). 
252 Ja’far Shahri, Tehran-e Qadim (Tehran: Moein Publishing, 24 Azar 1376/December 24, 1997). This 
five-volume work by Shahri (1914-1994) offers a social history of Tehran during the late 19th mid-20th 
centuries. More on Shahri’s life can be found in the chapter “Ja’far Shahri” in Abbas Milani’s Eminent 
Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran 1941-1979, pp. 893-898. 
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Reporting on Life inside Shahr-e No 
Although the literature on the conditions of brothel life post-Revolution is 
scarce,253 pre-revolution research was substantive as academics and fieldworkers from 
social and public health sectors investigated and regulated the conditions of Qal’eh 
prostitutes. A social worker by the name of Sattareh Farman Farmaian254 published a 
groundbreaking report in 1969 on the conditions of prostitutes of Qal’eh Shahr-e No 
during the Pahlavi period.255 Farman Farmaian’s report is not only important for the 
descriptions of Qal’eh daily life, but it also provides sociological details about the 
                                                
253 Since 1979 when prostitution was banned, there are very few sources in Persian about the extent to 
which prostitution has spread in Iran.  Independent scholars, both lay and professional, have commented 
about the taboo nature of this topic and thus it is unlikely that their writings would have passed government 
censors in the publication sector of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance.  According to Tehran-
based NGO S.P.A.S.D.I. director Mansourian, Sattereh Farman Farmaian wrote the only comprehensive 
study of Tehran’s Shahr-e No to date. Additionally, there are available blog posts about the history of the 
red-light district.  See “Shahr-e No: Mazhar-e Fesad dar Qabl az Engelab/Shahr-e No:  The Symbol of 
Moral Corruption before the Revolution,” Tahrikh-e Moaaser-e Iran, 22 Ordibehesht 1387/ May 11, 2008, 
accessed November 21, 2011, http://bahman18.blogfa.com/post-11.aspx.  It is worth noting that the 
opening lines of this article commence with a discussion about American and English colonialism and the 
decadent culture that it encourages in their colonies. The author argues that English and Americans in Iran 
also promoted this kind of corruption and decadence through the establishment of this brothel district, 
which, according to the article, took place during Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar’s reign. See “Shahr-e No,” 
Ahari Qorbat-Neshin (blog), August 9, 2011, accessed July 1, 2012, 
http://aharii.wordpress.com/2011/08/09/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%86%D9%88/.  See also 
Payvand, “Photos: Tehran’s brothel district Shahr-e-Noh 1975-77 by Kaveh Golestan,” 
http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2010/12/10/photos-tehrans-brothel-district-shahr-e-no-1975-77-by-kaveh-
golestan/. 
254 Sattareh Farman Farmaian is often praised as the “Mother of Social Work” in Iran. A memoir of her life, 
co-authored by Dona Munker, is found in Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from Her Father's 
Harem Through the Islamic Republic (New York: Doubleday, 1992). Born and raised into a large, 
aristocratic family in Tehran, she finished her university education in social work at University of Southern 
California (She was the first Iranian graduate of USC).  Thereafter, she returned to Iran to establish in 1958, 
with the Shah’s approval, Iran’s very first School of Social Work.  At the time, there was no word for the 
term “social work,” so Farman Farmaian invented the term madadkar, meaning “one who helps.” Daughter 
of Persia: A Woman's Journey from Her Father's Harem Through the Islamic Republic, p. 211. As a critic 
of both the Pahlavi regime and Khomeini, she was arrested by revolutionary forces in 1979 and soon 
immigrated to the United States. She died in May 2012. 
 
255Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 49/6/25, 
especially pp. 17-24.  Her work is also referenced in interviews I conducted in the summer of 2011 in 
Tehran. In an interview with sociology Professor Shirin Ahmadnia, she verified the prominence of her 





prostitutes and their living conditions. After conducting interviews with 1,548 sex 
workers, she compiled data on the prostitutes’ living conditions and sex work, some of 
which included their awareness of sexual intercourse, prophylactic usage, marriage 
status, and even spending habits.256  
Taking cues from prostitution discourse in America —many of her theoretical 
sources are based on publications from the American Social Health Association257—
Farman Farmaian provided what is still considered to be the most in-depth analysis of the 
conditions of prostitution inside Qal’eh. Funded by the Vezarat-e Keshvar (Ministry of 
Interior), Farman Farmaian investigated five locations where sex workers were prevalent 
—the largest section of this report is dedicated to conditions inside Qal’eh Shahr-e No.258 
Most of this research documents prostitutes working on the streets, in restaurants and 
bars, residing in the Qal’eh, or based in private brothels spread throughout the city. At the 
time of the report’s publication, prostitution was specific criminal offense in the Pahlavi 
penal code.259  
                                                
256 Ibid., p. 60. 
257 The American Social Health Association (ASHA), now called the American Sexual Health Association, 
is a non-profit organization dedicated to heightening public awareness about sexual health, including 
providing information about sexual rights, STDs, and health care providers.  Although established in 1914 
to control and prevent venereal diseases, drug addiction, and prostitution, by the 1960s, ASHA expanded its 
programs to include treating and rehabilitating drug addicts.  See “American Social Health Association 
Records, 1905-2005,” Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota Libraries, 2002, accessed 
December 10, 2011, http://special.lib.umn.edu/findaid/xml/sw0045.xml. 
 
258 Other sites Farman Farmaian researched included: public streets; houses outside of Qal’eh Shahr-e No; 
night entertainment spots; discotheques in the southern Tehran; and in qowdha (holes), garbage dumps 
which appeared more like slums, based in south of Tehran. Prostitutes lived and worked in some of the 
deep crevices of the qowdha. Ibid., pp. 22-23.  
259 Although there was no law criminalizing prostitution, there was a Pahlavi- era law criminalizing acts 
committed against social morality. According to section 3, Article 211 of the Qanoun-e Mojazat-e 
Ommumi (Pahlavi Criminal Code), ratified in 1924, the law stipulates, “Any person who participates in an 
act, which is against social morality, will be imprisoned from one month to one year, or will be fined from 
25 to 500 tomans.”  Adultery, homosexuality (man having sex with men), rape, and incest were treated as 
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Living Conditions inside Brothel District 
 Qal’eh Shahr-e No did not appear to be any lover’s paradise. Black and white 
photographs of war photojournalist Kaveh Golestan provide some powerful images of the 
conditions captured inside the “citadel.” Golestan famously remarked, “I want to show 
you images that will be like a slap in your face to shatter your security. You can look 
away, turn off, hide your identity like murderers, but you cannot stop the truth. No one 
can.”260 Women resided in cramped quarters, assigned to single rooms in houses that had 
about six to seven rooms each.  Every house typically had a hayat or courtyard.261 There 
are mixed reports on the length of time women resided in this district or even if the 
“citadel” was more like a work-site than living compound.262 Described as a “waste 
ground or public toilet,” conditions inside the compound were so grim that one report 
described a pile of rotting, post-coital tissues left alone in a hayat (courtyard).263  
 
                                                                                                                                            
crimes, punishable by death in Section 3, Article 207. See Qanoun-e Mojazat-e Ommumi, 1304/1924, 
Section 3, Article 207, 211. 
 
260 Quoted in Payvand, “Photos: Tehran’s Brothel District Shahr-e No 1975-77 by Kaveh Golestan,”  
Payvand.com, December 10, 2010, accessed December 12 2012,  
http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2010/12/10/photos-tehrans-brothel-district-shahr-e-no-1975-77-by-kaveh-
golestan/. 
261 See Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 
49/6/25, p. 14. 
262 One researcher in particular, Khosrou Mansourian, whom I discuss later in this chapter, insisted that 
most prostitutes only worked in the quarters and left the citadel for homes located in surrounding areas. 
Mansourian, interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, Tehran, July 17, 2011. 
263 Vivid images of this district are found in the photo compilation of Masoud Benhoud and Hojat 
Sepahvand. See Kaveh Golestan 1950-2003: Recording the Truth in Iran (Hatje Canz Publishers: 




Figure 2:  1969-1970 Farman Farmaian rendition of the concentration of  
prostitution-related activity in Tehran264 
According to Farman Farmaian’s study, the area was a dilapidated, hierarchal 
microcosm wherein social roles were clearly defined among the key figures inside the 
district. Sahebs (male pimps) and nae’eb khanoms (madams) were in charge of Qal’eh’s 
management. They confiscated a percentage of the prostitutes’ wages and acted as their 
liaisons to the world outside the district. As detailed in Farman Farmaian’s report, both 
clients and Qal’eh management followed certain role-playing and protocols during the 
sexual transactions.265 A potential customer would enter the Qal’eh, and shortly a madam 
would appear, beckoning him to meet her in one of the houses’ hayats or come inside the 
home. Prostitutes would stand in requisite positions; they were often visible from the 
                                                
264Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 49/6/25, p. 
25. 
265 Ibid., p. 14. 
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window balconies or sitting near the front door —“as if on display,” recalled 
Mansourian— for the potential customer.266 When a woman was found appealing to him, 
a bartering session between the madam and customer ensued.267 After a price was agreed 
upon, the madam would hand him a token, which he would then give to the prostitute 
with whom he chose to have sexual relations.  The prostitute in turn handed all tokens 
accumulated at the end of the day to the elder “Maman” (madam-figure) of the house. A 
veteran among the prostitutes and well known by customers, Maman would place the 
token in her leather or nylon purse; by day’s end, the number of tokens were tallied in 
order to divvy out the sums owed to each prostitute. Moreover, police would confiscate a 
portion of the madam’s profits because protecting women came at a price. 
Women who provided sexual services for male customers charged a daily rate of 
up to 600 riyals (or 60 tomans),268 were at the sexual service of men.269 Serving some 
16,000 men each day, they worked between three to twelve hours per day— some close 
                                                
266 Mansourian, interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, Tehran, July 17, 2011. Khosrou Mansourian 




268 According to an online report of currency exchange rates from 1979, one US dollar was equivalent to 70 
rials or 7 tomans.  See “Iran Currency Exchange Rate History:  1975-2012,”  Farsinet.com, accessed July 3, 
2012, http://www.farsinet.com/toman/exchange.html. 
 
269 There are contesting reports about the daily salary of prostitutes from this period.  In an interview, 
Khosrou Mansourian stated that prostitutes made between 400 and 500 tomans for each session.  However, 
this price counters of a Qal’eh Shahr-e No prostitute who was interviewed for the documentary film; she 
stated that children were prostituted for 40 to 50 tomans per hour.   In addition, Willem Floor uses Farman 
Farmaian’s report to note that the average daily income of a Shahre- No prostitute was 743 riyals, a price 
that is significantly lower than Mansourian’s estimate. It is likely that Mansourian was using 2011 currency 
exchange rates to estimate their salaries. In October 2011, one US dollar was equivalent to 10,700 rials or 
1070 tomans.  See Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 264.  It is also worth noting that 
whatever money a Shahr-e No prostitute earned would be divided according to rent and food expenses, as 
well as to divided among the madams and other prostitutes residing in each house.    
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to eighteen hours.270 (Some children were offered at a discounted hourly rate of forty to 
fifty tomans.)271  
 
The Women of Shahr-e No 
Young and old women who ended up in Qal’eh were primarily from rural areas 
and poor families; they had minimal literacy and virtually no schooling.272 Sold into the 
sex trade, many had not given their consent nor had any knowledge they were being 
trafficked.273 In some cases, their own husbands and parents tricked them or sold them 
into prostitution.274 Little girls, as young as six years old, were sold by their parents to 
traffickers and madams and brought to live and work in the district.275 Some of the older 
women prostitutes had arrived at Qal’eh as divorcees, having had little or no financial 
support from their families.276  
                                                
270 Floor, A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran, p. 265. 
 
271 The price estimate of children, according to a Shahr-e No prostitute, is found in the aforementioned film, 
“A Documentary about Prostitution in Qal’eh Shahr-e No, Tehran,” directed by Kamran Shirdel and 
produced by the Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Art from 1966 until1980. Farman Farmaian also 
interviewed prostitutes who were younger than age fifteen. See Farman Farmaian, Ruspargari dar Shahr-e 
Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran, 49/6/25, Table 58, p. 93. 
272 See Kaveh Golestan 1950-2003: Recording the Truth in Iran. For literacy rates of Shahr-e No 
prostitutes, see Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e 
No, 49/6/25, Table 37. 
273 Farman Farmaian, Daughter of Persia, p. 301.  Farman Farmaian explains, “Many were wives or village 
girls who had been lured or abducted from their homes and sold into the brothels, so that they were beyond 
the pale of respectable society and could never return to their families.” Ibid., p. 301. 
 
274 Farman Farmaian interviewed 1180 prostitutes and tallied how many were married.  In Shahr-e No, 893 
were married compared to 287 who were single. Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e 
Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 49/6/25, Table 20, p. 63. 
275 Khosrou Mansourian, interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, personal interview, Tehran, Iran, 
July 17, 2011. 
 




Added to the mix of Qal’eh denizens were female runaways and orphans, whom 
certain commentators have said were found and collected from the provinces, raped, and 
brought to Shahr-e No by opportunistic characters, such as Abdelmahmoud Arab and 
Erbab Jamshid.277 Prostitutes lived alongside children who were conceived from these 
liaisons and past relationships.278 Throughout the district’s history, gigolo-types (both 
male and female) would ultimately force these women into sexual servitude as 
compensation for their housing; gigolos held these women against their will and ordered 
them to pay back debts that they owed either to the gigolos or to their own parents.279  
In Farman Farmaian’s report, social workers had asked prostitutes their reasons 
for entering the sex trade. I highlight some of their responses: 572 said they were fooled; 
415 were sold; 311 had no guardian or immediate care; 41 had desires for wealth; and 72 
answered they became prostitutes for a “pleasure,” or lezat in Persian, which is neither 
explained by Farman Farmaian or by the women she interviewed.280 Despite the lack of 
explanation for their reasons, the report illustrates that there was some dimension of 
choice in a woman’s decision to enter and remain within the sex industry. Long before 
sex workers’ rights initiatives in the mid-1980s pushed for international conventions to 
                                                
277 “Shahr-e No: Mazhar-e Fesaad dar Qabl az Enqelab/Shahr-e No: The Manifestation of Moral Corruption 
before the Revolution,” Tahrikh-e Moaaser-e Iran, 22 Ordibehesht 1387/ May 11, 2008, accessed 
November 21, 2011, http://bahman18.blogfa.com/post-11.aspx. See also Floor, A Social History of Sexual 
Relations in Iran, pp. 262-263.  
 
278 These relationships also included marriages ending in divorce. 
279 Shahr-e No: Mazhar-e Fesaad dar Qabl az Enqelab/Shahr-e No: The Manifestation of Moral Corruption 
before the Revolution,” Tahrikh-e Moaaser-e Iran. This sentiment was also verified by Khosrou 
Mansourian in November 2011 interview. 
280 Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 49/6/25, 
Table 34, p. 75. 
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include self-determination and state protection of the industry,281 their answers reflect the 
role of self-awareness in the decision-making behind why and how women would reside 
in Shahr-e No.  (Another interesting find is that the majority of the prostitutes had 
minimal awareness of sex:  only 157 were aware of what sex was, whereas the remaining 
1,389 expressed ignorance.)282 
 
Intrepid Pari Bolandeh of Shahr-e No 
Once Shahr-e No became a veritable red-light district, it was guarded by the 
police and fortified with a wall that permanently demarcated its perimeters. At least two 
guardsmen stood at Shahr-e No’s only entrance on Sohrab Street (now Helal Ahmar 
Street) and inspected men and women hoping to pass through its gates. It was difficult for 
prostitutes to leave the premises of their own volition because Shahr-e No’s sole entrance 
was also its only exit;283 escaping was usually their only recourse to pursuing a life 
outside the quarter. Prostitutes who had fled were eventually arrested by police, beaten, 
and sent back to Qal’eh.284  
                                                
281 Jo Doezema, "Forced to choose: Beyond the voluntary v. Forced prostitution dichotomy" in Global Sex 
Workers, ed. by Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 35. 
 
282Farman Farmaian, Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran/Prostitution in Tehran’s Shahr-e No, 49/6/25, 
Table 16, p. 60. 
283 In an August 10, 2011 interview I conducted with 26-year-old Forough A.— whose name has been 
altered to protect her identity— she recounted a story of a grandfather who, as a teenager, had fallen in love 
with a young girl living inside Shahr-e No.  Because this girl could not leave the premises on her own, the 
young man and a group of his friends entered the district, carrying extra men’s clothing.  After getting 
dressed as a young boy, the girl left the “citadel” with them and soon after, the young girl and boy married. 
Forough A., interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, personal interview, Tehran, Iran, August 10, 
2011. 
 
284 For information about police tactics see film Qal’eh Shahr-e No, Tehran. 
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There are an untold number of powerful hands participating in economically and 
materially sustaining this institution, suggesting that political influence and corruption 
extended deep into the Iranian political system.285 Certain female figures inside Qal’eh 
also attracted attention and received clemency that originated well beyond Qal’eh’s 
domain.  Being business savvy, madams were able to invest in business and political 
opportunities outside Qal’eh. One of the most recognized of these madams was a 
prostitute by the name of “Pari Bolandeh (Pari the Tall),” the catchy moniker of Sakineh 
Qasemi.286  
Nicknames like hers were hard to come by. During Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign, 
women were not typically referred to by their full names.  According to formal custom of 
the time, women were referred to by their relationships to the closest male relative. 
Khanom (wife) or dokhtar (daughter) of Agha (Mister) was a more appropriate reference, 
ensuring that a respectful distance be maintained at all times between mahram 
relations.287 However, state modernization attempts altered many of these customs. Once 
Reza Shah demanded that Iran westernize itself, through force and legal ramifications, 
women were ordered to unveil in 1936.288  Prostitutes were exempt from this ordinance 
                                                
285 This comment about political corruption in Shahr-e No was stated by both Fatemeh Sadeghi (the 
daughter of former Islamic revolutionary judge Khalkhali) and Khosrou Mansourian during our personal 
interviews. Fatemeh Sadeghi, interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, personal interview, Tehran, 
Iran, October 1, 2011. 
286 “Pari Bolandeh Kist?/ Who is Pari Bolandeh?” Mahitaabe,  2010, accessed July 15, 2011, 
http://mahitaabe.blogspot.com/2010/04/blog-post_25.html. 
 
287 Mahram is an Islamic shari’a legal terminology that describes kin who cannot have sexual relations or 
get married as it would be considered both illegal and incestuous.  A mahram relationship can also be one 
established by blood, milk, marriage or sexual union. See Jane Khatib-Chahidi, “Sexual Prohibitions, 
Shared Space and ‘Fictive’ Marriages in Shi’ite Iran,” in Women and Space: Ground Rules and Social 
Maps, ed. Shirley Ardener (Oxford, Bloomsbury, 1997), p. 114. 
 
288 Nashat adds, “After the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, when the rule prohibiting the veil was  
abandoned, many women returned to it. But the trend was not completely reversed since the present-day  
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and allowed to wear the chador as a way to distinguish themselves as women who are not 
chaste. But Pari Bolandeh was a tradition-breaker; she capitalized on this era of state-
administered modernist reform. A tall and slender woman, Pari Bolandeh was known for 
her brazenness in advertising her female employees’ sexual services. Originally from 
Ghazvene, she appeared to have a popular following, having managed brothels from 
several properties throughout Tehran. Her reach even extended into the field of politics. 
During the American-orchestrated coup d’etat of Prime Minister Mossadegh, Qasemi 
participated in anti-Tudeh demonstrations, which were organized by Pahlavi state 
authorities. Pictured demonstrating along with athletes from zur-khanehs289 and other 
prostitutes from Qal’eh Shahr-e No, Qasemi publicly chanted “Death to Mossadegh” and 
the end to his nationalist policies.290  
The 1979 overthrow of the Pahlavi regime would mean the swift cessation of Pari 
Bolandeh’s madam activities and political activism. Arrested and tried under the Islamic 
revolutionary courts, she was executed by a firing squad291 on July 12, 1979, along with 
                                                                                                                                            
chador bears only a remote resemblance to the elaborate veil of yesteryear.” See Guity Nashat, “Women in 
the Islamic Republic in Iran,” Iranian Studies 13, no. 1/4, Iranian Revolution in Perspective (1980): p. 167. 
289 In 1953, one of the most prominent traditional athletes, Ša’bān Ja’fari, was a ringleader of the CIA-
financed riots that accompanied the military coup d’état of 1953 against Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddeq. See “zur-kana,” Encyclopedia Iranica, August 15, 2005, accessed August 18, 2011, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zur-kana. 
290 Though this photograph cannot be truly verified, a number of online Persian sources have posted a 
snapshot of what appears to be Pari Bolandeh.  In a black-and-white photograph apparently taken the day 
of the coup d’etat, she is photographed along with a group of men, waving a rod in the air as she holds onto 
a car door. See Kayhan, Issue 10700 (20 Dey 1390/ January 10, 2012), front cover.  
291 The details about her execution are not clear.  It was reported by Kayhan newspaper that she was killed 
by firing squad. According to the Omid Foundation of Human Rights, “The Revolutionary Tribunal of 
Tehran charged Ms. Sakineh Qasemi with ‘corruption on earth.’ Based on the Kayhan report, Ms. Qasemi 
was executed by a firing squad on July 12, 1980. However, according to the received electronic form, she 
was hanged in front of the Shekufeh-ye No cabaret in Tehran.” See Boroumand Foundation, “One Person’s 




two other female associates, Saheb Afsari (also known as Soraya Tarkeh) and Zahra Mafi 
(also known as Ashraf Cheharchesme, or Ashraf Four Eyes).292 Though details of the 
court proceedings are scarce (and provided the day after the Kayhan newspaper 
announced her execution), it was reported that after several closed meetings, Branch One 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Tehran found her guilty of administering and 
abetting the illegal prostitution of girls, deceiving women, operating brothels, and 
spreading corruption among generations —or, as the judgment read, “corruption on 
earth.”293 In the last known photograph of her (Figure 3), taken some time before her 




                                                
292 Kayhan, Issue 10755, “Be Hokm-e Dadgahha-ye Enqelab-e Eslami: Seh Zan va Chahar Mard Tirbaran 
Shodand/ The Islamic Revolutionary Courts Executed 3 Women and 4 Men by  
Firing Squad,” (21 Tir 1358/ July 12, 1979), front cover.  See also Maryam Hosseinkhah, The Execution of 
Women in Iranian Criminal Law:  An Examination of the Impact of Gender on Laws Concerning Capital 
Punishment in the New Islamic Penal Code (New Haven, CT: Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 
2012), p. 28. 
 
293 Boroumand Foundation, “One Person’s Story: Mr. Monir Taheri,” Abdorrahman Boroumand 
Foundation.   
294 The photograph of “Pari Bolandeh” can be found in the same Kayhan article, announcing her execution. 
See “Be Hokm-e Dadgahha-ye Enqelab-e Eslami: Seh Zan va Chehar Mard Tirbaran Shodand/ The Islamic 




Figure 3:  Kayhan announcement of the execution of Pari Bolandeh, 
photographed in black chador 
Male Clientele: Recalling Shahr-e No’s Past  
For male patrons of Shahr-e No, gaining entrance into the brothel district meant 
access into a somewhat exclusive club of mischief, revelry, and male sexual experience. 
Although politicians, celebrities, and even clerics were spotted entering Qal’eh, male 
laborers were reportedly the most frequent patrons. (Mansourian disputed this claim, 
stating that men from various social stratum and political persuasions used Shahr-e No’s 
services.) Married and single male laborers would seek the prostitutes’ services because it 
was claimed —and tacitly accepted— that the laborers’ extended periods away from their 
marital beds needed a relief from this sexual tension.295 According to Mansourian, not all 
men were granted entrance into the district. A customer’s age and masculine appearance 
often determined admission into the district. At the gates, police officers would check if a 
male had entered puberty by rubbing their bare hands across his cheek and chin. If he felt 
                                                
295 Payvand, “Photos: Tehran’s Brothel District Shahr-e-No 1975-77 by Kaveh Golestan,” Payvand.com, 




that hair stubble was present, then the customer was given entrance and usage of Shahr-e 
No’s services.  Those too young to produce a sign of a beard or any facial hair were 
turned away.296  
In interviews297 with erstwhile male patrons, Qal’eh provided an opportune space 
for a man’s sexual rite of passage. From ten interviews conducted with primarily middle-
age Iranian men based in Tehran, all of whom were teenagers or in their early twenties at 
the time of the Revolution, I encountered many diverse explanations for why men would 
choose Qal’eh for sexual experience. At this juncture, it is pivotal that I explain how I 
collected the research for this section —mostly compiled from personal interviews, 
newspaper articles, and online blogger accounts of former Qal’eh patrons. I conducted 
interviews specifically on the subject of Shahr-e No with ten Iranians (three females and 
seven males) between the months of June and October in 2011.298 I had met each 
respondent through word-of-mouth, and all interviews took place in the privacy of their 
homes. 
Among this group of interviewees, I discovered that each could easily recall the 
coordinates and activities of the district. However, none of the women had ever visited 
the site and had been instructed by their families never to be seen in such a place for fear 
of damaging their reputation. It became clear to me that the subject of Shahr-e No was 
                                                
296 Mansourian, interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, New York, November 15, 2011.  
 
297 All interviews for this dissertation followed International Review Board regulations, approved by 
Columbia University and the US Department of Health and Human Services. The purpose of the IRB is to 
make sure that human research is well planned and ethical. Columbia University has implemented a 
comprehensive Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) charged with the responsibility of ensuring 
that all human research studies conducted by Columbia students and staff are conducted ethically and in a 
manner that promotes the protection of participants in research. 
 
298 The interviewees were Tehran residents and all above the age of forty (except for the interview with 




not easily spoken about by people from a wide range of socioeconomic and religious 
backgrounds. For most of the Iranian men I interviewed, Shahr-e No was described as a 
rite-of-passage —visiting it with other male friends during their youth. However, none of 
the men admitted being direct patrons of Shahr-e No’s services.  For some of the 
respondents (whose names have been altered to protect their identities), their reasoning 
included the spontaneity and curiosity of youth that would lead one to seek out a Qal’eh 
prostitute. Two respondents claimed that Qal’eh prostitutes enabled these men to have 
their very first sexual experience with women. Jamal, a middle-aged jeweler, admitted 
that his friends frequently visited the quarters. His father, a pious man from Khomein 
village, was not aware of his son’s activities. However, Jamal’s close female relative299 
had her suspicions, although she never mentioned them to him. During our interview, she 
acknowledged finding a doctor’s prescription slip for syphilis treatment in his trousers’ 
pocket. At the time, Jamal was fifteen years old, and she presumed that he would not 
likely have become infected from any sexual relations outside Shahr-e No.   
In another interview, a male respondent described how a friend’s father purchased 
the services of a Shahr-e No prostitute to rid his son of his virginity. As previously 
mentioned, sexual rite of passage was a common theme expressed in the interviews. 
Nader, a middle-age computer engineer from East Tehran, recounted that at age fifteen, 
he accompanied an older group of male friends to Shahr-e No. Though Nader insisted he 
did not personally engage in any sexual activity and was there just for the experience of 
being there and seeing it, he recounted a story in which a young man fell in love with a 
prostitute and the lengths traveled to help her escape the premises. For some of the male 
                                                
299 Because of this sensitive subject, I am using this vague terminology to protect the names and identities 
of the interviewees and their family members. 
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interviewes, sneaking around the premises, either alone or with a group of friends, was 
just enough experience to weave into a nostalgic memory about youth adventure.  In an 
interview, thirty-something Farhad, a web-designer whose older cousins would confide in 
him stories about their Shahr-e No experiences, expressed sympathy for the prostitutes.  
Farhad argued that the quarter’s destruction would mean the prostitutes would soon be 
forgotten. When I asked him to elaborate, he mentioned that before the revolution the 
prostitutes had an actual site to work; now their work had dispersed throughout Tehran. 
 
The Demolishing of Shahr-e No 
As the tide of Pahlavi dissent culminated in the co-opting of a people’s revolution 
in the name of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islam, lesser-known prostitutes fared no better. 
Condemnation of women prostitutes swiftly entered riot stages, with angry crowds 
gathering around Shahr-e No within the first days of the Revolution. Qal’eh’s 
denouement proved both gruesome and spectacular: After a failed attempt to set fire to 
the district in November 1978,300 three months later in early February 1979, an angry 
mob was reported to have attacked Shahr-e No’s residents, setting the district ablaze after 
attempts by police and firefighters to quell the riots were unsuccessful.  (Mehrangiz Kar 
claims that the riots were the work of Islamic revolutionary extremists who had come to 
                                                
300In her memoirs, Farman Farmaian details her role in the November 1978 torching of Qal’eh—which, to 
her surprise, was lauded by Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani.  Fearing for the lives of the women and 
children at the welfare center of Qal’eh, she and her social work colleagues ran to the district, carrying 
buckets of water to put out the fire while also insisting that the police and fire stations help. She then 
realized they had not entered the quarters because “it was better to let the Qal’eh burn than to antagonize 
the ‘beards.’” “Beards” was the nickname for the most fanatical of the clerical supporters who Farman 
Farmaian witnessed carrying torches and cans of kerosene, intent on “punishing a few miserable women for 




“destroy the roots of moral corruption.”)301 There were two confirmed deaths.302 Soon 
after, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali —himself notorious for the swift condemnation and 
execution of political prisoners and activists during his tenure as chief justice of Iran’s 
first revolutionary courts— denounced the area and ordered bulldozers inside to level the 
district for its illegal and un-Islamic activities.303  
 
Figure 4:  November 2011 aerial view of Park-e Razi 
                                                
301 Kar, Crossing the Red Line, p. 181. 
302 “30 Years Ago on This Day,” Radio Zamaneh, 8 Bahman 1387/January 27, 2009, accessed September 
11, 2011, http://zamaaneh.com/revolution/2009/01/post_218.html. Quoted in Ettela’at, “Beh Atash 
Keshidan-e ‘Qal’eh-ye Shahr-e No’ va Koshtan-e Rouspeyan/Shahr-e No Quarter Set on Fire and 
Prostitutes Killed,” 9 Bahman 1357/January 29, 1979. 
 
303Khalkhali was sworn into office as Head of the Revolutionary Courts on the 24th of Bahman 1357  
(February 13, 1979), four days after Iranians mark as the celebration of the Islamic Revolution.  For more 
information about Judge Khalkhali, please consult the following websites: Ahari blogpost, August 9, 2011, 
accessed September 11, 2011, 
http://aharii.wordpress.com/2011/08/09/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%86%D9%88/.  Article on 
Khalkhali’s involvement also found in the following online sources: Balatarin, accessed September 11, 
2011, http://balatarin.com/permlink/2011/8/5/2651728.  
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Park-e Razi: Cleansing the Site of Prostitution for a Moral Leisure Area 
Today, the Shahr-e No narrative has faded into the outskirts of public memory. 
Ask most Iranians under the age of thirty and he or she will likely be puzzled as to the 
existence and history of these red-light districts.304 However, ask where Gomrok district 
is located, and more likely this response quickly follows: “It’s near a park!” Prior to 
1979, this answer was not possible, as Gomrok was always associated with Shahr-e No. 
Evidently, though the name of Gomrok has not changed, for two generations of Iranians 
in the Islamic Republic, its name resonates with something else.   
In the site that was formerly a red-light district now stands a multi-acre, 
manicured park known as Park-e Razi (Razi Park), which is located in Tehran’s District 
Eleven. All forty-four hectares (almost 108.7 acres) of Park-e Razi essentially cover the 
former site of Shahr-e No, although it bears no physical resemblance to its pre-
revolutionary incarnation. Unlike the majority of formerly inhabited lands in Tehran that, 
after the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, were heavily developed into office and 
apartment buildings —for land development has been a lucrative business— this 
particular area was transformed into a family-friendly leisure and athletics space.305  Its 
grounds include a cultural exhibition center, a public library, a cinema, the now defunct 
amusement park of Shahr-e Bazi (Play City), and a man-made lake fit with a neon-lit 
bridge on which park patrons and fishermen can observe swan gondola trips. The park 
                                                
304 Pahlavi-era movies and novels are two domains in which Shahr-e No characters have been sustained in 
the public memory—yet interviews of former patrons and inhabitants who lived in Qal’eh’s surrounding 
areas offer personal, nonfictional accounts of the social life, networks, and inter-dynamics of the quarter 
and its inhabitants.  
305 For information on the impact of quick urbanization of Tehran city from a study of satellite images of 
the capital’s urban development, see S.Z. Shahraki, Z. Arzjani, and N. Ahmadifard, “A Systematic Study of 
the Impact of Urbanization of Tehran City on Agricultural and Garden Land Use,” Crop Research (Hisar) 




also hosts a children’s playground area, a prayer space and lecture hall, as well as an 
open-air calisthenics section for public use.  From the park’s main entrance on Kargar 
Street, petty businessmen are found sitting on benches with their satchels open, selling 
snacks and trinkets to passersby. Traditional and fast food restaurants line avenues 
reaching to the main square, where a statue of Persian medieval scholar and physician 
Mohammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi peers over a rotunda. Park-e Razi’s surrounding area is 
still relatively poor, surrounded by a mixture of rundown two-story buildings, vacant 
shopping centers, local banks, and family-operated businesses selling odds and ends.306  
The Tehran Parks and Green Space Organization runs most of the capital’s eight 
hundred parks, providing maintenance, landscaping, and beautification services. The 
organization even produces its own newsletters about park-related topics and the 
psychological benefits to being park patrons. For instance, it published the article,  “The 
Importance of Green Spaces and its Effect on Human Mentality,” praising municipal 
parks as symbols of heaven and health. They are places where individuals escape to 
nature for peace, leisure, and relaxation.307 According to this article, visitors frequent 
parks in order to have calmer thoughts, which are enabled by the psychologically pleasant 
green colors surrounding them.308  
                                                
306 Located nearby are Park-e Khanevadeh (Family Park) and the miniature Ghazvene Square. 
 
307“Ahamiyat-e Faza-ye Sabz va Ta’sir-e Un bar Ravan-e Ensan/The Importance of Green Space and its 
Effect on Human Mentality,” Parks and Green Space Organization Tehran Municipality, date unknown, 
accessed June 26, 2012, 
http://parks.tehran.ir/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wBH9D6Qm7Uw%3d&tabid=101&mid=481. 
 
308 Fariba Abdelkhah has studied how municipal parks and gardens, especially in Tehran, offer a public, 
communal space in which different social groups and classes of society coexist and share in their “favourite 
consumption and leisure practices,” such as picnicking, socializing with friends, family gatherings, sports, 
and selling crafts.  However public parks are also sites on which varied social practices and groups interact 
and rival one another.  Parks are often where local authorities, neighbors, and Revolutionary Guard 
members observe and, at times, enforce the moral code demanded by the regime. See Abdelkhah, Being 
Modern in Iran, pp. 19-20. 
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  Park-e Razi is however operated by other municipal authorities. Since 2005, it has 
been uniquely managed by the state cultural organization, Sazman-e Farhangi Honari 
Shahrdari-ye Tehran (Cultural Arts Organization for Tehran Municipality), which has 
administrative offices located near a park entrance. The organization describes itself as a 
“center for cultural activities in Tehran and administrates over 300 cultural centers” 
across the city.309 As a state institution, it also has its own publishing branch. (For the 
thirty-second anniversary of the revolution, it commemorated the occasion by publishing 
a 600-page chronology of revolutionary milestones from state-media sources, which it 
planned to sell during the anniversary’s demonstrations.)310 According to a news report, it 
had special plans for Park-e Razi, transforming it into the “cultural pole of the capital.”311 
Currently, the park hosts art and film exhibitions and offers cultural and religious 
programs, such as the spring season 2012 lecture series on hejab and chastity called 
“Gohar-e Efaf” (The Jewel of Chastity).  
                                                
309 “Fifty Ambassadors, First Secretaries Guests of Iran Arts Garden-Museum,” Tehran Municipality 
website, June 26, 2012, accessed July 1, 2012, http://en.tehran.ir/default.aspx?tabid=77&ArticleId=747.   
 
310 “Comprehensive Chronology of Islamic Revolution Published,” Tehran Municipality website, February 
8, 2012, accessed June 14, 2012, http://en.tehran.ir/ViewArticle/tabid/77/ArticleId/523/Comprehensive-
Chronology-of-Islamic-Revolution-Published.aspx. 
 
311 “Yek Mohit-e Kamelan Farhangi Baraye Noh Hafte/ A Cultural Environment for 9 Weeks,” Hamshahri 




Figure 5:  Pedestrian sign at the Kargar Street entrance of Park-e Razi, Tehran 
 






Figure 7:  Neon-lit bridge overlooking man-made lake of Park-e Razi, Tehran 
July 2011 
In the last three decades since the formation of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian 
state has been engaged in the re-invention and calibration of certain monuments and 
geographic sites into Islamic communal leisure spaces, subsequently expunging from 
records the pre-revolutionary historical narrative of those particular spaces and objects. 
Redeveloping a century-old site of prostitution into a familial space is one method of 
projecting the triumph of Islamic values over the corrupt, symbolic political capital of the 
Pahlavis formerly embodied in these sites. According to the Islamic Republic’s 
revolutionary narrative, while the Pahlavi state promoted “dens of moral corruption,” 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of an Islamic state, by contrast, promoted religious and 
family values.312 Shahr-e No’s development into a recreational public park is one of 
many illuminating examples. In its place is a now utopian reconstruction of a historical 
site which functions in forging a new collective memory and social cohesion through the 
                                                
312 Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Cinema, Volume 1:  The Artisan Era, 1897-1941 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011), p. 260. 
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remodeling of a landscape into ideologically constructed space.  In this site, history can 
be both erased and re-imagined, in accordance to a particular ideology. This is illustrated 
in the historical and political narration of Park-e Razi in relation to the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic, which is published on the Cultural-Arts Organization of Tehran 
Municipality’s website. According to the website, an Islamic Revolution313 is praised for 
transforming the land where Shahr-e No once stood into something better: 
Historically, this area is one of the important areas of cultural heritage, if one  
counts the Ghazvin gates, the Garden of Kings, and Sheikh Hadi and Moniriyeh  
Streets.  Before the revolutionary period, the cultural background of this  
neighborhood was very bleak because of the existence of Jamshid quarter 
and other profound social problems. However, with the glorious advent of the 
Islamic Revolution (Khorshid-e Enqelab-e Islami) and through the efforts of the  
municipality, it was transformed from a corrupt area into the biggest leisure and  
sports center in the city.314 
 
Here, the text does not explicitly mention prostitution; instead, the area’s former name —
Jamshid— is mentioned, which is not a common reference point for Iranians under the 
age of thirty-five.  As a strategy of replacing the pre-revolutionary history by 
superimposing an Islamic identity and beginning for that site, the illicit past is ostensibly 
absolved through this process of spatial cleansing. The actual land of Shahr-e No 
transforms into a purported prostitution-free, green space that accommodates families, 
athletes, and library patrons. In this zone, Islamic values are cultivated and nurtured 
through the ubiquitous planning of the state. To a certain degree, visiting Park-e Razi is 
unlike visiting other parks spread across the city —it is a domain of the state. Because the 
                                                
313 Here, the 1979 Revolution is identified as an Islamic revolution, eliminating the existence of any 
oppositional, secular forces that participated in the fall of the Pahlavi regime. 
 
314 “Mo’arefi-ye Manteqe-ye 11/ Introducing District 11,” Cultural Arts Organization for Tehran 





Cultural Arts organization integrates religious and state programs into the recreational 
programs that the park offers, the state determines the meaning and content of recreation.  
Park-e Razi offers a new social and spatial reality where Islamic tenets are reinforced and 
made accessible to the general public. In other words, if a visitor wants to learn about the 
Revolution or the subject of modesty from the state’s perspective, then the park becomes 
a site where he or she can understand these topics. Hence, visiting Park-e Razi involves 
much more than an escape to nature for the benefits of health and leisure. 
The remodeled site is a cursory reincarnation, disguising an attempt to build over 
a “primary” site for the purposes of dismissing and revising facts about what exactly went 
on in that location for many generations. As Robert Sack has argued in his discussion of 
spatiality and social life,  
When place, and not only the things in it, is a force-when it influences, affects,  
and controls-it is a primary place. Primary places involve human actions and  
intentions and have the capacity to change things. Unlike a secondary place,  
which can be replaced without remainder by substituting the objects and  
interactions in its area, a primary place cannot be re-placed. Primary places are  
delimited, they possess rules about the things to be included and excluded, and  
they have meaning.315  
 
In this theoretical paradigm, Park-e Razi is a secondary place. The material fixtures of a 
children’s playground and prayer space are temporary replacements, meant to nurture an 
Islamic identity ground in piety, family, and Muslim community. Yet, although this new 
site looks and feels nothing like its predecessor, prostitution, which dominated that space 
for almost a century, is still a quotidian presence, for transactions for illicit sexual 
activities are made and conducted in various sections of the park. 
 
                                                
315 Robert Sack, Homo Geographicus:  A Framework for Action, Awareness, and Moral Concern 




Recalling Shahr-e No’s Past from Park Residents 
Although Shahr-e No was demolished, what has remained of this district is alive 
in the vivid storytelling of older generations and captured in history books and newspaper 
clippings. To learn more about the social history of the former brothel district and 
observe the physical transformation that the Gomrok district had undergone, I decided to 
visit the park and ask Iranians about their knowledge of Shahr-e No and of Park-e Razi’s 
past.316 In August 2011, I traveled to Park-e Razi and conducted eights interviews with 
visitors.317 The park was virtually empty, as it was both Ramadan and very hot. The park 
is not usually empty, as during the weekend holiday —for Iranians, Thursday and 
Friday— it is generally packed with families and young people mingling, playing sports, 
or picnicking.  
In Park-e Razi, I interviewed a total of six men and two women, whom I met 
while they were seated on benches at different locations throughout the park. Each person 
was a denizen of the park’s surrounding neighborhoods. The two women interviewees 
were in their late twenties and early thirties and were both strangers to me and to one 
another.  The men, however, seemed to be acquainted with one another, as each person 
offered suggestions about the next person with whom I should speak. Of the six men, five 
were above the age of sixty and informed me that they sat in the park as part of their daily 
ritual. The last interview I conducted in the park was with a gondola ride attendant who 
                                                
316 I visited the park with a female friend, as my family and I had safety concerns because I was unfamiliar 
with the area. Moreover, it is not typical for a female—regardless of her age, origin, or religious 
disposition— to visit parks unaccompanied in Iran. It would invite unwanted attention from strangers, 
including the park police, who would be curious about my reasons for doing so. 
 
317 The interviews took place in the afternoons of Wednesday and Thursday on August 24 and 25, 2011. I 
spent eight hours each day at Park-e Razi.   
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introduced me to a middle-aged security guard —coincidentally, one who had formerly 
worked at Shahr-e No. 
When I inquired individually if they had heard of Shahr-e No, they all responded 
that the park was constructed over its remnants. I spoke with a thirty-year-old mother, 
who was waiting for her son to finish a game of football.   She admitted she was too 
young to know details about the red-light district; however, she said that prostitutes were 
known to frequent the park in the early mornings and late evenings now. In one section of 
the park, canopies shield tables and benches, and certain areas are not well lit. She 
pointed out that prostitutes and potential customers gather discreetly to arrange meeting 
times and meeting places.  
The people I spoke to offered few personal details about the red-light district; this 
topic caused uneasiness particularly for the elderly men.318 For instance, after animatedly 
detailing the design layout of the park and describing mischievous activities of young 
couples in Park-e Razi, an elderly, divorced man suddenly lowered his voice when 
describing the area before 1979. He said, briefly, “Bad things happened here,” and 
promptly ended our conversation. In other interviews with male park visitors, the details 
tended to be more illustrative of the illicit sexual conduct —such as men and women 
engaged in petting and fornication—that they had witnessed while visiting the park. 
According to the twenty-one-year-old gondola conductor and the security guard who was 
a worker inside Shahr-e No, elderly prostitutes are spotted occasionally in the park, 
sitting on benches near the man-made lake. The conductor claimed that there was a 
particular protocol men and women would follow if they sought casual or paid sex: either 
                                                
318 I think that my female gender might have impacted what information male interviewees felt comfortable 
in sharing with me.  Moreover, I realize that the topics of Shahr-e No and prostitution are considered taboo 
and thus not easily broached in public, and among strangers. 
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would sit on opposite ends of the benches and discreetly flirt while discussing details of 
potential sexual encounters. When I inquired about these women’s identities —i.e., who 
they were and where they had come from— the men separately told me that, although the 
majority were young prostitutes, there were some rumored to have worked in Shahr-e No.   
According to their accounts, some women had returned to the site to continue sex work 
after having difficulty finding employment after the Revolution.319    
Even despite Shahr-e No’s physical destruction and renovation as a park, 
prostitution has not been eradicated.  The discussion of the pre-revolutionary history of 
Park-e Razi and the acknowledgment that prostitutes have not abandoned working in the 
area provide an important, public counter-narrative to the state’s evocation of Islamic 
family values in the constructing of this park. Clearly, the physical erasure of Shahr-e No, 
which was previously a government-regulated societal landmark and institution for 
prostitution, has only shrouded the site on which prostitution is practiced. The ongoing 
presence of prostitution suggests that the renovation of the space to eradicate the sex 
industry was a cosmetic effort and did not address the socioeconomic factors and 
conditions under which prostitution is practiced. The Islamic Republic’s cultural 
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initiatives to characterize and then monopolize how this particular space transforms are 
disputed.   
 
Conclusion 
This historical narration of Tehran’s erstwhile red-light districts and its 
contemporary manifestations is not meant to identify and thus sensationalize the 
underworld of a sex industry that now operates openly in a Tehran park.  To acknowledge 
the presence of sex workers in parks offers no radical redirection of the discourse on 
prostitution and how it operates and is handled in Iran. As I have discussed in an earlier 
section of this chapter, internationally, there have been varied methods of tolerance and 
regulation toward prostitution and the people involved in this industry. What is unique 
about prostitution discourse in contemporary Iran, in relation to Shahr-e No, is the 
politicized, spatial transformation of the erstwhile sites of the sex industry —from 
brothels catering to male customers to a park for pious, family-oriented patrons. As 
vestiges of Pahlavi opulence were confiscated and removed from plain-view, so were the 
dwellings of seedy urban life that operated freely under the Shah’s nose.  From the ashes 
of a burned-down red-light district a public park is constructed to represent and 
symbolize a new course distinct from its pre-revolutionary past.  Now promoting 
religious values, such as chastity and modesty, these green spaces are designed to 
celebrate spiritual and mental health —in some part, a return to nature. Yet, the 
elimination of prostitution in this form did not mean the eradication of memory or of 
illegal sexual interactions between men and women. When intersections of social, 
cultural, economic, and political factors merge into a zone once demarcated for human 
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excess, the transformations of that particular space into a pious alternative neither excuse 
nor deny the existence and continuation of prostitution. Thus far, knowledge of the park’s 
history has not stopped prostitution from continuing.  
In the next chapter, I engage further with the discourse of prostitution in the post-
revolutionary period, from 1979 until 2008. I follow the destruction of the Pahlavi 
“citadel” of prostitution and study how a unique re-formulation of illicit sex between men 
and women appears. I discuss the Islamist state’s reform policies, which targeted Shahr-e 
No’s sex workers, who, after 1979, were offered the chance to become useful members of 
Iran’s newly formed Islamic Republic. Although the actual “site” of Taleghani’s “toilet” 
in some manner vanishes, the conditions and circumstances that enable prostitution to 
proliferate years later suggest something equally troubling —that, within both Pahlavi 
and Islamist regimes, prostitution is an institutionally and conceptually accepted feature 






Post-revolutionary “Prostitution” and its Discontents 
The sex debate provides plenty of fodder for the Islamic Republic’s many enemies, and so 
turbulent is Iran’s recent history, and so extreme the contradictions, that wherever you 
turn you are never more than ten feet away from a scapegoat.320– John R. Bradley 
 
Introducing Islamic Reform  
As we left off in Chapter Two, the flagship red-light district of Tehran’s Shahr-e 
No was bulldozed in the Revolution’s first days. Three decades later, the manicured 
Park-e Razi now stands in its stead, redeveloped to look nothing like its pre-1979 
predecessor.  That prostitutes and clientele mingle in this setting is ironic given its 
modification as a gathering space for families and cultural activities.  For many reasons, 
the sex industry has returned to this site —its eradication an improbable task, even 
despite the demolition of a den of brothels once known as the “citadel.”  What factors 
have led to the recurring presence of prostitution in this site? The answer to this question 
lies in the complex historical process in which prostitution is mediated, peculiar to the 
Islamic Republic’s rehabilitation programs and the Shi’a discourse on human sexuality. 
Indeed, there have been many adjustments to the definition and mechanisms of 
prostitution, as the industry has proliferated under the radar. Any examination of the 
present status of prostitution necessitates a return to 1979, after Shahr-e No’s prostitutes 
find their residence on fire, their fates uncertain.  
After the fall of the monarchy, what became of Iran’s prostitutes in the midst of 
these structural changes? For those accused of zedd-e arzesh-e enqelab-e eslami (being 
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against Islamic revolutionary values) punishment was severe. Ad-hoc revolutionary 
courts sentenced intellectuals, activists, writers, madams, and members of the Pahlavi 
establishment to death.321 As cited in newspaper Ettella’at, “Any action that is pleasing to 
God is valuable; any deed that contradicts God’s command is anti-value.”322 As 
Najmabadi explains, “Execution of prostitutes, men and women accused of adultery, drug 
smugglers as well as drug addicts, are all part of the same campaign to ‘cleanse society,’ 
and expunge from it all these ‘points of corruption.’”323  
The standard narrative of this period recounts how the transition in government 
after the revolution followed a clear break in Iran’s historical trajectory. Scholars point to 
the return of exiled Ayatollah Khomeini on February 1, 1979 as the marked beginning of 
major economic, political, and cultural reforms in Iran. As bastions of the Pahlavi state 
were disassembled, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution324 began 
implementing institutional changes that helped construct Iran as an identifiably Islamist 
nation-state.325 “Islamic criteria,” as stated in the constitution, became the rubric upon 
which the state would design and implement new cultural, political, and economic 
policies.326  
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In order for the theocratic republic to establish its own institutions, there were 
radical transformations in Iran’s legal, economic, and social structures. Soon powerful 
ulama (Muslim scholars or clerics) re-entered the political fray, after decades of 
subjugation and exile by the Pahlavi leadership and secret police.327 Given top leadership 
and ministry positions, they helped draft the country’s constitution and assumed their 
positions as vice-regents or “heirs to the mantle of the Prophet.”328 “After the Islamic 
Revolution,” writes Ervand Abrahamian, “The clergy had the field to themselves, since 
recent socioeconomic developments had dissolved the traditional ties between the rural 
magnates and their clients, between landlords and their peasants, and between tribal chief 
and their tribesmen.”329 They also helped form a judiciary system staffed by 
mujtahids330and local court clerics, which replaced the Pahlavi-era secular court system 
(with secular university educated judges).331 This judiciary became the legal bastion of 
the Islamic state, interpreting and applying the Khomeini-approved doctrine of a 
theocratic government run by a senior-ranking Shi’a Ayatollah who holds the position of 
Veyalat-e Faqih (Guardian Jurist). Additionally, the Supreme Judicial Council (which 
was later unified in the position of the Head of the Judiciary in 1989) directed all courts 
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to abide by Islamic-legislation.  In 1982, Iran implemented a shari'a-based penal code  
(Qanoun-e Mojazat-e Eslami) for an experimental period; punishments were revised in 
accordance to their specifications in the Qur’an.332 Yet whatever claims to independence, 
transparency, and rule of law were asserted in the constitution were contradicted by a 
secretive due process.333  
According to Paidar, the institutionalization of Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideological 
doctrine faced many setbacks, for “the process of transition entailed a gradual 
disintegration of the discourse of revolution and the post-revolutionary transitional period 
became the scene of intense debate over the new culturally authentic and economically 
and politically independent society, and the place of women within it.”334 In the very first 
month of this transitional period, brothel districts were immediate casualties. Two days 
before jubilant celebrants greeted Ayatollah Khomeini at Tehran’s Mehrabad airport on 
February 1, 1979, newspapers printed images of the city’s red-light district on fire.335 At 
the end of the month, provisional revolutionary courts were established and ordered the 
demolishing of these vice areas. Places known for body traffic —sites where illegitimate, 
opposite sex interactions of the na-mahram336 sort took place, such as city intersections, 
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cinemas, brothels, and commercial centers— would be re-inserted into a conceptual 
landscape in which the revolutionary state designates all coordinates of moral and ethical 
interactions.  
In the historic period when Shahr-e No is destroyed and prostitution becomes 
illegal, seismic, discursive shifts in prostitution discourse take place. The role of the 
prostitute is re-conceptualized along with the function and purpose of prostitution, 
leading to the dispersion and mutation of the sex trade. It is during the stage in which the 
citadel red light district is destroyed that prostitution discourse enters the realm of Islamic 
ideology of marriage —though re-imagined and imposed onto a cityscape that was to 
become identified as Islamic.337 During this moment, the “ghettoization” of women’s 
sexual labor (in which their bodies provide sexual gratification for men) is teased into the 
framework of Shi’a legal discourse and articulated as public policy. To address social 
dilemmas —such as delayed marriage, prolonged bachelorhood, and rising 
unemployment— Iranian authorities encouraged a “temporary” solution —marriage. 
Sigheh —the Persian colloquial term for a fixed-term temporary marriage in Shi’a 
Islam— is posited, in official discussions of the economy and post-war rehabilitation, as 
a provisional and exigent method to regulate sexuality and maintain social order.338 In 
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Twelver Shi’ite ideology, there are two main forms of marriage: permanent (legally 
known as nikah mut’a) and temporary (known as mut’a sigheh). In either marital union, 
men pay money or valuables to gain exclusive right and access to sexual relations with 
women.339 (In the words of Shi’a mujtahid Muhaqqiq Hilli, marriage is “a contract whose 
object is that of dominion over the vagina, without the right of possession.”)340According 
to Shi’a legal consensus, sigheh is one kind of marital agreement (‘aqd), legitimized via a 
fixed-term contract between a Muslim man and an unmarried woman, “be she a virgin, 
divorced, or widowed,” writes Haeri.341  It is meant for sexual pleasure, unlike a 
permanent marriage whose objective is mainly procreation.342   Both parties in a mut’a  
arrangement decide the time limitations of their union, as well as the amount of money to 
be given to the temporary wife.343 
In general, an Islamic marriage is perceived as a contract of exchange based on 
duties and rights, wherein sexual access and compensation factor into the husband-wife 
relationship.344  One of several key distinctions between temporary and permanent 
marital contracts is that a Muslim man has the right to maintain multiple sigheh 
partnerships at any time, whereas a Muslim woman can have only one male sigheh 
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relationship at a time.345 Likewise, this arrangement is not a permanent marriage, 
whereby a man is limited to four permanent wives (although he can also have sigheh 
partners, simultaneously).  
Haeri reported that after the fall of the Pahlavi regime, many of Shahr-e No’s 
prostitutes (who were not executed or imprisoned) entered rehabilitation programs 
wherein some of them were transformed into sigheh wives.346 This program was 
presented as a kind of rebirth for “fallen women” to reform them into pious, useful 
members of society.347 Several years later, in order to combat the problems of unmarried 
veterans, economic duress, and unrestrained male sexuality, Iranian officials began 
suggesting temporary marriage, contending that it, as sexual safety valve that Islam offers 
believers, would ensure social order and tame sexual anxiety among men and women 
who could not enter permanent marriages for economic reasons.  And, more recently, in 
2002, the government reportedly proposed establishing “chastity houses,” where men and 
women seeking to enter a sigheh partnership could meet and engage in religiously-
sanctioned, brief sexual encounters. Despite these three instances, which illustrate the 
links between sigheh and prostitution, the government and clerical authorities deny any 
associations between the two.  
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Religious officials’ treatment of sex work is ambivalent and manifold.  On one 
hand, they legitimize it via the legal artifice of temporary marriage sanctioned by Islam.  
On the other hand, they are reticent to acknowledge —some even pointedly denying— 
the existence of this legal practice.  
In this chapter, I contend that these three episodes mark when the Islamic 
Republic began to expand sigheh in its Islamic framework to include prostitution. The 
introduction of sigheh as a legitimate method of rehabilitation points to a fundamental 
shift in the treatment, regard, and employment of prostitutes after the 1979 revolution. 
Initially the “prostitute” is condemned and encouraged to reform —in part, to help “fallen 
women” return to a morally guided path. In the aftermath of the Revolution, sigheh is 
promoted as an Islamically sanctioned solution to rehabilitate prostitutes who enter into 
temporary marriages with war veterans.  
Yet as economic problems increase over time along with the rising presence of 
prostitutes in urban spaces, government officials begin to comment publically about 
encouraging sigheh partnerships among the certain demographics, namely the youth. 
However, they promote sigheh as a response to controlling human sexuality, reasoning 
that young men and women would suffer sexual and psychological problems without a 
responsible framework and avenue for release. According to media reports, a government 
agency had drawn plans for setting up government-regulated brothels in which sigheh 
would be used to sanction sexual relationships between the sexes. Indeed, the 
participation of women and men in these programs was fundamental to this strategy, as 
were the historical shifts in the promotion and application of sigheh to solve domestic 
problems beyond regulating sexuality.  There are at least two remarkable —and 
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unforeseen— consequences of these policies: the first, that the government acknowledges 
the problem of prostitution and offers the temporary solution of sigheh, and the second, 
that the social category and identity of “the prostitute” is re-constructed and expands to 
such an extent that permanent wives and in particular, women who are educated and from 
the middle class, conceivably fall into this category. 
In order to analyze the discourse of prostitution as it has manifested after 1979, I 
briefly return to the site of Shahr-e No and discuss the reform programs meant to absolve 
the sins of female prostitutes through penance rituals.  Then, I discuss the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s regulatory efforts to clamp down on the sex industry as socioeconomic 
problems surmount, requiring government response. The remaining sections cover 
separate instances when sigheh discourse is integrated into discussions of human 
sexuality and economic crisis.  Because there are, to my knowledge, very few academic 
works in both Persian and English that seriously tackle the contentious subject of the 
links between temporary marriage and prostitution, I have assembled individual sources 
—including social science and medical journals, newspapers, blogs, government and 
NGO reports, and scholarly works— on three vectors: sigheh according to Shi’a legal 
tradition, street prostitution, and sigheh in practice. I analyze the point at which these 
vectors meet, highlighting studies that document its rising usage, acceptance, and 
visibility. 
 
Theorizing the Prostitute as “Other” 
Prostitution is an extremely controversial subject, stirring many debates about 
appropriate government response and whether or not to condemn or rehabilitate 
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prostitutes.348  Disputably the world’s “oldest profession,” it has, at different historic 
moments, clashed and adapted in accordance to social norms.349 For prostitutes and 
others involved in the sex work industry, the literature on their vilification, regulation, 
and exploitation is quite extensive, engaging with issues of patriarchal power, sexual 
exploitation and agency, economic survival, religious persecution and reform, and social 
deviance —among many others. Within this discourse is a process of othering that often 
demarcates normative from abnormal human behavior and is affected by many 
contradictory assumptions about human sexuality.350 Likewise, the figure of the prostitute 
as “other” continues to influence both government policy and public opinion in Iran. 
Erving Goffman contends “society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the 
complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these 
categories.”351 Those individuals that cannot conform to socially constructed norms are 
judged as deviant and stigmatized.  As Goffman argues, the term deviant refers to people 
who are seen “as declining voluntarily and openly to accept the social place accorded 
them, and who act irregularly and somewhat rebelliously in connection with our basic 
institutions.”352 Goffman defines the term stigma as “an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting.” Three types of attributes differentiate stigmas: physical deformities, a 
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problematic character, and a tribal or racial affiliation.353 Prostitutes are included in the 
second category, along with drug addicts, gypsies and the urban unrepresented poor, to 
name a few.354 
Shannon Bell argues that the characterization of “the prostitute” as “other” is a 
discursive outcome of a modernist discourse that dichotomized women into “good” and 
“bad” characters.355 In Reading, Writing and Rewriting the Prostitute Body, Bell suggests 
that “modernity through a process of othering has produced ‘the prostitute’ as the other of 
the other within the categorical other, ‘woman.’”356 She argues that the hierarchal, binary 
opposition of masculine and feminine, which is “at the heart of the foundational 
metaphysics of Western thought,” is reproduced within this dichotomy of good and bad 
woman and reproduced in feminist and modernist writings. She elaborates, “Prostitutes 
were analyzed and categorized in relation to the bourgeois female ideas:  the good wife 
and the virginal daughter.  The prostitute might be the same, she might be different; often 
she was located on a continuum somewhere between sameness and difference, but she 
was always the disprivileged other in relation to the determinant site:  wife, mother, 
daughter.”357 Bell contends that the process of othering runs through both feminist and 
modern constructions of the prostitute body, which was “actively produced as a 
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marginalized social-sexual identity, particularly during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century.”358 
Although both Goffman and Bell discuss the varied constructions of 
stigmatization from different cultural and literary contexts,359 their individual discussions 
of the construction of the prostitute as “other” are useful in this analysis of how certain 
state policies towards prostitutes were grounded in the demonization and stigmatization 
of female prostitutes during the Pahlavi era and maintained in the Islamic Republic. The 
conceptual portrait of the “prostitute” as whore, sexual object, insult, and paladin of 
decadence and moral corruption is prevalent in both pre and post-revolutionary political 
discourse in Iran.360 In the Iranian context, the female prostitute as other featured 
prominently in modernist literary discourse, especially in the writings of nationalists, 
religious scholars, and modernist women’s advocates during the late 19th century until the 
early 1970s, when Iran underwent state modernization and economic development.361 
The prostitute was the antithesis to the idyllic Muslim, Iranian woman character, which 
Shi’a clerics supported as an “ideal type model for Iran women.”362 For Iranian 
nationalists and women’s advocates, prostitutes featured in national discussions in the 
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first half of the twentieth century about women’s citizenship and motherhood; these 
themes typically incorporated the topics of hygiene, reproductive politics, and 
sexuality.363 Prostitutes were specifically accused of spreading sexually transmitted 
diseases, destroying the marital home, and spoiling new generations (as it was believed 
that infected men could spread syphilis to their wives and children).364 
In the 1960s, a treatise on female criminality identified a female-specific category 
of traits considered injurious and unbecoming of the ideal, Muslim woman. In this work, 
prostitutes are viewed with particular disdain. The 1962 publication of Qadisih Hijazi, 
author of Barrasi-ye Jara’im-e Zan dar Iran  (An Investigation of Women’s Criminal 
Activity in Iran) was the first “book-length Iranian treatise on female criminality.”365 A 
devout Muslim raised in a clerical family, she argued that “criminal-women” failed at 
being mothers, unlike “mother-women” who excelled in child-rearing and maintaining 
pious, crime-free domestic lives. Prostitutes did not have any socially acceptable place or 
role.366 Historian Cyrus Schayegh has described Hijazi’s conceptualization of female 
criminality as founded upon a woman’s rejection of her responsibility to her assumed 
social role: 
A woman’s original crime is a sin against her body, a body that does  
not truly belong to her, a body she has to look after for society’s sake.  
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Prostitution is morally condemnable, medically dangerous, and socially  
harmful. A woman’s attempt to subvert her body’s basic purpose— 
reproduction—drives her insane and endangers society.367 
 
Here, the prostitute’s crime is her rejection of reproduction. According to Hijazi, 
prostitutes consider reproduction as a method of attaining sexual pleasure of men and not 
for the purposes of maintaining social order or the propagation of the humans. In this 
framework of female criminality, the prostitute is the female persona non grata or the 
anti-role model that strays from her social and biological duties. 
The theme of straying from a righteous path is a consistent trope in the discourse 
of prostitution leading up to the Revolution.  Scorn was directed particularly at wealthy 
and middle class women who were condemned for having lost their moral standing 
during the Pahlavi era.368 During mass demonstrations, popular slogans denounced the 
treatment of women as “sex-objects.”369 The Pahlavi dynasty was labeled as the  
“spreader of prostitution.”370 Throughout the revolutionary period (1978-1982), the 
female prostitute continued to garner mixed public sympathy. Prostitutes maintained a 
precarious social position —either they were pitied as victims of social ills, or they were 
treated as leading a “pathological” life in need of a cure, writes Shahidian.371 Prostitutes 
were also judged to be women who were already promiscuous, unethical, and impious —
characteristics that conflict with the ideological construct of the Muslim mother and 
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368 Paidar explains, “While lower-class women were portrayed as passive victims of the regime’s 
oppression, affluent women were condemned as sex-objects, accomplices of the Shah and oppressors of 
lower-class women.”  See Paidar, p. 171. 
 




371 Hammed Shahidian, Women in Iran:  Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic, Volume 2 (Westport:  




family, foundational features of the Islamic Republic’s constitution.372 Even the word 
“prostitute” became a slur. When a woman was called a “prostitute,” it connected her to 
all that was anathema to the Islamic Republic’s model female citizens —women of piety, 
character, and family values espousing revolutionary ideals.373 In 1980, Ayatollah 
Khomeini condemned the Pahlavis by associating their government with sexual 
pandering: “In the name of freedom, progress, and civilization, Reza Khan and 
Mohammad Reza Khan led all our youths to prostitution but took all their freedoms 
away.”374 By all accounts, post-revolutionary Iran regards prostitution —including the 
                                                
372 For instance, in the section “Women in the Constitution” of the Islamic Republic’s national constitution, 
it affirms: “The family is the fundamental unit of society and the main center for the growth and edification 
of human being… It is the duty of the Islamic government to provide the necessary facilities for the 
attainment of this goal.  This view of the family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or 
instrument in the service of promoting consumerism and exploitation.  Not only does woman recover 
thereby her momentous and precious function of motherhood, rearing of ideologically committed human 
beings, she also assumes a pioneering social role and becomes the fellow struggler of man in all vital areas 
of life.  Given the weighty responsibilities that woman thus assumes, she is accorded in Islam great value 
and nobility.” See Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Preamble. 
373 The integration of the “prostitute” and the “whore” are still part of the political discourse in Iran; in 
particular the term “whore” has become a facile insult directed at women who are accused of participation 
in projects or displaying attitudes considered unacceptable and immoral by the regime. As recent as 
January 2012, Iran’s Council of Public Culture announced its decision to disband the established Cinema 
House—a non-governmental film-maker’s guild in Iran. Conservative director Farajollah Salahshour 
(director of film The Prophet Joseph) had denounced the association as a whorehouse.  Soon after, news 
reports and the blogosphere were charged with debate over the exposure of nubile actress Golfshifteh 
Farahani, who posed semi-topless (her hands strategically covering her nipples) in a French film magazine 
Madame Le Figaro. The reaction from Iranian authorities was neither pleasant nor tongue-in-cheek.  
Iranian authorities informed her, had she decided to return to Iran from her current residence in Paris, she 
would not be welcomed to her home country. For Salahshour quote, see “Salahshour: Cinema-ye Iran 
Fahesheh-khaneh Ast/ Salahshour: Iran’s House of Cinema is a Whorehouse,” Aftab News, 23 Mehr 23 
1390/ October 15, 2011, accessed February 14, 2014, http://aftabnews.ir/vdcepp8zwjh8xoi.b9bj.html.  See 
also “Vezarat-e Ershad Khaneh-ye Cinema ra Monhal Kard/ Ministry of Culture Dissolves House of 
Cinema,” BBC Persian, January 3, 2012, accessed February 13, 2012. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/01/120103_l06_khaneyecinema_shut_down.shtml. 
See also “Chare-ee joz Enhelal-e Khane-ye Cinema Nadashtim/ We Had No Choice But to Disband the 
House of Cinema,” Fars News Agency, 21 Azar 1390 /December 12, 2011, accessed February 13, 2012, 
http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13901121000539.    
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women involved—  not just as a criminal act, but also a morally vacant and socially 
deviant, Westernized lifestyle and condition.375  
 
Criminalization and Reform: Prostitution after 1979  
By 1982, strict punishments were identified in Iran’s criminal code to warn 
potential offenders of their fates in the event they were caught, prosecuted, and punished 
for abetting illicit sex.376 In the penal code itself, the crime and punishment of prostitution 
are cited in the section ghavadi  (pimping).377 Prostitution is considered a crime against 
public morality and chastity —a capital offense.378 Any person who facilitates 
prostitution or encourages immoral acts, establishes or manages brothels, or facilitates 
travel abroad for the purposes of prostitution is subject to particular punishments, 
including lashing and in certain cases, stoning.379 In Islamic jurisprudence, illicit sex falls 
                                                
375 Shahidian, p. 186 
 
376 The penal code is based on a system of four different types of crimes, which are subject to four different 
types of punishments.  They are hodoud, qesas, ta’zir, and diyat. Hodoud  (singular, hadd) are acts 
prohibited by God, with mandatory penalties defined by the Qur’an.  Qesas are crimes against a victim and 
his or her family; the decision of retribution lies with the victim’s family in cases of murder.  Ta’zir crimes 
are acts for which no specific penalties are mentioned in the Qur’an, leaving it up to the judge’s discretion.  
Diyat punishment refers to a form of payment or compensation, payable to the victim or his or family. 
Mehran Tamadonfar, “Islam, Law, and Political Control in Contemporary Iran,” Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 40, no. 2 (June, 2001): p. 213. 
 
377 Islamic Republic of Iran Penal Code, Book 2, Hadd punishment, Part 4, Articles 135-138. The 
colloquial term for pimping is jakeshi kardan; a pimp is a jakesh.  Both terms are considered derogatory 
and thus not used in polite speech. 
 
378 According to Amnesty International, “Under Iranian law, capital offenses include adultery by married 
people, incest, rape, four convictions of an unmarried person for fornication, three convictions for drinking 
alcohol, or four convictions for homosexual acts among men.” Prostitution is included in facilitating the 
fornication between unmarried persons. See “Iran: The Last Executioner of Children,” Amnesty 
International, June 27, 2007, accessed February 13, 2012, 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=17401. 
379 Stoning punishments are administered for primarily adultery cases, and Article 172 and 198 of the 
constitution grant judges the authority to accept stoning as a possible sentence.  See Shadi Sadr, "The 'End 
Of Stoning': Islamic Republic Style," Huffington Post: The Blog, March 13, 2012, accessed July 12, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shadi-sadr/iran-stoning_b_1335809.html.   
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under the umbrella category zena and includes the acts of adultery, prostitution, pre-
marital fornication, and homosexuality. Sex between an unmarried man and woman is 
explicitly forbidden and is punishable by prison, lashing, or execution by stoning. The 
penal code designates criminal sexual activity as hodoud (literally in Arabic, restrictions) 
crimes —meaning that specified forms of punishment are outlined in the Qur’an and 
hadith and thus should be applied.380 However it is important to note that certain 
conditions must be met for the application of this punishment. These include the use of 
‘proper procedures, such as fair and reliable witnesses, and the determination of the 
“circumstances" of the case.381  
Simultaneous to the formulation and implementation of an Islamic jurisprudence-
based criminal code, which handles prostitution-related offenses, lawmakers and clerical 
authorities began pursuing the route of rehabilitation to control prostitution.  For those 
prostitutes from the red-light district not imprisoned, many were reportedly given a 
second chance, provided they accept a specific kind of Islamic reform. Yet before delving 
into the details of this program, it is necessary to first return to the gripping days of the 
revolutionary period, when Shahr-e No was demolished. 
Little is published in Persian and English on the individual fates of Shahr-e No’s 
prostitutes. In Iran, the available sources are located primarily in public discourse —for 
instance, during tangential conversations about the site’s historic past. In one exceptional 
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case, the topic of Shahr-e No became the point of departure for a university thesis on 
street prostitution in contemporary Tehran. Doctoral candidate, Akbar Varvayyi, at the 
University of Tehran in the School of Law and Political Science, composed the 2008 
thesis, “Barrasi-ye Avamel-e Ruspigari-ye Kheyebani dar Tehran-e Bozorg” 
(Investigation of the Beginning of Street Prostitution in Greater Tehran).”382 This 
dissertation provides key information about former Shahr-e No residents —the 
prostitutes’ main sources of income and housing for instance. Varvayyi recounts that 
after prostitutes became homeless, they began pouring into neighboring areas. Mahal-e 
Jamshid  (Jamshid district) and Meydan-e Shush (Shush Square) for instance, became 
provisional residences.383 Many of the prostitutes found work in parks or on roadsides; 
most were runaways or had a history of drug usage. After an undisclosed number of 
years, authorities grew weary of the tarnishing of the area’s reputation. There were 
reports of makeshift brothels and other illegal activities. Arrests soon followed, and those 
suspected of criminal activity, including approximately eight hundred women believed to 
be working as prostitutes, were detained. (According to Varvayyi, their fates were mixed: 
some faced imprisonment; others became vocal supporters and activists for the 
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dissertation contributes pivotal historical details about Shahr-e No’s former inhabitants, especially during a 
time when the research topic would have been deemed taboo. However, being that the thesis project was 
approved and conducted during the reformist administration of President Mohammed Khatami, it is 
probable that university professors were more at liberty to approve controversial doctoral dissertations in 
the social sciences. See Akbar Varvayyi, “Barrasi-ye Avamel-e Rouspigari-ye Kheyebani dar Tehran-e 
Bozorg/The Investigation of the Causes of Street Prostitution in Greater Tehran, Ph.D. diss., University of 
Tehran, School of Law and Political Science, 2008. 
 
383 The most destitute of the prostitutes were the qod-neshin, a terminology for a prostitute residing in the 
poorest and dirtiest areas of Tehran, such as Shush Square in south Tehran. In this area, prostitutes were 
known to wear chadors and were managed by a riess (boss), whom they called “Maman.” See Varvayyi, 




government.  And some women entered low-wage earning jobs, working as domestic 
help or seamstresses.)384  
Other academic sources, albeit less detailed, offer general information about the 
resurgence of the sex industry after the Revolution. Anthropologist Shahla Haeri and 
historian Paidar —both scholars who published in English— mention the incipient 
government policy towards prostitutes immediately after Shahr-e No was razed. With 
prostitutes no longer concentrated in red-light districts, there were growing concerns that 
the sex industry would penetrate city life —and this time, under the radar. For those 
madams and prostitutes of Qal’eh Shah-re No not condemned to death, many were given 
the option of reform. Paidar explains, 
[The Islamic Republic’s] Bureau [for Combating Corruption] adopted a carrot and  
stick policy towards prostitution.  It announced that prostitutes who chose to  
repent would be assisted to marry and ‘return to the warm embrace of family life,’  
or be provided with jobs in specially set-up workshops. Those who chose to 
‘continue their wicked ways, causing perversion of the country’s youth and 
betraying the blood of the martyrs of the Revolution, would be punished by 
revolutionary courts.’385 
 
The Bureau For Combating Corruption was set up to cleanse post-revolutionary Iranian 
society of the “manifestations of  'Westernized' gender relations;” it also sought to stop 
the  “free relationships between men and women.”386 According to Haeri, the Bureau’s 
special rehabilitation workshops focused on training former prostitutes to embrace their 
maternal and spousal responsibilities387 —for their reform necessitated accepting 
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385 Kayhan, Issue 82.  Quoted in Paidar, p. 346. 
386 Nahid Yeganeh, “Women, Nationalism, and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran,” 
Feminist Review 44, Nationalism and National Identities (Summer,1993):  p. 16. 
 
387 Haeri, Law of Desire, p. 100. 
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gendered roles of mother, wife, and sister which the Islamic Republic’s religious 
authorities encouraged.388 With room and board provided, former prostitutes were 
educated in household tasks, such as ironing and washing. They were also pushed to re-
establish family bonds, gain employment, and marry.389 The main idea behind this 
program was to reform prostitutes through their resettlement into the most honorable 
setting: the domestic sphere.  In this site, a woman’s obligations to her family would 
ensure the safe maintenance of a pious household. Moreover, women would learn to 
embrace “instinctual” maternal sensibilities, such as childrearing. By accepting Islam as a 
guiding force, former prostitutes would be rehabilitated and reintegrated into the ummat 
(Muslim community) —from which they were presumably occluded during their work as 
prostitutes. The program’s emphasis on reforming prostitutes generated much public 
sympathy; subsequently donations poured into this revolutionary program.390 
 
Re-Introducing Revolutionary Sigheh 
Also available to prostitutes was an alternative program —touted as an “ultimate 
rehabilitation.”391 The slogan was “productive labor makes free,” describes Floor.392 
According to Haeri, the government needed to find a quick solution to minimize the 
rising numbers of single veterans unable to find wives and/or sexual partners.  As a 
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method of providing a sexual respite for veterans of the Iran-Iraq war, they began 
encouraging temporary marriage among the former prostitutes. In what Haeri has 
described as “penance sigheh,” prostitutes were brought to northern Tehran mansions for 
“rehabilitation and purification.”393 While in rehabilitation centers, they were encouraged 
to marry revolutionary guards, temporarily —which many did so willingly and 
unwillingly.394 Women were also told that veterans of the war would be granted a place 
in heaven —suggesting that marriage to a veteran would mean a shared spot.395 (Another 
report noted that “[s]exual  sigheh  was also applied as a means of both repentance and 
punishment. In prisons too, women prisoners who were virgins were forced into sigheh 
with their jailors before being executed, since according to [the State’s] religious beliefs 
they [the prisoners] would otherwise go to heaven.”)396  
Ayatollah Khomeini praised especially women who demonstrated this kind of 
sacrifice in the name of revolutionary causes supporting the Islamic Republic.397  In a 
mother’s day speech addressing women, he acknowledged “that brave young girl whose 
magnanimous spirit overflowed with sincerity and genuineness [who] said: ‘Since I 
                                                
393 Ibid. Similar rehabilitation programs were reported for “harmed women” in recent years. According to 
Shahidian, in 2000, newspaper Iran reported that 350 prostitutes were taken to similar centers, and the 
number of prostitutes was higher than the previous year.  See Shahidian, p. 186. 
 
394 Paidar, p. 278. 
395 Ibid., p. 279. For a detailed explanation, see Haeri, Law of Desire, pp. 99-100. 
396 Ibid., p. 278. Quoted in Amnesty International Report, 1987. The details of this situation are not 
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397 That women should assume operational roles during Iran’s war effort is a theme Ayatollah Khomeini 
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crucial to Khomeini’s directive for a national mobilization army of twenty million; thus women received 
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and first-aid training. See Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Power, Morality, and the New Muslim Womanhood,” in 
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cannot go to the war front, let me pay my debt to the revolution and my religion through 
this marriage.’”398  Although he did not distinguish this marriage as a sigheh union in this 
particular case, he still highlighted a woman’s responsibility in galvanizing the war effort. 
This is exemplified by her marrying a would-be martyr —or, in other words, veterans of 
war, who were praised as the revolution’s ultimate paragons of self-sacrifice.399 In the 
same vein, reformed women who married veterans could “[reintroduce sigheh] into 
society from a completely new perspective,  ‘purifying’ the institution of some of its 
negative cultural connotations.”400  Ayatollah Khomeini was not alone in his approbation 
of sigheh; the same sentiment was echoed by other esteemed figures of the revolution, 
including Ayatollah Motahhari, who found it to be one of the most progressive and 
farsighted aspects of Islamic thought.”401  
 
Publicizing Sigheh in Post-revolutionary Iran 
After sigheh was integrated into government-administered rehabilitation 
programs, there were three different occasions when officials publicize their support of 
temporary marriage. In lieu of focusing on sigheh’s curbing of errant, human sexual 
practices, government officials emphasized finding an Islamic solution to socioeconomic 
problems. In one particular case, temporary marriage is assigned a regulatory purpose. As 
                                                
398 Excerpt is from Khomeini’s speech, delivered to a group of women in honor of Women’s Day. See 
“Ruhollah al-Musawi al-Khomeini Women’s Day Speech,” Iran Chamber Society, 25 Farvardin 1361/April 
14, 1982, accessed January 21, 2012, 
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a method of reigning in street prostitution, the government had intended to establish 
special centers where men and women met for brief, sexual unions under official watch. 
These three episodes, which I present chronologically, exemplify how the state comes to 
integrate temporary marriage in both discussions of uncontrollable, human sexual desires 
—of veterans, self-sacrificing women, the unemployed, the unmarried, and the youth— 
and socioeconomic duress. Yet, interestingly, government officials continue to deny 
sigheh’s relevance to prostitution. 
By the late 1980s, Iran was entrenched in a post-war trauma. The country’s 
casualty-heavy eight-year war with Iraq culminated in high numbers of veterans and 
widows in need of social and public assistance. Yet by 1985, journalists were already 
reported about an impending marriage crisis, brought about by economic problems, 
housing shortages, and decreased incomes.402  Iranian president Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani began offering a temporary solution —sigheh (temporary marriage). 
In a series of speeches, television appearances, and newspaper interviews in 1983, 1985, 
and 1997, he addressed a subject seldom discussed in public forums.403 Rafsanjani 
expressed concern about the societal consequences of fewer marriages; for him, they 
would present society with untamed sexual problems and sexual instincts. (According to 
Paidar, there was also a concern that these problems might contribute to “an increase in 
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1966 to 19.7 in 1986, according to a 1988 report by the SCI.  See Paidar, pp. 284-285. 
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venereal diseases, especially since prostitution had gone underground.”)404 For 
Rafsanjani, sigheh was Islam’s “safety valve to prevent explosion.”405 He cautioned, “It 
is not there for men to satisfy their voluptuousness and ruin their families.”406  
In a pivotal 1985 interview with Zan-e Rouz magazine, he again iterated sigheh’s 
ideal purpose.407 During an interview with the CBS program 60 Minutes, which aired in 
1997 for an American audience, he clarified his views on temporary marriage. Though no 
longer Iran’s head-of-state, Rafsanjani has maintained his political dominance in Iran’s 
deliberative bodies of the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts.  In answer to 
journalist Mike Wallace, who asked him about how sigheh functions in Iranian society, 
Rafsanjani argued,  
This corruption in ethics, which is so common in the West, in Islam has been  
organized in a controlled manner and a legal way. It has been considered that  
under certain circumstances, when a man and woman aren’t able to marry on a  
permanent  basis, they need to satisfy their instincts. We believe this is a solution  
to sexual problems…They need to satisfy their instincts. It is not possible for  
everyone to  have a permanent marriage —[for instance] occasionally some are  
travelers, some do not have the financial potential. There are many things.  There  
are women losing their husbands, and overall, there are many people who need to  
satisfy their instincts on a temporary basis. This could be accomplished through  
an official agreement or contract between two parties…for whatever the time.   
This brings an order to the relationship. The fate of the child would be clear, it  
addressed the idea of the woman in respect of her expenses and she will not be  
able to marry for a while. Psychologically speaking, this is a legal act, not a  
forbidden act that everyone is fearful of…In the Shi’ite  school of thought, all  
ulama accept this. We believe this is a solution to sexual problems.408 
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Yet despite Rafsanjani’s elaboration of sigheh’s advantages in alleviating social 
dilemmas pertaining to sexual tension, his explanation did not alter public opinion, 
which, at the time, was generally disapproving towards temporary marriage and saw 
these types of unions as similar to male-female relationships formed in western 
cultures.409 Although his comments stirred a lively debate in the local press, thereafter 
sigheh was not deliberated publically for more than a decade.410 Paidar has observed, 
“Cultural disapproval of sigheh prevented its legitimization and institutionalization 
during the first decade of the Islamic Republic despite state propaganda in its favour.”411 
However, almost two decades later, sigheh re-entered public and state discourses 
as a temporary solution for a growing societal problem —prostitution.  
 
Prostitution on Tehran’s Streets 
Iran’s state media uses an official terminology for prostitution and the women 
involved in the sex industry.  Prostitution is officially translated as khod-forushi (selling 
oneself) and tan-forushi (selling of the body).  Yet, instead of using the definitions 
ruspigar or ruspi for a female prostitute, euphemisms are instead used.412  The terms zan-
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Prostitution is not limited to female prostitutes. According to the news website Baztab-e Emruz, a 
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e kheyabuni (street woman), dokhtar-e ferari (a runaway girl), and more recently zanan-e 
asibdideh-ye ejtima’i (socially harmed women) are mentioned in state media and 
government agency reports.413 The unspecific terminology is reflective, in part, of the 
official government reticence to admit the existence and prevalence of prostitution 
countrywide. To date there are no independently confirmed statistics on the number of 
prostitutes nor is there any systematic research on prostitution in Iran.414 In 2002, 
unofficial estimates claimed that approximately 300,000 prostitutes were working in 
Iran.415 In 2007, they claimed that approximately 84,000 prostitutes reside in Tehran 
alone.416 Government officials dispute unofficial figures, claiming that this part of the 
social issue is part of a Western plot to corrupt Iranian youth.417 Their responses usually 
manifest in two ways: either they deny the existence of prostitution or they provide lower 
estimates, pointing to inaccuracies and exaggerations in unofficial statistics.418 For 
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instance, Tehran’s chief of police Hossein Sajedinia reported in 2011 that there were only 
two hundred “street women.”  Iran’s Wellbeing Agency disputed this number, reporting 
that about four hundred female prostitutes are arrested annually in Tehran.419 Medical 
researcher Zargooshi quoted an anonymous official who claimed that, outside the capital, 
about two thousand prostitutes were working in Kermanshah.420 Similarly, in a rare 
instance of official recognition of this social issue, government official Homayun 
Hashemi from Iran’s Social Welfare Organization, a government-run body, admitted, 
“Certain statistics have no positive function in society; instead, they have a negative 
psychological impact. It is better not to talk about them.”421 
Despite this reticence, there are many sources elaborating government and police 
involvement in shutting down prostitution rings.422According to diverse media reports, 
there is an intricate and vast network of domestic and international sex work taking place 
inside Iran and traversing its borders.  Although Iran’s state press does not typically 
report on this subject, alternative domestic and international media sources have reported 
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on police raids of brothels and prostitution networks in Tehran.423 In 2002, Agence 
France Presse reported that Iranian authorities were stepping up their raids of prostitution 
rings. Police commander Mohammad Bagher-Ghalibaf said, “[The police] are ready to 
pick up all street women and prostitutes in less than 72 hours across the country.”424 In 
June 2002, the Basij paramilitary forces made a rare public announcement that raids on 
brothels had resulted in 48,900 arrests.425 In Tehran, even the elite Revolutionary Guards 
were involved in the prostitution crackdown, raiding four prostitution rings “centered on 
Tehran which had been sending young Iranian girls to France, Britain, Turkey and Arab 
countries of the Gulf and arrested more than 100 people.”426 Clearly, there is domestic 
sex work going on in Iran, despite the official government proclamations to the contrary 
—and Iranians are aware that brothels exist. (In 2001, The Hindu reporter interviewed an 
elderly gentleman, about the “peculiar gender situation” in Iran.  The journalist observed 
his response: “There was a long pause and then, as if he had decided that there was no 
more delicate way to express himself this gentleman said, ‘Teheran had the biggest red 
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light district in the Middle East before the revolution. Do you think this has all gone 
away?’”)427 
 
Deterring Prostitution through Khaneh-ye Efaf (Chastity Houses)  
The reported increase in prostitution —leading to rising arrests and punishment 
for those involved in the illegal sex industry— has compelled certain religious officials to 
consider regulating prostitution. This strategy is a reversal of an approximately three-
decade policy of criminalizing prostitutes. In 2002 Ayatollah Mohammed Mousavi 
Bojnordi, a former member of the Supreme Judicial Council, was quoted as saying, “We 
face a real challenge with all these women on the street. Our society is in an emergency 
situation.” In an interview with Etemad newspaper, he stated, “If we want to be realistic 
and clear the city of such women, we must use the path that Islam offers us.”428 Just as 
Rafsanjani had argued, Bojnordi reasoned that Islam, as a model and all-encompassing 
life system, was capable of responding to every societal dilemma, including prostitution.   
The same year, independent news organizations inside Iran began publishing 
reports that the government was intending to regulate prostitution through the 
establishment of khaneh-ye efaf (chastity houses). The basic idea behind this program 
was that women and men would convene in small and private centers, being monitored 
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by government agencies, and conduct sexual activity in legal and religiously sanctioned 
brothels.429 The proposals were based on “providing safe sex for men of the city.”430 
Initially the government was silent about these reports; it would not officially 
confirm that there were any designs for such a program.  Only after media reports began 
piecing together more details did the authorities begin to relay any information.431 
According to the research findings of WomeninIran,432 a now-defunct, Tehran-based 
social science, journalist, and feminist research group, several government agencies were 
involved in designing and implementing this program.433 WomeninIran reported that the 
judiciary, Tehran municipality, and the Ministries of Corrections and the Interior were 
each participating in this government plan.434  However, among this group, the only 
ministry to offer information to the press was that of the Interior, which emphasized the 
prevention of disease and sexual health of Iranians. 
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Ashraf Bornudi, the Society Deputy for the Minister of Interior argued that a 
“specific strategy” needed to be designed with which to address the relationship between 
men and women in the Islamic Republic, especially concerning protecting their health.435 
According to a preliminary plan for khaneh-ye efaf, prostitutes would be provided with a 
health card, which they would receive after obligatory health checkups.  This card, 
affiliated with the Ministry of Health, would grant them access to public health facilities. 
Couples would then go to special centers, such as hotels, where they could consummate 
their union without police interference.436 In August of the same year, it was apparently 
agreed that the Social Council would begin collecting expert opinions on these legalized 
brothels. By the end of August, an internal memo had circulated around government 
agencies discussing plans for licensing a particular institute to handle sigheh contracts. 
Proponents of this plan argued that “chastity houses” would help eradicate social 
corruption.437 
Researchers from WomeninIran reported widespread disapproval from the 
public.438 Markez-e Amar-e Mosharekat-e Zanan (The Statistical Center for the 
Participation of Women), a Tehran-based women’s advocacy group, challenged the 
Ministry’s plans, stating that sexual contact was just one way in which sexual diseases 
could spread. They argued that the Ministry’s focus on the prevention of AIDS through 
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this route would be ineffective.439 After news of these plans was leaked to the public, it 
stirred much controversy, prompting immediate denials from officials. Hojjat al-Eslam 
Rahami, then head of the Political Conscience division of Iran’s security forces, 
announced that the chief architect behind these proposed chastity houses had been 
identified and arrested.440 The arrest —which cannot be independently confirmed if, in 
fact, it did happen —was perhaps an attempt to placate public disapproval while 
simultaneously denying that the plan had any official government approval, or even 
existed.  It is generally believed that plans for khaneh-ye efaf were abandoned soon after.   
Indeed, the controversy surrounding the proposals for chastity houses was based 
on the possibility that the government would commence regulating brothels in the Islamic 
Republic. But these plans were also problematic because implicit to this policy was the 
involvement of particular demographic groups. According to WomeninIran, the 
likelihood that destitute women and female runaways would participate was strong.441 
Was the government indirectly providing a location and reason for these women to seek 
sex work as a quick source of income? 
 
Capping the Youth’s Sexual Desires 
Year 1997 marked the emergence of a reformist-backed civil-society agenda, 
implemented by the Khatami administration, which was curtailed a decade later via the 
monopolization of power in the hands of Iran’s conservatives factions. Since the 
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dissolution of the Iran-Iraq war and the end of Rafsanjani’s tenure as president, Iran’s 
political structure had undergone significant changes in leadership, transitioning from the 
reformist-leaning Ayatollah Muhammad Khatami to conservative politician and former 
mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. By the 2000s, financial grievances had 
augmented in the face of mounting international sanctions, coupled with government 
economic mismanagement. These factors caused young couples to delay entering 
permanent marriage.  More than ever, Iranians were finding themselves out-priced by the 
housing market and unemployed —as university degrees did not automatically grant 
them employment.442  
During Ahmadinejad’s first presidential term, sigheh was again broached 
publically in 2007.  In this period, as economic problems surmounted, government 
officials began worrying about the short-term and long-term consequences affecting a 
specific demographic —Iranian youth. Young couples were encouraged to enter 
temporary marriages to avoid prolonged courtships in which they would be tempted to 
engage in pre-marital sex. At a conference in Qom, cleric Mustafa Pourmohammadi, then 
minister of the Interior, announced that the government should promote sigheh among the 
youth, as it would provide a stabilizing and preventive force in the face of society’s moral 
corruption.443 Pourmohammadi said, “We must not be afraid in promoting the temporary 
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marriage of youth in a society in which God rules; this problem must be bravely 
addressed across the country.”444 In another media report, he elaborated: 
The increase in the marriage age in this country has caused many problems. Is it  
possible that Islam is indifferent to a 15-year-old youth into whom God has put 
lust? We have to find a solution to meet the sexual desire of the youth who have  
no possibility of marriage. Islam is a comprehensive and complete religion and  
has a solution for every behaviour and need, and temporary marriage is one of its 
solutions for the needs of the youth.445 
 
Here, Pourmohammadi concentrates on the progressive nature of Islam, which is 
perceived to offer Muslims solutions for modern-day dilemmas, using Islamic 
institutional structures and tenets.446 Moreover, explicit in the aforementioned 
government officials’ reflections on temporary marriage is the prevailing assumption that 
human sexuality naturally requires satiation.   As such fulfilling sexual desires is best 
handled through heterosexual marital relations —or as Shahidian has defined, “healthy 
hetero-marital” unions, designed in accordance to Shi’a marital traditions.447 In this 
framework, human sexuality is viewed as normal as long as it is confined to specific 
marital arrangements.  In the event that sexuality should err towards deviant expression 
—meaning that couples should engage in premarital sex or be tempted by lust—
temporary marriage is a sufficient mechanism to help subdue errant sexuality. 
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Sigheh and Human Sexuality: Engaging and Limiting Human Desires 
Underlying this emphasis on sigheh is the notion that human sexuality is 
inherently insatiable —in other words, that men and women are voracious consuming 
subjects of sexual desire. The opinions of Rafsanjani, Bojnordi, and Pourmohammadi on 
sigheh demonstrate a traditionalist understanding of human sexuality, constructed in  
Twelver Shi’a theological and legal discourses. It is believed that the overall aim of 
sigheh is to satisfy sexual urges.448  Shi’a ulama, such as Ayatollah Motahhari, have 
argued that sigheh —in legal terminology, nikah mut’a— is “one of the brilliant laws of 
Islam.”449 It is sanctioned by leading Shi’a Jaf’ari jurisprudential interpretations of a 
Qur’anic verse — chiefly al-Nisa 4: 24.450 Hadith sources, too, cite that the Prophet 
Muhammad permitted sigheh. However the Shi’a believe that Caliph Omar, whom the 
Shi’a do not acknowledge as the rightful blood heir and next in line to the Prophet 
Muhammad, had outlawed the practice.451  
Shi’a ulama have specified the circumstances within which legitimate and lawful 
interactions between men and women in a sigheh union are permitted to take place —
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such as in the event of long periods of travel like a pilgrimage or an educational 
sojourn.452 Because sexual segregation is a committed priority of the Iranian ulama, 
maintaining propriety between na-mahram (non-blood- or kin-related) parties is 
legitimized through this form of legal consent.453 The consent in this marriage means that 
both parties agree to either a sexual or nonsexual (platonic) interaction.454 Just as 
Rafsanjani had alluded to in his interview, both parties in a sigheh arrangement determine 
the contract’s expiration, the precise nature of the services rendered, and if financial 
compensation will be exchanged.455 The time period may last from as little as one hour 
up to ninety-nine years.456 (Once a sigheh contract expires, a woman must wait the 
expanse of two menstruation cycles to assure that, in the event of a pregnancy, the father 
can be identified and held accountable.)457  
Haeri, author of Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran —and one of the 
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foremost contemporary experts on temporary marriage practices in Iran— argues, 
“Islamic ideology on marriage and sexuality is celebrated by the Shi’i ulama as being 
positive, self-affirming, and cognizant of human needs…Celibacy, on the other hand, is 
considered evil and unnatural.”458 According to Haeri, the Shi’a ulama justify mut’a 
marriage on the basis of human nature, which is dichotomized into male and female 
sexualities. The distinction between the two helps maintain social order.459 Sigheh unions 
are temporary, preventive solutions to the “animalistic” sexual needs of men —necessary 
in times when their sexual desires reach insatiable levels.460 In “Shi’i ideology, the man is 
assumed to be driven by his sexual drives, to have ‘animal’ energy.461 Male sexual drives 
are also described as “volcanic” and in need of containment and satisfaction through 
morally acceptable means.462 Women, by contrast, are perceived to be the sources of 
energy, to be “nature itself…something that is life giving and life threatening, frightful 
and fascinating.”463  
Yet in this dichotomy of sexualities, male sexuality —if conducted within the 
confines of a legal marriage contract— is considered legitimate, natural, and expected. It 
is instinctual, natural, and central to the propagation of an orderly Muslim society. By 
contrast, female sexuality is perceived as a form of “enslavement” because “‘by nature’ 
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they cannot refuse to yield; it is their nature to want to be taken.”464 Mir-Hosseini adds, 
“Control of women’s sexuality finds its legitimacy in the fuqaha’s  (Muslim jurists) 
conception of marriage.”465 For unrestrained sexual relations between two non-married 
persons encourages vice, uncontrolled urges, which could potentially lead to 
psychological unrest.466 Sexual relations between a “husband and wife” however offered 
the best example of male-female, spousal complementarity in a controlled and 
“traditional” framework.467 Thus to satiate these alleged desires and instincts, temporary 
sexual partnerships are pursued —sanctioned by Islamic law and doctrine and even 
encouraged by Iranian authorities.   
 
Considering Sigheh as a Prostitution Variant  
 
Even despite the 2002 controversy stemming from the plans for government-
regulated brothels, state and clerical rhetoric continue to insist that there is no connection 
between sigheh and prostitution. The late Mohammad Kazem Shari’atmadari, the leading 
Grand Ayatollah in Qom and whom Haeri interviewed in 1978 for her fieldwork, asserted 
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that mut’a was not legalized prostitution. He asserted “this to be an erroneous 
understanding, typical of what foreigners think about mut’a.”468 Shi’a clerics generally 
view sigheh as a sexual safety value, which is available to Muslims in certain 
circumstances. For Ayatollah Sayyid Reza Borghei Mudaris specifically, sigheh is 
available to financially strapped persons —for instance, a widow who “ answers her 
needs because if she doesn't, she will have psychological problems.” 469  In other cases, 
men who cannot afford a permanent marriage should consider sigheh, as well as a 
“married man with domestic problems who needs ‘a kind of medicine.’”470 
Haeri contends that calling mut'a (sigheh) another variation of prostitution would 
be a mistake.  She explains, “The problem is more complex than the apparent similarities 
might suggest.”471 There are many important debates circulating in both scholarly and 
public discourse about the interwoven relationship of sigheh to women’s sexuality, 
prostitution, economic stability, and extramarital affairs. However, to deny the links 
between the two is to ignore both the important social realities and the demographic 
changes taking place in prostitution.  More so, there is recent evidence that government 
policy, to some extent, is aware of the problems associated with prostitution and is 
responding accordingly.  As case-in-point (and thus, as a direct critique of Haeri’s point 
that sigheh is not a variant of prostitution) is the proposed establishment of chastity 
houses.  Why would the Ministry of the Interior incorporate sigheh into this program if 
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temporary marriage is not, in some significant way, considered a mechanism by which 
prostitution can be legitimized and thus regulated?  
 
Who Participates in and Benefits from Sigheh? 
According to the academic literature on sigheh, there is a general consensus 
formed about temporary marriage —that it is not celebrated to the same level as a 
permanent marriage. Haeri explains, “This form of marriage lend themselves to a wide 
range of manipulations, negotiations, and interpretations of the institution on both 
symbolic and practical levels.”472 In a permanent marriage, sexuality “is celebrated by 
Shi'a ulama as being positive, self-affirming, and cognizant of human needs.”473 By 
contrast, sigheh is generally looked down upon. As social scientist Mir-Hosseini has 
argued, temporary marriage is a  “socially defective marriage.”474 In an interview with 
the American magazine Mother Jones, Mir-Hosseini reiterated her opinion that sigheh is 
not an ideal or celebrated partnership because “women who enter this kind of marriage 
never talk about it.”475 The stigma is even more pronounced when the dynamic of the 
temporary contract is sexual in nature. For those women involved, they are more likely to 
hide or deny their participation.476 Paidar explains, “Those who practiced it tended to 
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keep their activities secret and this also applied to the clerics who fervently defended its 
philosophy.”477 Haeri adds, “Sigheh is a pejorative term that has been colloquially applied 
to a woman who is temporarily married, but the term is not applied to a man.”478 In fact 
women who do become sigheh do not generally celebrate this kind of union.479  
However, for Iranian feminist Shahla Sherkat, sigheh has a potentially positive, 
transformative effect on societal understandings towards women’s sexuality.   Sherkat, a 
prominent women’s activist and former editor and publisher of Zanan, a feminist journal 
closed by authorities in February 2007, has argued that sigheh can offer a particularly 
emancipatory direction for perceptions on a woman’s virginity and sexual rights. In a 
New York Times interview, she enumerated the benefits to sigheh: "First, relations 
between young men and women will become a little bit freer.  Second, they can satisfy 
their sexual needs. Third, sex will become depoliticized. Fourth, they will use up some of 
the energy they are putting into street demonstrations. Finally, our society's obsession 
with virginity will disappear."480 
However several research studies conducted in Iran suggest that these benefits 
have yet to materialize in a meaningful way.481 According to the 2009 research findings 
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published in the monthly journal Gozaresh, from a group of Iranian social scientists 
affiliated with the Sociological Society for Women’s Studies, the primary reason behind 
a woman’s agreeing to a temporary marriage is financial compensation. Moreover, there 
are crucial differences in how this compensation is realized depending on the 
demographic group. As stated in the Gozaresh article, “Women who are sigheh usually 
have a history of societal hardships or are divorced or they have husbands who have 
problems with addiction, betrayal, and family violence; or, they do not accept 
responsibility.”482 Additionally, there are emotional and financial reasons that draw 
women into temporary marriages —the primary reason being financial, since they receive 
little help from Iran’s welfare organizations to mitigate their economic duress.483 They 
contend that sigheh partners are typically poorly educated.484 Likewise, they have a poor 
general knowledge of sexual health; diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis are unknown to 
them.485 (This ignorance can also be attributed to the limited, sexual health education 
programs in Iran’s school curriculum.)486  
                                                                                                                                            
 
482 “Sigheh:  Niyaz-e Mali, Mabna- ye Tahghir-e Zan-e Irani/Sigheh: Financial Need, the Reason for the 
Denigration of Iranian Women,” Gozaresh 215, no. 19 (Bahman 1388/February 2009):  
p. 10. 
483 Ibid., p. 10.  The authors also note that this financial stress is gender-related; women, they state, have 
much more difficulty entering the workforce than men. In my own interviews conducted in 2011 in Tehran, 
I spoke with two women who mentioned that they had entered sigheh as a way to sustain a romantic 
relationship with married men, who had no intentions of divorcing their permanent wives. Both women 
were professional women in their mid-thirties who were in sigheh relationships with older men. 
484 Ibid., p. 11. 
485 Ibid. As for the male demographic that participates in a sigheh relationship, Gozaresh reported that only 
three percent of men are believed to be against sigheh.  As for the men who are generally associated with 
entering into sigheh partnerships, Gozaresh does not positively characterize them. Male participants to 
sigheh are described as vashy—a term in Persian that connotes both wild and violent characteristics.  With 
their sigheh spouses, they engage in gheir materof-e jensi  (non-standard sex, presumably meaning risky 
sexual positions) and often believe that by making threats and using money as their advantage, they can 
behave in any manner with these women.  Married men, in particular, are portrayed negatively, as their 
reasons for sigheh partnerships are based on their wives’ alleged failures: for instance, husbands describe 
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In another study, researchers found that people were entering temporary marriage 
because it was more financially feasible.  Permanent marriage is being delayed simply 
because it was too expensive to get married. According to psychologist and family 
counselor Dr. Ali Asghar Kayhania, there is a rise in this predicament because men are 
being discouraged to enter permanent marriages because the mehriyeh (dowry) agreed to 
in a permanent marriage are often out of financial reach for these men.487 Moreover, 
fewer men are becoming homeowners or their families cannot afford to purchase 
properties for them, and thus the idea of a newly (permanently) married couple resettling 
in a new place is too difficult. As a secondary solution, young women agree to temporary 
marriages because they do not want to incur additional hardships for their partners, who 
would otherwise be responsible for compensating mehriyeh in the case of divorce.488 
(Rising gold prices also affect a man’s decision to enter a permanent or temporary 
marriage, especially if the mehriyeh amount agreed to by the bride’s family is a financial 
impossibility for the groom.) 489 
                                                                                                                                            
their wives as being sexually cold or emotionless, or they do not become sexually aroused by their 
husbands.  In no manner did the husbands admit to their own personal failures or misgivings. 
 
486 Ibid. Only in 2011 did the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Ministry of Health and 
Human Services permit the release of a sexual education DVD detailing how to have pleasurable sex 
between spouses, entitled Ashnayeh Mahboub (The Beloved Companion). Upon its release and within the 
time span of one month, the DVD was no longer available across Tehran pharmacies; the video is now 
available online. 
 
487 Mehriyeh is a payment owed to the wife upon marriage that is typically requested in the event of a 
divorce.  It is an essential condition for the legality of marriage and also a wife’s right to request. For an in 
depth explanation of mehriyeh, see Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law 
(London:  I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 72-83. See also Zahra Tizo, Domestic Violence in Iran: Women, Marriage 
and Islam, pp. 39-44. 
 
488 “Sigheh:  Niyaz-e Mali, Mabna- ye Tahghir-e Zan-e Irani/Sigheh: Financial Need, the Reason for the 
Denigration of Iranian Women,” Gozaresh. 
 
489 In January 2012, rising inflation caused the value of gold coins to skyrocket. The number of sekeh (gold 
coins) is often the bargaining factor in the formulation of mehrieh in a permanent marriage contract. 
Legally speaking, mehrieh is one of the most important structural components of the traditional Islamic 
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Sociologist Parvaneh Hooshmand suggests that financial sustainability is a 
secondary reason underlining sigheh partnership. Her research suggests that the chief 
motivating force behind entering a sigheh is material desire.490 She interviewed fifty 
urban middle and upper class women on the practice of temporary marriage, and her 
findings suggest that temporary marriage is used as sexual currency, wherein sex can be 
offered in exchange for housing, a meal, or even easy cash.491 Hooshmand claims that in 
a sigheh arrangement, sexual intercourse means material gifts are expected —or that 
women must use sex as a method to convince their temporary “husbands” to give them 
something they want.492 She argues that this expectation of an exchange does not appear 
in long-term or permanent marriages, wherein sex is not used as part of the quid pro quo.  
For a study on the number of male participants in sigheh, there is a 2006 report 
published by the government’s Statistical Center of Iran, which is responsible for census-
taking and preparing statistics of state policies and programs.  According to its findings 
published in Ebtekar News, married men were more inclined to have sigheh partnerships 
than single men.493 The statistics showed that, among Iran’s general population, the 
                                                                                                                                            
marriage and must be indicated in the marriage contract itself. The groom’s acceptance of Mehrieh is often 
determined by the number of sekeh he agrees to pay the bride in case of emergency or the dissolution of 
marriage. This agreement is sound provided that the union is consummated “Afzayesh-e Ezdevaj-e 
Movaqat pa-be-pa-ye Qeimat-e Sekeh/The Rise in Temporary Marriage on Pace with the Rise in Gold 
Coins,” Asr-e Iran,  
5 Bahman 1390/ January 25, 2012, accessed January 27, 2012. 
http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/198672/ﺵﯼﺍﺯﻑﺍ-ﺝﺍﻭﺩﺯﺍ-ﺕﻕﻭﻡ-ﺍﭖ-ﻩﺏ-ﯼﺍﭖ-ﺕﻡﯼﻕ-ﻩﮎﺱ.   
 
490 See Parvaneh Hooshmand, “Sexualities. Practices. Iran,” in Encyclopedia of Women in Islamic  
Cultures: Family, Law and Politics 3, ed. by Suad Joseph and Afsaneh Najmabadi, pp. 384-386 (Leiden: 
Brill Publishing, 2005). 
 
491 Hooshmand, “Sexualities. Practices. Iran,” p. 385. 
492 Ibid. 
 
493 Permanently married women are not permitted to enter sigheh relationships, be they sexual or 
nonsexual. Haeri explains, “A fictive nonsexual sigheh with a married woman is…perceived to be 
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number of men and women between the ages of twenty and sixty constituted thirty-seven 
million people. Within this population, two million had sigheh relationships between the 
ages of twenty and fifty.  Of the male correspondents, more than two-thirds who pursued 
temporary marriage were married men, whereas less than one-third of the male 
correspondents were single.494 
These aforementioned studies reflect not only the diverse practices and public 
opinions about sigheh, but also the crucial factor of compensation. It is not simply, as the 
government claims, human sexual desires motivate men and women to enter into 
temporary unions. Fatimeh Sadeghi, a political scientist and former professor at Islamic 
Azad University, maintains, 
…in our [Iranian] society many women agree to become sighehs mostly  
because of distress due to economic pressures and the inability to provide their 
own means of subsistence. When a woman becomes a man's sigheh under such  
circumstances, she is in essence engaging in a fundamentally unequal exchange. It  
is her distress over providing her means of subsistence that forces her to agree to  
become a sigheh. On the other hand, given the disagreeable character of sigheh in  
our culture, many of these women are compelled to keep the relationship a secret  
from neighbors and family members. It is even worse when an unwanted child  
results from the relationship.495 
 
The social reality attests to the fact that for many women, sigheh is knowingly used as a 
form of financial protection and welfare. Government rhetoric, however, does not 
                                                                                                                                            
threatening because it symbolically infringers on the husbands’ exclusive right of ownership to his wife’s 
wifely duties and, for that matter, poses a threat to the purity of his seed.”  See Haeri, Law of Desire, p. 93. 
 
494  “Mokhalefan-e Ezdevaj-e Movaqat Cheh Migouyand?/ What Do the Opponents of Temporary Marriage 
Say?” Ebtekar News, Issue 949 (12 Tir 1386/ July 3, 2007). 
 
The government does not publish recent statistics about the status of sigheh usage among Iranians.  
495 Fatemeh Sadeghi, “ ‘Temporary Marriage’ and the Economy of Pleasure,” trans. Frieda Afary, Tehran 






consider this variable, and instead focuses on the purported lustful inclinations of the 
youth. 
 
Modern-day Madams and the Changing Demographics of Prostitution 
In December 2011, Habibollah Farid, the director of the Societal Victims Bureau 
of the State Welfare Organization, reported that fifty percent of women involved in 
prostitution are married and consider themselves middle class.496 His findings provide 
recent data about the status of women sex workers in Tehran, which showed that the 
majority of women sex workers were generally poor, illiterate, and unmarried.497 (Recall 
Varvayyi’s dissertation, which discusses what transpired following the illegalization of 
prostitution in 1979 and the living conditions of street prostitutes working in various sites 
throughout Tehran.) Farid suggests that economic survival is no longer the main reason 
for entering prostitution; recently, more prostitutes turn out to be middle-class women 
with moderate salaries who prostitute themselves as a “second job.”498 According to 
Amnesty International, “Married women are sometimes forced into prostitution by their 
                                                
496 See “Tanforoushi baraye Afzayesh-e Keyfiyat-e Zendegi/Prostitution for the Purpose of Improving 
Quality of Life,” Salamat News, 22 Azar 1390/ December 2, 2011, accessed January 20, 2012, 
http://salamatnews.com/viewNews.aspx?ID=38047&cat=12.  See also “Sazeman-e Behzisti:  Bish az 
Panjah Darsad-e Kargaran-e Jensi, Zanan-e Mote’ahel Hastand/ State Welfare Organization:  More than 50 
Percent of Sex Workers are Married Women,” BBC Persian, December 12, 2011, accessed January 12, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/12/111212_l21_sex_worker_iran.shtml.   
497 “Tanforoushi baraye Afzayesh-e Keyfiyat-e Zendegi/Prostitution for the Purpose of Improving Quality 
of Life,” Salamat News. 
 
498 “Sazeman-e Behzisti:  Bish az Panjah Darsad-e Kargaran-e Jensi, Zanan-e Mote’ahel Hastand/ State 




husband to feed their drug habits or as a result of an abusive relationship. If arrested, they 
risk being charged with adultery and, if convicted, execution by stoning.”499  
In an interview with Iran’s Sharq newspaper, analyst Saieed Madani elaborated 
Farid’s assessment.  He reported that “95 percent of women sex workers in Tehran” are 
literate.500 The medium age for women sex workers had dropped by three years, wherein 
girls between the ages of fourteen and fifteen were reportedly entering the sex market.501 
(This drop in age is significant, given that in July 2000, the average age of prostitutes had 
dropped from twenty-seven to twenty years.)502 Among the population of female 
prostitutes whom were interviewed, 11.7% claimed they were virgins the very first time 
they prostituted.  In addition, 11.8% of the female sex workers were presently living with 
their own husbands.503 However, for those women who chose prostitution even though 
they had modest incomes, Madani cited two reasons: economic mobility and 
accumulation of material wealth.  The reasons why a woman entered the sex market were 
not only based on economic necessity but also on enhancing quality of life and increasing 
material possessions.504 Indeed, both Madani and Farid emphasized that these women 
                                                
499 Amnesty International, Iran: End Executions by Stoning Report (London:  Amnesty International 
Publications, 2008), p. 7. 
 
500 “Sazeman-e Behzisti:  Bish az Panjah Darsad-e Kargaran-e Jensi, Zanan-e Mote’ahel Hastand/ State 
Welfare Organization:  More than 50 Percent of Sex Workers are Married Women,” BBC Persian.  
  
501 The article compares the medium age to figures from 1969, but it does not state explicitly what the 
medium age is in year 2012. See ““Tanforoushi baraye Afzayesh-e Keyfiyat-e Zendegi/Prostitution for the 
Purpose of Improving Quality of Life,” Salamat News. 
 
502 Muhammad Ali Zam, Bahar newspaper, July 2, 2000. Quoted in Alavi, We are Iran, p. 158.  
 
503 “Tanforoushi baraye Afzayesh-e Keyfiyat-e Zendegi/Prostitution for the Purpose of Improving Quality 
of Life,” Salamat News. 
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were at the beginning of the spectrum of prostitute types.  Once they entered the “cycle” 
of the profession, they would become exposed to drugs and sexually transmitted diseases 
and would need additional psychological care.505 
 
Consuming Insatiable Desires 
In Iran, to state that prostitution is illegal is to equivocate about its actual 
presence. Not only do the police and government authorities endorse policies that are 
arguably cosmetic, but also they are also complicit in implementing strategies that enable 
prostitution —yet publicized as an “Islamic” practice.  This is not to say that clerical 
authorities encourage sleeping with “fallen woman”— nay, quite the opposite.  Some 
clerics have interpreted paid, sexual liaisons within the framework of temporary marriage 
as a method of maintaining social order. Yet one result is that in the face of economic 
duress, prostitution has been integrated into the discourse of marriage via temporary 
marriage contracts. 
Indeed, prostitution is a delicate issue of social, economic, and political 
importance. At the height of the Iranian Revolution, some considered it a societal blight. 
Its practice and regulation was blamed on the liberal, westernized policies of the Pahlavi 
regime, and it was often presented as an example of the overall moral decline of the 
Iranian people during this reign. Ayatollah Taleghani regarded prostitution as a social 
necessity, akin to the fundamental presence of a toilet in a house. In the post-
revolutionary era, prostitution is both conceptually and physically emancipated from 
saturnine dwellings of red-light infamy. After 1979, the physical site of prostitution 





enters a conceptual leviathan —money being exchanged for sexual services becomes 
reconfigured as a procedural activity in a legal, marriage contract. Popular religious 
commentaries on human sexuality are identified as the theoretical and legal sources upon 
which to support the usage of sigheh for young adults, veterans, and men, in general.  By 
2002, there are reports of clandestine, government proposals for chastity houses.  
In this chapter on the study of prostitution in the post-revolutionary period, there 
are two parallel, yet codependent, discourses motivating one another: the state discourse 
of prostitution and the discourse of sigheh.  In both, the notion of insatiable, consuming 
sexuality underscores the reasons for the existence and regeneration of the sex industry 
and why temporary marriage is argued as a necessity in maintaining social order. 
Intimately tied to the sigheh-prostitute phenomenon is an epistemological shift wherein 
the destruction of the red-light “site” of prostitution leads to the re-configuration of 
prostitution discourse in Iran to include men’s and woman’s perpetually motivating 
sexualities. Yet what does the repeated emphasis of the desiring man and woman suggest 
about human beings —that essentially they have no control over their sexual desires and 
bodies?  Moreover, are human relationships just about lasciviousness and fornication? 
Should solutions to socioeconomic problems always consider these two notions? 
As this research demonstrates, the technologies of subject formation are used to 
market both male and female citizens as Muslim subjects who are desiring consumers, 
too. Yet the onus of responsibility falls significantly on women. Implicit in the Shi’a legal 
discourse of sigheh and the state’s promotion of sigheh is the assumption of a passive 
female sexuality. It is presumed to be the conduit of sexual relations with men. Sigheh is 
promoted as an available, Islamically approved alternative to entering illicit sexual 
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relationships.  However state officials have not encouraged young women to satiate their 
desires by entering temporary marriages.  It is still taboo for women to enter sigheh, and, 
as I discussed in the previous section, women do not usually announce their sigheh 
relationships. 
For many Iranians, sigheh is understood to be a legitimized form of prostitution in 
spite of clerical insistence that sigheh is best practiced within the stipulations outlined by 
Islamic legal tradition. The custom and institution of sigheh has entered the unchartered 
terrain of social reality, where diverse sexual practices and human relationships soften the 
government’s red lines designating appropriate and morally-guided conduct in an Islamic 
society. An immediate consequence of this strategy of encouraging and accommodating 
sigheh — perhaps unintended— is that the concept of (female) prostitute has expanded. 
Now the concept of prostitute includes a wider range of women from varied 
socioeconomic backgrounds —meaning, it is uncertain who and what constitutes and 
qualifies as a sex worker and as sex work. Moreover, in lieu of a prostitute located within 
a red-light district, the contemporary version of “prostitute” has penetrated traditional, 
domestic spaces, taking on the title of “ wife,”  albeit momentarily.  These days, 
prostitution bears the faces of the middle class, many of whom regard Islamic marital 
tradition like sigheh as a permission-slip to conduct extra-marital affairs or even, as some 
women have expressed, as a method by which to obtain economic mobility and financial 
security.    
 For the penultimate chapter, I turn to a discussion of the regulatory methods of 
erasure and modification through the handling of artistic representations of women in the 






Naked Modesty and the Reformation of Statues in Post-revolutionary Iran 
 
A cleric could not walk through the university with those scenes on the grass, in classes, 
in streets. We could not go to government offices.  If you stood in front of a desk, you 
would commit a sin, because there was a nude statue [an unveiled woman] behind the 
desk. —Hojjat al-Eslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani1 
 
Introduction 
The former President of Iran does not mince his words: when a cleric stands 
before an unveiled woman, the encounter is one of sexual impropriety; the opportunity 
for decadence abounds. Rafsanjani’s anecdote illustrates that the presence of an unveiled 
woman evokes unnecessary temptation, especially for a believer seeking to maintain his 
piety and moral constitution. Although the impending sin is not elucidated, it must 
nevertheless be avoided. Yet evading such an encounter involves two possible solutions: 
either the believer should not enter official spaces where he should come across women 
who are “naked,” or, women should not be permitted to present themselves as “nude 
statues” in the workplace.  
The legal enforcement of compulsory hejab has shown that the latter option was, 
in fact, the only possible outcome. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic came 
an Islamicization program that reinforced values of modesty, piety, family, and 
revolution that are all promoted in the preamble of Iran’s 1979 constitution. Afsaneh 
Najmabadi surmises, “The notion was now emerging of the importance of possessing 
some singular morality that would help purify a society perceived to be hopelessly 
                                                
1 Kayhan, airmail edition, 23 Bahman 1364/ February 12, 1986. Quoted in Najmabadi, “Iran’s Turn to 






corrupt, as opposed to backward.”2 Accusing unveiled women who entered public space 
of being naked was a tactic often used by many of Ayatollah Khomeini’s hardline 
supporters to discredit and shame those who opposed observing Islamic hejab. These 
women were subsequently criticized for behaving in a manner perceived to be destructive 
to Islamic values.3 Women who refused to wear the hejab and “flaunt their naked bodies 
in the streets” were denounced in Kayhan editorials as “corrupt, seditious, dangerous and 
destructive of public honour and chastity.”4 During a March 1979 speaking event, 
Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that Islamic agencies would be committing sin if they were 
to allow women to enter office spaces while being lokht (naked).5 According to the 
Suleyman Hayyim New Persian-English Dictionary, lokht generally translates as “naked,” 
“bare,” or “nude.”6 In both leaders’ usage of lokht, the term refers to a particular 
expression of nakedness associated with not wearing an Islamic head-cover.  
If we set aside Rafsanjani’s lesson and instead focus on the metaphor he invokes 
(of an unveiled woman as a “nude statue”), is the statue of a woman, situated in a city 
square, an automatic provocateur, evoking disapproval and shame in the viewer just as 
Rafsanjani presumes the presence of an unveiled woman does? Does it evoke feelings of 
impropriety, sin, and immorality in the viewer?  If such is the case, what are the 
institutional approaches to modifying public space and the objects that inhabit that site in 
                                                
2 Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Iran’s Turn to Islam:  From Modernism to Moral Order,” Middle East Journal 41, 
no. 2 (Spring 1987), p. 204. 
 
3 Nashat, “Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” p. 185. 
 
4 Kayhan, March 14, 1983.  Quoted in Haleh Afshar,  “Women, State and Ideology in Iran,” Third World 
Quarterly 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1985): pp. 265-266.   
 
5 Shahidian, pp. 97, 99.  See also Najmabadi, “Power, Morality and the New Muslim Womanhood.” 
 







order to ensure that men and women—in particularly their gazing upon this object—are 
shielded from temptation and immoral thoughts?   
Much of the literature on the status of women in post-revolutionary Iran focuses 
on the issue of compulsory hejab, analyzing the policy’s effects on the daily lives and 
restrictions experienced by Iranian women. Generally, these studies enumerate and 
contextualize the ways in which sex segregation and veil ordinances affect women’s 
mobility, dress, and civil and political rights. Ever since Ayatollah Khomeini declared 
that Iran was a religious, Islamic society and thus should be governed by laws adhering to 
Islamic criteria, compulsory hejab has continued to be a contentious sociopolitical issue. 
Ashraf Zahedi has argued that this specific policy was “part of the regime’s agenda to 
institutionalize the female identity espoused by the Authenticity Movement which 
promoted the wearing of hijab as ‘moral cleansing.’ Concealing female hair became the 
clerics’ immediate ‘political project.’”7 Ziba Mir-Hosseini has maintained that 
“paradoxically, the enforcement of hejab became a catalyst here: by making public space 
morally correct in the eyes of traditionalist families, it legitimized public presence.”8 A 
woman’s entrance into heterosocial, public space necessitated her observance of a new 
verbal and bodily language, whereby disciplinary tactics such as sex segregation and 
compulsory hejab certified her legal and legitimate presence in this space. Val 
Moghadam argues, “But the legal imposition of hejab was not about protecting women, 
and it was certainly not part of any  struggle  against  male sexism:  it  was  about 
negating female sexuality and therefore protecting men. The idea that women had  ‘lost 
                                                
7 Ashraf  Zahedi, “Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian Regimes,” Journal of 
Middle East Women’s Studies 3, no. 3 (Fall 2007), p.  89.  
 






honor’ during the Pahlavi era was a widespread one.”9 Though the extensive debate on 
compulsory hejab cannot be limited to the reflections of these scholars, they do speak to 
an overarching trend in the academic literature on women in post-revolutionary Iran that 
emphasizes hejab ordinances and the material and legal ripple effects they had for Iranian 
women. An extension of this debate, seldom addressed, is the regulation of female 
sexuality through the disciplinary modification of objects in heterosocial, public space— 
such as, the veiling of a nude statue in a public square. 
There is an extensive history of the destruction of landmarks by powerful elites 
who compete over a nation’s social and political capital. This is especially true for 
monuments that are held within the collective memory of a populace, for whom a historic 
victory or an esteemed political icon is concretized in the form of a marble monument 
and placed in the center of major squares and thoroughfares. By commemorating societal 
achievements and ideals, these statues are designed to reflect national heritage and pride 
—of artistic value and wartime significance. Yet timing bears heavy consequences on the 
visual object of that square: as political regimes pull one hero down from the pedestal and 
raise another up, the threat of extinction looms large.  As the hero of one regime swiftly 
becomes the antagonist of another, new symbols manifest, new identities are crafted and 
legacies are re-written in an effort to erase all vestiges of the fallen regime.10 
                                                
9 Val Moghadam, "Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women: Gender Politics in Iran and Afghanistan," 
Social Text 22 (Spring 1989): p. 45. 
 
10 I recall two examples: Taliban-run Afghanistan and post-Soviet Russia. In 2001, the Taliban’s Mullah 
Muhammad Omar ordered the destruction of ancient Buddhist cave temples, towering fifty meters in 
height, in Bamiyan, Afghanistan. According to the Taliban’s rigid interpretation of both the Qur’an and 
sunnah, the pre-Islamic statues were considered idolatry and thus such figures were ordered destroyed 
countrywide. (The cave temples were located in three major sites throughout Afghanistan; there are 1000 
known cave temples in Bamayan.) See “Taleban dismisses statue outcry,” BBC News, February 27, 2011, 
accessed August, 30, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1192195.stm. A similar example of 





In the midst of regime change from dynastic to clerical leadership, many Pahlavi-
era landmarks and monuments were destroyed. Sculptures of Persian historical and 
cultural icons were vandalized —a notable instance was the beheading of the sculpture of 
famed, Iranian classical poet, Ferdowsi, located in central Tehran’s Ferdowsi Square.11 
Although statues of women in particular were not subject to the same manner of 
destruction in the early years after the Revolution, they were dealt with in accordance to 
the state’s social policies enforcing an “Islamic code of public appearance.”12  
For sculptures of women, this was translated into material reform by rendering 
any “obscene” exhibition of the body13 as modest and thus suitable for public viewing. 
Determining which presentations of a statue fell under the category of “obscene” has 
varied from the offense of a statue displayed without a hejab to any hint of female 
sexuality, such as a sculpture with a noticeable bosom. According to some religious 
officials I underscore later in this chapter, public space is an arena suitable only for 
displaying objects that are consistent with Iran’s “societal standards” and exemplify 
Islamic values; hence any object that contradicts these values should not be exhibited.  In 
the past seven years, the same criticism has been directed at all life-like representations of 
                                                
the Soviets, whose prominence waned with the establishment of independent Russia. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Russians sought a re-formulation of the symbolic capital that key Soviet-era monuments 
posed for the general public during the “critical juncture” of the 1990s. Russian officials sought the 
removal and relocation of Soviet-era monuments from Moscow’s public spaces; in other cases, throughout 
this transition period, political elite would alter the composition and design of these monuments’ sites to 
gain prestige and legitimacy with the public.  See Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Unraveling the 
Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow,” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 92, no. 3 (Sep. 2002): p. 524. 
 
11 After public protest, the statue was repaired and still remains in the same square in central Tehran. 
 
12 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, p. 177. 
 
13 The term “body” refers to individual and whole representations or features of the physical structure of a 





women, such as mannequins in storefronts, which have been accused of advertising 
inappropriate (and unlawful) relationships between men and women. 
In an attempt to diversify scholarly discussion on the regulation of sexuality in 
contemporary Iran, I do not limit myself to the discussion of the social control of 
compulsory hejab.  Instead, I focus on other cultural, religious, legal, and spatial 
dimensions within this regulatory framework that determine how and to what extent 
women’s bodies and their representations are disciplined. In this chapter, I review the 
alteration of specific statues, monuments, and mannequins to point out the strategic 
application of “Islamic criteria” in the face of robust social change. In what follows, I 
discuss the controversies surrounding mannequins and three sculptures —“Mard-e 
Neylabakzan” (The Flute Player), “Mojassameh-ye Fereshteh-ye Azadi” (Angel of 
Freedom), and “Zan va Mard-e Keshavarz”  (Man and Woman Farmers).  These three 
public artworks were once prominently displayed in Tehran’s public squares and in front 
of ministry and municipal buildings. Their subsequent renovation in the post-
revolutionary period illustrates how public works of art —especially those representing 
women— went from being recognized as part of a national, cultural heritage to suddenly 
being identified as suspicious, immodest, and obscene objects.  The historical narrative 
behind this process of modification in the name of promoting “Islamic values” of public 
morality, chastity and modesty aids in contextualizing how and in what ways public 
space underwent significant transformations through the regulation of sexuality.  
Studying these pieces helps identify the shifting understandings toward female 
sexuality alongside the legal, authoritative, and sculptural methods used to re-codify 





sphere. In what follows, I elaborate the government’s efforts to restructure the physical 
and social dynamics of public space so that the people and objects interacting and 
situated, respectively, in that space conform to an “Islamic moral imperative.”  
 
Gender Paradigms of Space and Social Organization in Tehran 
How is public space14 articulated in Iranian state and religious discourses?15  
Islamic laws on modesty mediate the social construction of public spaces via the 
modification of physical spaces and regulating social interactions in those spaces. Thus, 
citizens in public spaces are prevented from gazing upon immodest statues or interacting 
immodestly with each other. The modesty of interactions is defined by state policy 
founded in an Islamic conceptual paradigm of gender relationships known as mahram 
and namahram.16  Although this framework is an imperative in Shi’a discourse, this does 
not mean that this provision is necessarily and fully observed, accepted, and/or practiced 
by Iranian men and women.   However, a brief illustration of a dominant social 
organization of space is worth our attention.   
                                                
14 For more on the division between private and public space within an Islamic context, see Fatima 
Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist’s Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam (New York:  
Basic Books, 1991). 
 
15 Although this chapter focuses on the conceptualization of public space in the Shi’a Iranian  context, there 
are other formations of public space, as they are practiced and constructed in other contexts of the region, 
which are also worth future consideration.  See  Shirley Ardener, ed. Women and Space:  Ground Rules 
and Social Maps (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1981). For an analysis of spatial divisions in the Algerian 
context, see Doria Cherifati-Merabtine,  “Algeria at a Crossroads:  National Liberation, Islamization, and 
Women,” in Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, ed. Valentine 
Moghadam, pp. 40-62 (London: Zed Books, 1994). 
 
16 Jane Khatib-Chahidi, “Sexual Prohibitions, Shared Space, and Fictive Marriages in Shi’ite Iran,” in 
Women and Space:  Ground Rules and Social Maps, ed. Shirley Ardener (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 






The Islamic legal terminology of mahram and namahram designates 
marriageability between men and women. Kinship relationships determine the extent and 
manner of social interaction between opposite sexes.17 Mahram denotes a legal 
“relationship by blood, marriage, or sexual union.”18 Parents for instance, are mahram to 
their children, as are brothers and sisters to one another.19 A namahram relation is 
denoted as “any person of the opposite sex whose kinship does not represent an 
impediment for marriage.”20 Men and women, who are both unrelated to each other, can 
become mahram to each other through marriage. Haeri expounds, “The 
mahram/namahram paradigm, or rules of segregation and association of the sexes, is one 
of the most fundamental and pervasive rules of social organization, social relations, and 
social control in Iran.”21 The clerical leadership’s and state agencies’ implementation of 
this gendered paradigm has been translated into the veiling of women before men who 
are namahram to them.  
Yet the construct of mahram and namahram does not fully explain how 
apparatuses of the state reconfigured public space to be an “Islamic arena” by invoking 
the ideal of modesty. This recoding of public space—its meaning, purpose, and 
parameters— was the outcome of a unique process, involving the demarcation of societal 
red lines and integrating ethical, religious, financial, and political factors.  
                                                




19 Khatib-Chahidi describes four categories of mahram persons: blood relatives (including half-brothers and 
sisters, maternal and paternal aunts and uncles); milk relatives (meaning children breastfed by a non-
biological woman and including her own biological children);  relatives by marriage; and relationships 
arising from illegitimate sexual unions.  Ibid.,  pp. 116-1117. 
 
20 Ibid.,  p. 114. 
 






In the Islamic Republic of Iran, public space is a domain that never holds one 
identity: it is a site of intermixing propaganda, commerce, religious fervor, passionate 
marches, traffic congestion, clashing lifestyles, and prayer demonstrations.  It is also an 
arena in which codes of conduct and social norms are observed and disobeyed under the 
watchful eyes of a clerical leadership, morality police, and regime supporters. Iranian 
citizens are expected to interact in a manner that is mindful of social regulations and 
policies  —many of which are determined by state and religious discourses of modesty 
and hejab.  
In the public sphere, the promotion of sexuality that might incite arousal is sinful; 
for many believers, guarding one’s gaze is a necessary tactic in fending off unlawful lust 
and tahrik (arousal) between the sexes.22 As Hamid Dabashi has written, there is a 
“serenity of a distanced gaze”23— of an image, object, or person that does not provoke 
temptation, but just is. In public space, the heterosexual gaze must keep its distance; it 
should not submit to temptation and desire. Eyes of a believer must be directed away 
from the object of desire (to “guard their gaze”) —even if this is a statue of a woman in a 
public square. For even gazing upon a statue is an act of temptation, for it may lead him 
or her astray by kindling prurient thoughts and illicit actions.24  Hence to control (and 
                                                
22 Ziba Mir-Hosseini has published several interviews with prominent and high-ranking Shi’a mujtahids 
who offer differing opinions on “guarding one’s gaze” with respect to observing hejab. See Ziba Mir-
Hosseini, Islam and Gender:  The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (London:  I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 
44-45; p. 76.  
In Persian, the word tahrik refers to bodily provocation in which a man or woman’s desires are 
aroused and thus this arousal triggers an inclination towards that object or person of desire; this instigates 
or provokes such feelings and, in many cases, bodily reaction (or arousal of the sexual organs), in him or 
her.  
 
23 Dabashi, “Body-less faces:  Mutilating Modernity and Abstracting Women in an ‘Islamic Cinema,’” p. 
377. 
 
24 According to Shi’a discourse on sexuality, the natural disposition of a heterosexual gaze is wanton and 





subdue) the gaze, the assumption is that one must exterminate the potential source of 
moral corruption —and, as I explain via the following example, a monument of a woman 
erected in a historic city square. 
 
Effacing the Feminine of Baharestan Square 
How does a new regime transform the identity of a well-known public site –as an 
example, a city square that was once the site of a national monument or famed sculpture 
of the previous regime?25 In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian officials and 
leaders have both modified and discarded those objects that contradict its ideological 
vision. As Forest and Johnson have argued, “Official memorials, monuments, and 
museums play a unique role in the creation of national identity because they reflect how 
political elites choose to represent the nation publicly.  By erecting memorials in public 
space, states and interest groups attempt to define the historical figures that become 
national heroes and establish the historical incidents that become the formative events of 
a nation's identity."26 Consider, for instance, the landscape of posters and billboards 
across Tehran. Across the city, advertisements and panels of revolutionary slogans are 
posted on highways and the walls of apartment buildings, announcing the state’s ongoing 
commitment to the 1979 Revolution, redefining social values and norms.27 As a visual 
                                                
unrestrained male and female sexualities. The Qur’an (24:30 and 24:31) instructs believing men and 
women to lower their gaze and guard their modesty. For more on the discourse of the gaze in Islamic texts, 
see Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (New York:  I.B. 
Tauris, 2000), pp. 64, 68, 94. 
 




27 Haggai Ram, “Multiple Iconographies:  Political Posters in the Iranian Revolution,” in Picturing Iran:  





topography and pictorial archive, they narrate a ubiquitous expression of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s supporters: a national story of triumph in the form of an Islamic Revolution, 
which rid the nation of a pro-West, secular dictatorship.28 Yet, in this process of crafting 
a new legacy and heritage for Iran, monuments of both symbolic and secular heroines, for 
instance, have disappeared from public space. In their stead are the monuments of Islamic 
philosophers, war martyrs, and veiled mothers.29 As an example, in the proceeding 
paragraphs, I detail the reconstruction of identity and purpose for Tehran’s Baharestan 
Square in the post-revolutionary period. 
Newspaper headings mark June 24, 2009 as a bloody day of protest in Baharestan 
Square.30 Less than two weeks after the presidential re-election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, protests continued to swell in the streets; city squares became crucial 
meeting points for both dissenting citizens and security forces, whose fist-to-fist battles 
were photographed and videotaped, later broadcast on major international news programs 
and posted and commented on across the Internet. Two days earlier, a young woman by 
the name of Neda Aqha Soltan was shot in the head and died instantly. Public anger 
skyrocketed, as video images of her death went viral. Government threats of reprisal were 
                                                
 
28 See Arjomand (2009); Abrahamian (1982, 2008);  Rostam-Povey (2012). 
  
29 For instance, in Tehran, a bronze statue of a veiled mother (sculpted by Zahra Rahnavard) is erected in 
Mothers' Square (also called Mohseni Square) at Mirdamad Boulevard.  At Imam Khomeini Square 
(formerly Toupkhaneh Square during the Pahlavi period), there is a monument honoring Iran’s pre-Islamic 
and imperial dynasty, and on top of that structure is a metal sculpture of the word God in Arabic. Hassan 
Abad Square in the traditional business (Moniriyeh) district of Tehran was renamed to the 31st of Shahrivar 
Square, however this name did not stick and the square is still referred to by its original name. The 31st of 
Shahrivar (September 30) marks the day Iraqi forces launched an air and ground invasion of Iran. 
 
30“Gozaresh-ha az Voghou-e ‘Dargeeri’ dar Meydan-e Baharestan-e Tehran Hekayat Darad/ Reports of 
Outbreaks in Tehran’s Baharestan Square,” BBC Persian, 3 Tir 1388/ June 24, 2009, accessed August 11, 






not initially successful in deterring Iranians from joining opposition rallies in public 
squares.31  
              
Figure 1:  Baharestan Square, June 201132and December 201033 
Baharestan Square was one of several popular gathering spaces where protesters 
have held opposition rallies. For more than a century, demonstrations have historically 
taken place in front of Parliament’s old headquarters, which directly face the square.34 
The square has an extensive political history in the modern formation of the Iranian state 
—from the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) to the present Islamic 
Republic. It was once the site of one of Tehran’s oldest structures, the palace of Mirza 
Hossein Khan Sepahsalar, Iran’s Prime Minister from 1871 to 1873. In recent years, 
Baharestan Square has been used as a public exhibition space for government military 
                                                
31 Hamid Dabashi has written extensively about the tumultuous period after the re-election of President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2009.  See Hamid Dabashi, The Green Movement in Iran (New 
Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 2011).  
 
32 Tehran’s Baharestan Square, June 27, 2011, accessed December 12, 2011, 
http://www.panoramio.com/photo/54834343. Courtesy of Saied Mahmoud Javadi. 
 
33 Tehran’s Baharestan Square, December 22, 2010, accessed December 12, 2011, 
http://www.panoramio.com/photo/45391444.  Photographer unknown. 
 
34 Baharestan Square was already well known for holding opposition rallies during the prescient days of 
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh (1882-1967), who was overthrown in a 






and artillery shows. In September 2008, the Iranian government staged an exhibition of 
its “sacred defense,” showcasing a yellow-colored missile in the square’s center and 
situating armored vehicles under a giant poster of Velayat-e Faqih Ayatollah Khamenei.35 
 
Figure 2:  Angel of Freedom Statue, Baharestan Square, 1982 
Since the square’s construction, several statues of politicians and cultural icons 
have been located in its center.  At present, a statue of Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan 
Modarres, a supporter of the Constitutional Revolution and a former mentor of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, is the square’s main center of attraction.36 The bust of this early twentieth 
century cleric is a relatively recent addition; three decades prior, a winged statue, known 
                                                
35 Fars News Agency, http://www.aerocenter.ir/forum/showthread.php?t=3772.  See also “Namayesh-e 
Moushak-e Shahab-e She dar Meydan-e Baharestan-e Tehran /The Exhibition of Shahab-Three Missile in 
Tehran’s Baharestan Square,” BBC Persian, 3 Mehr 1387/ September 24, 2008, accessed January 1, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/09/080924_mg-shahab3.shtml. 
 







as “Mojassameh-ye Fereshteh-ye Azadi,” (Angel of Freedom), was erected in that very 
site.37 The statue was a gift to Parliament from Sardar As’ad Bakhtiari (1856-1917), a 
powerful democratic reformer and tribal leader during Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, 
and later installed in front of the parliamentary buildings in 1937 (1316).38 While 
reviewing the photographic material from women’s journal Zan-e Rouz, an important 
archive for this dissertation’s inaugural chapter, I stumbled upon a doctored photograph 
of Baharestan Square, printed three years after the Revolution.39 (See Figure 2.) However 
it was a challenge to locate more pieces of evidence demonstrating the existence and 
history of this statue.  I was not successful in locating other photographs, and public 
recollection of the statue has waned.  
The photograph and accompanying article were published in the February 1982 
edition of Zan-e Rouz, in the section “Begoo! Begoo!” (Say! Say!), which was dedicated 
to reader commentary about local domestic and political affairs. In this section, readers 
voice their complaints and offer suggestions to officials from the Ministry of Labor and 
other state organizations. (For instance, in this issue, a reader criticizes the incompetent 
method of ticket collection on city buses.)  
As shown Figure 2, there is an “x” marking placed directly on the statue’s bust to 
prevent the reader from clearly viewing it. (For emphasis, I deliberately circled the “x” 
marking in red.)  The censorship reflects a new editorial policy of Zan-e Rouz to not 
publish images that depict nudity and immodesty. Although not explicitly stated, it is 
                                                











likely that Zan-e Rouz’s editors found the exposure of women’s form —specifically the 
contours of her breasts— inappropriate for its magazine audience, even if the majority of 
its readership were women. The “x” marking is one example of a new direction in the 
visual depiction of women’s bodies deemed permissible for public viewing —that they be 
represented in more modest forms although not yet veiled. As I discussed in Chapter 1, in 
1980, Zan-e Rouz re-launched itself as an Islamic lifestyle magazine, publishing articles 
and images of women whom they characterized as natural homemakers, self-sacrificing 
mothers and sisters of the Revolution, and pious Muslims observing Islamic hejab.  
This particular image is significant not only for it having been censored, but also 
for the title and the reader commentary accompanying it. As shown in Figure 2, the statue 
itself depicts a defiant pose of a female figure charging forward against the wind, 
wrapped in swarms of fabric billowing below her feet. Underneath the photograph, the 
headline reads “Mojassameh-ye Azadi-ye Shahanshahi dar Meydan-e Baharestan” 
(Imperial Statue of Freedom in Baharestan Square). Presumably the editors changed its 
name to designate its origins and association to the previous dynasty, when purported 
symbols of empire were lambasted by those opposed to the Pahlavi regime.  
Located directly below the photograph is a short commentary from a concerned 
Zan-e Rouz patron, based in Tehran: 
Thank you to those who are responsible for the page, ‘Begoo Begoo,’ it  
has been some time that I’ve wanted to write a letter and request a response  
from municipal officials. The issue is that every time I pass by Baharestan  
Square, my eyes fall upon the scenery of the square and the statue of the  
winged-woman, whose shape and appearance are against public modesty.  I  
don’t understand how such a statue exists on one side, in front of the buildings  
of education, whose great mission is to educate and to foster humanity.   





well as the Central Committee.  I don’t know what kind of concept and message 
this is sending, based on our Islamic, revolutionary rituals and doctrine.  This 
statue reminds us of the Pahlavi’s free woman…40 
 
After complaining about why the statue had not yet been removed, the reader states his or 
her expectation: “I hope that these words of caution can be useful for the sazandegi 
(reconstruction) of the slogans and dress41 of the Islamic society.”  In closing, the reader 
says, “Hopes for the success for all of those who are committed to Islam.”  
 Both the photograph of the statue and the reader commentary illustrate a shift in 
the representations of women permitted for exhibition in print media after the Revolution.  
In this instance, the presence of an unveiled, curvaceous statue is intolerable to an 
attentive reader, and thus government officials must be alerted. For the statue infringes 
new standards of modesty and public morality of the Islamic Republic. Additionally, as 
the reader suggests, the “Angel of Freedom” is a barefaced reminder of the values of the 
Pahlavi regime. In the reader’s view, an Islamic society cannot be achieved without the 
removal of such objects that challenge Islamic, revolutionary ideals. 
 
Making Statues Modest:  Nakedness in State and Religious Discourses 
How does an Islamist state mandate modesty and ensure that it is reflected in 
public works of art? For statues representing women in particular, does the strategy 
require the addition of a veil? The answers to these questions lie in the history of the 
construction and implementation of laws and prohibitions governing social interaction 
                                                
40 See photograph of “Mojassameh-ye Azadi-ye Shahenshahi dar Meydan-e Baharestan,” in section 
“Begoo! Begoo!” of Zan-e Rouz, Issue 853 (Bahman 1360/February 1982), p. 62. 
 
41 The term used in this text is desaar, an Arabic term for clothing and dress.  The author of the complaint 






between the sexes and how they came to be internalized in the first decade after the 
Revolution. In the early summer of 1979, the clergy-dominated Islamic Republican Party 
(Hezb-e Jomhouri-ye Eslami or IRP) had just formed to assist in mobilizing political 
support for Ayatollah Khomeini and help popularize his doctrine and teachings.42 
Simultaneously, the leadership of a Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (which I 
discuss later in this chapter), staffed by hardline supporters of Khomeini, set forth new 
societal red lines prohibiting a wide range of political and social activities.43  These 
provisions gave expression to ideal standards of morality maintained in a religious, Shi’a 
society.  For Iran’s ruling clerical authority, citizens were automatically identified by 
their religious beliefs and practices —chiefly, as Muslim subjects.  Citizens were 
encouraged to abide by good moral values based on faith, family, revolution, and the 
preservation of public morality.44 The clerical authority put into place new restrictions of 
sex segregation and, by 1982, they declared that all Iranian women in public settings 
should observe compulsory hejab ordinances or they would be fined or punished.  
Tangential to these policies were new guidelines on how to lead a moral life —for 
instance, provisions on how Iranians should behave and dress modestly in consonance 
with an idealized, morally-guided Islamic society. Subsequently sculptures and other 
works of art, especially those pieces that depicted the human body in two-dimensional 
form, were scrutinized within this framework.  Uncovered body parts (such as limbs, 
                                                
42The IRP, an important parliamentary party, was first led by cleric Mohammed Husayn Beheshti, and it 
was disbanded by the regime in 1987.  
 
43 Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 
1989), pp. 297-298. 
 
44 For more on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s state goals, see Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, 






buttocks, and hair) were looked at suspiciously and derided, as they were regarded as 
pornographic and immoral objects —hence publicly displaying them would lead Muslims 
astray from staying on the morally righteous path found in an Islamic society. 
Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) scholars have come to the consensus that the 
exposure of one’s private parts is haram (religiously forbidden), although there is some 
differentiation in identifying awrat areas —meaning which body parts must not be left 
uncovered during namaz (prayer) or in the company of mahram and namahram men and 
women. The term awrat is mentioned several times in the Qur’an, as well as in hadith 
literature.45 Some fiqh scholars state that only the vagina, penis, and buttocks are private 
parts whereas others contend that for women, their entire bodies are awrat.46 Shi’a 
understanding of awrat is based on the religious commentaries of the sixth Imam, Ja'far 
al-Sadiq, which consider awrat to include women's bodies, save their faces and hands.47 
 However, this definition of awrat is mutable, depending upon the activity being 
performed and in front of whom.  For example, Ayatollah Khomeini —who was a 
marja’e taqlid  (Shi’a source of emulation or Grand Ayatollah)48— specified that during 
prayer, the awrat of a woman becomes her entire body, including her head and hair, 
                                                
45 See Qur’an 24: 58 Sura al-Nur and Qur’an 33:13, Sura al-Ahzab. In Persian, the term is known as awrat  
whereas in Arabic, the term is pronounced as awra.  
 
46 For more on the concept of awrat, see Haideh Moghissi, Women and Islam: Social Conditions, 
Obstacles, and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 81-83. Moghissi provides a contextual 
analysis of the many uses of awrat in the Qur’an and hadith literature, which has often been associated with 
women’s bodily weakness. She argues that a more suitable definition should be “inviolate vulnerability,” as 
reference to the broader notions of Arabo-Islamic sanctity and privacy of the home and family. 
47 According to J’afar al-Saddiq, men’s awrat is considered to be their genitals and buttocks.  
 
48 Grand Ayatollahs, known by their honorary titles of Ayatollah al-Uzma, are the highest sources of 
emulation in Shi’a Islam. They offer specialist interpretations of Islamic texts and law and publish their 





except for her face, hands, and feet.49 In this occasion, it is expected that a Muslim 
woman cover her body completely with a full-length, loose-fitting garment —which, in 
Iran, is usually a chador.  In other cases, determining awrat is dependent on the company 
present. In Tahrir al-Vasileh, Ayatollah Khomeini asserts that it is haram to become 
naked for the purposes of pleasure and incest, with the exception of undressing or being 
naked before one’s spouse.50 (The Qu’ran encourages married couples to enjoy looking 
upon their partners’ bodies. By contrast, in private interactions between unmarried, 
namahram and mahram men and women, being naked is a sin. Women in particular are 
expected to be covered from navel to the knee.) 
A marja’e taqlid’s interpretation of the parts of the human body he considers 
awrat is also evident in fatwas on social interactions in which the issue of appropriate 
clothing is broached.  Notably the late Ayatollah Behjat51 issued a fatwa that “men must 
cover their private parts from other men,” although covering the rest of their body is not 
vajeb (necessary). Certain marja’e taqlid have specified the type of clothing appropriate 
to wear, depending on the occasion. 52 Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi (who, in 
2006, issued a fatwa against women entering football stadiums in direct challenge to 
Iranian president Ahmadinejad’s calls to allow them access) stated that some workout 
                                                
49 Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, Tahrir al-Vasileh, vol. 1, Chapter 129, lines 3-11. 
 
50 Sadr, “Ahkam-e lebas/Clothing Regulations,” p. 229.  
 
51 For more information about Ayatollah Muhammad Behjat, who died in 2009, see Yasin Jibouri, “Uswat 
al-Aarifeen. A Look at the Life of Ayatollah Bahjat,” Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project, 2005, 
accessed  March 15, 2012, http://www.al-islam.org/uswat_alarifin/.  For Behjat’s resaleh, which is 
published online, see http://www.aviny.com/Ahkam/ResalehBahjat/index.aspx. 
 
52 Sadr., p. 230. Grand Ayatollahs have even deliberated over exercise clothing, for its tightness on the 
body presents potential challenges in preserving modesty and Islamic chastity and might elicit sexual 






clothing has negative consequences on akhlaq (morality and manners) and for this reason 
should be avoided.53  
 
Modern Art Sculptures under Islamic Reform 
Solicitation and patronage of modern art sculptures reached a zenith during 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s regime.54 Armenian-Iranian artist and curator Marcos 
Grigorian organized Tehran’s first biennial exhibition in 1958.55 Iranian artists were 
traveling back and forth between European capitals and Tehran, training in sculpting and 
painting ateliers. The 1950s was also the decade in which the faculty of Fine Arts in 
Tehran University, which had opened an arts academy in 1940 modeled after France’s 
Beaux Arts, developed a full university degree curriculum.56  “The highly active 1950s,” 
writes art historian Maryam Ekhtiar, “were followed by the equally spirited 1960s and 
'70s. These decades saw the opening of Iran to the international art scene, as local artists 
participated in art fairs, founded galleries, and courted foreign collectors.”57 
After successful exhibitions in Paris and Italy, many Iranian artists returned to 
Iran, having been commissioned by the Pahlavis to sculpt some of the country’s cultural 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
 
54 See “Setiz ba Mojassameh/The Struggle with Statues,” BBC Persian, August 26, 2002, accessed 
September 20, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/arts/020826_mj-mojassame.shtml.  
 
55 See Ehsan Yarshater, “Namayeshgah-e Bienal-e Naqqashi va Peykarsazi dar Kakh-e Abyaz,” Sokhan 9, 
no. 1 (1958): pp. 82-84. 
 
56 Habibollah Ayatollahi, The Book of Iran:  The History of Iranian Art (Tehran: Organization for Islamic 
Culture and Communications & Center for International-Cultural Studies, 2003), p. 307. 
 
57 Maryam Ekhtiar and Marika Sardar, "Modern and Contemporary Art in Iran,” in Heilbrunn Timeline of 






and political icons into marbled works of art.58 Among this group of artists are the 
sculptors Parviz Tanavoli, Jalil Ziapour, Jazeh Tabatabai, and Bahman Mohassess.59 
During the revolutionary period, many of their works were subjected to attacks. Clerics 
and supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that certain sculptures projected 
allegiances to the former monarchy.  The statues were also regarded as advertising anti-
Islamic Revolution messages, and were subsequently vandalized or pulled from their 
original sites.60   
 
Conforming Art and Modesty:  Hejab-wearing Monuments after 1979 
 A matrix of clashing motivations underline the vandalism and destruction of 
public statues, monuments, and other landmarks in the post-revolutionary period. The 
main reasons are politically and ideologically motivated, on pace with anti-Pahlavi 
demonstrations and the suspicious fires of cinema houses61 —at the time, deemed dens of 
immoral activity— prior to pro-Khomeini revolutionaries securing control of a popular 
movement against the Pahlavi regime. Based on one of the religious arguments pertaining 
to statues in Islam, the production and veneration of idols and figurines are prohibited  —
                                                
58 “Setiz ba Mojassameh/The Struggle with Statues,” BBC Persian.  
 
59 Tabatabai (d. 2008) was a poet, avant-garde painter, and sculptor. Ziapour (d. 1999) was a modern-art 
pioneer in painting.  Tanavoli (b. 1937) is considered one of Iran’s greatest modern art painters and 
sculptors.   
  
60 Ibid. In the same article, BBC Persian reported that in 1980, many statues considered anti-revolutionary 
were destroyed.  As recent as 2002, Ayatollah Jannati urged attendants of Tehran’s Friday prayer to destroy 
the statue of “Kaveh Ahangar” in Esfahan because it was anti-revolutionary.   
 
61 Recall the burning down of Cinema Rex in Abadan, Iran, which I discuss in Chapter Two of this 







be they of living or nonliving things.62 The Prophet Muhammad banned the worship of 
deities, calling upon Muslims to abandon polytheistic traditions and accept the oneness of 
God. As narrated by hadith traditionalist scholar al-Bukhari, the presence of statues 
discourages angels from entering a Muslim home.63  The prohibition of statues is 
extended to artistic renditions of the human form.  
Among Shi’a fiqh scholars, it is argued that by creating sculptures, artists would 
mold them in their likeness and thus be inclined to worship something other than God —
He, who is already perfect and inimitable.64 According to Grand Ayatollah Makarem 
Shirazi, sculptures of human bodies and animals are problematic, however paintings of 
them are permitted.  In certain cases, the sculpting of human beings is permitted as long 
as these sculptures or statues are used specifically as materials for war propaganda, as 
dolls for children, as medical education tools, and as robots that are not used for 
entertainment purposes but for extending human life.65 
In mounting demonstrations against Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, landmarks 
and monuments became integrated into anti-revolutionary slogans against the regime’s 
opulence and its propagation of anti-Islamic, pro-Western values. Certain statues 
commemorating Pahlavi heroes and statesmen were subsequently vandalized for 
                                                
62 In the early history of Islam, according to Islamic and Christian sources there is an oft-quoted story of an 
attack on images and statues, marking an “outbreak of iconoclasm,” during Yazid II.  b.  'Abd al-Malik 
Caliphate (720-724).  See G.R.D. King, “Islam, Iconoclasm, and the Declaration of Doctrine,” Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 48, no. 2 (1985): p. 267. 
 
63 Yusuf al-Qardawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (Oak Brook, IL:  American Trust 
Publications, 1999), pp. 98-99. 
 
64 See “Hormat-e Mojassamehsazi va Naqqashi / The Sanctity of Sculpting and Painting,” Kavoshi Now 
dar Fiqh-e Eslami 4 (Summer and Fall 1374/1995):  pp. 62-64. 
 
65  See Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi “Comments on Exceptions on Sculptures and Statues,” 





emblematizing not only a pre-Islamic heritage and legacy, but also for honoring political 
figures perceived to be corrupt and enemies of the Revolution.  
In other instances, modern art sculptures tied to Pahlavi values were subject to 
denunciation and vandalism during the revolutionary period.  Sculptures featuring naked 
torsos and exposed genital areas, such as “Mard-e Neylabakzan” (The Flute Player), as 
shown in Figure 3, suffered damage because they were regarded as obscene and contrary 
to Islamic values —the same accusations made of the Pahlavi dynasty before its demise.  
Standing at four meters tall, “The Flute Player” by the late sculptor and painter Bahman 
Mohassess depicts a mythological, two-horned creature playing a flute.66 Originally 
sculpted in Rome in 1975 (1353) and commissioned by Empress Farah Pahlavi, the 
artwork was gifted to Tehran’s City Theatre and remained at the theatre’s entrance until 
its removal after the Revolution.67  
Although the reason for its removal was never officially announced, the figure’s 
exposed buttocks and genital area were likely the cause; left uncovered, the sculpture was 
criticized for promoting nudity and immodesty. Initially, museum officials stored the 
piece in the stage area of the theatre (it was later transported to a storage facility in 
Tehran’s Museum of Contemporary Art), deliberating a more suitable exhibition space 
for the sculpture. Should officials keep the statue in front of the city theater in its present 
state? Or should they sculpturally-remedy the figure? According to one proposal, placing 
tonikeh (underpants) to cover the figure’s posterior was suggested, however its poor 
design did not solve the problem of the exposed backside. “The Flute Player” remained in 
                                                
66 According to the sculpture’s title, it is presumed that the artwork depicts a male creature playing a flute. 
 







storage until a photograph of the statue leaked online showed that it had been vandalized 
—the flute player’s two hands were missing, and the nose-flute extension was no longer 
attached (See Figure 4).  
During this period, museum officials provided contradictory statements about the 
sculpture’s status. Initially they denied reports of any damage, insisting it was safely 
packed away in storage.68  However as public speculation grew, museum director Dr. 
Habibollah Sadighi, in a 2008 interview with Iran newspaper, stated that among the 
museum’s collection, several pieces of art, including “The Flute Player,” were scheduled 
for repair. The museum had even publically invited sculptor Mohassess to return to 
Tehran in order to conduct the repairs.69 (In 1969, Mohassess had immigrated to Italy.) 
Yet Sadighi neither disclosed the culprits behind the damage nor offered a motive for 
why it might have been intentionally destroyed. Instead, he suggested that the damage 
might have occurred during the renovation of the City Theatre.70 Sadighi conceded, “In 
addition to being repaired, some part of [the statue] has a specific nakedness.  Even 
though it is not erotic, it must still fit the standards of our society so that we can display it 
in the garden of Tehran’s contemporary art museum.” Insisting that the work would not 
                                                
68 “Mard-e Neylabakzan-e Ta’atre-e Shahr dar Kojast? / Where is The Flute Player at City Theater?” 
Rooznameh Aftab-e Yazd, 28 Aban 1386/November 19, 2007, accessed February 14, 2012, 
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http://bahmanmohassess.com/life/biography-part-one/. 
 
70Mard-e Neylabakzan, Hamchenan Montazer-e Mohasses Ast/ The Flute-playing Male Statue is Still 








be censored, he emphasized: “As the director of creative arts, I want to preserve the 
quality of the statue and also display it— what can I do except ask the artist himself to 
repair it and adjust it in accordance to societal standards.”71  
 
Figure 3:  Front angle of “Mard-e Neylabakzan” 72 
 
Figure 4:  2010 leaked photograph of damage to statue “Mard-e Neylabakzan” 
This call to adjust modern art sculptures to suit the Islamic Republic’s “societal 
standards” is frequently made, for the phrase has been used as the underlining motivation 
behind the authorities’ regulation of modern works of art—and, by extension, artistic 
representations of the human body. Yet the phrase itself is imprecise in meaning, eliciting 
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72 Photograph of “The Flute Player” from following website:  





questions as to its actual definition and construction. Does the Iranian public know of the 
explicit and implicit meanings behind the expression “societal standards” and who 
determines them? More so, is a “societal standard” of the above case constructed and 
interpreted arbitrarily, or is it constructed in the matrix of globalizing forces, such as 
consumerism, political factionalism, religious doctrine, and evolving discourses on sex 
and sexuality?  
In the example of “The Flute Player,” the nakedness of a mythical creature is a 
breach of a “societal standard” evoking responses that range from removal to partial 
destruction. For other public works of art displayed prominently in front of key 
government buildings —especially statues of women— their vilification followed a 
different trajectory in the post-revolutionary period; they were given a second chance at 
life. Once these sculptures reflected a modest appearance, in their strategic covering and 
visual subjugation of female sexuality, officials began to consider re-installing them in 
public sites. 
In the next section, I examine the rocky process of translating an Islamic, 
revolutionary ideal of modesty into a specific female sculpture amidst public criticism. I 
review how it was modified in the post-revolutionary period after it was considered too 
controversial to be displayed in public.  The statue’s “controversy” lies in the portrayal of 
an unveiled woman whose body parts are left uncovered, such as its hair and limbs. 
Because this landmark was regarded as posing a threat to the chaste communal space 
being projected by the Islamist government, after the Revolution, it was removed from its 
original site and transferred into an unknown location. Spared from destruction, the 





modesty and compulsory hejab. In the following section, I piece together this sculpture’s 
unique historical narrative, emphasizing this pattern of modification in the name of 
“Islamic modesty.”  
 
Man and Woman Farmers Meet Islamic Reform 
This next example is of the sculpture “Zan va Mard-e Keshavarz”  (Man and 
Woman Farmers), an oxidized bronze monument sculpted by Dariush Sane’izadeh and 
depicted in Figure 5.73 Presently located at the far corner of the courtyard of the Museum 
of Contemporary Art in Tehran, it was located during the Pahlavi era near the front 
entrance of the Ministry of Agriculture on Keshavarz Boulevard.  The statue depicts a 
farmer couple surrounded by a collection of symbols from industry and agriculture. For 
example, it features symbols typically found in communist iconography —a sheaf of 
wheat and a cogwheel, as shown in Figure 5. However “Zan va Mard-e Keshavarz” does 
not necessarily express the working-class struggle of a proletariat couple; instead, it 
evokes a feeling of collaborative work, conducted by two characters engaged in the quiet 
action of watering a sprout.  In this scene, a male farmer appears to be focused on a 
sprouting plant, which is being watered by his female companion.  
After the Revolution, the symbol-laden “Zan va Mard-e Keshavarz” provoked 
criticism from a particular faction of Khomeini’s supporters who sought its immediate 
removal. Their reasons are attributed to three visual factors:  the depiction of an unveiled 
woman; the short-length of her skirt; and the statue’s association with communist 
                                                






symbols.74 The artwork’s homage to communist ideals —which undoubtedly rejects 
religion as a foundation— aggravated the religious and ethical values being avowed by  
Khomeini’s Islamic government. Pressure mounted to remove the statue from public 
space because it was accused of promoting indecency and societal corruption.75 Given the 
challenges that this statue explicitly posed for the ideals propagated by an Islamist 
regime, it was eventually removed. The story behind its subsequent modification is 
examined next. 
 
Figure 5: Photograph of Zan va Mard-e Keshavarz sculpture in the courtyard of Tehran’s Museum of 
Contemporary Art, October 2011 
The alteration process of “Zan va Mard-e Keshavarz” was by no means smooth 
but conducted in the face of public ridicule. Officials were initially perplexed over how to 
                                                
74 The history of the communist movement in Iran begins in the late 19th century and early 20th century with 
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opposed to Ayatollah Khomeini’s consolidation of power, for the new leadership did not include 
representatives of the left parties. For more on the factionalism of opposition parties in the early years of 
the post-revolutionary period, see Farhang Jahanpour, “The Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party,” The World 
Today 40, no. 4 (Apr. 1984): p. 153. 
 






re-style the sculpture into an appropriate statue for display; preserving the female figure’s 
modesty and adhering to compulsory hejab were prime among their concerns.   
Subsequently they made several attempts to reconfigure its structure by altering the attire 
of the male and female characters. Officials first covered the entire statue with burlap 
canvas. Yet its awkward placement on the sculpture, at the time located in front of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, provoked visitor curiosity as museum patrons inquired about 
what lay underneath its cover.76  The tarp cover was subsequently removed and a smaller 
piece of burlap was placed on the female figure’s head to resemble a rousari or 
headscarf.  As for her lokht (naked) legs, officials placed specially designed trousers, also 
made of burlap, over them.  In its refashioned state, the piece was pilloried  —one 
common joke was that the female farmer appeared to be covered in mud.77   
Despite the changes applied to this sculpture, officials decided that the piece had 
minimal value and thus removed it from the ministry’s offices, transferring it to the front 
entrance of Museum of Contemporary Art. In this new site, the sculpture again came 
under fire, as new complaints arose protesting the work’s exhibition and its potential to 
corrupt the mind.78  The piece was moved to the far corner of the museum’s sculpture 
garden, where it remains as it was originally carved and is still visible from North Kargar 
Street.  
The significance of the modification and subsequent concealment of “Zan va 
Mard-e Keshavarz” from public view lies in the motive and haphazard manner in which 
this alteration took place —essentially, that by placing an Islamic hejab onto a statue, the 










object would be instantly refashioned into a modest work of art, both suitable for public 
viewing and reflective of a religious society’s new values towards sculptures depicting 
women (and men). However, despite these efforts at reform, the resulting work was 
ridiculed and the modification process was abandoned, leaving the statue as it had been 
originally sculpted.  What does this entire modification process relay about the efficacy 
and value of imposing an enigmatic “societal standard” of modesty onto statues depicting 
women? Moreover, does the concept of modesty become uniquely identifiable with a 
material and object —the veil— and thus by covering the head and legs of a female 
statue, this is, by extension, a dependable method by which to one, preserve a woman’s 
modesty and two, construct and control female sexuality, erotic practice, intimacy, and 
identity? 
The answer to these questions lies in the sociopolitical and legal contexts within 
which these statues were removed and/or modified. In what follows, I investigate the 
theoretical framework and development of social policies by clerical and state officials to 
cultivate and reinforce “societal standards” through the concepts of modesty and hejab. 
As evidenced by the repetition and emphasis of these concepts in official state 
documents, these three concepts are identified as core “Islamic” values and identified as 
positive values of the Revolution enshrined in Iran’s national constitution.  
 
Post-revolutionary State Policy of Hejab and Modesty: Designating Protocols and 
Societal Standards  
Since the early 1980s, legal mechanisms, ad-hoc revolutionary committees, and 





been used to implement and enforce a hegemonic vision of Iran as a religious society 
under the absolute authority of the Velayat-e Faqih.79 Soon after Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
return to Iran upon the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty —a triumphant event referred to 
by many Iranians as the “success of the Revolution”— neighborhood watches formed in 
major cities, working both as security and as informal committees.80 While aiming to 
keep their communities safe, given the breakdown of the Shah’s police force, some of 
these committees (such as the Komiteh-ye Enqelab-e Eslami) also acted as the “eyes and 
ears” of the Khomeini’s supporters in government. As enforcers of the  "fundamentalist 
moral and religious standards upon the residents in their neighborhood," komiteh were the 
precursors to the morality police known as Gasht-e Ershad,81a government police force –
typically clad in green uniform— that polices activity deemed illegal or in contravention 
to the cultural and gender policies of the state.82 In 1992, three branches of the 
government's security forces merged to form the police force, known as the Nirou-ye 
                                                
79 According to Iranian reformer and philosopher Abdulkarim Soroush, “The Iranian state may be the first 
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Entezami-ye Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (Security Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
or the police).  (Gasht-e Ershad is a sub-branch of this force). 
 In the 1990s, the clerical leadership became even more sensitive to the 
liberalizing attitudes of Iranians who appeared to be loosening their adherence to Islamic 
hejab, fearing eminent societal corruption if hejab policy was not designed and 
implemented. (This was a few years before reformist Mohammad Khatami was elected 
President and news reports proliferated of loosening restrictions on hejab policies in 
public.) In a May 1992 missive addressed to the head of parliament, Majles Chairman 
Mehdi Karroubi, the minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Mohammad Khatami, and 
the ministers of the Budget, Finance, Industry, and the Interior established new guidelines 
of “cultural and societal goals” for preventing “the corruption of public morality.” 83The 
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance designated further restrictions on which 
clothing items were considered inappropriate to be worn in public places and at “centers 
of cultural production.” New prohibitions banned the usage of see-through veils or veils 
showing exposed necks and mismatched or colorful shoes.84  The letter also obliged 
restaurants, salons, photography studios, and agencies to observe these guidelines. 
 
Fostering a Culture of Hejab and Modesty 
In December 2011, at a meeting for officials from the women’s affairs bureau in 
Shiraz, the director of Fars province’s office of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
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Guidance, Mahmoud Alishavandi, announced that a culture of “hejab and modesty” 
should be encouraged when creating works of art.85  Emphasizing art’s impact on 
impressionable audiences, Alishavandi suggested that the creation of art should include 
the themes of “hejab and modesty,” which he argued were valuable in society.86 These 
thematic elements, which are presently fundamental social policy, date back to the late 
1990s. From 1982, there were already state policies on observing Islamic hejab, however 
no specific laws or regulations determined how exactly this policy should be 
implemented and observed in varied social settings. It was only in 1998, a few months 
after the landslide victory of Khatami, that the Iranian government formulated a broader 
policy framework on hejab with which to cultivate a religious lifestyle and to protect 
revolutionary-Islamic values.   
These edicts came at a time when reformists had won the presidency in 1997, and 
three years before, they had gained a majority of seats in Parliament.87  The reformists’ 
preliminary efforts at liberalizing social and political facets of the Iranian state 
culminated in the loosening of press restrictions and, at least momentarily, making 
overtures to improve relations between Iran and America and Europe.88 Amidst these 
sociopolitical changes, the tempo on the street was similarly animated. For many women 
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in Tehran, Khatami’s presidency was an opportunity to tamper with the state’s dress code 
restrictions and establish non-governmental advocacy organizations to push for changes 
in discriminatory parliamentary bills.89 Secular women and religious women who 
participated in the reformist political movement –primarily from the middle and upper 
classes— began sporting a range of dress styles, such as shorter manteau and trousers, 
bright-colored scarves, and for some women, tighter clothing overall.  
 The rapid social changes and public resistance to social and legal restrictions 
conducted on the streets prompted the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution —
hereafter, the Supreme Council— to reinforce its Islamist agenda for a disobedient 
public. The Supreme Council, whose membership is determined by the Supreme Leader 
and which, until 1989, was founded and led by Velayat-e Faqih Ayatollah Khomeini,90 is 
the central government body responsible for guiding Islamicization policies in 
educational, cultural, and industrial sectors. (The Supreme Council is presently under the 
control of Velayat-e Faqih Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.)  For almost two decades, it has 
sought to expand and strengthen the “influence of Islamic culture” in a Shi’a Muslim 
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society.91 The main objective of their policies is to fortify “human, religious and spiritual 
values and heartfelt beliefs,”92 which would mean concentrating on identifying and 
reinforcing Iranian-Muslim society’s moral roots and behavior. This very program 
entailed the institutionalization of “farhang-e efaf” (culture of modesty)93 throughout 
Iranian society by delineating cultural guidelines and implementing security measures 
that deter social corruption and preserve national morality.94  
  The pairing of the terms hejab and efaf first appears in both official and legal 
documents of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution in February 1998, however 
it becomes a wider campaign slogan for cultural reform in the 2000s.95 In 1998, the 
Supreme Council commenced a national campaign of farhang-e efaf via the text Ousoul 
va Mabani va Ravesh-ha-ye Ejraee-ye Gostaresh-e Farhang-e Efaf/The Principles, 
Foundations, and Executing Methods in Spreading a Culture of Modesty. In this text, in 
order to construct a “culture of modesty,” the Supreme Council emphasizes education in 
Islamic principles and the fortification of family structures by appealing to ideal 
representations of the Muslim family.  The institution of the family, in particular, is 
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92 Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, The Principles, Foundations, and Executing Methods in 
Developing a Culture of Chastity, 14 Bahman 1376/ February 3, 1998, Article 10. See also Shadr, pp. 58-
59.  
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95 For a brief discussion of the committee’s inaugural years, see Nikki Keddie and Yann Richard, Modern 
Iran:  Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 250. See also Paidar, 
pp. 320-321 and Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 






emphasized as a natural, cohesive unit within which a culture of modesty should be 
consolidated “in thought and spirit.”96   
 The campaign also helped define and structure social policy by integrating 
popular revolutionary-era terms expressed in Iran’s national constitution. The main goal 
was to establish a “system of modesty that aimed to make the modesty of Iranian women 
the hallmark of the new Shiite nation.”97 In a rather extensive explanation of its goals, the 
Supreme Council affirmed,  
It is necessary to attract the attention of the general public, especially the youth, to  
the role of modesty and hejab in order to create an independent, cultural and  
national identity for the country and nation; [it is also necessary] to attract their  
attention to the positive, political effects of this independence [as well as to  
understand] the enemies’ aims in advocating a culture of nudity, which is a  
method of cultural attack, by mentioning and describing the evidence and  
historical incidents [of this attack].98 
 
   By the mid-2000s, the government campaign to foster a culture of modesty was 
thoroughly reassessed. In July 2005, the Supreme Council established guidelines for 
developing this culture of modesty, designating forty-seven objectives in Rahbord-ha-ye 
Gostaresh-e Farhang-e Efaf/Guidelines of Developing or Spreading a Culture of 
Modesty. Objective 8 clarifies that the philosophy and positive cultural, social, mental, 
and ethical consequences of efaf and hejab in various arenas of life.”99 The Supreme 
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Council concentrated on establishing a framework of guidelines for a culture of modesty 
in education, family, social awareness, and regulations of clothing. It also warned that 
when a society does not abide by these principles, this kind of intransigence would be an 
“unsettling” force to the moral principles of family in society.100  
 Six months after Ahmadinejad was elected president, in June 2006, these 
guidelines were already standard features in Iran’s social policy. The Supreme Council 
enumerated a list of requirements for each government agency and designated how each 
was individually responsible in “fostering and preserving a chaste culture.”101 In the 
introduction of Qanoun-e Rahkar-ha-ye Ejraee-ye Gostaresh-e Farhang-e Efaf va Hejab/ 
The Law of Executing Solution for Developing a Culture of Hejab and Efaf, hejab was 
introduced as one of the “most valuable cultural and societal manifestations of the 
Islamic-Iranian civilization.”102 Of primary importance was elevating the hejab in the 
general public, which the Supreme Council found needed refining when implemented in 
the domains of media, education, cinema, theatre —among many others. 103 The Supreme 
Council left little room for misinterpretation or ambiguity by devising guidelines that 
were both broad and specific: from specifying the kind of attire worn in official and 
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public settings to designating certain practices as good and “bad hejab” (mal-veiling),104 
which include wearing make-up in the workplace.105 
 Whereas both the 1998 and 2005 documents emphasize the importance of the 
hejab and wearing Islamic covering in its objectives, the titles of these documents 
emphasize only efaf or modesty.  The term hejab is listed under the umbrella category of 
efaf. In 2006, this emphasis changes, when both terms are present in the title of the 
executing orders of the Supreme Council.   This dual emphasis of hejab and modesty 
suggests that the Supreme Council had begun to regard both concepts as equal and 
interconnected in the enterprise of reforming Iranian society. 
As outlined in The Law of Executing Solution for Developing a Culture of Hejab 
and Efaf, the Supreme Council sought to “give authenticity to the culture of modesty 
through various appropriate cultural and artistic products.”106 In this text, the Supreme 
Council indicates the exact roles of government ministries and agencies for the purposes 
of institutionalizing a culture of “hejab and modesty.”107 In Objective 4, the Supreme 
Council states that they should introduce proper cultural standards for advocating a 
culture of modesty. These standards should be in line with the “national, religious 
culture” and also provide the “necessary contexts for the advocacy of ideal types of 
appropriate, Islamic covering through the efforts of institutions, which are responsible for 
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hejab is translated as “misveiled,” describing girls who wear hejab in order to “accommodate themselves to 
Iranian legal requirements yet intentionally disregard the spirit if not precisely the letter of the law.”  See 
Sadeghi, “Negotiating with Modernity:  Young Women and Sexuality in Iran,”  p.  250. 
 
105 Ibid., “General Policies and Methods,” Objective 3.  
 
106 Ibid., Objective 8. 
 






making these patterns.”108 Moreover, under the General Principles section of this text, the 
Supreme Council affirmed one of its main objectives: to “[strengthen] the moral 
foundations, principles, foundations of the education for parents —specifically mothers 
on the topics of modesty and hejab— by creating a sensitivity in them regarding the idea 
[behind this law] is the preservation of chaste culture.”109  
Devising and implementing strategies for this social policy of hejab and modesty 
fell upon executing government agencies.  Security forces (Nirou-ye Entezami) were put 
in charge of announcing to the public the limitations and legal criteria of modesty and 
bad-hejabi —and also recognizing when infractions took place.110  Subsequently they 
began policing cinema houses, stadiums, and other public places for acts and dress of 
impropriety.  Ultimately, the security forces would “[make] society aware of the positive 
ethical and social effects of hejab and modesty…by creating cultural and artistic products 
and advertisements.”111  As per the responsibility of policing sculptures, this was the duty 
of the Ministry of Economy and Properties, whom the Supreme Council had designated 
to be in charge of banning the importation, production, exhibition and supplying of 
sculptures, toys, mannequins and pictures that advocate anti-modesty, such as paintings, 
carpets, newspapers, and other products.112   
                                                
108 See Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Qanoun-e Rahkar-ha-ye Ejraee-ye Gostaresh-e 
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110 Qanoun-e Gostaresh-e Rahkarha-ye Ejraee-ye Efaf va Hejab/Law for the Spreading of the Method of 
Executing Hejab and Chastity, “Security Forces,” Duty 1. 
 
111 Ibid., Duty 9.   
 





 A close review of these policies suggests that the specifications of the hejab and 
modesty ordinances were defined once social reality began to challenge the Supreme 
Council’s vision and narrative that Iran is (and should be) a modest Islamic society.  
Increasing public resistance, demonstrated in the altering of styles of dress worn in 
public, presented a direct challenge and threat to the political elites’ control of this 
narrative. The presence of a woman using heavy makeup, wearing a bright-colored hejab 
and a curve-hugging manteau, jeopardizes not only the sanctity of public space but also 
the founding values of the Islamic Republic. Thus the examples of potential threats to the 
state’s version of modesty began to multiply: from statues of women in city squares to 
more recently, fashionable women walking on the street. They are known by the term 
mankanha-ye khiyabani (street mannequins) for being colorfully dressed and/or heavily 
adorned in public.  
 This body of regulatory policy, devised by the Supreme Council of the Cultural 
Revolution, has had far-reaching effects, even in the realm of non-artistic renditions of 
the female body —such as lifeless dummies or mannequins displayed behind a storefront 
window.. In the next section, I discuss the strategies of Islamicizing mannequins as a 
prerequisite for their being displayed in storefronts.  The story of their modification 
differs from the aforementioned examples of monuments and statues, as the 
transformation of a mannequin into a “modest form” is determined by a quick, back-and-
forth negotiation between store-owners and officials. The tactics employed by both 
parties illustrate the mutability of social policies on modesty and hejab, in addition to the 
state’s inconsistent and incoherent conceptualizations of women’s bodies that appear to 






Figure 6: Partially-severed head of a female mannequin on Vali Asr Street, 
August 2009 
Islamic Mannequins and Bodies in Commerce  
Haft-e Tir Square is the bustling manteau (overcoat) district located in central 
Tehran. Stores offer a variety of designs —intricately jeweled scarves; manteau for every 
occasion; and knock-offs of European and American brands. Competition here is fierce, 
for over thirty stores selling manteau vie for customers’ business. For the shops 
encircling this square, often the most outrageous and well-styled window displays attract 
the most customers. In spite of the area’s commotion, mannequins in window displays 
stand out. Because magazines censor clothing advertisements (certain body parts are 
obscured from view and heads are covered in scarves), storefront displays are optimal 
forums for potential customers to envision how clothing drapes on female figures.  For 
many Iranians, the freedom to envision something as simple as an overcoat on a 






Figure 7: Mannequins with cut-off breasts, 2006113 
In the early months of President Ahmadinejad’s first term, the Ministry of Culture 
and Islamic Guidance began clamping down on window displays that exhibited 
inappropriately-dressed and adorned mannequins. Clerics and authorities believed the 
unregulated displays of the life-size statues would evoke illicit thoughts in passersby, 
thus encouraging society’s moral depravity.114 Thus they encouraged police to prevent 
                                                
113 See Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Qanoun-e Samandehi-ye Mode va Lebas/ Regulations on 
Re-organizing Fashion and Clothing, 12 Dey 1385/ January 2, 2007 and 20 Dey 1385/ January 10, 2007, 
accessed July 4, 2012, http://honari.farhang.gov.ir/rules-rule7-fa.html. 
 
114 University settings are not exempt from these regulations on the body.  Explicit guidelines are 
frequently published by semi-official online Fars News Agency, which publishes new dress codes 
prohibiting particular forms of dress, including body jewelry and headgear that does not come accompanied 
with some form of a hejab. Directed at both men and women, the dress code would ensure all transgressors 
would not be allowed entrance onto university grounds.  These dress regulations banned the wearing of 
bright colored clothing, tight or shortened slacks, and tattoos that were visible to the human eye. As women 
would be prohibited from dressing in tight clothing, men would also be ordered to follow similar modes of 







“the promotion of prostitution through mannequins and models.”115 Subsequently all 
public exhibitions featuring women’s fashions, including catwalks of dress exhibitions, 
were thoroughly inspected and regulated.116  
In September 2008, the same ministry, under the leadership of Mohammad 
Hossein Saffar Harandi, published extensive guidelines for catwalk models in a seven-
part report, Dastour ol'amal-e Sodour-e Mojavez-e Barpaii-ye Namayeshga-he Mode va 
Lebas dar Keshvar (Rules for the Permission of Clothing and Fashion Exhibitions inside 
Iran).117  Among the list of prohibited behaviors included the banning of fashion runways 
themselves, as they were charged with promoting non-Iranian and non-Islamic influences 
—typically code words for the state’s disapproval of “Western” hegemonic culture— 
popular in satellite programs broadcast by Iranian communities living outside Iran.  
Harandi announced that models and designers would no longer be permitted to emphasize 
the curves of a woman’s body when designing and displaying new fashions. To 
implement these new standards, models were told to they “should avoid any behavior that 
would distract visitors' attentions from the clothes put on display,” according to the 
“Guidelines for Fashion And Dress Shows.”118  Also stated in the Guideline, “The 
                                                
115 “Mankan-ha-ye Sineh Borideh dar Vitrine-ha-ye Iran,/ Cut-off Breasts of Mannequins in Iran’s 
Windowships,” Radio Farda, 12 Azar 1385/December 3, 2006, accessed June 5, 2012,  
www.radiofarda.com/content/f2_mancan/269913.html. 
 
116 “Iran’s Catwalk Ban is Only the Beginning,” RFERL, September 20, 2008, accessed July 4, 2012, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Catwalk_Ban_Only_The_Beginning/1201610.html. 
 
117 These guidelines were an extension of clothing regulations, Qanoun-e Samandehi-ye Mode va Lebas, 
devised in 2007 (1385). For more information about the “Guidelines For Fashion and Dress Shows” from 
the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, see “Sharayet va Zavabet-e Bargozari-ye Namayeshga-he 
Mode va Lebas dar Keshvar Eblagh Shod/ Conditions and Regulations on the Exhibtion of  Fashion and 
Clothing in the Country Announced,” Fars News Agency, 14 Sharivar 1387/ September 4, 2008, accessed 








wearing of tight and body-hugging clothes and types of makeup that are incompatible 
with Islamic and Iranian culture are prohibited."119  
Three years before these guidelines were published, in 2005, officials in the 
Gasht-e Ershad division of Nirou-ye Entezami had already implemented a policy of 
inspecting mannequins in window displays of popular shopping districts in Tehran.  
 
Figure 8: Half-headed mannequins with severed breasts in 
Haft-e Tir Square, June 2010 
 
                                                
119 Additionally, during any designer exhibition, it is required that appropriate music should be played, 
which should be "well-matched to Islamic and Iranian culture," and according to one news report, “should 








Figure 9:  Display case of veiled mannequins with severed breasts in 
Haft-e Tir Square, June 2010 
  







Figure 11:  Faceless mannequins with flattened chests near Haft-e Tir Square, June 2011 
 






 The arrival of spring signaled a new inventory of clothes to be showcased in shop 
windows.  In clothing emporiums across Tehran, shop-owners began re-designing their 
window displays to feature the season’s latest “must-haves.” Gasht-e Ershad began 
patrolling shopping districts, paying close attention to shortened shirtsleeves and skirt-
lengths that would expose a mannequin’s shape and body parts. Shop owners were 
warned: if they placed immodest mannequins in storefronts, they would be fined or shut 
down.  The threats of closure and reduced business and profit120 initiated what Fataneh 
Farahani has described as a process of “Islamicizing mannequins” in window shops —a 
modification process that began between 2005 and 2006.   
Shop-owners moved swiftly in order to meet the plainclothes officers’ 
expectations.121 First, a few inches were added to short skirts displayed on 
mannequins.122 At the time, mannequins’ forms were still curvaceous, and hair was still 
visible from underneath their rousari. Officials found fault with the mannequins’ 
hairstyle, hair color, and the fact that the mannequins were not fully veiled.  “Within a 
few weeks,” mannequins were displayed bald, “leaving their luscious hair behind in 
storage rooms.”123  Soon their heads were fully covered by veils, and any unruly hairs 
were tucked underneath scarves.  
                                                
120 According to a December 2006 Radio Farda news report, sales dropped by twenty percent in 
comparison to the previous year. See “Mankan-ha-ye Sineh Borideh dar Vitrine-ha-ye Iran/Cut-off Breasts 
of Mannequins in Iran’s Windowships,” Radio Farda. 
 
121 I interviewed four clothing managers in Haft-e Tir in July 2010 and June 2011. They detailed how they 
would maneuver through Gasht-e Ershad’s policies.  The managers did not want to provide their names and 
preferred that I report only on the general procedural interactions between them and the Ministry of 
Cultural and Islamic Guidance. 
 
122 See Fataneh Farahani, Disaporic Narratives of Sexuality:  Identity Formation among Iranian-Swedish 
Women, pp. 138-140.  
 
123 Mehrangiz Kar, “Death of a Mannequin,” in My Sister, Guard Your Veil; My Brother, Guard Your Eyes: 





As these modifications diminished the selling power of the mannequins, on which 
shopkeepers and designers advertised the upcoming fashion season, owners sought other 
methods to entice potential customers inside. Without this main showpiece, shop owners 
became creative out of necessity. Some owners chose to enhance the mannequins’ 
makeup, which again drew ire from officials.  The authorities responded by ordering 
them to minimize the eyeliner and lipstick because they “claim[ed] that the lips of women 
were aphrodisiac and their eyes stimulating….”124 And finally when matching the 
authorities’ expectations seemed improbable, owners began contemplating buying 
expensive government-approved mannequins. However, some shopkeepers decided to 
remove the mannequins entirely from their displays, and, in other instances, they began to 
consider displaying headless mannequins on which to exhibit fashion items.  
Despite these many changes, officials disapproved of the mannequins —chiefly, 
the curvature of the mannequins’ breasts that was still noticeable underneath the 
garments. In lieu of buying new mannequins, storeowners decided to slash the chest area, 
as it was more cost efficient (See Figure 7).125 However this solution did not satisfy 
authorities, for breasts were still visible underneath the clothing in their jagged forms 
(See Figures 8 to 10). In other cases, “little coils” were used to assume the shape of a 
                                                
 
124 Quoted in Kar, Crossing the Red Line, p. 35. See also Farahani, p. 140.  
 
125 As reported on its website, since 1989, the company Manken-e Yaran (also known as Yaran Company) 
has been the first and largest producer, distributor, and exporter of male and female mannequins in Iran.  
With over ten offices across the country, Manken-e Yaran advertises and sells mannequins online through 
an Iran-based web address to domestic and regional customers.  Noticeably, some of the male mannequins 
are advertised without clothing. Female mannequins, by contrast, are all pictured with clothing, however 







wire breast.126  “The coils,” Mehrangiz Kar contends, “displayed the mutilated gender of 
the mannequins.”127  
 The back-and-forth negotiations between shopkeepers and authorities exemplify 
the haphazard construction and arbitrary interpretation of certain social policies seeking 
to enforce modesty onto mannequins.  It also suggests that the conceptualization of a 
“modest” woman’s appearance for public display was neither standardized nor easily 
identifiable. In fact, officials acted without a firm policy in place —often 
extemporaneously— and thus could not fully explain to storeowners (or even themselves) 
the proper display of a storefront mannequin.  Moreover, every rough alteration of the 
mannequin proved to be more comical and conspicuous in its outcome.  For example, 
once the mannequins’ breasts were sawed off, their jagged appearance drew special 
attention —inviting curiosity, guffaws, disbelief, and condemnation.  
The most recent depictions of mannequins’ forms are found in Figures 11 and 12.  
As the photographs show, the mannequins’ bodies appear streamlined; the chest area in 
particular bears little resemblance to the typical female form —what were once two 
round breasts now appears to be a flat surface covered by fabric. Representations of 
female bodies are now depicted as shapeless, revealing what appears to be the slight 
cleavage of an adolescent girl. Moreover, full- sized, female plastic mannequins no 
longer come in all shapes and sizes. Often mannequins are deliberately displayed with 
missing hands, legs, and heads. In their latest manifestation (from June and October 
2011), half-headed female mannequins are displayed with flattened chests, hairless, and 
                                                








almost always with a scarf wrapped around their heads (See Figures 8 and 9).128 (“Iran’s 
concern over the mannequins coincides with high levels of plastic surgery in the 
country,” remarks Nina Power, “as young women attempt to wrest control over their 
bodies by way of oddly homogeneous rhinoplasties.”)129 
The struggle to maintain an aesthetic value in compliance with societal standards 
determined by clerical authorities and administered by state agencies demonstrates the 
complexities and crisis that renditions of the human body present in preserving a chaste 
Islamic culture.  The underlining assumption is that, even a dummy —a non-human 
entity with human-like features— disturbs the ideal of modesty being projected onto an 
Iranian public.   
 
Conclusion 
Imposing a “culture of modesty” is a method of disciplining both men and women 
not only in how they dress but also in their behavior and social interactions.130 However 
exhibiting a modest self is not just a requirement of both sexes; it also extends to their 
representations in art. Just as Iranian women  (and men) were subject to ordinances of 
veiling and sex segregation in official spaces, statues and mannequins of women were 
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130 Registering modesty involved a deliberate process of Islamic reform, the subjects of Chapters One, Two, 






subject to obligatory modifications so that they complied with the clerical leadership’s 
categorical ban of any forms of nudity and “erotic” art.131  
The transformation process in which monuments are subject to reform is similar 
to the destruction and subsequent metamorphosis of red-light district Shahr-e No into a 
family-themed park. Those landmarks of public art that were spared from being 
vandalized were offered a second chance at public exhibition, provided they underwent 
the process of modesty reform. In such instances, officials attempted to redesign pieces 
that adhered to the Supreme Council’s articulation of an Islamically sanctioned visual and 
bodily aesthetics. The implicit understanding was that the public’s gaze must be shielded 
from any suggestion or expression of female sexuality.  
The state’s tendency, via its public policy and morality campaigns, has designated 
the human body (and its representations) as something shameful. The emphasis of certain 
body parts as taboo, in particular those belonging to women, has undoubtedly led to three 
outcomes: certain bodies go into hiding; they become absent; or they resort to a kind of 
mutilation. As stated by Mehri Honarbin-Holliday, the female body, in particular, is used 
as “the state’s instrument in order to dictate cultural behaviors.”132 It became the overt 
expression by which an Islamist state would commence its paksazi or cleansing process. 
This means that the moral jurisdiction of the state designates which bodies are clean, 
pious, favorable, and worth memorializing. This also means that whatever potency the 
state possesses can be administered through vast manipulations and erasures of the public 
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(social) memory, the public (social) body and the private (physical) body. Thus “bodies,” 
in their many states of representation, compliance, and resistance, can be physically and 
publicly forgotten through legal and extra-legal policies, structures, development, 
destruction, and, moreover, compulsory forgetting.  
Indeed, one cannot walk the streets of Tehran without sensing and realizing the 
importance of bodies —their manipulations, their troubles, their politicization, their 
projected martyrdom, and their socialization. In Tehran’s public spaces, there is always 
something to see —an object or person on which to gaze, evoking a mixture of 
bemusement, affirmation, vindication, and confusion. Billboards of martyred men and 
painted slogans of the Islamic Revolution on walls throughout the city hang above 
Iranians, young and old, sporting dramatic styles and weaving through traffic.  Here, 
Tehran bears witness to how living and non-living bodies are constituted, re-constituted, 
projected, and denied expression as the regime pursues its ideological project to 
transform this capital into an “Islamic city.”133  Yet this title has had little impact on this 
city of “paradox.”134 For the diverse inhabitants who traverse and maneuver through it 
daily, it is a home and theater to a widely contradictory Islamist ideology that has become 
intimate with secular, consumerist, technological, sexual, and global forces.135  
 For the fifth and final chapter, I devote to the experiential side of bodily 
technologies from the perspectives of Iranian women living with HIV. Through their 
                                                
133 Bayat, “Tehran: Paradox City,” New Left Review 66 (Nov./Dec. 2010): p. 114. 
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135 Bayat comments, “More dramatically, it still retains the structural and architectural palimpsest of the 
Shah’s time, but this is overlaid with a veneer of post-revolutionary ideology, some significant redevelop- 
ment and the footprints of globalization. More dramatically, it has been transformed from below by 





accounts, one learns about the individual internationalizations of and struggles with 




HIV/AIDS and the Problem of “Taboos” Talking 
Bit by bit, bodies become relational, territorialized in specific ways. Indeed, places 
themselves might be said to be exactly the same: they, too, are made-up out of 
relationships between, within and beyond them; territorialized through scales, borders, 
geography, geopolitics. Bodies and places, then, are made-up through the production of 
their spatial registers, through relations of power. Bodies and places are woven together 
through intricate webs of social and spatial relations that are made by, and make, 
embodied subjects —Heidi Nast and Steve Pile1 
 
Introduction 
In the previous four chapters, I discussed specific sites by which bodily 
technologies are employed to structure and reinforce ideals of family, marriage, modesty, 
citizenship, and becoming “modern” since the late Pahlavi period until present-day Iran. 
In this chapter, the discussion segues into the topic of health —specifically, how striving 
for and maintaining a “healthy body” are important in structuring identity, personhood, 
purpose, and social status; the quest for health can guide living habits, shape life goals, 
values, and ethical foundations, and influence decision-making for oneself and family 
members. For many Iranians, health is both a regime and an ideal, often cast within 
spiritual and religious frameworks, to achieve a wide range of objectives: from bodily-
spiritual balance to social acceptance, from self-monitoring and control to honoring 
family traditions.  
For people living with HIV/AIDS, 2 maintaining a healthy body often involves the 
negotiation of religious, economic, social, political, and cultural factors —a combination 
                                                
1 Heidi J. Nast and Steve Pile, “Introduction: MakingPlacesBodies,” Places Through the Body (London:  
Routledge, 1998), p. 3. 
2 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is a virus that attacks the body’s immune system, complicating 
the body’s defense against diseases and illnesses.  There is currently no cure for HIV, however HIV 
 247 
that is constantly in flux and whose outcomes are often out of their control. When a 
person is HIV-positive, there are immediate assumptions about his or her lifestyle, 
education, religious conviction, drug usage, and economic status. For Robert Crawford, a 
scholar who studies the cultural stigmas associated with AIDS/HIV in the American 
context, “At the heart of the cultural politics of AIDS is a contestation over the meaning 
of the self. It is a politics about identity and difference, about the boundaries of 
personhood which distinguish legitimate from non-legitimate identities, and about the 
meanings upon which identities are constructed, managed, and reworked.”3 This 
assessment resonates with the cultural politics of HIV/AIDS in the Iranian context. 
Crawford states that HIV/AIDS is a boundary marker, differentiating the “unhealthy” 
from the “healthy.” It is an illness associated with many presumptions about “deviant” 
sexuality and excessive sexual behaviors.4 
In Iran, many interrelated political and religious factors complicate government 
and advocacy groups’ efforts to tackle HIV —an illness that, since 1996, has been 
characterized as a public health crisis. As in many societies around the globe, 
misinformation and ignorance of the virus’s basic facts, such as modes of transmission, 
have jeopardized efforts to rally government and public support to raise awareness about 
                                                
treatment assists in people living healthy, active lives.  Late diagnoses of the virus mean that treatment may 
be less effective in preventing AIDS. HIV is transmitted through infected blood, semen, vaginal fluids or 
breast milk.  The most common ways for transmission are: unprotected sex with someone living with HIV; 
sharing infected needles; and from an HIV-positive mother to her child during pregnancy, childbirth, or 
breastfeeding.  For more information about HIV/AIDS, see Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: 
Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic (New York: Macmillan, 2007); Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside, 
AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  
 
3 Robert Crawford, “The Boundaries of the Self and the Unhealthy Other:  Reflections on Health, Culture 
and AIDS,” Social Science & Medicine 38, no. 10.  (1994): p. 1347. 
 
4 Crawford, “The Boundaries of the Self and the Unhealthy Other:  Reflections on Health, Culture and 
AIDS,” p. 1355. 
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the disease and improve access to medical care. Patients often feel shame and fear 
familial abandonment; these pressures are compounded by their stigmatization, the threat 
of violence, unemployment, and financial destitution.5 These myriad demands have 
encouraged a culture of secrecy and anonymity for many Iranians living with HIV.6 For 
the majority of Iranian women living with the virus, having HIV complicates and often 
determines their social status, their maternal capabilities, and the social services available 
to them — be they from the government or medical professionals. For HIV-positive 
women in Iran, their social stigmatization is exacerbated by three important variables: 
first, their health status is considered taboo; second, the changes in government 
administration have effects on the length and extent of their care; and third –perhaps the 
most crucial— the importance of their plight and HIV as a matter of public health are 
questioned.  
Inspired by the ethnographic contributions of Shahla Haeri, Mehri Honarbin-
Holliday, Roxanne Varzi, Shirin Saiedi, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, and Azam Torab in the fields 
of Iranian and Women’s studies, this chapter endeavors to highlight HIV-positive 
                                                
5 See Ali Mohammadpour et al.,“Coming to Terms with a Diagnosis of HIV in Iran:  A 
Phenomenological Study,” Journal of the Association of Nurses in AIDS Care 20, no. 4 (Jul./Aug. 2009): p. 
252.  
6 For a study on societal attitudes in Egypt, see I.A. Kabbash, et al., “Needs Assessment and Coping 
Strategies of Persons Infected with HIV in Egypt,” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 14, no. 6 
(2008): pp. 1-13. On attitudes in Thailand, see P. Liamputtong, N. Haritavorn, and N. Kiatgying-Angsulee, 
“HIV and AIDS, Stigma and AIDS Support Groups: Perspectives from Women Living with HIV and AIDS 
in Central Thailand,” Social Science & Medicine 69 (2009): pp. 862-868. On attitudes in Yemen, see A.W. 
al-Serouri, et al., “AIDS Awareness and Attitudes among Yemeni Young People Living in High-Risk 
Areas,” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 16, no.  3 (2010):  pp.  242-250. On personal narratives of 
AIDS in Africa, see Stephanie Nolen, 28 Stories of AIDS in Africa (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2008). On 
attitudes among English-speaking US adults, see Gregory Herek, Keith Widaman, and John Capitanio, 
“When Sex Equals AIDS:  Symbolic Stigma and Heterosexual Adults’ Inaccurate Beliefs about Sexual 
Transmission of AIDS,” Social Problems 52, no. 1 (2005): pp. 15-37. On public attitudes and knowledge in 
the United Kingdom, see National AIDS Trust Press Release, February 2011, accessed April 20, 2012, 
http://www.nat.org.uk/News-and-Media/Press Releases/2011/February/MORI%20survey%20-
%20knowledge%20and%20attitudes%20to%20HIV.aspx.   
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women’s reflections on their lived experiences with the disease, taking into account the 
physical, political, and historical factors that help shape their perceptions and 
experiences.7  By “lived experience,” I refer to how “people become social entities and 
how they attend to one another and the products of human endeavor in the course of day-
to-day life.”8 In this case, I investigate how HIV-positive women in Iran contend with the 
many social, legal, economic and political complications related to their health status. In 
other words, how do they attempt to navigate and even break down a social taboo when 
they are largely perceived to be the physical manifestations and carriers of that very 
taboo? Do they attempt to dodge their health status and condition in order to survive? 
Thus far, this dissertation has examined various sites in which patriarchal and 
heteronormative understandings of women and female sexuality determine social policy, 
visual reform, spatial contexts, and the dominant historical narratives of the revolutionary 
period.   In each chapter, I have discussed intersections of gender, politics, sexuality, and 
consumerism as they relate to regulatory methods used to discipline sexuality —be these 
modes conceptual or physical— by analyzing media images of the “modern” and 
“revolutionary Islamic” woman; by investigating the modification of female monuments 
in public settings; and by looking at the historical processes of regulating prostitution and 
disciplining prostitutes since the 1979 Revolution.  
                                                
7 See Haeri, Law of Desire; Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary 
Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Mehri Honarbin-Holliday, Becoming Visible in Iran 
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008); Roxanne Varzi, Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom 
in Post-Revolution Iran (Duke University Press, 2006); Azam Torab, Performing Islam: Gender and Ritual 
in Iran (London: Brill Academic Publishing, 2006); Shirin Saiedi, “Hero of Her Own Story: Gender and 
State Formation in Contemporary Iran” (PhD  diss., Cambridge University, 2011). 
8 Prus, Symbolic Interaction and Ethnographic Research:  Intersubjectivity and the Study of Human Lived 
Experience, p. 2. 
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This final chapter is devoted to the experiential side of bodily technologies.  It 
focuses on the integration of positive ideals about health, sexuality, family, marriage, and 
modesty from the individual accounts and experiences of Iranian women living with 
HIV.  I ask the following questions: how do women from this marginalized community 
experience, confront, conceive, and speak about these ideals given their HIV-positive 
status and the stigmas associated with the disease? More so, how do these personal 
accounts speak to the individual ways in which HIV-positive women “live through” the 
world of HIV/AIDS in the Islamic Republic of Iran? To tackle these questions, I set aside 
state and religious narratives about HIV/AIDS and interviewed women who knew 
firsthand about living with this disease. For they are acutely aware of the complexities of 
their stigmatization, experiencing varying moments of inclusion and exclusion in social, 
family, and community gatherings. They also realize that their health status has become 
politicized, especially when government officials and members of the clerical authority 
withdraw their emotional and financial support, or when government efforts to raise 
public awareness about the disease cease. 
The ethnographic material is based on interviews I conducted with women in Iran, 
during two research trips: the first from March 2010 to September 2010, and the second 
from May 2011 until October 2011. In total, I completed 81 face-to-face qualitative 
interviews, with women ranging in age from eighteen to eighty-five years old. However 
the interviews highlighted in this chapter include a small sample of four women whom I 
met at a nonprofit, health advocacy enter in Tehran. On average, I spent six to seven 
hours each week at this center, attending group sessions with nine HIV-positive women 
 251 
before conducting any interviews.  The ethnographic part of this chapter is a testament to 
the depth of our personal interactions and discussions.9  
This chapter contributes both diversity and nuance to the rather small 
ethnographic body of literature on Iranian women dealing with politicized health issues, 
such as HIV-AIDS. I include this valuable ethnographic material not only because it 
provides useful information on diverse interpretations of sexuality and sexual practices, 
but also because it illustrates the very complex construction of and experiences with 
social custom, identity, personhood, and power in contemporary Iran. According to their 
accounts, living with HIV necessarily involves piloting a matrix of conflicting customs, 
practices, and beliefs. Despite many challenges, these women navigate (and even break 
down) the numerous social taboos, discrimination, and stigmas they confront in their 
daily lives. They offer opinions on how having a “healthy body” uniquely matters to 
them —especially when encountering new questions about their mortality or the strength 
of their support networks.    
Through their accounts, one learns about the individual internationalizations of, 
and struggles with, positive ideals of health, sexuality, marriage, and modesty that are 
often promoted by government officials and local clerics. In our discussions, several 
women invoked these ideals in unique and ordinary ways to help formulate their own 
opinions about motherhood, sexual identity, femininity, fashion, and being modest. In 
                                                
9 Only 9 of the 81 interview participants are HIV-positive, to the best of my knowledge. I chose to highlight 
four women’s interviews due to space and time constraints.  As in any project wherein the material 
accumulated and the information sought produces infinite routes for analysis as well as many areas for 
concentration, this particular chapter underwent several requisite incisions and interventions. With great 
hesitation, I excluded from this discussion the majority of interviews I conducted by virtue of the fact that 
both the volume and wealth of resources over-extended the range and scope of this chapter.  Future projects 
will likely engage in the remaining content and dimensions of these discussions, however at the present 
moment, considerations of space and time determined how I would navigate this rich material.     
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many respects, the forthcoming opinions  and intimate details shared by this particular 
group demonstrate an open defiance to the clerical authorities’ reticence on the subject of 
the impact of HIV/AIDS in Iranian society. Many of the women revealed how they reject 
their marginalization, as well as the assumptions that they were sexually irresponsible or 
participated in other high-risk behaviors. Moreover, when revealing how they contracted 
HIV, the actual conditions and circumstances under which they contracted HIV become 
apparent. As I discuss later in this chapter, this means that their accounts often contradict 
government assessments of not only the number of communities being impacted by the 
disease, but also the circumstances in which this type of infection occurs.  
 
Chapter Breakdown:  Historical Analysis and Ethnographic Study 
Before I delve into the ethnographic section of this chapter, I will first explain 
aspects of the intermixing social, political, legal, religious, and economic factors that 
contribute to the difficulties this particular group of women faces.  These topics are each 
addressed in this chapter’s Part I, entitled “Contextualizing HIV/AIDS in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.” Here, I present an overview of some of the social and political 
challenges of HIV/AIDS in Iran; each of the following variables is mutually important in 
the construction of state and religious discourses on HIV/AIDS. First, I navigate through 
the state’s HIV/AIDS discourse, highlighting government policies on HIV/AIDS. I look 
at the discrepancies in official and nonofficial statistics and analysis, detailing ministry 
health agencies and non-governmental HIV/AIDS organizations’ attempts to reduce the 
rising rates of infection. Second, I discuss how the state’s handling of HIV/AIDS through 
media and state agencies has led to the sustaining of HIV as a taboo disease. Third, I 
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examine the dissemination of misinformation about HIV and how this generates feelings 
of paranoia and shame for those living with the virus. After this section, I examine 
individual ulama opinions about the disease.  
As I navigate through this matrix, I underline several themes in this discourse: 
one, that being HIV-positive is a social taboo; two: that state and religious discourses 
treat and describe people living with HIV as “vulnerable;” and three: that government 
health reports exacerbate the HIV/AIDS epidemic by misleading and stigmatizing. In 
analyzing HIV/AIDS infection statistics, I had to consider the consequences that 
presenting real statistics about a controversial subject like HIV/AIDS would have on 
public morality, state competency, and sexual practice —three areas which test the 
Iranian government’s khat-e ghermez (red lines).10  
                                                
10 See Kar, Crossing the Red Line. The reformist-leaning media coined the term “red line” during Iranian 
President Khatami’s tenure starting in 1997. The phrase expressed social and political boundaries 
demarcated by the government for citizens not to cross.  “Red lines” include limits to freedom of the press 
and expression, restraining journalists and opposition candidates from speaking freely about government 
policy in public forums.  Often these red lines are not explicit and journalists only discover they have 
crossed the red line when they are arrested or their news publication suddenly closed. The term “red line” 
has more recently been used in negotiations between Iran and its right to nuclear energy development 
program.   
The government’s sensitivity in acknowledging any rise in sexually transmitted disease cases is 
believed to be a substantial motivation behind the June 2007 arrest of Iranian brothers known for their HIV 
research and advocacy, physicians Kamiar and Arash Alaei. The Alaeis organized workshops to raise 
HIV/AIDS public awareness, reduce social stigma, and educate others on high-risk behavior. After their 
arrest, health advocates accused government officials of attempting to stultify and thus silence efforts to 
research and discuss HIV/AIDS research in public forums, domestic and international. Even though both 
brothers had participated in launching a prison needle exchange program and a condom distribution 
program in health clinics across Iran, the two were arrested in June 2007 and charged and convicted in 
January 2009 with violating Article 508 of Islamic Republic of Iran Penal Code. In October 2010 and 
August 2011, Kamiar and Arash were released, respectively. However their plight and subsequent 
imprisonment have discouraged other health advocates to publicize their efforts to reduce HIV/AIDS 
numbers in settings not approved by Iranian authorities. For more information about the Alaei brothers’ 
case, see Paul Grondahl, "Doctor Released from Iranian Prison," Times Union, June 13, 2011, accessed 
March 20, 2012.  http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Doctor-released-from-Iranian-prison-I-struggle-
1420477.php#ixzz1PXaIeC00.   Their imprisonment marked a new direction for the government, who had 
previously provided financial support for the Alaei brothers’ efforts to tackle the problem of intravenous 
drug use in clinics across Iran. However, the Alaeis’ attendance of international AIDS conferences drew 
government ire. After a one-day closed trial hearing, both men were convicted of aiding in velvet 
revolutions to overturn the regime; authorities presented evidence that the brothers had met with foreign 
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In Part II, entitled “Reformulating the Taboo of ‘Vulnerable’ Women and 
HIV/AIDS,” I move from state and religious discourses on HIV/AIDS to the experiential 
domain of the disease. Aside from the government’s reasoning that HIV transmission in 
Iran is the result of “high-risk” behaviour —the most common method being dirty 
needles from intravenous drug use— this research shows that a unique combination of 
factors have led to higher transmission rates among Iranian women. Moreover, 
government data on the demographic of HIV-positive women does not adequately 
describe the conditions and circumstances with which infections occur.  
By “reformulating the taboo of HIV,” I ask how Iranian women engage with a 
regime of societal expectations that dictate motherhood roles, construct particular desires, 
determine partnership arrangements and even shape health ideals. I consult their personal 
narratives, looking at how their opinions and ideals contend with and compare to ideals 
about health, femininity, and sexuality that are cast in Islamist phrasing and packaging. In 
our interviews, I ask them to comment on global forces, such as consumerism, media, and 
fashion.  We also engage in discussion about maternity, through the controversial and 
highly sensitive issue of a HIV-positive mother breastfeeding her children.  
These interviews illuminate how some Iranian women contend with a maze of 
life-and-death issues related to their health status. In many of these interviews, women 
comment on being active members of nuclear and extended families. They describe 
striving for societal acceptance, seeking to be treated fairly, and having access to health 
and employment services. A point worth emphasizing is that many of these women had 
refrained from “high-risk” behavior the moment they became infected; for some of the 
                                                
health advocates and officials while attending workshops and conferences abroad. In an interview with an 
American university newspaper, Dr. Kamiar Alaei remarked, "I visited many prisons as a doctor to help the 
prisoners and now I was a prisoner myself. It made no sense." 
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interviewees, the sources of their infections were claimed to be their philandering and/or 
drug addicted husbands and sigheh partners. 
To commence, I survey the historical and discursive trajectory of HIV/AIDS 
policy and awareness in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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Part I:  Contextualizing HIV/AIDS in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Iranian State Discourse on HIV/AIDS 
Sources provide varying accounts of the first documented case of HIV in Iran. 
The first case appeared as a result of a contaminated blood during a blood transfusion 
sometime between 1985 and 1987.11 Thereafter, consecutive waves of HIV infections hit 
different demographic populations at different times, across Iran. The first wave, ending 
in the mid-1990s, was marked by infections among hemophilia patients who received 
tainted blood transfusions.12 (According to the Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education13 (MOHME) 2010 report, until 1995 less than ten new cases of HIV were 
identified annually).14  
The Iranian government began charting demographic shifts in the general public’s 
sexual behaviors almost ten years after it realized that rates among “high-risk”  
groups15 —in official health reports, identified as primarily intravenous drug users 
(IDUs) and prisoners— were reaching epidemic levels.16 An incident marking the 
                                                
11 In Iran’s HIV/AIDS reports to UND,  the first cases of HIV were documented in 1985. See UNDP Iran, 
“The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in Iran,” February 27, 2011, accessed April 12, 2012, 
http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/project-highlights/481-27-february-2011-the-prevention-and-control-of-
hivaids-in-iran.  Researcher Pardis Mahdavi states that HIV was first detected in 1986.  See Pardis 
Mahdavi, “Who Will Catch Me if I Fall? Health and the Infrastructure of Risk for Urban Young Iranians,” 
in Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society and Politics, ed. Ali Gheissari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 2009), p. 157.  Journal Zanan claims the first detected case was reported in 1987 caused by 
contaminated blood during a transfusion.  See “Zanan va AIDS dar Iran: Az Enkar ta Paziresh/ Women and 
AIDS in Iran: From Denial to Acceptance,” Zanan 135 (Sharivar 1385/September 2006): pp. 50-55. 
12 “The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in Iran,” UNDP Iran, February 27, 2011. 
13For more information about the organization and its operations in the provinces see Ramin Mehrdad, 
“Health System in Iran,” Japan Medical Association Journal 52, no. 1 (2009):  pp. 69-73.   
14 Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS 
Committee Secretariat, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical Education, February 2010, p. 14. 
 
15 In the many medical publications I reviewed for this chapter, I noticed that in Iran’s official reports of its 
domestic HIV/AIDS epidemic, the same list of characters (also known as sub-populations participating in 
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“second wave” of HIV in the mid-1990s necessitated an immediate change in public 
health attention and strategy. Two hundred fifty prisoners from the Kermanshah-Khanuj 
prison tested positive for HIV.17 The reported occurrences of needle sharing among 
inmates presented a potentially dangerous public health scenario if prisoners were 
released undiagnosed.  As a result, health officials began implementing practical 
strategies for treatment and prevention.  
At the time, the epidemic was regarded as “concentrated” in the sub-population of 
IDUs from state penitentiaries.18 To curb the soaring numbers of infections among IDUs, 
                                                
high-risk behaviors) are mentioned as participating in unhealthy, high-risk activities; and thus by this kind 
of categorization, government resources are allocated to specific groups for treatment, prevention, and 
study. This group historically included female sex workers, inmates, intravenous drug addicts, and men 
who have sex with men; in the past decade (between 2001 to 2008), studies surveyed truck drivers, sailors, 
and pregnant women.  
16 The term “IDU”  stands for “intravenous drug user” or “injected drug user.” According to  a UNAIDS 
2002 report, most HIV transmission in the country occurred among its estimated 200,000–300,000 IDUs, 
of which sixty-five percent of the known and reported HIV cases in Iran were IDU-attributed. Figures first 
reported in 2002 by Iran’s Ministry of Health and published in Ali Rowhani Rahbar, et al., "Prevalence of 
HIV Infection and Other Blood-borne Infections in Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated Injection Drug Users 
(IDUs) in Mashhad, Iran," International Journal of Drug Policy 15 (2004): p. 151. 
Studies find that Iranian drug users seeking treatment use opium and heroin.  (Opium usage has 
significantly decreased but injection of a form of methamphetamine is on the rise.) However very little is 
known about the characteristics and risk profiles of Iran’s IDUs. A 2006 study attempted to describe the 
correlation between harm reduction needs of IDUs and others at at a high risk of HIV infection. See Emran 
Razzaghi, Afarin Rahimia Movaghar, Traci Craig Green, and Kaveh Khoshnood, “Profiles of Risk:  A 
Qualitative Study of Injecting Drug Users in Tehran, Iran,” Harm Reduction Journal 3, no. 12 (March 18, 
2006): p. 2.  Another 2006 study conducted on patterns of drug use among IDUs found that specific 
information on IDUs in Iran —such as their high-risk behavior— is insufficient and as such, has yet to lead 
to the creation of specific health promotion and intervention strategies specific to these populations.  
Additionally, researchers find that the specific data on IDU, such as help seeking and blood-borne virus 
risk behaviour is  insufficient to allow such tailoring of health promotion and intervention strategies.  They 
also question if government agencies can adequately facilitate the monitoring of risk-factor trends over 
time. See Carolyn Day, Bijan Nassirimanesh, Anthony Shakeshaft, and Kate Dolan, “Patterns of Drug Use 
among a Sample of Drug Users and Injecting Drug Users Attending a General Practice in Iran,” Harm 
Reduction Journal 3, no. 1 (2006): p. 2. 
17 Janne Bjerre Christensen, Drugs, Deviancy, and Democracy in Iran:  The Interaction of State and Civil 
Society (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 134. 
18 Fallahi et al., “Stigma, Discrimination, and the Consequences of HIV-AIDS for People Living With It in 
Iran,” Life Science Journal 8, no. 4 (2011): p. 503. Because of the high infection rates reported among the 
incarcerated, the MOHME and non-governmental health agencies concentrated on controlling sexually 
transmitted infections (STI) in prisons. A 2002 voluntary study conducted in a local prison in Iran’s Fars 
province reported that  “30% and 78% prevalence rates of HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection 
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clerics, public health advocates, and government officials encouraged a more “typology-
suggested intervention.”19 Subsequently needle-exchange, methadone maintenance, 
outreach programs, and harm reduction therapies were introduced and strategically 
implemented for an incarcerated demographic that was, in many respects, physically 
quarantined in prison.20 Even prisoners’ families were provided complimentary medical 
care.21  
With these reforms, official perceptions of HIV-infected drug addicts began to be 
transformed. Public health workers lobbied clerics, judges, and government officials to 
treat drug addition as an illness and humanitarian issue. Judges began ordering 
rehabilitation for treating substance abuse instead of jail-time.22 If convicted drug users 
                                                
among incarcerated drug users, respectively.”  See Bijan Nassirimanesh, “Proceedings of the Abstract for 
the Fourth National Harm Reduction Conference,” Harm Reduction Coalition, Seattle (2002). Of the 
population sampled, shared needles and razors, along with used needles and unhygienic conditions for 
tattooing, were reported to be common conduits of disease transmission. 
 
19 Razzaghi, et al., “Profiles of Risk:  A Qualitative Study of Injecting Drug Users in Tehran, Iran,” Harm 
Reduction Journal 3, no. 12 (March 18, 2006), doi: 10.1186/1477-7517-3-12. The needle exchange 
program was established in the late1990s, at the time distinguishing Iran as the only country in the Middle 
East and North Africa to offer needle exchange services in some of its prisons.  As of September 2011, the 
needle exchange program was  ongoing and UNAIDS reported 679 sites for needle exchange compared to 
21 sites in Afghanistan. See Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS 2011, UNAIDS, p. 21, 
accessed March 5, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2011/JC2257_UNAID
S-MENA-report-2011_en.pdf. 
 In a one-year period, 6,022,834 free needles and syringes were distributed. On average, between 
26 to 35 needles and syringes are distributed per IDU per year. See Islamic Republic of Iran: Monitoring of 
the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS Report, National AIDS Committee 
Secretariat, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical Education, March 2012, p. 25. 
20 See Emran Razzaghi, et al., “Profiles of Risk:  A Qualitative Study of Injecting Drug Users in Tehran, 
Iran,” pp. 1-13. 
21 Ibid., p. 11. Prisoners and their families were informed about HIV risks and given condoms; in certain 
prisons, pilot programs administering clean syringes were offered to IDUs. Prisoners’ wives, who became 
directly infected through conjugal visits with incarcerated IDUs and/or contaminated blood contact, also 
received some information and training about the disease. 
22 Christensen, pp. 135-136. Article 1 of Iran’s Anti-Narcotics Law, as amended in 1997, punishes anyone 
“using drugs in any form or manner except for cases provided for by law.” Article 2 specifies the 
punishments for each offense, taking into account the defendant’s criminal record. Depending on the 
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went through rehabilitation programs, their sentences would be reduced or dropped 
altogether.23 This shift in policy represented a radical approach to state-level methods of 
discipline and punishment,24 which treated drug addictions and HIV/AIDS as signs of 
moral depravity and corruption.25 Public health reforms began to treat people with drug 
addictions as “vulnerable” patients, in need of comprehensive public health guidance and 
support.26 
Once major reforms in the nation’s penitentiary treatment programs were also 
implemented in the general public, HIV/AIDS policies changed nationwide. These 
measures ran parallel to the liberalizing reforms of Iran’s fifth president, Mohammad 
Khatami.  By 2001, MOHME and participating agencies had created a National Strategic 
Plan, concentrating on “age appropriate information and education, voluntary counseling 
and testing, harm reduction, HIV/STI care and treatment and strengthened HIV related 
                                                
number of kilograms found in his/her possession, for the first offence, fines and lashes are administered; by 
the fourth offense, the death penalty is administered. Article 42 notes that judiciary power is permitted to 
request that drug-related convicts attend special detoxification camps to aid in rehabilitation rather than 
prisons. See “The Anti-Narcotics Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” November 8, 1997, accessed April 
25, 2012,  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c35b0a52.html.   
It was reported that in January 2005, justice minister Ayatollah Mohammad Esma’il Shoushtari 
instructed prosecutors to ignore punitive judicial laws germane to drug offences and defer to health 
ministry officials on treating drug-addicted convicts.  See Amir Arsalan Afkhami, “From Punishment to 
Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addiction in Contemporary Iran,” in  Contemporary Iran: Economy, 
Society, Politics, ed. Ali Gheissari (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 207; Karl Vick, “AIDS 
Crisis Brings Radical Change in Iran’s Response to Heroin Use,” Washington Post, July 5, 2005. 
23 Ibid.,  p. 135. 
24 For an extensive discussion of modern day techniques employed by western penal systems, which 
elaborate disciplinary power structures, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
25 Afkhami, “From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addiction in Contemporary Iran,” 
p. 200. In capital criminal cases, drug addicts were also charged with mohareb ba khoda (at war with God). 
26 Christensen, p. 135.  See also Afkhami, “From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of 
Addiction in Contemporary Iran,” p. 200.   
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applied studies.”27 Two years later, the clerical leadership and government institutions 
began to accept the possibility of a rising HIV rate, which led to expansions in university-
approved research studies on the epidemic and more programs to reach members of the 
general public affected by the disease.28 In August 2006, localized support centers, 
known as Bashgah-e Yaraneh-e Mosbat (Positive Clubs), were set up for HIV-positive 
patients, focusing on HIV harm reduction and creating local strategies for the problems of 
stigma and discrimination. 29 
Iran’s various ministries also pledged to assist in maintaining infection rates at 
less than 0.1 percent among the general population and below 25 percent among high-risk 
groups by the end of 2010.30 Triangular clinics were established to incorporate accessible 
services such HIV/AIDS treatment and care (including treatment with antiretrovirals);31 
                                                
27 Dr. Mohammad Hossein Nikman, “United Nations High-level Meeting on HIV/AIDS Statement,” 
(statement to United Nations from Acting Health Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, June 8-10, 2011, 
New York), accessed April 12, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/ga/aidsmeeting2011/pdf/iran.pdf. There is also 
a 30-member National AIDS Committee which assists in coordination and management of the AIDS Plan 
that the Ministry of Health attests has an “active participation and administration of the government.” See 
Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education, March 2012, p. 54, accessed April 12, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2012countries/ce_IR_N
arrative_Report.pdf. 
28 See Mahdavi, p. 158. 
29 Positive Clubs are affiliated with Tanzim-e Khanevadeh-ye Jomhouri-ye Islami (Family Planning 
Association of the Islamic Republic of Iran). 
 
30 See “The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in Iran,” UNDP Iran, February 27, 2011,  accessed April 
12, 2012, http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/hivaids-tb-malaria/481-27-february-2011-the-prevention-and-
control-of-hivaids-in-iran/. 
31 Standard HIV/AIDS treatment is Antiretroviral Therapy (ART), which was introduced internationally in 
1996.  See World Health Organization, Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV Infection in Adults and Adolescents: 
Recommendations for Public Health Approach 2010 Revision (Geneva: WHO, 2010). In Iran, the estimated 
number of people eligible for antiretroviral therapy is 26,000—compared to 22,000 in Pakistan, 25,000 in 
Somalia, and 93,000 in Sudan. See UNAIDS Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS 2011, 
pp. 52-53. 
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voluntary and confidential testing; and information on HIV/AIDS, STD, and drug 
dependence.32 (However in the provinces’ urban centers of Esfahan, Shiraz, and Mashad, 
testing centers were less available).33 Iran’s HIV/AIDS and public health experts also 
began presenting their findings and prevention methods at  international research and 
NGO conferences; they showcased innovative HIV/AIDS prevention and care programs, 
such as methadone maintenance treatment and triangular clinics operating in Iran.34 
(Many of these researchers were university-funded and affiliated with Iran’s Center for 
AIDS Research.)35 Also at these conferences, Iranian researchers collaborated and shared 
                                                
 
32 Other services included the following: information, education, assessment, family and group counseling; 
methadone maintenance, and the provision of sterile needles and syringes and condoms.  See Rahbar, 
“Prevalence of HIV Infection and Other Bloodborne Infections in Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated 
Injection Drug Users (IDUs) in Mashhad, Iran,” p. 152. “Triangular clinics” were established as part of a 
comprehensive nationwide policy to provide prevention and treatment. The first triangular clinic was 
established in Kermanshah’s central prison in October 2000. It demonstrated that by “grouping the three 
service areas together, it was possible to deliver a responsive, comprehensive and integrated service to drug 
users, their local community and people living with HIV, including drug users and their families.” See 
UNAIDS Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS 2011, p. 31. 
 
33 Clinics such as ones established in Mashad by the Central Prison of Mashad offered programs for 
HIV/AIDS, drug dependence, and sexually transmitted disease (STD). See Rowhani Rahbar, et al., 
"Prevalence of HIV Infection and Other Blood-borne Infections in Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated 
Injection Drug Users (IDUs) in Mashhad, Iran," p. 152. The government even augmented its spending in 
the fight against rising HIV/AIDS infections. For 2004-2005, they pledged about $US 14 million.  By 
March 2009, it spent 309,174,961 thousands rials ($US 38 million) for HIV/AIDS control programs, 
accounting to a 16.2 % increase in spending, according to the MOHME. Financial commitments were 
pledged for “all members of the general population, especially high-risk groups and prisoners.” According 
to the MOHME’s 2012 monitoring reports prepared for UNAIDS, the “allocation of funds, sex, age, ethnic 
and religious background and profession have not been a factor.” See Monitoring of the United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Iran Ministry 
of Health and Medical Education, p. 22; “The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in I.R. Iran, Phases 1& 
2," UNDP Iran, 2011, accessed April 30, 2012, 
http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/component/content/article/403. Ongoing, joint Iran and UNDP efforts 
pledged almost $15.9 million dollars in a two-phase education project designed to control HIV prevalence 
and incidence. 
34 Afkhami, “From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addiction in Contemporary Iran,” 
pp. 203-204. 
35 Kamiar Alaie (HIV/AIDS expert and medical doctor), interview by author,  telephone interview,  New 
York, NY., June 26, 2012.  
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teaching and prevention strategies with HIV experts from different countries. These 
combined efforts between government officials, social scientists, and public health 
advocates were believed to be the reason behind the improvement of domestic HIV/AIDS 
treatment and subsequently decreasing domestic rates of HIV infections.36  
Government officials began speaking about HIV/AIDS as a matter of public 
interest and subsequently commenced a MOHME-administered media campaign to 
inform the general public.  MOHME began releasing official, annual statistics on the 
reported cases of HIV/AIDS infections, via Iran’s media agencies, including the Iranian 
Students’ News Agency (ISNA), Mehr News Agency (MNA), and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).37 State television and radio commenced mass media 
programs through “teaser” health campaigns.38 MOHME-sponsored campaigns began 
                                                
Telephone interview in New York with Kamiar Alaie (HIV/AIDS expert and medical doctor), interview 
with Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, June 26, 2012, New York. 
36Afkhami, pp. 204-206.  
37 The Iranian media has also broadcast some programs for “the elimination of discrimination and stigma 
against people living with HIV/AIDS.” See Islamic Republic of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the 
United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee 
Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Education, February 2010, p. 33, accessed April 18, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/fr/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/2010progressreportssubmittedbycountrie
s/file,33662,fr..pdf. ISNA usually publishes HIV/AIDS  statistics that are accompanied interviews with 
Ministry of Health officials  who confirm these numbers; the articles do not report any information about 
how the data is calculated or provide data about sexual behaviors in the general public that might attribute 
to rising HIV rates of infection. It is also worth mentioning that MNA is run by Islamic Ideology 
Dissemination Organization, headed by Seyyed Mehdi Khamoushi, which recently launched “Wikifeqh” an 
online information site for Islamic Religious Law. See “Wikifeqh,” Islamic Ideology Dissemination 
Organization, accessed April 18, 2012, http://wikifeqh.ir/wiki/index.php.   In 2006, funding allocated to 
media programs through IRIB was set at $254,00.00.  See “Declaration of Commitment,” Islamic Republic 
of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and 
AIDS, Office of the Under-Secretary for Health, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Centre for 
Disease Management, January 2006, accessed June 1, 2012, 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2006/2006_country_progress_report_iran_en.pdf.   
38 See “The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in Iran,” UNDP Iran, February 27, 2011. 
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publicizing World AIDS Day, which is celebrated annually on December 1.39 Health 
clinics were supplied with brochures on AIDS awareness. Across Tehran, giant billboards 
were decorated with red ribbons —the universal symbol for HIV/AIDS advocacy— in 
major thoroughfares and parks. 
The public health community also helped mobilize public awareness. HIV/AIDS 
advocates began pushing for the widening of public access to HIV/AIDS-related 
information by promoting prevention methods, such as condom use.40 Health officials 
initially focused on reaching out to specific demographic groups to stimulate changes in 
knowledge, attitude, and behavior —namely, teachers; trainers; high school and 
university students; couples intending to permanently marry; and “high risk” 
populations,41 including IDUs, prisoners, and sex workers, were provided cursory 
                                                
39 Conflicting media sources reported that Iran had removed World AIDS Day from their state calendar. 
State-affiliated newspaper Etemad reported on March 12, 2012 that the new regulations, approved by the 
Supreme Council of Revolution, permitted the official state calendar to hold occasions “of importance to 
different layers of the nation” and that “strengthen ‘Iranian national identity.’”  It was reported that the 
ruling was approved and signed by council chair and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in August 
2009.  This report disputes the actual events. According to Iran’s UNDP, the official holiday was celebrated 
at the Iranian Health Ministry in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Iran’s English-language satellite channel Press TV 
broadcast the short-program, “Getting to Zero,” about a Tehran-based World AIDS Day conference. See 
Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran Reportedly Removes World AIDS Day from State Calendar,” RFERL, March 17, 
2012, accessed June 4, 2012, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/iran_takes_world_aids_day_off_calendar/24518879.html. “Iran Marks World 
AIDS Day,” Press TV, November 30, 2011, accessed June 4, 2012, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/213079.html.   
40 Interviews in Tehran with Fatemeh Salehi (SPASDI social worker) and K. Mansourian (SPASDI 
director), interview by Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi, September 21, 2011, Tehran, Iran. 
41 In the many medical publications I reviewed for this thesis project on conceptualizations of women’s 
bodies in contemporary Iran, I noticed that in Iran’s official reports of its domestic HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
the same list of characters (also known as sub-populations participating in high-risk behaviors) are 
mentioned as participatory in unhealthy, high-risk or at-risk activities; and thus by this kind of 
categorization, government resources are allocated to specific groups for treatment, prevention, and study. 
This group has typically included female sex workers, inmates, intravenous drug addicts, and men who 
have sex with men; in the past decade (between 2001 to 2008), studies surveyed truck drivers, sailors, and 
pregnant women.  
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instruction about HIV prevention and care.42 By 2006, policy reforms for HIV/AIDS 
curriculum were proposed in schools and workplaces where AIDS-awareness pamphlets 
and handbooks were approved for distribution. Qom-based43 Shi’a clerics even endorsed 
the booklet.44 (A 2012 official review of this education curriculum concludes that HIV is 
still considered a taboo in the education system, in spite of the HIV/AIDS curriculum that 
commenced in 2006.45 In one qualitative study, researchers found that “because of 
unreasonable fears among most Iranian people that AIDS education promotes high risk 
                                                
42 By 2011, nearly 38 percent of registered teachers in Iran had been trained in HIV/AIDS awareness and 
prevention. “The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS,” UNDP Iran, February 27, 2011, accessed June 19, 
2012. 
43 Qom is the largest center for Shi’a scholarship in the world. 
44 Hannah Allam, “Iran’s AIDS-Prevention Program among World’s Most Progressive,” Knight Rider, 
April 14, 2006.  The pamphlet was mainly designed by Dr. Arash Alaei, who helped improve HIV/AIDS 
awareness in Kermanshah province after a government-testing program confirmed the rising rates of 
infections among drug addicts from its ex-convict and prisoner populations, which was subsequently found 
present among the wives and children of Kermanshah’s addicts. This article reports that the handbook is no 
longer in distribution, after the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  
 
45 Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, March 2012, p. 34.  Research studies conducted in different geographic areas 
across Iran and published between the years 2001 and 2011, document the current attitudes, behaviors, and 
knowledge about HIV/AIDS. In general, many of the studies identify discriminatory attitudes towards 
HIV/AIDS patients. Moreover, they report to the misconceptions about contraction, curability, and 
prevention that have contributed to the spread of misinformation about the illness, along with fomenting 
anxieties about the virus’s alleged threat to society. The reasons for this misinformation have been 
attributed to poor media attention to the issue; the application of certain spurious religious beliefs; the 
limited and inconsistent HIV/AIDS education for student populations; and the reticence of parents, 
teachers, physicians and nurses to discuss the issue to their respective communities. Negative attitudes of 
the illness are also attributed to religious beliefs. In a 2010 study on the attitudes of a selection of Shiraz 
high school students, researchers concluded that “loyalty to Islamic religious beliefs have an important role 
on attitudes towards the disease.” See Tavoosi et al., “Knowledge and Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among 
Iranian Students,” BMC Public Health 4, no. 17 (2004), doi:10.1186/1471-2458-4-17;  See Mohammadi, 
“Reproductive Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior among Adolescent Males in Tehran, Iran.” and  CA. 
Yazdi, K. Aschbacher, A. Arvanta, HM Naser, A. Abdollahi, M. Mousavi, MR. Narmani, M. Kianpishe, F. 
Nicfallah, and AK Moghadam,  “Knowledge, Attitudes and Sources of Information Regarding HIV/AIDS 
in Iranian Adolescents,”   AIDS Care 18, no. 8 (November 2006): pp.1004-10; M. Movahed and S. Shoaa, 
“On Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among Iranian Students:  Case Study: High School Students in Shiraz 
City,” Pakistan Journal of Biological Sciences 13, no. 6 (Mar., 2010): p. 275. 
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behaviors, sex education about HIV transmission has no place in schools and universities 
in Iran.”)46 
Yet, even despite official campaigns to improve HIV/AIDS awareness during 
Khatami’s administration, other obstacles jeopardized how much access and knowledge 
about the virus and its prevention Iranians could obtain, given the state’s control of 
information output.  One fundamental discrepancy lies in government estimates of the 
number of people in Iran living with HIV/AIDS. According to many critics, whom I 
showcase in the next section, this data is both misleading and inaccurate.    
 
Who Counts? Statistical Discrepancies in HIV/AIDS Discourse 
“Obtaining an estimate of the number of people infected with HIV in a country or 
region is important for the purpose of evaluation, programme planning and advocacy,” 
writes the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS and STI 
Surveillance.47  Each country employs different surveillance systems of their respective 
HIV epidemics, although reporting systems intend to  “provide information that will 
increase and improve the response to the HIV epidemic.” 48 Early warning indicators of a 
possible epidemic can also be determined, and among concentrated demographics or sub-
groups, “surveillance can provide valuable information for designing focused 
                                                
46 See Anahita Tavoosi et al., “Knowledge and Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among Iranian Students.” 
47 Guidelines for Measuring National HIV Prevalence, UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on Global 
HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance, 2005, p. 5, accessed April 10, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/manual/2005/20050101_gs_guideme
asuringpopulation_en.pdf 
48 Guidelines for Measuring National HIV Prevalence, UNAIDS/WHO, p. 5. 
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interventions.”49 Iran’s MOHME concurs, qualifying that estimating the number of HIV 
infected cases and at-risk groups  “can play a decisive role in clarifying the political 
orientation of prevention with respect to the size of each at-risk group, the gravity of the 
problem in each of the groups, the change in the conditions of the epidemic among them, 
and the identification of the program’s blind spots.”50   
One issue that has received little critical attention is the discrepancy between the 
official HIV statistics provided by the MOHME and the Center for Disease Management 
—two institutions that release official HIV/AIDS statistics— and the data published by 
international HIV/AIDS agencies and reported by Iran’s domestic health organizations 
and medical researchers. The discrepancy lies in the government reports on the actual 
versus estimated cases of Iranians who are HIV-positive. Moreover, government health 
officials provide different health statistics for different audiences. Compare MOHME 
monitoring and epidemiological reports from 2004 to 2012 reports, which it prepared for 
UNAIDS, WHO, and UNDP to satisfy its reporting obligations for membership in (and 
funding from) these agencies. According to Iran’s HIV/AIDS progress reports, 
HIV/AIDS statistics are much larger than reported in their domestic monitoring reports.  
In 2003, Iran reported an estimate figure of 31,000.51 By the end of 2005, Iran reported a 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 “Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS,” National 
AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, February 2010, p. 19, accessed 
April 10, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/fr/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/2010progressreportssubmittedbycountrie
s/file,33662,fr.pdf. 
51 See “Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections: 2004 Update for 
Iran,” UNAIDS/WHO, pp. 1-14, accessed April 10, 2012, http://data.unaids.org/publications/Fact-
Sheets01/iran_en.pdf. 
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range of 60,000 to 70,000 cases of people living with HIV.52  In a 2008 epidemiological 
report for the UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS and STI, Iran 
reported an estimate of 86,000.53 For 2009, in another country monitoring report, 
MOHME estimated 83,000.54 In Iran’s 2012 progress report for UNAIDS, health officials 
reported 23,497 registered cases of people living with HIV by September 2011, and 
93,250 estimated for 2010. They forecast that by 2015, the figure would increase to 
126,300.55 
Experts within the fields of medicine, public health and social work, as well as 
journalists writing on women’s health or other health-related issues, are aware of this 
under-reporting.  Public health employees, medical researchers, and HIV/AIDS advocates 
have responded by going on record, conducting interviews with domestic and 
international media outlets while pushing aside the potential backlash or the fear of losing 
their jobs for speaking out. Their objective is to encourage MOHME to accurately 
publish the number of HIV cases–which are already published in regional and 
international AIDS reports—for the general public. And when they were not successful in 
                                                
52 See “Declaration of Commitment,” Islamic Republic of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, Office of the Under-Secretary for Health, 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Centre for Disease Management, January 2006. 
53 “Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS 2008 Update,” Islamic Republic of Iran, October 2008, 
p. 4, accessed April 13, 2012,  
http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2008/full/EFS2008_IR.pdf. 
54 “Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS,” National 
AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, February 2010, p. 19, accessed 
April 3, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/fr/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/2010progressreportssubmittedbycountrie
s/file,33662,fr.pdf.  
55 Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, p. 15. 
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reaching this objective, they published counter-statistics to dispute official MOHME 
reports.  Note the following cases: in 2003, a research study from University of Tehran’s 
Medical Sciences reported that official figures were approximately 5,000 people infected 
with HIV/AIDS.56 HIV/AIDS experts disputed this figure, stating it was likely five times 
more.57 Iran’s Center for Disease Management stated that by late 2004, official figures 
were around 9,800 HIV-positive cases and 374 cases of AIDS.58 In 2006, according to 
feminist journal Zanan, Iranian officials reported 13,357 known cases.59 Three years 
later, in 2009, MOHME reported an increase in HIV cases, reporting around 20,000 cases 
of HIV countrywide.60 Hossein Ali Shahyari, Acting Director of the Health Commission 
for the Majles (Parliament), disputed MOHME’s data on the reported number of HIV-
positive cases in 2009. As cited by Farda News, an online Persian-language news portal, 
he claimed the range was “five to seven times this number, equaling almost 100,000.”61 
The most recent estimate from a 2012 joint-report from the MOHME and the Center for 
                                                
56 The researchers explain, “In 2003, officially there were 5086 Iranians living with HIV/AIDS, of which, 
4838 were male and 248 were female.” See Anahita Tavoosi et al., “Knowledge and Attitude towards 
HIV/AIDS among Iranian Students,” BMC Public Health 4, no. 17 (2004). 
57 See Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran:  Tehran Begins to Confront the ‘Time Bomb’ of HIV/AIDS,” RFERL, 
November 10, 2003, accessed April 2, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1104954.html. 
58 HIV/AIDS in Iran (Cumulative Statistics) Tehran 2004 Report, Iran Center for Disease Management, 
Office of the Deputy for Public Health, Ministry of Health and Medical Education of the I.R. Iran, 2004. In 
Persian. 
59“Zanan va AIDS dar Iran: Az Enkar ta Paziresh/ Women and AIDS in Iran: From Denial to Acceptance,” 
Zanan. 
60 “Amar-e Vagh'ei-ye Mobtalayan be AIDS dar Iran/Real Statistics of AIDS Cases in Iran," Farda News, 7 
Azar 1388/November 28, 2009, accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/96834/. 
61 Ibid. 
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Disease Management cited 23,125 known domestic cases of HIV—of which 8.5% are 
women and 91.5% are men.62 
By the MOHME’s own admission, there is a wide gap between the official figure 
for the identified cases of HIV versus the number of estimated cases. The ministry’s 
monitoring reports attribute this challenge to limitations of diagnostic services, which 
require expensive tests.63 In a 2012 monitoring report, for instance, “special software” is 
reportedly the reason for the new and larger estimates.64  
 
Breaking down HIV as a Taboo: Let’s (Try to) Talk about Sex and HIV/AIDS 
Given the inconsistencies in HIV/AIDS figures from the MOHME reports, it is 
presumed that other implicit factors determine how, when, and why HIV/AIDS statistics 
are calculated and released for public consumption. In the previous section, I commented 
on the inconsistent data published in Iran’s HIV/AIDS reports.  There is an additional 
matter of importance, which is implicit in the political decision to withhold of HIV/AIDS 
information from the general public. Relatively few details are provided in official 
HIV/AIDS statistics that may assist in providing context of HIV/AIDS reported cases.  In 
the Persian-language MOHME reports on HIV/AIDS statistics, there is no data 
elaborating the identities, lifestyles, and geographic locations of these cases.  But would 
this information not help determine atypical indicators behind HIV transmission modes, 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education, March 2012, p. 48, accessed April 13, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2012countries/ce_IR_N
arrative_Report.pdf.   
64 Ibid., pp. 15, 72. 
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populations-at-risk, and the reasons behind the discrepancy between estimated versus 
actual cases for people living with HIV?  
Moreover, would contextual data on HIV/AIDS statistics better inform 
researchers, officials, and clerics when making decisions on targeted prevention of the 
illness? For instance, do current HIV rates include unprotected, sexual relations and sex 
only in married, heterosexual unions? Do these figures also consider sexual activity 
among young persons, single adults, or as extra-marital affairs? Why are there great 
discrepancies in the ratio of HIV-positive men to HIV-positive women?65 If condom 
usage among IDUs —the highest population of HIV cases— is not standard, should 
statistics in fact reveal a higher ratio of HIV-positive women? Or do male HIV-positive 
IDUs practice abstinence? Moreover, are any of the HIV-positive patients members of 
particular communities affiliated with the state—such as the Basij-e Mostazafin 
(Mobilization of the Dispossessed), the Revolutionary Guards, war veterans, clerics, or 
state officials?66 Given reports of drug addictions among war veterans and basij 
communities, do HIV/AIDS statistics reflect any occurrences or trends among specific 
communities that scholars have analyzed to be Iran’s “sacred social categories” (Iran-Iraq 
                                                
65 According to Iran’s 2012 monitoring report, among the indicator category “people who inject drugs and 
use condoms,” the national data showed that only 15.1% of IDUs used condoms; 16.1% with non-paid 
regular partners; and 15.3% with commercial partners or sex workers. Ibid.,  p. 9. 
 
66 The Basij-e Mostazafin is a volunteer, religious-military organization or paramilitary organization, dating 
back to the Iran-Iraq war. Individual members are referred to as basij. For information and commentary 
about the Basij and Iran’s veteran communities, see Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven:  
Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 64, 70.  For further information about the role of Iran-Iraq war veterans 
and their status as “shahid” or martyrs, see Varzi (2006); Farhang Rajaee, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics 
of Aggression (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1993). 
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war veterans, the basijs and the Muslim family)?67 As of this writing, MOHME reports 
on HIV/AIDS do not comment on any of the illuminating demographic details. 
Despite the top-level and community-specific strategies implemented to mitigate 
the rates of infection, according to Pardis Mahdavi, “for many years the government 
refused to comment on the incidence of HIV in Iran, and researchers interested in this 
topic were discouraged from investigating the issue.”68 The government reticence to 
publish comprehensive data about people living with HIV inside Iran is rooted in certain 
legal, social, cultural, and religious factors that, as a whole, continue to stigmatize the 
HIV-positive community.  Consider the following variables: first, Iran’s religious 
authorities forbid premarital sex, and it is punishable by law. Second, family reputation is 
important in maintaining social status and ties; an HIV-positive diagnosis likely tarnishes 
one’s familial reputation and may lead to discrimination and/or being ostracized. Third, 
marriage (including one’s marriageability) is considered an ideal union between a man 
and woman, according to state and religious discourse.69   
According to Twelver Shi’a ideology, marriage is a necessary social institution 
and contract in preserving legitimate, heterosexual relations —and by extension, 
maintaining public morality and order. Sigheh or temporary marriage —a topic discussed 
in Chapter Three— complicates this objective in the case of sexually transmitted 
diseases. The institution of sigheh is stigmatized, and men and women who enter these 
                                                
67 For further information about drug addictions among these specific communities, see Christensen, pp. 
138-145. 
68 Mahdavi, “Who Will Catch Me if I Fall? Health and the Infrastructure of Risk for Urban Young 
Iranians,” pp. 157-158. 
69 See Chapter Three of this dissertation for analysis on the Iranian state and religious discourse of 
temporary and permanent marriage. 
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unions typically do not publicize their relationship.  Although sexual relations conducted 
during sigheh are permitted and encouraged, according to Twelver Shi’a discourse, there 
are certain problems that arise when the man or woman’s health is compromised.  In 
cases of sexually transmitted infection, there are issues of culpability as well as how to 
seek legal, medical, and monetary recourse. Suppose that HIV is contracted during a 
sigheh union and one of the parties is a carrier of the virus, knowingly or unknowingly.  
Also, suppose that the sigheh contract is conducted in secret –meaning, without the 
permanent wife or sigheh wife knowing of each other’s existence.  In what ways has this 
emphasis of marriage as a method of prevention and as a model framework for male and 
female relations authorized reckless behavior —specifically, irresponsible, sexual activity 
that is potentially medically dangerous? In the second half of this chapter, this scenario 
will transition from the hypothetical realm to social reality; it illustrates some of the 
serious issues that authorities, religious leaders, and citizens increasingly face.    
Given the state’s targeted reforms in HIV/AIDS treatment programs for its IDU 
demographic, it appears that clerical authorities and MOHME reports associate 
HIV/AIDS transmission in Iran more with drug abuse and addiction than with sexual 
intercourse.70  To speak frankly about sex and sexual practice would require the 
government to “recognize the occurrences of premarital sexuality, prostitution, and 
homosexuality —to which heavy legal penalties apply.”71 And talking about HIV/AIDS 
is largely based on the assumption that the virus is directly related to extramarital sex –
                                                
70 See Christensen, p. 135.  Kamiar Alaie also confirmed this statement in telephone interview. 
71 Ibid., p. 135.  See also Islamic Republic of Iran Penal Code, Book 2, “Hadd Punishment for Adultery.” 
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which is forbidden.72 “In a country where high value is placed on ‘proper’ and ‘moral’ 
behavior, admitting a disease whose mode of transmission is primarily through 
unprotected sex and IDU is difficult.”73 Because HIV/AIDS testing is neither encouraged 
nor obligatory for young people and unmarried couples, and the access to contraception is 
confined to pharmacies (free condoms are distributed in prisons), how should health 
workers and officials encourage Iranians to practice safe sex?74 
 
The Role of the Shi’a Ulama in HIV/AIDS Discourse 
One cannot reflect on the status of HIV/AIDS in Iran without acknowledging the 
vital role of the Shi’a ulama in building public awareness of HIV/AIDS and determining 
the government’s health policies on the disease. Since the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic in 1979, clerical influence has been a mainstay in the construction and 
promotion of policies on health and family planning corresponding to Supreme Leader 
and Velayat-e Faqih (Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist) Khomeini’s fatwas on 
procreation and birth control.75 In the past three decades, ulama involvement has shifted, 
undulating between issuing doctrinally-based responses on public health to offering 
pragmatic solutions for exigent problems, such as population policy in the face of rising 
                                                
72 Mina Rasheed, “Iran: HIV/AIDS—More than a Social Taboo,” Payvand News, February 2, 2009, 
accessed March 21, 2012, http://www.payvand.com/news/09/feb/1346.html.  
73 Mahdavi, p. 157. 
74 As stated in Iran’s 2006 monitoring report, “There is no scheme for the social marketing of condoms 
specifically for safer sex, although condoms are provided without any restriction or limitation throughout 
the national network of PHC [Primary Health Care] clinics.”  See “Declaration of Commitment,” Islamic 
Republic of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV and AIDS.  
 
75 Akbar Aghajanian, “Family Planning and Contraceptive Use in Iran, 1967-1992,” International Family 
Planning Perspectives 20, no. 2 (June 1994): p. 67. 
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food, housing, employment and health demands.76 This was particularly evident in 
February 1988 when government and health officials sought to revamp the reproductive 
health and family planning programs of the Pahlavi-era, which would mean promoting 
reduced fertility rates, birth spacing intervals of 3 to 4 years, and contraceptive use 
among married couples in an effort to control Iran’s growing population.77 Moreover, 
these new policies reflected the government’s modulation of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
decade-old pro-natalist edict encouraging the increase in the family size of Iranian 
Muslims during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).78 During the Khatami administration, 
ulama influence in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic has followed a similar pragmatic 
trajectory in confronting the HIV/AIDS epidemic. MOHME officials and HIV/AIDS 
advocates were given the blessing of certain ulama to commence sexual education 
courses in schools, and some clerics even considered allowing the distribution of 
condoms to non-married young persons.79 
 In a MOHME 2011 monitoring report, health officials state that there is an 
“increasing trend of community leaders, i.e. religious leaders, who are subsequently 
addressing issues such as prevention, stigmatization, and discrimination at the local and 
                                                




78 Amir Mehryar, Shirin Ahmad-Nia, and Shahla Kazemipour, “Reproductive Health in Iran:  Pragmatic  
Achievements, Unmet Needs, and Ethical Challenges in a Theocratic System,” Studies in Family Planning  
38, no. 4 (Dec. 2007), pp.  352-361. For information on Ayatollah Khomeini’s involvement in family  
planning policy.  See also Diane M. Tober, Mohammad-Hossein Taghdisi,  and Mohammad Jalali, "Fewer  
Children, Better Life" or "As Many as God Wants"?: Family Planning among Low-Income Iranian and  
Afghan Refugee Families in Isfahan, Iran,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 20, no. 1, Medical  
Anthropology in the Muslim World: Ethnographic Reflections on Reproductive and Child Health 
(Mar. 2006): pp. 50-71. 
79 Mehryar, Ahmad-Nia, and Kazemipour, “Reproductive Health in Iran:  Pragmatic Achievements, Unmet 
Needs, and Ethical Challenges in a Theocratic System,” p. 358.   
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grass-root levels in Iran.”80 Likewise, a 2011 UNAIDS report praises this involvement, 
deeming it exemplary within the region. UNAIDS has previously praised “the support of 
the ayatollahs in Iran for harm reduction programmes for people who inject drugs. With 
their support, the country’s harm reduction programme has become the most extensive 
and effective in the MENA region.”81 The report acknowledged:  
In Iran, religious leaders are active participants in a project on psychosocial  
support to people living with HIV. This project, which is funded by the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,82 is working with Islamic leaders 
on understanding the psychological and social aspects of HIV and providing them 
with the necessary knowledge and communication skills to support people living 
with HIV. As part of an initial needs assessment with participants, this project 
found that 83% of religious leaders believed in the participation of religious 
leaders and figures in psychosocial support for people living with HIV.83  
 
This assessment of clerical involvement in HIV/AIDS advocacy is misleading because it 
comments specifically on the intentions and not on the actual participation of Islamic 
leaders to offer support services for people living with HIV.  Furthermore, the statement 
does not mention the results of this support, nor does it convey how precarious this 
support has become when Iran’s political leadership —namely, the President of Iran and 
his cabinet— changes. According to a 2008 study, conducted during Ahmadinejad’s first 
presidential term, most conservative religious leaders have been opposed to safe-sex 
curriculum, the promotion of condom usage, and needle-exchange programs, fearing that 
such education promotes acts prohibited by Islamic tenets (These forbidden acts include 
                                                
80 “The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in I.R. Iran, Phases 1& 2," UNDP Iran, 2011. 
81 UNAIDS Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS 2011, p.73.  
 
82 According to The Global Fund website, “The Global Fund is an international financing institution 
dedicated to attracting and disbursing resources to prevent and treat HIV and AIDS, TB and malaria.” See 
The Global Fund, “Who We Are.” The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2012, 
accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/whoweare/. 
83 Ibid, p. 73. 
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premarital sex, homosexuality, and intravenous drug use.)84 During official gatherings of 
Friday prayer in Tehran, when sermons are broadcast on state television, the Shi’a 
clerical establishment (including Grand Ayatollahs, Ayatollahs and Hojjataleslam clerics) 
have not yet commented on the HIV epidemic and the rise in domestic cases of HIV. The 
responsibility of disseminating information to the general public usually falls upon lower 
level clerics in the vast hierarchy of the clergy, who address social issues to their local 
communities.85 In areas where MOHME resources are not comprehensive or readily 
accessible, clerics fill in necessary social roles by informing the public of taboo topics, 
such as HIV.  
The most recent public statements about HIV/AIDS, published in 2012, have 
come from influential Grand Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli, who announced that 
“God had punished [Western] society with HIV/AIDS for legally permitting 
homosexuality…Problems like AIDS didn’t exist before.”86  Presently, few marja’e 
taqlid have issued fatwas (doctrinal pronouncements) on HIV/AIDS prevention methods 
for the general public.87 Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei has issued the most fatwas 
                                                
84 See Kalkhoran and Lauren Hale, “AIDS Education in an Islamic Nation:  Content Analysis of Farsi-
language AIDS-education Materials in Iran.” 
 
85 See Hamid Dabashi, Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest (Boston: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2011); Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam:  The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1985). 
86 See “Ezharat-e Ayatollah Javadi Amoli darbaraye Hamjesbazi-ye Qanouni dar Gharb/  Statements of 
Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s the West’s Legalization of  Homosexuality,” Khabar News, 28 Farvardin 1391/ 
April 16, 2012, accessed April 20, 2012, http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/208221/culture/religion.  See 
also, Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Homosexuals are Inferior to Dogs and Pigs, Says Iranian Cleric,” The 
Guardian.co.uk, April 18, 2012, accessed April 20, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iran-
blog/2012/apr/18/iran-cleric-condemns-homosexuality. 
87 Fatwas are advisory, written, or oral juristic statements issued by Islamic muftis (legal scholars), based 
on their knowledge of the Qur’an and the sunnah (body of traditional social and legal custom and practice 
for Muslims). 
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concerning HIV-AIDS-related issues. When asked about preventive methods against 
HIV, he stated that he supported the distribution of clean syringes to drug addicts and 
approved AIDS awareness education in schools.88 Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi has 
issued one fatwa concerning “AIDS high-risk education,” and he forbids the marriage 
between an HIV-infected person and a Muslim girl.89  
 
Prescribing Islam as a Preventive Measure against HIV 
 “The best prescription in the struggle against AIDS is Islam,” remarked cleric 
Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad Taghi Sarfipour, a leader of Friday prayer from the city Pol-
e Dokhtar in Lorestan Province.90  In a 2010 interview with semi-official Fars News 
Agency, Sarfipour discussed the presence of AIDS’ in his community, deeming it “one of 
the worst phenomenon we’re facing.” As a solution for the prevention of the spread of 
HIV, he suggested that believers seek guidance and direction from the religious sources 
in Islam. “Islamic teachings,” he clarified, “are very good for reaching human growth and 
evolving as human beings, which has been ordained for us. If we follow these orders 
                                                
88 See “Amouzesh-e Ommumi dar Pishgiri az AIDS/Public Education about AIDS Prevention,” Grand 
Ayatollah Saanei Fatwas,  accessed June 1, 2012,  http://www.feqh.org/fa/estefta/estefta46.htm. 
89 The fatwa mentioned in this section is dated June 5, 2007, and was reported in Iran’s 2010 HIV/AIDS 
monitoring report. See Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, p. 68. Makarem Shirazi issued another fatwa 
concerning the marriage between a Muslim who is infected with HIV. He responded that if the marriage 
creates any danger to the health of the other, marriage is not permitted.  See “Select Fatwas of Ayatollah 
Makarem Shirazi on Marriage and Family,” Islamopedia Online, accessed June 1, 2012, 
http://www.islamopediaonline.org/fatwa/select-fatwas-ayatollah-makarem-shirazi-marriage-and-family. 
90Lorestan Province is located in Western Iran, amidst the Zagros Mountains. “Behtarin Noskhe-ye 
Mobarezeh ba AIDS Din-e Eslam Ast /The Best Prescription in the Fight Against AIDS is Islam.” Fars 




well, we'll never suffer from moral decline and incurable diseases.”91 Sarfipour’s 
statements parallel the suggestions of other religious leaders in Iran, who appear to 
interpret HIV/AIDS as a religious issue. Thus the methods they suggest to control the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic necessarily involve a believer’s adherence to social and moral 
principles discussed in Islamic texts and teachings. Prevention of the spread of HIV is 
communicated as leading a pious and moral lifestyle, whereby monogamy, abstinence, 
and being faithful become deterrent mechanisms.92   
However studies show that these efforts are limited to a small area and do not 
reflect a general trend of clerical engagement in HIV/AIDS-related issues nor that the 
illness is considered a pressing matter of public health and of religious importance. 
Additionally, studies have shown mixed results about the strategy of treating HIV/AIDS 
prevention as a religious concern. A population-based study in Iran found that about 80% 
of the respondents agreed with the notion that the lack of religious and moral 
commitments could result in AIDS infection.93 In a study by Mohammadi et al., boys 
who regarded themselves as ‘‘religious’’ had less knowledge of sexual issues compared 
with those who regarded themselves as being ‘‘somewhat religious’’ or ‘‘not 
religious.’’94 And despite recent studies expressing public desire to learn more about 
                                                
91“Ibid. 
92 See Kalkhoran and Hale, “AIDS Education in an Islamic Nation:  Content Analysis of Farsi-language 
AIDS-education Materials in Iran. 
 
93 See Ali Montazeri, "AIDS Knowledge and Attitudes in Iran: Results from a Population-based Survey in 
Tehran," Patient Education and Counseling 57 (2005): pp. 199-203. 
94 See Mohammad Reza Mohammadi et al., “Reproductive Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior among 
Adolescent Males in Tehran, Iran,” International Family Planning Perspectives 32, no. 1 (2006): pp. 35-44. 
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HIV/AIDS through an evidence-based approach to HIV/AIDS policy and research, the 
clerical establishment has not changed its course.95   
Given MOHME’s recent warning of demographic shifts in the domestic HIV 
epidemic, in the context of stigmatization and taboo associated with the virus, how do 
policymakers, clerics, and HIV/AIDS advocates tackle such a politically and socially 
sensitive public health issue? How do they properly address HIV/AIDS-related issues 
(such as access to medical treatment, insurance costs, discrimination, among many 
others) when there is considerable top-level resistance to investigating the cultural, 
political and social reasons for the rise in HIV rates? Moreover, what resources are 
available for those populations that do not fit into the categories of “high-risk”?  
                                                
95 See Tavoosi, et al., “Knowledge and Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among Iranian Students.”  A. 
Feizzadeh, “Evidence-based Approach to HIV/AIDS Policy and Research Prioritization in Islamic 
Republic of Iran,” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 16, no. 3 (March 2010): pp. 259-265. C.A. Yazdi 
et al., “Knowledge, Attitudes and Sources of Information Regarding HIV/AIDS in Iranian Adolescents.” 
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Part II:  Reformulating the Taboo of “Vulnerable” Women and HIV/AIDS  
The Resulting Shifts in State Discourse of HIV/AIDS and Sex: From Prisons to the 
General Public 
When infections began to appear in non-incarcerated populations, authorities and 
health experts grew worried about the potential for a public health explosion in other 
demographics. HIV/AIDS was now affecting communities that were not included as 
“high-risk groups” from previous indicator reports.96 As HIV rates increased, health 
officials began to remark on the sexual transmission of the virus, which they perceived 
would jeopardize the HIV/AIDS policies already set in place and published in MOHME’s 
monitoring reports.97 AIDS advocates voiced their concerns about the efficacy of certain 
prevention programs against the spread of HIV, calling them inadequate in dealing with 
the pace of HIV infections via sexual transmission—that is, through unprotected, 
premarital and marital sexual relations.98 In the February 2010 MOHME report, entitled 
Monitoring of the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, the Ministry 
                                                
96 This group includes female sex workers, inmates, intravenous drug addicts and their sex partners, 
prisoners, men who have sex with men, and street children. 
97 Esfandiari,  “Iran:  Tehran Begins to Confront the ‘Time Bomb’ of HIV/AIDS. What was in 2006 
considered a relatively stable figure of 5 to 8 percent transmission via sexual intercourse, by 2010 became 
an issue of increasing concern for more health officials and public health experts. 
98 Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education, February 2010, p. 14, accessed April 14, 2012. 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2010countries/iran_201
0_country_progress_report_en.pdf.  In the 2011 report, Iranian researchers state, “The share of sexual 
transmission in the identified cases remained relatively stable until 2006 standing at approximately 5-8% 
but the absolute value of this percentage has been rising continuously and has gone from 50 cases in 2000 
to almost three times that much in 2006. This trend has been on the rise ever since reaching a total of 
around 13% of all the identified cases in 2008. The major factor behind this rise is the increase in 
identifying female cases.”  Ibid., p. 14. 
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disclosed some crucial obstacles to the improvement of rising transmission numbers.99 It 
determined: 
Currently, the major cause for concern when it comes to an uncontrollable HIV  
 epidemic among the general public is risky sexual behaviors among the  
 youths, the general public, and certain other population cohorts such as sex  
 workers, MSM [men who have sex with men], and their linking rings with  
injecting drug users. Accordingly, policymakers, planners, clerics, other key  
groups, and the general public must be sensitized in this regard and their  
support must be gained particularly to conduct life skills training among youths 
and the general public and also safer sex promotion for all high-risk and  
at-risk groups. Furthermore, stable marriages and reinforcing the institution of  
the family can play a decisive role in HIV prevention.100 
 
One year after publishing this report, Iranian health officials provided mixed statements 
to the media about the domestic status of HIV/AIDS. In a 2011 progress report on Iran’s 
obligations to its UNDP Goals in HIV/AIDS prevention, Iran’s representatives in 
UNDP101 lauded the cooperation between the MOHME, the Prisons Organization, and 
the Ministry of Education in promoting awareness about the virus among university 
                                                
99 The report specified the risky behaviour of youth, the general public, and injecting drug users; by risky 
behaviour, the government means unprotected sexual activities, which were the primary reasons for the 
expansion of HIV prevalence across the country.” See Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report:  
Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS 
Committee Secretariat, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical Education, February 2010, p. 3, accessed April 
14, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2010countries/iran_201
0_country_progress_report_en.pdf.   
100 Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education, UNAIDS, February 2010, p. 100, accessed April 25, 2010, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2010countries/iran_201
0_country_progress_report_en.pdf.   
 
101 For this project, UNDP-Iran partnered with the Ministry of Health Centre for Disease Control, Prisons 
Organization, Ministry of Education, Welfare Organization, University of Medical Sciences, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Broadcasting, and the Iranian Blood Transfusion Organization. 
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students and prisoners.102 In this report, they stated, “The approach taken by 
the Government to openly address the problem with the public during the recent years 
and the success of this project have brought international recognition for the country.”103  
Critics at Tehran’s Center for AIDS Research and MOHME’s own AIDS division 
were skeptical; in the Iranian press, they are quoted speaking less of successes and more 
about on-the-ground consequences:  Infectious disease specialist and head of Iran’s AIDS 
Research Center Minoo Mohraz  stated that 99 percent of new HIV infections were due 
to sexual transmission.104 (In an interview published by the Tehran University of Medical 
Sciences, a direct sponsor of the AIDS Research Center, Mohraz is quoted stating that 
HIV prevention should improve with an increase in harm reduction programs for IDUS 
and if Iranians took preventive measures such as “abstaining from intercourse before 
marriage, being committed to partners during marriage and practicing safer sex, use of 
condoms were safe methods to prevent HIV infection.”)105 
Likewise, Abbas Sedaghat, the director of the MOHME’s AIDS division, warned 
that Iran had fallen into a “red danger” zone, stating that the conditions were ripe for a 
third wave of an HIV epidemic.  As quoted in Etemad newspaper, he stated, “There are 
indications that the AIDS contraction model in Iran is changing from shared syringes 
                                                
102 See "The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in I.R. Iran, Phases 1& 2," UNDP Iran, 2011.   The same 
report calculates that “a total of 370,303 university students, prisoners and their family members (people 
belonging to “At-Risk” and “High-Risk” groups) were reached through HIV/AIDS peer education.” 
103 Ibid. 
104 “Navad va No Darsad-e Bimaran-e Jadid-e AIDS az Tariq-e Ravebet-e Jensi Mobtala Shodand/ 99 
Percent of New AIDS Infections through Sexual Relations,” Fars News Agency, 9 Khordad 1391/ May 29, 
2012, accessed June 3, 2012, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910309000837.  
105 “Dr. Minoo Mohraz Streses on the Prevention of Diseases such as HIV/AIDS for Maintaining a Healthy 
Society,” Tehran University of  Medical Sciences Public Relations News,  December 7, 2011, accessed 
June 1, 2012, http://publicrelations.tums.ac.ir/english/news/detail.asp?newsID=29111. 
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toward sexual contacts… Unfortunately, the two main target groups, addicts using 
syringes and those with irresponsible sexual behavior, may together exacerbate the spread 
of this disease," he said.106 Although the director did not disclose the exact nature and 
context of these relations, he commented on the “alarming rates” found in “women as a 
group.”107  
UNAIDS reports that this growing trend in HIV-positive women is being 
observed across the MENA region: “The rise in the estimated number of people living 
with HIV in the region presumably is the result of an increased HIV prevalence among 
key populations at higher risk and a forward transmission of the virus to a larger number 
of individuals who are generally at lower risk of infection.”108 UNAIDS reports that 
women account for 50 percent of people living with HIV (PLWH); young women are 
particularly vulnerable to HIV infection rates, accounting for 22 percent of all new HIV 
infections.109 In the MENA region, women comprise an estimated 41% of adult PLWH 
cases. The majority of these women are infected by their husbands or partners who 
                                                
106 “Iran Intensifies Campaign against HIV,” Fars News Agency, November 11, 2008, accessed June 1, 
2012, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8709061775.  
107 Chalesh-e Vazir-e Behdasht ba Sazman-e Nezam Pezeshki/ Minister of Health’s Challenges with the 
Medical Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Afkar News, 21 Ordibehesht 1391/ May 10, 2012, 
accessed  May 20, 2012, http://www.ghatreh.com/news/nn9805044/شﺵلﻝاﺍچﭺ-رﺭیﯼزﺯوﻭ-تﺕشﺵاﺍدﺩهﻩبﺏ-نﻥاﺍمﻡزﺯاﺍسﺱ-مﻡاﺍظﻅنﻥ-
یﯼکﮎشﺵزﺯپﭖ.   
Abbas Sedaghat also warned about the return of the rise in HIV infections among prisoners. See “Negarani 
az Bazgasht-e Mojaddad Moj-e AIDS dar Zendanha-ye Iran/Worries for the Return of the AIDS Epidemic 
Wave Among Prisoners in Iran,” Emruz News, 13 Esfand 1390/ March 3, 2012, accessed April 19, 2012, 
http://www.emruznews.com/2012/03/post-9499.php.  
108 UNAIDS, Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS, 2011, p. 1.   





engage in high-risk behaviors and are mostly unaware of their status.110  In Iran, the most 
recent statistics reveal that of the 23, 497 registered cases of HIV patients, 8.7% are 
women.111 (Compared to September 2005, among 12, 556 persons reported as HIV-
positive, 5.4% of the cases were women.)112  
HIV advocates have sought to improve women’s access to health care services 
and to demand their legal rights and protections even despite the poor political and social 
support to mitigate the stigma of the disease. Since the late 1990s, there have been 
continuing efforts across the globe for the plight of HIV-positive women. Along with 
WHO and UNAIDS efforts, non-governmental organizations have joined forces to 
provide increased access and networking among the community of people living with the 
virus. “A tension exists between the needs of people living with HIV and the economic 
and social realities in many developing countries, where health care services for the entire 
population are grossly under-resourced.”113 
Accessing HIV prevention, treatment and care services are caused by barriers that 
stem from socioeconomic inequalities, thus limiting decision-making powers, control, 
resources and mobility of HIV-positive women and their families.114 For many Iranian 
women widowed by AIDS and now HIV-positive themselves, accessing health care and 
                                                
110 See “Women, Girls, Gender Equality and HIV Fact Sheet,” UNAIDS, p. 3. 
111 Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education, March 2012, p. 11. 
112 See “Declaration of Commitment,” Islamic Republic of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, Office of the Under-Secretary for Health, 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Centre for Disease Management, January 2006. 
113 Bell et al., “Sexual and Reproductive Health Services and HIV Testing:  Perspectives and Experiences 
of Women and Men Living with HIV and AIDS,” p. 114. 
114 See “Women, Girls, Gender Equality and HIV Fact Sheet,” UNAIDS, p. 1. 
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forming support networks are matters best solved by Iran’s NGO community. For Iran’s 
official statistics and research studies on the HIV/AIDS core indicator reports do not 
mention the real communities directly affected by HIV and the sociopolitical and 
economic repercussions associated with this virus.  Rarely does the state’s HIV/AIDS 
discourse mention what happens after HIV escalates into full-blown AIDS, when wives 
become widows and must face a variety of pressures, be they public, religious, cultural, 
economic, and familial. Their exclusion from government reports is troublesome, as 
United Nations regional reports on HIV/AIDS state that “a large proportion of women 
living with HIV in the MENA region are believed to have acquired their infection from 
their spouses who practice high-risk behaviors.”115 How do HIV-positive women in 
particular grapple with these pressures while receiving minimal — even inconsistent —
government and societal support? 
 
HIV/AIDS State Discourse in Iran: Accountability and Rhetoric versus Reality 
In the past twenty-five years since the virus’s domestic detection, the state’s 
HIV/AIDS policy and advocacy have been mired in opposing political, religious, and 
social conflicts. Two major factors contributing to these challenges are the taboo-laden 
associations and stereotypes attributed to HIV/AIDS patients and their lifestyles.116 That 
                                                
115 UNAIDS Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS 2011, p. 11. 
 
116 Social stigma of HIV on risk groups is one of many challenges that impede efforts to deter rising HIV 
infection rates. According to Iran’s March 2012 progress report on HIV/AIDS, these challenges include: 
the insufficient number of competent NGOS, lack of suitable programs for street children; expensive 
diagnostic services; limited complementary examinations in provincial districts thus necessitating patient 
referrals to other cities; treatment interruptions perhaps due to patient non-compliance, simultaneous drug 
addiction or intermittent incarcerations; limited laboratory facilities for certain important tests; the need for 
improvement in the quality of existing services; and the shortage of financial and human resources to 
deliver care services to home-bound people living with HIV (PLWH). See Islamic Republic of Iran 
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being HIV-positive marks the carrier with a particular taboo status is confirmed in 
research studies, media reports, and government statements about the subject of 
HIV/AIDS. According to a qualitative study by Rahmati, et al., nearly all HIV patients 
felt stigmatized and discriminated by healthcare providers in a variety of contexts. 117  his 
treatment has resulted in patients postponing or avoiding receiving therapeutic services; 
revealing their disease to therapeutic staff; feeling motivated to protect their health; some 
feeling a sense of malice or vengeance; using alternative medicine and not antiretroviral 
treatment; or feeling emotionally stressed.  
As for HIV-positive women, state, religious, and public discourses regards them 
as occupying a particularly vulnerable position, one linked to drug and other criminal 
networks. Government monitoring HIV/AIDS reports also link them to high-risk 
behaviour. As recently as 2011, Iran’s acting director of the MOHME reported that: 
The majority of women living with HIV in Iran are indicated to be spouses of  
injecting drug users. However, these centers address special needs of all HIV  
vulnerable women including spouses of male drug users or male prisoners, female  
drug users and the women with high risk behaviors.118 
 
However acknowledging the existence of an emerging demographic of HIV-positive 
women has not yet translated into government financial and public health support.  
As evidenced by the high concentration of HIV-positive cases among Iran’s IDU, 
prisoner, and prostitute demographics, specialized funding and social support for single 
women and widowed mothers are in limited supply—an alarming circumstance given 
                                                
Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, 
National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, March 2012, pp. 34, 44, 
48, 53, 56. 
117  F. Rahmati-Najarkolaei, Sh. Niknami, F. Aminshokravi, M. Bazargan, Ahmadi,  A. Hadjizadeh, et al.  
“Experiences of Stigma in Healthcare Settings among Adults Living with HIV in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.” Journal of the International AIDS Society 13, no. 27 (2010): pp. 1-11. 
118 Nikman, “United Nations High-level Meeting on HIV/AIDS Statement.” Supranote 25. 
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that the number of women living with HIV has increased in recent years, according to 
Iran’s MOHME.119  Thus, one inquires, where do HIV-positive Iranian women seek 
support to improve their health and livelihoods?  
 
SPASDI:  Confronting HIV/AIDS for Iranian Mothers 
The fundamental principle is to teach fishing, while providing fish.—K. Mansourian, SPASDI director 
 
 Since its establishment in 1999, Tehran-based SPASDI (the Society for the 
Protection and Assistance of Socially Disadvantaged Individuals) has gone from a 
nonprofit organization determined to “help prevent social disorders, protect the 
foundation of the family, and offer support to vulnerable individuals and families who are 
victims of social disadvantages” to one also committed to the protection of women and 
children with HIV.120 Because of Iran’s mounting societal problems due to poverty, 
prostitution, homelessness, AIDS, and divorce, Director Khosrou Mansourian121 has 
individually steered the organization towards providing crucial services where the Iranian 
government does not.  It provides professional counseling and a confidential hotline 
                                                
119 Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS 
Committee Secretariat, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical Education, February 2010, p. 14, accessed 
April 14, 2012, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2010countries/iran_201
0_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
120 SPASDI began raising awareness and offering public outreach, speaking on university campuses and in 
government ministries and agencies, to better assist children with disabilities. Their social programs have 
expanded to meet the demand of natural disasters (they helped facilitate emergency aid to earthquake 
victims in Bam, an ancient city where roughly 70% was destroyed).    
121 Mansourian is also credited for his contribution to the seminal research report, authored by Sattareh 
Farman Farmaian, on the living conditions of prostitutes in the former Pahlavi-era red-light district Shahr-e 
No. See Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
 288 
service; professional rehabilitation for children with mental and physical disabilities; self-
help workshops; art exhibitions; and AIDS special services. 
Since 2007, SPASDI has concentrated on tackling the controversial issue of 
HIV/AIDS because it contends that Iran has entered a “third stage of HIV-AIDS 
epidemic” caused initially by intravenous drug abuse and more recently, by unprotected 
sexual relations. In many ways, SPASDI mediates between HIV/AIDS state policy and 
how gender is enacted at a lived level. HIV-positive widows, seeking emotional support 
and financial assistance, are introduced to this organization typically via word-of-mouth 
and recommendations from state hospitals, such as Tehran’s Imam Khomeini hospital.  
Yet obtaining help from this non-profit is not an easy task producing immediate results.  
Women who ask about SPASDI’s social services are immediately informed that they 
must not dramatize the HIV virus or its impact —that by receiving help they agree to 
begin the long process of breaking down this social taboo and changing their own 
assumptions and ignorance about the illness.122  This happens via the women’s individual 
efforts to improve social awareness of the disease —educating friends and strangers on 
basic facts and methods of transmission— and eventually, letting others know that they 
are HIV-positive.   
Accepting and then affirming that one has the HIV virus is a fundamental 
SPASDI principle.  The organization expressly discourages being silent about an HIV-
positive diagnosis —they reason that not disclosing this information creates and increases 
                                                
122 In one meeting, a SPASDI social worker predicted that the societal treatment of those who have 
HIV/AIDS would improve just as it had for those afflicted by syphilis, which, almost fifty years earlier, 
was a common STD  among rural and urban communities. See Chapter Two of this dissertation for more 
information about the syphilis epidemic in early 20th century Iran. 
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the risk of spreading the disease.123 Often volunteers (although none who are HIV -
positive) wear pins and t-shirts that state, “I am HIV-positive.”  This is done not only in 
recognition of the global effort to destigmatize the illness and increase public awareness, 
but also to symbolize solidarity for the women and children of the center who do live 
with the virus.  
 
A Community of HIV-positive Mothers:  Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat  
As in many countries around the globe, it is still taboo to speak about sexual 
education and HIV/AIDS.  In Iran, where factors —such as stigmatization, poor 
resources, and misconceptions about the disease— are many, single mothers are 
especially at risk. As Mansourian has explained, “Many of these victims don’t have a 
proper understanding of HIV-AIDS and its implications for them. Moreover, they are 
afraid to openly disclose their illness, due to the negative biases regarding the disease in 
society. Those who do disclose their HIV infection are deprived of the simplest social 
services (e.g. refusal by dentists or other physicians to provide medical services, rejection 
from jobs, deprivation of children from school registration).”124 For the aforementioned 
reasons, SPASDI regards this group as “harmed victims, ” especially in a social context 
where negative biases and misinformation towards the disease prevail.125  
                                                
123 “AIDS Special Services:  Activities for AIDS Victims: Single Mother Families & Children,” SPASDI, 
August 1, 2010, accessed April 14, 2012, http://spasdi.ir/en/?p=52. 
124 MOHME reports concur with Mansourian’s assessment. According to Iran’s March 2012 monitoring 
report: “HIV-positive persons who are known to engage in high-risk behaviors tend to refrain from 
accessing counseling center, laboratories, mental health specialists, and other services; consulting these 
services could potentially result in their public identification.” See Islamic Republic of Iran Progress 
Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, p. 61.   
125 “AIDS Special Services: Activities for AIDS Victims:  Single Mother Families & Children,” SPASDI. 
 290 
Since December 2007, the center has held mandatory hour and a half sessions for 
mothers living with HIV, under the program title Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat (Mothers 
Supporting Health). For over a year, between July 2010 and October 2011, I attended 
these weekly meetings and gradually began to understood more about its inner-dynamics 
as well as about the women who chose to attend the meetings regularly.  
The women in this group were similar in two ways: they were all at various stages 
of being HIV-positive, and they traveled great distances to reach the center in Tehran. 
Kermanshah, Qom, Karaj, Mashad, Bandar Abbas and Quchan were some of the names 
of cities and towns from where these women traveled and originated. (Some mothers 
would begin their travel in the early hours of the morning and others the night before, 
hoping to reach the center by the 9:30 a.m. meeting time.)   
Yet traveling long distances was the least of their worries. Widowed and facing 
single-parenthood, they focused on maintaining their CD4 levels and that of their 
children, many of whom are also HIV- positive.  These women also dealt with pressures 
to earn a living and provide food and shelter for their children. In addition, many have 
expressed frustration in navigating the state’s leviathan health care and welfare network. 
In order to continue receiving their monthly antiretroviral treatment, they must know 
which clinics offer safe and accessible health care. 
Among the nine women who attended consistently (about twenty were expected 
to come each week), seven of them were mothers of young children, ranging in age from 
a few months to a twenty-five-year old. The majority of the women were also widowed 
after their spouses died from AIDS-related illnesses —having contracted the virus 
through intravenous drug use, sexual relations with other women, or through other means 
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during the period of incarceration.  (As an exception, there was an HIV-positive woman 
in her late twenties who attended Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat.  She had not been 
married and did not reveal to the group and its facilitators how she contracted the virus.  
She began attending their workshops after an acquaintance informed her about the 
emotional support services SPASDI offered.)   
Many of the mothers attending SPASDI workshops had entered the organization 
under severe psychological pressure, suffering from financial duress, depression, and 
family isolation.  Women were struggling with lack of emotional support; in certain 
cases, family members who learned of their diagnosis refused to speak about their 
infection; in many cases, they did not permit their daughters to return home. (These 
accumulating pressures had led some of the women to attempt suicide.) These personal 
details  were common knowledge among the participants. When a new mother would join 
the group, others would often update her on the other members’ marriage status, children, 
hometown, and crucially, under what circumstances they contracted the HIV virus.   
This very topic (how these women contracted the disease) was often a mutual 
point of reference and common denominator.  In certain cases, their husbands’ 
extramarital relations and temporary marriage partnerships (to which their permanent 
wives were not privy) were largely responsible for how they contracted the virus. In other 
cases, because some of the women were unaware of their husbands’ intravenous drug 
usage, they were still sexually active with their spouses. These variables are all important 
considerations in questioning Iran’s official discourses of HIV/AIDS.  They elaborate 
how an emerging demographic of HIV-positive women is not necessarily participatory in 
high-risk behaviors. Instead, it is their (now-deceased) husbands. 
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The weekly meetings of Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat usually took place on 
Monday mornings.  Mansourian’s volunteer corps of social workers and retired nurses 
chaired each session, and by all accounts, each meeting was unique —a credit to the 
discussions and interactions of diverse personalities within the group.    
 For the last few workshops in the summer of 2011, the director brought in health 
experts to teach these women how to eat more nutrient-rich foods and improve their 
dental hygiene. Staff members spoke extensively about fortifying their immune systems 
with exercise, nutrition, positive thinking, and spotting drug addiction.  Often moderators 
showed informational videos on these subjects, followed by short lectures on self-
confidence, self-awareness, and compassion.  They repeatedly discussed these themes in 
an effort to promote positive self-esteem among the group members. When it came time 
for group discussion, conversations were often speckled with personal tales about their 
children and economic hardships —or, during other candid moments, about flirtatious 
advances of male admirers.  
Almost every week, the moderator asked questions about each person’s state of 
mind, health status, and if they had any particular difficulties and thoughts they would 
like to share.  Soon after, one of the group’s mothers —who had volunteered  the 
previous week to prepare the next week’s group activity based on a particular theme— 
would take over discussion.  These  brainstorming sessions were often interrupted by 
whispers and side conversations between women or between women and their little 
children. (Children would often be present towards the end of the workshops; they would 
shyly enter the room, no longer wanting to remain on the upper floor’s nursery.) 
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 On the occasions when director Mansourian was present, the level of seriousness 
and concentration heightened.  I noticed that the moment he entered the workshop room, 
the mothers would immediately sit up straight, adjusting their hair by neatly tucking it 
under their rousaris and chadors.126 Side conversations would come to a halt, and any 
group member who arrived late would typically wait near the room’s entrance, preferring 
not to enter until his lectures had finished.  
 A discussion session led by Mansourian was often informative, dynamic, and 
filled with a medley of anecdotes.  He included inspirational stories, as common 
reference points,  from the Qur’an and hadith. On other occasions, his stories referenced 
Iranian television shows and films to compliment these anecdotes.127 He pointed to 
individual mothers, referencing their children, stories of success and overcoming 
obstacles. Mansourian had an encyclopedic knowledge of each member’s personal 
history, after having spent years working to provide them social services tailored to their 
circumstances. In the workshops I had attended, he consistently addressed the women 
with respect, and by meeting’s end, many of the members had asked him to help solve 
any problem they faced in their homes, neighborhoods, and at government health 
agencies. 
Once the director departed, the women relaxed their positions. Tea and sweets 
were served, and during break-time, women would update one another, carrying on 
                                                
126 A chador is a long garment, also described as an open cloak, worn by Iranian women in observance of 
Islamic hejab. 
127 I recall a particular lecture on the narrative of Musa (Moses) and Bani Israel.  Mansourian had 
encouraged the participants to believe in their collective efforts —to increase HIV/AIDS awareness and de-
stigmatize the disease— even though the end goal, which Mansourian had compared to Qur’anic and 
Biblical accounts about the parting of the Red Sea, seemed an impossible feat.  He said, “You must have 
faith even in a path where there is no faith.  We must make ourselves stronger in the face of societal 
problems.”  Excerpt taken from workshop on July 26, 2011 at SPASDI headquarters in Tehran. 
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personal conversations or sharing stories for the entire group.  On more than half of these 
occasions, certain mothers reported on their CD4 white blood cell count.128 When a 
woman’s CD4  count was low, the typical reactions were an outpouring of compassionate 
words and actions.  At most meetings, a number of women were absent. The reasons for 
this were varied—some health-related and others financial and personal. (According to 
my interviews with two of SPASDI’s social workers, in some cases, mothers stopped 
showing up after fearing their families would find out about their health status.)  
But the seminars were not just information sessions about healthy approaches to 
living with HIV.   They were also opportunities for share positive news, to form a 
supportive community and network, and to become financially independent. It was often 
throughout the seminars that Mansourian and his organizers expressed joy upon hearing 
news that two of the women had remarried —in one case, a member had gotten re-
married to an HIV negative man who knew of his wife’s condition and willfully practiced 
safe sex with her. (This happened very rarely.)  According to director Mansourian, “This 
is a success, given the fact that even remarriage for healthy divorced or widowed women 
is faced with lots of cultural barriers in Iran, let alone for HIV infected women.”129  
There was also news of financial stability and progress made in raising awareness 
about the illness.  Because SPASDI administered personal loans from private donors to 
women seeking stable housing, some of the mothers were able to buy their own small 
                                                
128 CD4 cells are clusters of white blood cells or lymphocytes and are an important part in fortifying the 
immune system. A low CD4 count means the immune system is weakened and thus the ability to fight off 
infections is compromised.  HIV most often infects and becomes part of these cells; when infections form, 
these cells multiple and make more copies of HIV. See The Body: The Complete HIV/AIDS Resource Fact 
Sheet, CD4 (T-Cell Tests), The Body.com, March 29, 2012, accessed April 14, 2012, 
http://www.thebody.com/content/6110/cd4-t-cell-tests.html#anchor251. 
129 “AIDS Special Services: Activities for AIDS Victims:  Single Mother Families & Children,” SPASDI.   
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apartments. A few of them received smaller loans from the organization itself in order to 
start a home-based, small business. During one of the meetings, a participant spoke of her 
excitement after selling her handicrafts at the annual show-and-tell event marking the end 
of Ramadan.  At this event, SPASDI encouraged women to be guest speakers before an 
audience of donors, relatives, friends, government officials and religious intellectuals 
supportive of Mansourian’s work. (At the last two events I attended, Mohammad 
Mojtahed Shabbestari, renowned Shi’a philosopher and once a close ally of President 
Khatami, was in attendance and had also delivered a congratulatory speech to SPASDI 
and the mothers.) 
  
Interviewing Methodology: One Meeting at a Time  
For almost thirteen months, I attended SPASDI’s weekly educational workshops. 
My attendance involved partial observation and, in the first six months of attendance, 
minimal participation with the group.  Initially the director and social workers were 
concerned that my presence would unsettle the workshop participants. To assure the 
safety and comfort of the women, the director and I agreed that I would attend the 
workshops as an observer and, after brief introductions and consistent attendance for 
several months, I would be permitted to interact more with the group. If I wanted to 
converse with the women outside of class, it was my responsibility to gain permission 
from each of the group members, along with the SPASDI staff.  Furthermore, if at any 
moment they would feel uncomfortable about my presence and subsequently voice 
concern to the director or moderators, I had agreed to depart on friendly terms. 
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My observer status quickly disappeared after just one meeting.  The moment the 
mothers learned I spoke Persian and was personally connected to the director, they began 
to ask me questions about my family background, education, research interests and 
project, and even my love for Persian food. 130  
At first, our conversations and interactions were limited. Save smiling and 
attending meetings, I was quiet and did not approach any of the participants individually.  
I remained a physical helper of the workshop moderators, pouring tea and distributing 
sweet snacks.  The moderators immediately dismissed my silence, asking me to comment 
on HIV/AIDS training and advocacy methods in New York.  After the first occasion 
wherein I expressed my ignorance, I returned home to conduct cursory online research. 
The following week, the moderators would allot me five to ten minutes to divulge 
whatever information I had assembled on mothers and children living with HIV and the 
medical resources available to them through New York’s municipal health agencies.   
At every moment I expressed my inadequacy in delivering or explaining this 
information; however, it appeared that this was inconsequential.  The brief information 
sessions were used by the moderators as opportunities for the mothers to feel comfortable 
with my presence and most certainly my intentions —that, for example, I would fully 
commit to participation with respect and humility. Once the meetings ended, many of the 
women would ask me questions about my personal life and my Iranian father. Because I 
was single (and thus this non-marital status piqued their curiosities concerning my 
potential marriageability in my 30s), I was asked about potential mates, when I wanted to 
                                                
130 Mansourian’s son is my good friend and former classmate in New York. 
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have children, and future plans once I completed my doctorate. After over a year of 
mutual acquaintanceship, we warmly greeted one another and catch up.  
In September and October 2011 (the last two last months of my time in Tehran) 
director Mansourian agreed to my personally interviewing the group of mothers for my 
dissertation project, provided I abide by three conditions.  First, the NGO’s staff should 
approve the questions I intended to ask, and second, I should obtain personal permission 
from each woman.131 The permissible questions, from  the questionnaire I had originally 
designed,132 included questions on perceptions of street mannequins, breastfeeding 
techniques, and personal philosophies of the body. I also asked questions about access to 
health services, and the women’s familiarity with the terms “taboo,” “masculine body” 
and “feminine body” and if these words had any relevance to them.133  
                                                
131 Of the twenty-two questions I would ask other participants for this study, only eight questions were 
allowed. I also distributed to each person a confidentiality form that explained their rights and a description 
of my project and credentials. 
 
132 This questionnaire, which has approximately thirty questions, was handed out to other participants I 
interviewed for this dissertation. The question set provided me with an open framework to consult as I 
followed topical trajectories in our conversations. These questions covered topics of motherhood, health 
awareness, and breastfeeding practices. For each female participant, I asked, for example, “What is your 
opinion of your body?” or “In your opinion, what do you imagine or feel about the male or female body?” 
As a way to both clarify and focus my subject, I asked women about their relationships with their breasts, 
e.g., through their individual reflections on ideal breast size, body maintenance, intimate encounters, 
nursing, and as a gendered marker of a female physical form.  Because the topic of “breasts” served as the 
common denominator for all of the women, many of the participants spoke candidly about body 
satisfaction, breastfeeding, and ideal breast size, to name a few. 
 
133 All interviews took place at the center in Tehran, in a private room adjacent to the meeting room on the 
third floor. The interviews varied in length, depending on how extensive or descriptive each person chose 
to respond to the questions. Before each interview, I provided them with a hard copy of the question set. In 
the beginning of the interview, I allotted time to explain my research project, intentions, and interview 
format. Then I asked each participant her preference in conducting the interviews—between writing down 
or recording their answers. For both options, I promised to disguise their names and identities. 
For each interview, I was not permitted to write down any of their names and responses. I was however 
allowed to record the interviews, provided that I would quickly transcribe them and erase them within one 
week.  I obliged their wishes and the current translations offer my best attempts at describing, 
idiomatically, how each person responded in the equivalent level of Persian she spoke. This means that 
colloquial expressions are often uttered, along with responses that do not appear to be grammatically sound. 
Their translations in English reflect these idiosyncrasies and cadences. 
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There were a number of questions I was not permitted to ask.  I was not allowed 
to ask about words pertaining to nudity or even the means they use to gather information 
about their bodies. Moreover, any direct questions about the relationship between bodies 
and politics was not permitted. I was also not authorized to ask any questions about 
underwear —specifically about brassieres and breasts.   These topics were deemed too 
personal and could potentially embarrass women who were not comfortable speaking 
about such topics to family members, let alone strange researchers. However I was 
encouraged by the director to speak about motherhood and breastfeeding. One of the staff 
members informed me that such topics would be well received by the group, as it would 
enable them to speak more about their experience as mothers.   
Last of all (and perhaps the most important) condition was that I would agree to 
not dramatize their HIV-positive status —meaning I would not focus my questions on 
them having HIV.  Although Mansourian knew the general concept of my thesis and 
about the interviews I had conducted in the past, he wanted to be certain about my 
treatment and analysis of them.  He reasoned that HIV should not be an isolated 
characteristic of their lives and experiences, and thus I should not sensationalize the 
disease during our interviews. (“You should speak to them just as you would speak to 
someone who has diabetes, cancer, or a common cold —humanely, just as you treat your 
sister or your mother,” he once said to me.) If the women themselves felt inclined to 
bring up the disease in conversation, and a conversation would ensue about something 
HIV-related, then it was their prerogative and permissible.  I agreed to observe all three 
conditions and, moreover, I agreed to not ask questions about their illness.   
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One week in advance of conducting any interviews, Mansourian and the seminar 
moderator F.  Salehi informed the participants that I intended to conduct confidential, 
voluntary interviews over the next few weeks in late August until late September 2011. 
Of the sixteen participants from Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat, I spoke with nine women 
from the group, followed by interviews with four female members of the staff.  (I speak 
in depth about the participants in the following section.)  
In the next section, I provide segments of individual commentaries from four 
different HIV-positive women from Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat. Although I 
interviewed nine women in total from this group, I include the reflections of four women 
specifically for the diversity of responses on the subjects of motherhood, marriage, 
sexuality, modesty, womanhood, and, whenever they broached the subject themselves, 
living with HIV.  Though I did not initiate discussion about their health status, I found 
that the participants, of their own accord, provided answers that naturally covered some 
of these impermissible topics. When I asked them about how satisfied they were with 
their bodies, for example, some mentioned taking better care of their bodies since being 
their diagnosis.   
By conversing with them, my intention was to learn more about their perspectives 
on health, their self-confidence in relation to their bodies, and what they envisioned or 
thought about women’s bodies as a general concept. Essentially, how do they overcome 
being and feeling socially stigmatized?  Do their experiences and reflections counter state 
and clerical opinions about HIV-positive women —their roles, communities, health 
status, and lifestyles?  
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After the interviews, I began the transcription process, listening intently to the 
women’s reflections on their personal relationships, medical care, and support networks. 
To the best of my abilities, I attempted to understand them on their own terms, while I 
also sorted through and questioned any interferences, preconceptions, and 
misconceptions of my own that I held before, during, and after the interviews. In each 
interview, there are interspersing moments of conciliation and despair; of curiosity and 
indignation; of contradiction and consistency. In the interstitial spaces of these accounts, I 
observed many simultaneous emotions of turmoil and contentment, manifest in tears 
being shed and in some cases, in smiles and laughter.   The responses were often uttered 
without direction, as each woman moved in and out of topics, describing one feeling and 
then immediately abandoning this description in order to comment a new or different 
sensation, emotion, thought, and image.134 
 In what follows, I present brief biographies of four women, followed by three 
thematic sections, which elaborate different leitmotifs that emerged during our 
conversations about their perceptions.  
  
Introducing Farah, Maryam, Masoumeh, and Akram 
For thirty-year old Farah, HIV was “an additional virus that I have compared to 
others; it’s like a guest, and I think of it as if I am its host.”135  Tehran-born and raised, 
she was college-educated, having obtained her Associates degree in Persian literature,  At 
the time of our interview, she was working as a seamstress and sold her handicrafts 
                                                
134 When this happened, I quote them in their entirety and thus only submit bracketed comments to help the 
reader better understand the context of their speech and story.  
 
135 Farah (alias), interview by author, personal interview, Tehran, September 5, 2011. 
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through neighborhood networks.  She had not disclosed her diagnosis to any family 
members, and yet she was an active participant in SPASDI’s public awareness teach-ins. 
She discovered she was HIV-positive mid-way through her first pregnancy, after her 
husband, a hemophiliac, became HIV-positive as a result of a HIV-contaminated blood in 
a blood transfusion. 
Originally from Shiraz, forty-nine-year old Maryam was one of two childless 
widows from the group. A steady participant, she always arrived on time and was often 
one of the last women to leave the meetings. Single and living alone in a small Tehran 
flat, she had no profession and considered herself poor. Maryam was a self-proclaimed 
tomboy and is not a practicing Muslim. She was a vocal participant in group workshops, 
offering her opinions about films and quietly debating with the group moderators. She 
had a distinct sporty style of dress and was known for her throaty voice —likely the result 
of years of cigarette smoke. In our conversations, she admitted to past indiscretions, 
especially during the period of her life when she was addicted to injecting the intravenous 
drug shisheh or “glass” (the colloquial terms in Persian and English for crystal 
methamphetamine).  Raised in a family of boys, Maryam spoke of emulating their 
freedom; she hung out late and interacted with new people whom she found exciting in 
her youth. Unlike her female cousins, who pursued education and marriage with ordinary 
men, she socialized with a “rough crowd” and wanted to “date a lot.”  When she fell into 
drugs, she lied and stole to preserve her habit. After losing a husband to AIDS-related 
complications, she has been sober for almost a decade. She had been attending Madaran-
e Hami-ye Salamat for almost a year.  
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Tall, bespectacled, and willowy Masoumeh resided in Karaj.136 Originally from 
Kashan, she raised her two teenage sons with the help of family members.  At age forty-
one, she became a single mother after her husband died from an HIV-related illness.  A 
former wearer of the chador, she said that her decision to give up the this kind of veil was 
the result of her worsening eyesight, which compromised her mobility.  After more than a 
year, I became the most acquainted with Masoumeh for she consistently attended group 
meetings and was ostensibly the most loquacious, doling out advice and telling anecdotes 
about raising her sons, her sigheh (temporary marriage) partnerships, HIV treatment 
bureaucracy, cooking, among many other topics. When the mothers were reticent to 
speak, the director and moderators often turned to Masoumeh to jump-start group 
discussion. At other times, she volunteered to lead conversation and then encouraged 
other women to participate. In our conversations, she was the only woman who made no 
mention of her HIV-status, a point I will reflect on later in this section. 
Lastly, there was chador-wearing Akram, a Kermanshah resident, who traveled to 
Tehran using various forms of transportation to make it to the center on time.  Her 
children were often in tow, and SPASDI’s volunteers watched them as she participated in 
group discussions. Among the four women, she was the most recent widow, after her 
second husband —a drug addict and former prisoner who died from AIDS— passed 
away three months before our interview. Akram, in her thirties, said she is a member of 
the lower-lower economic class. Her attendance at SPASDI was based, in part, on her 
need for financial support, as she had no profession and worked at home. She had two 
children, a daughter and son from two marriages that were, in her words, not easy 
                                                
136 Masoumeh (alias), interview by author, personal interview, Tehran, September 4, 2011. 
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relationships. Akram was the only interviewee to not respond to any questions regarding 
her perceptions of men and their bodies. “I have no good opinions of men,” she said.     
 
Breastfeeding HIV-negative Babies?  The Desires and Pressures of Motherhood  
“Motherhood as experience and institution,” writes Linda Blum, “continually re-
creates the core paradox and core ambivalence that being "from the mother half of 
humanity" poses for all women.”137 When a woman becomes a mother, she is confronted 
by numerous expectations of her purpose and role, and especially she encounters pressure 
to feed her child human milk. Researchers have studied various aspects of motherhood 
experiences, theorizing the maternal role as a learned or an intuitive process.  Reva Rubin 
posited that the maternal role was interactive, reciprocal, and social and acquired through 
the process of “maternal role attainment.” With the birth of each child and the special 
needs accompanying his or her development, a woman builds on her maternal experience 
and acquires a new sense of self through her maternal identity.138  Ramona Mercer, 
further developing Rubin’s theory, argues that the mothering role actually involves 
multiple processes of “becoming a mother.” When a woman has a successful 
breastfeeding experience, she learns to feel competent about her caretaking tasks and 
                                                
137 Linda Blum, "Mothers, Babies, and Breastfeeding in Late Capitalist America:  The Shifting Contexts of 
Feminist Theory," Feminist Studies 19, no. 2 (Summer 1993): p. 290.  
 
138 Reva Rubin, “Attainment of the Maternal Role. Part 1: Processes,” Nursing Research 16 (Summer/Fall 
1967): pp. 237-265. 
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mothering abilities.139 Maternal confidence is linked not only to breastfeeding itself, but 
also to its duration.140  
The issue that breastfeeding is a normalized moral imperative of mothering is 
hotly debated by scholars.141 The literature on the many wrong, right, or natural ways and 
styles of breastfeeding is countless.142 A point of congruence within this literature is that 
a mother breastfeeding her child is deemed a natural activity for nourishing a child, often 
preventing disease, lowering health costs, and promoting bonding between mother and 
infant. Despite the ubiquity and necessity of breastfeeding to human development, there 
are very few qualitative studies that focus on breastfeeding practices in nominally 
Muslim countries like Iran, where maternal-child nursing is considered an important 
factor in defining Islamic revolutionary ideals of motherhood, adjudicating monetary 
compensation during divorce cases, and in designating spousal responsibilities during 
marriage.143 The coercion to mother (through the activity of breastfeeding) is essential to  
                                                
139  See Ramona Mercer, Becoming a Mother:  Research on Maternal Identity from Rubin to the Present 
(New York:  Springer, 1995). 
140 Blum, "Mothers, Babies, and Breastfeeding in Late Capitalist America:  The Shifting Contexts of 
Feminist Theory,” p. 291. 
141 Ibid. 
142 On breastfeeding practices and motherhood roles, I consulted the following sources: Cindy A. Stearns, 
“Breastfeeding and the Good Maternal Body,” Gender and Society 13, no. 3 (June 1999):  pp. 308-325; 
Sharon Hays, The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood (New Haven and London:  Yale University 
Press, 1996); Pam Carter, Feminism, Breasts and Breast-Feeding (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1995);  
Rima Apple, Mothers & Medicine:  A Social History of Infant Feeding 1890-1950 (Madison:  The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).  
143 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet has studied breastfeeding policies in relation to the maternalist discourse of the 
first four decades of the Pahlavi regime. Kashani-Sabet researched changing midwifery and hygienic 
practices, looking at maternalist endorsements of breastfeeding using Islamic and local traditions to 
promote health children in antiseptic conditions. Iran’s support of hygienic reforms came at a pivotal time 
when the women’s movement was in its burgeoning stage. See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “The Politics of 
Reproduction:  Maternalism and Women’s Hygiene in Iran, 1896-1941,” International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 38 (2006): pp. 1-29.  Also, Avner Giladi has written about medieval Islamic views of 
breastfeeding. Giladi studied Qur’anic commentaries, legal texts, and medical texts on medieval 
breastfeeding perceptions and noted that nursing between a mother and child created much more than a 
 305 
pronatalist family planning policies and cultural practices in Iran, where mother-centered 
descriptions of women are presented in state and religious discourses as central values 
upheld by the majority of Iranian citizens. 
The dearth of qualitative research on maternal identity through the personal 
experiences of Iranian women are what inspired me to learn more about individual 
perceptions of childrearing, health, and body image through the complex issue of 
breastfeeding in Iran.144 
I was particularly interested in hearing about women’s breastfeeding experiences, 
as these individual stories illuminated the processes of negotiation and identity formation 
in the face of family and maternal pressures, religious restrictions, and precarious support 
systems. A woman’s decision to breastfeed is often intensely personal and dependent on 
life circumstances.145 In many societies, moral scrutiny and shame factor equally into this 
decision to nurse her child.146 Moreover, cultural mandates dictate “if, when, where, and 
how long a child will receive human milk,” surmises J. Stolzer.147 For many HIV-positive 
women, the decision to reproduce presents a moral dilemma. In cases when HIV-positive 
                                                
biological connection. It was commonly held that personality traits were being transferred between breast-
provider and suckling child.  Giladi also researched Islamic milk kinship laws, which forbid marriage 
between females (and their offspring) and non-biological children they breastfed.  See Avner Giladi, 
Infants, Parents and Wet Nurses:  Medieval Islamic Views on Breastfeeding and their Social Implications 
(Leiden and Boston:  Brill, 1999). 
 
144 Gabrielle Palmer wrote the seminal book The Politics of Breastfeeding on the politicization of 
breastfeeding in western countries. She argues that the decline of breastfeeding practices from the 1940s to 
1970s was a result of the collusion between the medical profession and breast milk-substitute corporations, 
who encouraged women to use formula in lieu of breastfeeding. See Gabrielle Palmer, The Politics of 
Breastfeeding  (London: Pandora Press, 1988). 
145 Blum, p. 297.   
146 Dia Michels and Naomi Baumslag, Milk, Money, and Madness:  The Culture and Politics of 
Breastfeeding (Westport:  Bergen & Garvey Trade, 1995), p. 6. 
 
147 J. Stolzer, “Breastfeeding:  An Interdisciplinary Review,” International Review of Modern Sociology 32, 
no. 1 (Spring 2006): p. 109. 
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women become mothers, for many women, the following question arises: should she 
breastfeed knowing that the child might contract the virus —is it ethically and morally 
responsible?  
For women living with HIV, compounding social and public forces, in addition to 
health factors that might bear significant consequences for their children, influence their 
reproductive decisions.148   HIV-positive women can generally bear children, however 
certain steps must be taken to reduce the possibility of the child contracting HIV to less 
than one percent. Breastfeeding in particular carries many risks. Nearly one-third of 
infants born to HIV-infected mothers will contract the virus.149 UNICEF warns, “The 
longer a child is breastfed by an HIV mother, the higher the risk of HIV infection. 
Breastfeeding for six months has about one third of the risk of breastfeeding for two 
years.”150 HIV-positive women are recommended to follow preventive interventions —
such as antiretroviral therapy, delivering the child by Cesarean section, and not 
breastfeeding.  If breastfeeding is conducted then health experts estimate that between 10 
to 20 percent of children will contract HIV.151 
I spoke with Farah one year before she became pregnant with her second child. In 
our conversations, she emphasized a desire to become pregnant again, to possibly 
breastfeed, and to have two healthy children. For Farah, the subject of breastfeeding was  
                                                
148 DB Barnes, “Reproductive Decisions for Women with HIV:  Motherhood’s Role in Envisioning a 
Future,” Qualitative Health Research Journal 19, no. 4 (April 2009): pp. 481-491. 
149 “HIV and Infant Feeding:  The Facts,” UNICEF (New York:  UNICEF, 2002), p. 2. 
150 See “Infant feeding and HIV:  Risks and Benefits of Breastfeeding,” UNICEF (New York: UNICEF, 
2002), accessed April 12, 2012, http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/23964_infantfeeding.html.  
151 See Mark Cichocki, Living with HIV: A Patient’s Guide (North Carolina:  McFarland & Company, Inc., 
2009); “HIV Facts: The Basics,” National AIDS Trust, 2012, accessed April 20, 2012, 
http://www.nat.org.uk/HIV-Facts/The-basics.aspx. 
 307 
a deeply personal issue. When I asked her about breastfeeding, knowing that the potential 
for exposure of her baby to HIV was high, Farah recalled: 
I found out mid-pregnancy that I was HIV–positive .. . My doctor advised  me to  
not breastfeed. And when I gave birth after a C-section, my breasts were filled 
with milk.  After two or three days, I became so upset. My doctor again said not 
to breastfeed, and to place ice on my breasts so that the milk would stop. This 
feeling was so upsetting. I went into the shower and cried, holding the ice to my 
chest, and thinking, ‘Oh God, I don’t know what the solution is, my breasts are so 
heavy with milk, and I’m not allowed to breastfeed.’ And now when I see 
someone giving milk to her child, my heart just aches...I also think being a 
woman--maybe this is a really traditional way of thinking, or old-fashioned-- but 
this thought comes to me that woman and womanhood, a woman’s entire value is 
giving birth, breastfeeding, raising children...these are all valuable for women. 
When I couldn’t do this, I thought any mother would do anything for her child, 
and I haven’t done this..But then, when I feel this way, I think it’s more valuable 
that my child is healthy and HIV negative. 152 
 
 
The following summer I saw Farah again; she was glowing, fully six months pregnant.  
When I asked her if she was excited about giving birth, she beamed, and said that she 
hoped the baby would be born healthy. 
Farah’s situation was exceptional. For the majority of the women who became 
HIV-positive after bearing children, they no longer considered breastfeeding an option 
because of the increased chances of transferring the virus to their children. Of the nine 
interviewees, two were married, and only Farah had expressed a wish to expand her 
family. The remaining women expressed little interest in remarriage (save one woman 
who has sigheh partnerships); as single mothers, some of them explained that they 
struggled to provide for the children they already had. However, despite an apparent 
ambivalence towards future breastfeeding, the mothers responded positively to my 
                                                
152 I try to quote the interviewees’ comments as they are expressed. However, for the purposes of 
clarification, I would ask additional questions; these interjections are noted through italicized phrases 
which I parenthesize.  
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question about breastfeeding practices. They spoke extensively about their experiential 
knowledge of nursing, discussing aspects of childrearing, family dynamics, and personal 
traditions and customs they often attributed to religious belief and family custom. 
For this particular group, exclusive breastfeeding was the preferred choice for at 
least the first year of their children’s lives.153 The women’s individual descriptions of 
nursing their children impart moments of tender tactility and of relaxation between 
mother and child. One woman in particular relayed with excitement that she once 
breastfed her sister’s child, after obtaining permission from her husband.154 While 
describing feelings of maternal connection during breastfeeding, they made associations 
between maternal experience and a woman’s self-worth.  Of the women who had 
breastfed, breastfeeding was described as a method of ensuring not only the health and 
peace of their child, but also as an activity that fulfilled certain maternal and familial 
obligations.  The concept of breastfeeding became a key demarcation point between how 
certain women conceptualized their bodies in conflict with their personal desires, family 
traditions, and what they perceived as distinct religious and/or cultural traditions and 
values. 
                                                
153 Exclusive breastfeeding is defined as providing only breast milk to the baby from birth. MOHME 
suggests that a mother breastfeed for at least six months.  “Nokat-e Mohem darbare-ye Shir 
Dadan/Important Points about Breastfeeding,” MOHME, 
http://bzhc.qums.behdasht.gov.ir/index.aspx?siteid=183&pageid=31393&pro=nobak, accessed May 13, 
2012. According to Olang et. al 2009 study, “At a national level, 90% and 57% of infants [in Iran] were 
breastfed at one and two-years of age, respectively. Exclusive breastfeeding rates at 4 and 6 months of age 
at national level averaged 56.8% and 27.7%. Exclusive breastfeeding rates at 4 and 6 months of age in rural 
areas were 58% and 29%, and in urban areas 56% and 27%, respectively.”  See Olang et. al, “Breastfeeding 
in Iran: Prevalence, Duration and Current Recommendations,” International Breastfeeding Journal 4, no. 8 
(2009), doi:10.1186/1746-4358-4-8. 
 
154 In Islamic legal terminology, breastfeeding or suckling is known by the technical term rada or rida, an 
act that produces the legal impediment to marriage of foster-kinship (meaning any female and her blood 
relatives are forbidden from marriage with the unrelated child she suckled). In Iran, suckling produces an 
automatic biological relationship through milk, known as milk kinship or rezaii in Persian. (A mother who 
breastfeeds a non-biological child is known as a madar-e rezaii.) See Peter Parkes, “‘Milk Kinship in 
Islam. Substance, Structure, History,” Social Anthropology 13, no. 3 (2005): pp. 307-329. 
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A conversation with Masoumeh reminded me that there were many factors 
contributing to the complex social meanings of breastfeeding in Iran.  I had asked 
Masoumeh about her body satisfaction.  She giggled, and interpreted the question as a 
moment for her to comment on her physical appearance. Masoumeh mentioned her breast 
size, which she found “very small.” When I asked her about breastfeeding experiences, 
she told me, “When I breastfed, [my breasts] were big and good.”   I asked if she could 
recall how she felt while she breastfed, and Masoumeh immediately smiled. 
“Breastfeeding gave me such pleasure, when I held my child in my arms, it gave me such 
a unique feeling and sensation,” Masoumeh reminisced.  I then inquired about the length 
of time she breastfed, and her response was precise: “Two years completely, each child 
[for] two years.” When I ask her reasons for breastfeeding for this period, she replies,  
“Because it’s the law, they say that children should be breastfed. Girls should be nursed 
at least one year and ten months and boys two years and two months…I heard this from 
my mom, from my [extended] family, for example.” I ask specifically if this “law” is 
officially in the civil code or a cultural norm; she says it is the latter.   
In most of the interviews, I heard the standard response of nearly two years for the 
duration each woman nurses —it appeared that any time less than this number would 
compromise the health of the child.155 Of course, not all of the women breastfed for this 
duration, though when such was the case, four of the women expressed regret in the form 
of “I breastfed one year and seven months, but should have breastfed two years.”156 
                                                
155 Three women mention additional support from public advertisements, television and radio broadcasts, 
and medical advice from physicians. 




Because I heard repeated answers of two years, I became curious about the origin and 
authoritative sources of this number, especially how particular woman used it as a marker 
of empowerment. When I inquired about its origins, only one of the nine women 
responded that it signified the length of time the Prophet Muhammad, as a newborn, was 
breastfed by Halimeh, his dayeh or wet nurse.157  This hadith source for breastfeeding 
was not commonly known in this group, however there was a general understanding that 
women should customarily nurse for two years —irrespective of where this advice 
originated (meaning from elders, family members, peers, or from religious sources).  
 Iran’s maternalist policies underscore breastfeeding as a primary biological activity 
of women that fulfills their ideal obligations and responsibilities in accordance with 
gender and family roles outlined in Shi’a Islamic tradition.158 Religious treatises (resaleh) 
of Shi’a Grand Ayatollahs (marja’e taqlid or sources of emulation) are rife with 
                                                
157 According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, suckling is mentioned in the Qur’an’s Sura IV: 23, Sura II: 
233, and sunna. Mothers are advised to breastfeed their babies for a complete course of two years, with a 
minimum of six months to ensure child’s survival. However the same verse considers breastfeeding as the 
decision of the mother and father. Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, rada or rida, accessed May 25, 
2012, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
2/rada-or-rida-COM_0896?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=breast-feeding.  
According to a common recollection of this story, Muhammad was later returned to his mother Amina after 
two years of being suckled.  Avner Giladi argues that the two-year period was generally interpreted within 
the context of divorce. See Giladi, Infants, Parents and Wet Nurses, pp. 18-20.    
158 Though burdened by space limitations, I quickly offer a summary (which I will discuss at length in my 
dissertation) of the Islamic revolutionary discourse’s conceptualization and emphasis of the role of 
Muslims, Iranian women. This has already been well established through the legal, political, and societal 
manifestation of a patriarchal logic in which women’s individuality, independence and autonomy were 
largely downplayed. (Scholar Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut has described this ideology as having “denied” these 
three features.) Much of the rhetoric about female empowerment is taken from shari’a legal understandings 
of matrimonial harmony, in which women are associated with familial roles and their main functions within 
the family are to provide “childbearing, child-rearing and housework,” says Kian-Thiebaut.  Moreover, 
through the characterization of certain revolutionary women religious figures, such as Zeynab and Fatimeh, 
Islamist ideologues have drawn an additional framework in which Iranian women are encouraged and 
believed to embody and perform these roles.  By way of extending national pride to the self-sacrificing, 
religiously observant mother, IRI has spent the past thirty years producing a variety of social programs that 
highlight these symbolic, nationalist prototypes for its women citizens.  Yet, clearly many Iranian women 
—across a wide spectrum of disparate religious, political affiliations and concerns— have come to 
challenge and re-configure these prescriptive roles through their activism, local knowledges, university 
education, rising literacy rates, independent, religious training and civic and/or political participation. See 
Mir-Hosseini (1999; 2001); Kian-Thiebaut (2002); Ahmed (1993). 
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extensive commentaries on breastfeeding practices and the financial compensation 
afforded to wives and mothers in cases of divorce.159 Even Iran’s personal status laws 
reflect the importance of breastfeeding in the preservation of Muslim families; women 
are granted the legal right of financial maintenance for the length of time they breastfeed 
their children during marriage.160  
During and immediately after the Iran-Iraq war, MOHME (at the time known 
only as the Ministry of Health) began campaigning against formula use, integrating 
references of Islamic religious tradition to promote the state’s family planning policies. 
Wartime rationing raised the price of formula once the government limited imports of 
formula, and for many years, it was not for sale to the general public.161  Through 
promotional pamphlets distributed in health clinics and mosques, “Breast is Best”-type 
advertisements informed Iranian mothers of the superiority of breastfeeding because the 
Qur’an recommends it for the health of the child.162 Editorial pieces in women’s journals 
like Zan-e Rouz discussed the nutritional risks of shir-e khoshk (dry-milk or formula). In 
one particular article, formula was described as a product heralding a consumerist 
lifestyle; this was a direct censure of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), whose favorable 
reception and advertisement of Western commercial goods helped promote 
                                                
159 Touzih al-Masa'el of Grand Ayatollahs Khomeini (d. 1989),  Hossein-Ali Montazeri (d. 2009), Naser 
Makaram Shirazi, and Yousef Saanei, who individually comment on breastfeeding practices in a section  
entitled “Ahkham-e Shir-dadan” (Rules on Breastfeeding). 
160 See Islamic Republic of Iran Judiciary, Family Law, Qanoun-e Tarvij-e Taghziye ba Shir-e Madar va 
Hemayat az Madaran dar Doran-e Shirdehi/Law Encouraging Breastfeeding and the Protection of 
Mothers during Breastfeeding, 1374 Azar 22 (Tehran:  Ganjdanesh Publishing, 1385/2006), pp. 295-298. 
Additionally, a breastfeeding mother should be financially compensated by her husband, even if they are 
divorced.    
161 Mohsen Maddah, “Breastfeeding Rates in Iran:  Why is There Such a Large Gap between Iran and Other 
Countries,” Journal of Human Lactation 24, no. 149 (April 2008), doi: 10.1177/0890334408316087. 
162 Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Reproductive Choice in Islam:  Gender and State in Iran and Tunisia,” 
Studies in Family Planning 25, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1994):  p. 47.    
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modernization and westernization to Iranians.163 The state’s efforts to reduce formula 
usage came on the heels of WHO and UNICEF joint efforts to prevent malnutrition in 
infants and young children by "regulating inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods 
that can be used to replace breast milk."164 
By 1991, domestic breastfeeding policy was elevated in national importance 
through MOHME’s establishment of the National Committee of Breastfeeding 
Promotion. The committee began producing booklets, pamphlets, compact discs, and 
workshops, in an effort to prevent infant morbidity and improve infant health.165 
MOHME designated hospitals as “baby friendly”166 through the Tarh-e Bimarestan-e 
Doostdar-e Koudak (Baby Friendly Hospital Initiative), and in each of Iran’s provinces, 
the ministry set up a health network with a breastfeeding committee. In 1995, Iran’s 
Parliament ratified a law entitled, "Promoting Breast-feeding and Supporting Mothers 
During the Nursing Period," whereby the import of any form of dried milk or 
supplementary nutrition for infants was allowed only with the government's permission, 
                                                
163 “Zarourat-e Taghziye ba Shir-e Madar va Dalil-e Afzayesh-e Biraviye-ye Masraf-e Shir-e Khoshk/ The 
Necessity of Nourishing from Breast-milk and the Reason for Irregular Increases in Formula 
Consumption,” Zan-e Rouz, Issue 748, 21 Dey 1358/January 11, 1980, pp. 38-39, 42. See also  “Shir-e 
Madar, Sarshar az Vitamin/ Breast-milk, Vitamin-Rich,”Zan-e Rouz, Issue 1117, Ordibehesht 1366/ May 
16, 1987, pp. 12-13, 26. 
 
164 Resolution WHA31.47, Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the 
Executive Board, vol. 2 (Geneva, 1981), p. 62. The World Health Assembly (WHA), in 1974 and 1980 
recommended establishing “an international code of marketing of infant formula and other products used as 
breast-milk substitutes.” 
See International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes,  WHO (Geneva:  World Health 
Organization, 1981), p. 5.   
165 See Olang, et al., “Breastfeeding in Iran: Prevalence, Duration, and Current Recommendations.” 
 
166 “Baby friendly” is the rough translation of doostdar-e koudak. 
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and in limited cases.167 Almost a decade later, in 2004, MOHME reevaluated its 
breastfeeding mission, and health officials increased efforts to promote breastfeeding in 
order to reduce growth abnormalities, to decrease the morality rate, and to increase the 
number of “baby friendly hospitals.”168  
In the past three decades of breastfeeding advocacy and policy in Iran, the 
subject of breastfeeding practice has been integrated into the ideological rhetoric of the 
Revolution and has factored in the construction of a healthy, morally guided Islamic 
state. At different historical moments, breastfeeding is encouraged not only as the 
responsibility of Muslim mothers, but also as the method by which to ensure the survival 
of their children. Especially during wartime, formula usage is politicized and 
discouraged. Given the extensive policy initiatives to promote breastfeeding, emphasized 
through religious and political rhetoric, breastfeeding cannot be viewed as simply an 
endearing engagement between mother and child. As the following interviews will 
demonstrate, for the majority of women, nursing a child was an essential rite-of-passage 
marking their transition into a particular maternal, familial, and in some cases, religious 
community. The coercion to mother and thus breastfeed were articulated and reinforced 
by the state as cultural and religious norms.  
 Yet national policies on breastfeeding promoting ideal maternal responsibilities for 
women did not quell the social pressures that many Iranian women faced, such as looking 
and feeling physically desirable during and after breastfeeding. Most of the women 
                                                
167 Also, only pharmacies could distribute formula or dried milk. (This policy, however, is not strictly 
enforced as formula can be easily found at corner stores.) Quoted in “Shirin Ebadi Book Excerpts,” 
BadJens Iranian Feminist Newsletter, September 2004, accessed June 1, 2012, 
http://www.badjens.com/ebadi.html.  Original source from Shirin Ebadi, Women’s Rights in the Laws of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.   
168 See Olang et al., “Breastfeeding in Iran: Prevalence, Duration, and Current Recommendations.” 
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mentioned this concern in their interviews, yet among this particular group, six women 
stated that their decisions to breastfeed reflected how they prioritized their children’s 
health over maintaining their physical appearance. They believed that metropolitan 
women were more concerned about achieving a perfect body — by metropolitan, they 
meant women from Tehran and/or women influenced by fashion trends. Interestingly, 
most of the women acknowledged that the pressures to maintain perfect, round breasts 
which did not sag and thus appeared firm underneath their manteau, were important 
concerns for women of Tehran.169 Three women whom I interviewed claimed that this 
particular demographic preferred using formula. (However, they also responded that this 
perception was gaining popularity for women in the provinces.)Both Masoumeh and 
Farah mentioned that when a woman denied her breastfeeding responsibility for the sake 
of less consequential concerns —such as time management and maintaining perfect 
breast form— the baby’s health would be jeopardized.  
According to some of these women, deciding not to breastfeed meant that a 
woman had rebuffed her obligatory, maternal duties —an act that would potentially 
blemish a family’s reputation. Furthermore, avoiding breastfeeding was considered a 
potentially dishonorable act against family tradition and advice.    
Yet among the nine women, one woman in particular stated that nursing was a 
personal choice. When I asked her if it was every woman’s responsibility to breastfeed, 
Akram responded,  
No, not now. In the past, when women wouldn’t breastfeed, they would call her  
                                                
169 Government campaigns have promoted exclusive breastfeeding in both rural and urban areas.  See 
Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Reproductive Choice in Islam:  Gender and State in Iran and Tunisia” about 
breastfeeding national policy.   
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lazy.  But a woman who would breastfeed, they would call her active. Nowadays  
it’s just formula.  Nobody breastfeeds that much anymore… Because nowadays  
they say, our breasts will droop, our bodies will be ruined, we’ll be ruined.  (Does  
this happen more in Tehran or in shahrestan?) Yes, the provinces are becoming  
that way, too. I have a relative that gave birth to two sets of twins. And she didn’t  
breastfeed any of them. She said, ‘I can’t breastfeed. I’ll give them formula, and  
I’m comfortable with that. I don’t want my breasts to droop…I didn’t have a  
natural delivery, I had a Caesarean because I wanted that [vagina] area to be in  
tact.’ Science is progressing and their minds are becoming better. 
 
In this passage, Akram’s comments germane to her relative’s decision on breastfeeding 
convey her ambivalence. Unlike Farah and Masoumeh, Akram was generally accepting 
of divergent viewpoints regarding a mother’s responsibilities towards her children. For 
her, breastfeeding was not obligatory of women; more so, choosing not to breastfeed did 
not represent a particular ineptitude or poor decision-making on the woman’s part. Rather 
than expressing negativity or judgment about her relative’s decision, Akram instead 
spoke about it, matter-of-factly.  To her, breastfeeding was dependent on variables of 
time, shifting priorities, and social circumstances.   
In many respects, the politicization of breastfeeding discourse in Iran can be read 
conceptually as a pronatalist regulatory technique of corporeal inscription on Iranian 
women’s bodies.  Corporeal inscription has been invoked in feminist critique of 
compulsory hejab. 170  Just as “makeup, stilettos, bras, hair sprays, clothing, 
underclothing mark women’s bodies,” the veil (within Iran’s sociohistorical context) has 
been interpreted by scholars Minoo Moallem and Hamideh Sedghi, as a “corporeal 
inscription of citizenship [putting] in place a system of signs that delegitimizes and even 
                                                
170 In much of the literature on corporeal citizenship in Iranian studies, scholars emphasize the different 
historic episodes of veiling ordinances throughout Iran’s modern history. As many scholarly works have 
attested, the concept of the veil became an immediate marker of the politicized female body. In 1935 
to1936, compulsory unveiling became legally enforced under Reza Shah Pahlavi, then it was eased under 
his son Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Ayatollah Khomeini’s establishment of the Islamic Republic in 
1979 saw within the first two years, compulsory veiling being instituted for all Iranian women. In several 
analyses of state policies on veiling in academic (and feminist) discourse, the veil is treated as a conceptual 
and material mode of corporeal inscription. 
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criminalizes certain bodies.”171 “In the post-revolutionary state,” remarks Moallem, “the 
law, which was exercised externally, became internalized as the essence of the female 
body.”172 This particular explanation of the corporeal inscription of women’s bodies can 
be extended to this discussion of women’s breastfeeding experiences in Iran. In some 
respect, breastfeeding becomes another method by which to internalize positive ideals 
about health, family, and faith, which are also emphasized in Qur’anic and hadith 
narratives.  By questioning how these values are being articulated and reinforced, I am 
questioning the presumption of a maternal “truth” manifest in nursing children. Morever,  
 What should be treated as a general encouragement to breastfeed for the health of a 
child is in fact expressed as an expectation for women to nurse. This pressure can have a 
disciplinary effect on women, influencing their decisions to breastfeed out of 
responsibility. to their family and faith. As many of these interviews demonstrated, 
breastfeeding is mired in many presumptions about what a good mother and woman 
should do for her baby.  For many of these women, they understood breastfeeding to be 
an expression of a cultural, economic, familial, and political norm accepted by the 
majority of Muslim-Iranian women. However, the consequences of these normative 
assumptions place a burden on Iranian women who, by virtue of their HIV-positive 
status, could place their children in danger if they do decide to breastfeed.   These 
interviews have led me to ask, rhetorically:  Do Iran’s state and religious discourses on 
motherhood, which encourage women to breastfeed, place an inordinate pressure on 
HIV-positive women to fulfill ideal motherhood roles? More so, could this be viewed as 
                                                
171 Moallem, Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister,  p. 73. 
172Ibid. 
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an irresponsible health policy that may have potentially damaging results for public 
health?   
 
Maryam and Getting It Straight 
At SPASDI, the group moderators often integrated popular culture to explore 
certain themes in a directly visual manner. I attended many of the seminars when guest 
speakers like dentists, nutritionists, and social workers would play cartoon films or appeal 
to Iranian television characters to elucidate problem-solving techniques to deal with 
common problems to this group, such as drug addiction, recidivism, and the immune 
system. When the dramedy Tasvieh Hesab173 was shown —an Iranian comedy about four 
female ex-convicts and their get-rich-quick schemes— Maryam became the most 
animated when critiquing the film’s portrayal of prison realities and criminality. “Prison 
doesn’t rehabilitate,” she surmised, insisting that people should spend more time 
discussing the reasons why criminal acts are committed. During group discussion, she 
pointed to the deep emotional scars of some of the characters with whom she empathizes. 
Personal conversations with Maryam were often the best occasions to see her 
dynamic personality and the depth of experience and wisdom with which she spoke. 
When I asked Maryam if she was satisfied with her body, Maryam smiled and said, “I’m 
very satisfied with the way I look for someone my age.”  Then she recalled an anecdote 
in which strangers had mistaken her for being a sports coach (she dressed frequently in 
                                                
173 Filmed in 2007, Tasvieh Hesab follows the scams of ringleader Ziba and her three associates who 
kidnap unsuspecting male drivers. The women wear various attractive disguises and await men to approach 
them for presumably a free lift or potential intimate encounters. The men are held at gunpoint and taken to 
an empty doctor’s residence, where they are tortured and drugged. In a hallucinogenic stupor, they agree to 
treat women fairly while they are being extorted. Meanwhile, the main female characters battle drug 
addictions, domestic violence, rape, and familial abandonment. One of the main themes of the film 
concerns women’s attempts to seek moral justice amidst patriarchy and social stigmatization.  
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Adidas tracksuits). On other occasions, women had approached her in the street, 
complimenting her on her figure, she said. 
During our interviews, I asked her to speak about her perceptions of the concepts 
of “badan-e zananeh” (feminine body) and “badan-e mardaneh” (masculine body) as she 
understood them. Translated from Persian, the aforementioned questions encapsulate two 
English phrases: “What is a feminine/masculine body?” and “When I say ‘feminine’ or 
‘masculine’ body, what do you perceive?” Maryam became confused, and immediately I 
realized my errors.  Not only were these questions not commonly asked, but I also 
expressed them using peculiar, social science terms.  Thereafter I learned to immediately 
rephrase my questions so that they were better understood by the participants.  In my 
rephrasing of these concepts, I gave five different versions to create an approximate 
meaning that was both understandable and relatable to my interviewees.174 After a minute 
had passed, Maryam responded, “Feminine bodies are zarif  (delicately crafted).” When I 
asked her to elaborate, she described an experience she shared with a coterie of friends 
who were apparently unsatisfied that they could not act freely wearing feminine clothes. 
As a solution, they preferred to dress in boyish clothing in public—one of the many 
manifestations of cross-dressing in Iran.  Maryam explained, 
I have a lot of friends whose style is pesarane (like young men) —not that the  
clothes are boyish, but that their style is like that of young men.That’s not my 
meaning [exactly]. My meaning is that for me, I’m a little bit  like that but not to 
the extreme.  For instance, I always wear boyish t-shirts (clothing for male 
teenagers). So far I haven’t seen myself wear skirts —even though I have a 
beautiful figure. (But those friends that you mentioned? Are they married?) Yes, 
they’re married, but they hang out this way!. . . I myself, I don’t wear skirts. Other 
                                                
174 For the question, “What is the female body?” I asked the following variants: “What is your 
conceptualization of a woman’s body?” “How do you imagine a feminine body?” “In your mind, when you 
think of a woman’s body, what do you imagine?” “What comes to your thoughts when you think of a 
women’s body?”  
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than my husband, no one has seen my bare ankles. If you ask why, they say, ‘Oh, 
it’s not appropriate…’ I say to them, ‘You’re a woman, if your husband sees your 
ankles, what’s the problem?’ [By dressing this way], although they are women, 
they want to show that ‘we are not women.’  
 
Maryam elaborated on this group of female friends —themselves former 
addicts— who chose to wear clothing typically associated with young males in public, 
which I include in their entirety: 
I don’t know what a masculine body is…I saw, even those that are women, and 
from these [rehabilitation detoxification] camps, they were addicts and became 
clean. Most of those women, especially the older ones… when you speak to them, 
most of  them say ‘I didn’t want to be a woman; we’re upset being women. We 
wear boyish clothes mostly because we’re not completely satisfied with being 
women. We don’t want to go into the street wearing a maghna’eh175 and manteau.  
We wear boyish clothes and hats. 
 
I asked her if she considered any of them to be hamjensgera or homosexual. She 
responded,  
No, they’re not hamjensgera, but they like that kind of style. Hamjensgera are  
those that are lez (lesbians). Even [there were] times I had a conversation with 
them and they said, from childhood, because when they were younger, our family 
couldn’t have sons. They would make them look like boys and dress them like 
boys. And they were raised like that and formed like that…They wear this 
stretchy material that [she then motions to her breasts, making a pressing motion 
to demonstrate her wrapping a stretchy material her chest in order to flatten her 
breasts.]  (Then they go out into the street like this?) Yes, there are many in 
Tehran, especially in parks. (Do you mean they go to Park-e Daneshjou?)176 No, 
these people aren’t into that kind of stuff. They just like to walk around with that 
kind of style. They say, ‘We’re not comfortable wearing maghna’eh.’ 
 
                                                
175  The maghna’eh is a special headscarf, formed like a hood, that is typically worn in official public 
spaces, such as government offices.  Many women wear this hejab underneath a chador. 
176 Park-e Daneshjou (now University Park and formerly Koroush Park) is located in central Tehran, at 
ValiAsr Boulevard and Enghelab Street.  This particular park has the stereotype that it is frequented by 
people soliciting gay and straight sex and/or seeking drugs. The park is also home to Tehran’s City Theater, 
mentioned in Chapter Four. 
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I inquired further, “Do their faces not look so feminine, meaning do they look like 
women?”  “Of course, it’s obvious [they are women]!” she responded. “They go outside 
this way. Well, nowadays, girls and boys —even boys pluck their eyebrows.” 
According to Maryam, the difference she observed between feminine and 
masculine bodies was based on her perception of which body could best draw out her 
confidence. Dressing in young men’s clothing enabled her group of friends to realize a 
desire to feel a freedom that cannot be actualized by wearing the usual markers of 
feminine clothing —in this context, a headscarf and manteau. While walking in public 
and dressed in male garb, she noticed the difference in the way they carried themselves, 
especially when their gender and sex were not obvious. Wearing masculine clothes 
became a source of self-empowerment and self-confidence, in Maryam’s opinion.  
Dressing in this manner allowed them to feel mobile and independent and, at least 
temporarily, their rights to feel and dress as they wished  were not impinged upon.  
That Maryam was also mistaken for an athlete or young man walking freely in 
public was uniquely satisfying for her. Implicit in  her observations was that these 
sensations and perceptions were not ones she or her friends readily associated with 
wearing the hejab and manteau in public. Notably, Maryam’s attitude about dressing in 
such a fashion was not associated with any particular sexuality, sexual orientation, or 
adherence to a particular religious tenet.  For her, dressing like a young man  afforded her 
the opportunity to move and act  in public with a little more freedom.177   This anecdote 
                                                
177 I hesitate to describe Maryam and her friends’ style of dress as a form of transvestism because I did not 
conduct enough research about how modes of cross-dressing are expressed and analyzed within the Iranian 
context.  I did however consult certain pieces about cross-dressing and gender performance, namely Judith 
Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity and Marjorie Garber’s Vested Interests: 
Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety. Garber has written exclusively on the subject of cross-dressing from 
Renaissance dramas to pop culture icons, Madonna.  She critiques feminist literature of transvestites, whose 
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demonstrates that her feeling of being masculine was made possible through how she 
dressed her body. How she dressed gave her a momentary gender identity, which she 
transforms at her choosing and in accordance to her own beliefs. 
Also implicit in her comments was the recognition of the privileges afforded to a 
masculine body—a theme I heard repeatedly in these interviews. These women regularly 
observed that having the body of a man meant that one could access public space easily 
and faced less social restrictions. Masoumeh from Kashan, for example, had distinct 
understandings of what constituted being and looking masculine or feminine. “The body 
is a body,” she said, “they’re organs, but…you’re asking such a difficult question. A 
feminine body?  It differs from a masculine body.” I asked her to explain more, and she 
responded, “In terms of reputation, women, in general, I don’t know what to say, they 
should be covered…Men’s bodies, they walk around with their chests pushed out, it’s not 
a problem for a man to be lokht (naked), well, it’s a man!” (She then stuck out her chest 
in a boastful manner.) Masoumeh observed that a crucial difference between masculine 
and feminine bodies was the way that men protruded their chests in public. For her, this 
act  was identifiably masculine body language, whereby men performed their masculine 
gender through a distinct bodily act. In her opinion, men were also allowed  to expose a 
part of their bodies (which she described as nakedness ) —which did not apply to women.  
In no point of the interview did Masoumeh question why it was that certain acts were 
acceptable for men yet not for women. Instead, she exclaimed, “They’re men!”  
 
                                                
analyses tend to focus too much on the bodies beneath the clothes of cross-dressing men and women. 
Garber encourages analyses that “read” the transvestite for who s/he is by looking “at” him or her. 
According to Garber, transvestism is an “enabling fantasy” in which our ways of thinking about identity, 
self-knowledge, and self-sufficiency are being blurred and destabilized.  See Butler, Gender Trouble (New 
York: Routledge, 1999); Garber, Vested Interests (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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Advice on Respecting the Body and Its Private Parts, in Masoumeh’s Words  
Masoumeh’s enthusiasm was frequently demonstrated in our discussions. When I 
inquired about her occupation, she replied, “For now, a housewife!”  The adverbial 
expression “for now” was repeated often throughout our conversation. For Masoumeh 
was a woman with many plans—to remarry, to get a driver’s license, and to find a job.  
Concocting and executing these plans was a subject of group importance. On one 
occasion, Masoumeh started discussion by animatedly discussing how a young man was 
pursuing her at her driver’s license classes. Fearing that his intentions were dishonest or 
prurient, she used the opportunity to start a phone acquaintanceship with him and teach 
him about how to seek relationships with women in a more “respectful manner.”178  As 
the group sat in amazed silence, Masoumeh described a telephone conversation wherein 
she advised him to regard her as a sister. Within minutes of this advice, she began 
informing him about the benefits of contraception and to respect a woman as he would 
respect his female family members. 
I remembered this particular anecdote when Masoumeh was describing the care 
she took of her body.   In her words, she paid great attention to her  appearance and 
always tried to carry herself in a respectful manner. Noticeably, Masoumeh does not 
mention any health regime she followed as a result of her being HIV-positive. In fact, she 
made no references to her health status. For her, paying attention to her body meant that 
she should consult medical professionals, such as the gynecologist.  For her, the reasons 
stemmed from “wanting to be cute, for my heart to be happy.” Ten years ago, she stated 
this was not the case, yet did not explain why.  
                                                
178 It was understood that the young man desired to have casual sexual relations with Masoumeh.  
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I found our conversations as animated as her anecdotes, filled with comical 
moments when Masoumeh drew attention to various parts of her body in order to 
demonstrate certain points.  When I asked her a question about her faith practices, 
followed by a question about the differences she perceived between men and women, she 
recounted the following advice her (deceased) husband had given her. I include our 
conversation as it transpired: 
I’m religious, but a believer? To the first degree, the highest level?  Yes, to the 
level that my hair not be shown, or a man shouldn’t see my waist, I’m not that 
strict. But I’m also not so comfortable to uncover my neck in front of a mard-e  
namahram.179 I’m sensitive to my ankles…that men not see my legs.  (I laugh, 
asking her why.)  We think it’s extremely inappropriate. We say if a man sees a 
woman’s legs, it’s like he’s seeing your vagina.  It makes no difference if a man 
sees either. (She laughs). It’s what we say. We say that from the ankles, he would 
understand what’s going on up there and how is it (She points to her groin area.) 
 
This mention of the sensitivity afforded to the ankle area was also broached during my 
conversation with Maryam, yet her reason differed from Masoumeh’s. For Maryam, 
religious observance did not factor into her decision to not show her ankles to others, 
except to her husband. It was more a matter of expressing both her respect to her 
husband. Also, equally important, she felt more comfortable wearing trousers than 
wearing skirts. 
Maryam’s comments were in mind when I inquired again from Masoumeh where 
she heard about the sensitivity of the ankle area.  She answered,  
I heard this from my husband, and I discovered it was right [assumption]…It’s the 
same thing with the neck.  It doesn’t make a difference if a man sees the  
neck….the neck is important, and so are the ankles.  If a man sees this, they’ll  
become seduced. I believe in this 100 percent…No, there are three areas:  
the neck, the ankles, and the behind. The buttocks protrude out. I’m thin, I was  
chadori, but now that my eyesight is weak, I don’t wear the chador.  But when I  
went out with the chador, when it was windy and thundering, my  
husband would tell me ‘You musn’t go out, your chador clings to your butt, and  
                                                
179 See Chapter Four of this dissertation for an explanation of the mahram/namahram paradigm. 
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men will look at it.’  He didn’t like it at all; he was sensitive to this. Based on  
repeated episodes of that happening, I got used to [wearing the chador this way].   
[Outside] when I see that someone’s back area is tight, I think it’s like I’m a man 
looking at her butt, especially when it’s big and chubby.  (And so what should 
women do?) They should wear looser clothing. 
 
She offered another example, 
…or during prayer, when a mard-e namahram sits behind a woman, if a woman 
knows that he is sitting behind them, when they bow down, they  
should be aware that their chador doesn’t go in the line between their  
butts…Did you see that some women wear tight clothing so that you can see their  
bra strap?  That’s a big sin…They are sinning. 
 
Here, transgression is manifested through an act that Masoumeh found immodest, self-
promoting, and exhibitionist for the purposes of sexually attracting the opposite sex. She 
imagined a similar scenario transpiring during a moment of prayer, when opposite sexes 
who were unrelated to one another were placed in compromising situations.  In this case, 
it was the onus of the woman to make sure her modesty was preserved. This scenario 
appeared more imaginative than actual.  For in the Shi’a-Iranian context, men and women 
are advised to (and generally do) pray in separate spaces, or they are separated by some 
kind of barrier, so that this situation does not happen in the first place.  
Even though Masoumeh did not explicitly reference any religious sources for the 
connections she made between the ankle and the vagina, she implied that either of their 
exposure would result in the same offense: temptation and sin. This relationship is 
perhaps attributed to her acknowledgment of a Muslim concept on intimate bodily parts, 
known as awrat, which is mentioned several times in the Qur’an, as well as in hadith 
literature.  According to consensus among Islamic fiqh scholars, the exposure of private 
parts is forbidden, though there is some differentiation about which parts of the male and 
female bodies are considered awrat. Some scholars state that only the vagina, penis, and 
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buttocks are considered private parts, whereas others designate that for women, their 
entire bodies are awrat. Shi’a understanding, based on sixth Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq's 
religious commentaries, believes that the concept of awrat includes women's bodies, save 
their faces and hands.180  Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder and Grand 
Ayatollah, wrote in Tahrir al-Vasileh, that at the time of prayer, women's awrat, is her 
entire body, including her head and hair, except for her face, hands, and feet.181 
Masoumeh’s subtle engagement with the religious concept of awrat was an 
important authoritative source for her conceptualization of body image.  But it was one of 
many sources she consulted; another influential force was the opinion of her husband.  
He insisted that she not be desired by others and thus insisted she dress modestly in order 
to preserve her reputation and not invite attention from the opposite sex.  Masoumeh 
knew which parts of the female body were  sensitive to the opposite sex and thus  she 
diverted her eyes from looking in their direction. Notably, she reminded herself that the 
lustful gaze towards a woman’s body, an act she associated with male behavior, was 
something any person could easily slip into. When this happened, she slipped into the 
gazing position of the male observer and this made her feel uncomfortable. To avoid this 
discomfort, she instructed women to wear looser clothing. It is worth noting that she did 
not advise that men, too, should look away.  
 
                                                
180 Men’s awrat is their buttocks, according to Jafar al-Saddiq.  The concept of awrat is studied by  
anthropologist Haideh Moghissi, who provides a contextual analysis of the many uses of awrat in the 
Qur’an and hadith literature, which has often been associated with women’s bodily weakness. Moghissi 
argues that a more suitable definition should be “inviolate vulnerability,” as reference to the broader 
notions of Arabo-Islamic sanctity and privacy of the home and family.  See Haideh Moghissi, Women and 
Islam: Social Conditions, Obstacles, and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 81-83.  
181 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Tahrir al-Vasileh, vol. 1, Chapter 129, lines 3-11. 
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Concluding Remarks: Imagining a Non-taboo Embodiment of HIV/AIDS  
For this particular group of women, HIV/AIDS is one variable, among many 
others, constructing their worldviews, daily schedules, and lifestyle choices.  These 
interviews clearly attest to the fact that HIV-AIDS does not control how they live their 
lives nor does it alter significantly their personal interests and biases.   According to one 
of the women I interviewed, the disease is described as just a virus, not a debilitating 
death sentence and certainly not a definite taboo-marker. In fact, it is a negotiable status 
they reveal to some, hide from others, and, at times, speak about with reverence. For 
some of the women, how they contracted the virus has influenced their perceptions of 
HIV/AIDS and in particular their opinions of men.182   
In my interactions and conversations with them, each woman reflected on her 
individual process of improving awareness of nutrition and health while simultaneously 
maintaining a positive relationship with her body. Some even conversed about how their 
experiences would lead to future roles as health and cultural ambassadors for the disease. 
Through educating first themselves, then their families, and finally the Iranian public 
about HIV-AIDS facts and prevention, perhaps their health status would eventually be 
treated as a non-taboo laden illness such as cancer. In such a case, it would be regarded as 
a disease affecting the general public and not necessarily one targeting a particular social 
group, class, sexual practice, and lifestyle.   
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive or detailed account 
of their daily lives. Nor does this interview section seek to make any grand claims or 
                                                
182 Although I know the mode of transmission for each interviewee, I did not feel comfortable revealing this 
information if the women themselves did not mention it during our one-on-one interviews.  I became privy 
to the mode of transmission for each participant throughout attending SPASDI’s meetings.  
 
 327 
judgments about the health, piety, sexuality, or lifestyle choices of HIV-positive Iranian 
women. Instead, this chapter turns to layered episodes within their personal lives —some 
of which deal with HIV, others which sidestep its importance— to diversify the content 
of health reports and expand the target audiences of HIV/AIDS official discourse in Iran.   
This chapter has drawn from the reflections of four Iranian women about their 
individual perceptions and experiences, covering a range of topics, from sexuality to 
breastfeeding to health. The experiential knowledge they impart elucidates the 
interrelated demands and expectations they carry for themselves, their families, and their 
peers. The participants individually comment on their personal journeys, telling 
anecdotes of struggle and failure, as well as of overcoming health problems, economic 
obstacles, and family strife. Encouraged by the growing numbers of nongovernmental 
and volunteer HIV health advocates, they participate in these groups having much at 
stake —their family reputation, their health, and their financial survival, for instance. 
As Iris Marion Young has written, “The body as lived is always layered with 
social and historical meaning and is not some primitive matter prior to or underlying 
economic and political relations or cultural meanings.”183 This last chapter, contributing 
to the growing ethnographic literature on the diversity of women’s experiences in Iran, 
invokes Young’s assessment. In many ways, their individual responses reflect a chorus of 
sameness and difference. Like many women around the globe, they attempt to maintain 
healthy, marital relations, find a career that suits them, provide for their families, and feel 
a sense of security. However, these desires are impacted not only by the politicization of 
health care for those living with the HIV-virus, but also by the virus’s stigmatized status, 
                                                
183 Iris Marion Young, On Female Body Experience: ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ and Other Essays (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 7.  
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fueling negative perceptions of these women’s lifestyles, sexual behaviors, and value 
systems. 
These interviews also shed light on the real impact of shifting public health 
policies on HIV in the last decade —that the communities impacted by the disease (which 
were once identified in official reports as prisoners and drug addicts) now include a 
growing number of widowed, divorced, and unmarried women.   Despite the precarious 
welfare assistance and the stigmatization that refers to them as a “high-risk population” 
participating in illegal, underground activities (such as prostitution, drug use, and errant 
sexual practice), for these women living with HIV, they persist in attempting to transform 
public and clerical perceptions about the disease.  
Obviously, these interviews provide rich material with which to further examine 
the unique situation of HIV-AIDS in Iran. This analysis is the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg in understanding how these women live within a matrix of contesting cultural 
practices, changing state policies, and religiously defined moral imperatives.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to gain understanding of the diversity of experiences for women 
with HIV; these interviews contrast the opinions, analyses, and statistics presented in 
MOHME reports and jurisprudential literature. By inquiring about breastfeeding 
experiences, I encountered variegated messages the importance of health and body 
maintenance. I heard fascinating anecdotes about maintaining desire and femininity. 
Moreover, I learned about subtle expressions of collaboration and resistance—of 
coalition-forming between social workers, the MOHME, and clerics; of organizing public 
awareness campaigns to confront HIV-positive persons’ stigmatization.  Indeed, by 
attending SPASDI’s Madaran-e Hami-ye Salamat workshops, they are participating in a 
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courageous act — by not remaining silent about their illness, they pressure the Iranian 
government and general public to acknowledge a social reality and emerging public 
health issue expanding in many communities. By the simple act of talking —about their 
experiences in front of their peers and family members, health officials, and strangers— 
they generate other discussions in society about breaking down the assumptions and 
stereotypes associated with men and women carrying the virus. Moreover, as the numbers 
increase, of men and women publicizing the disease and their personal stories of 
contraction and survival, the responsibility to act shifts towards health officials, 
politicians, and the clerical leadership to thoroughly address official approaches and 
policies on maternal health, drug prevention, sexual education, and HIV preventive care. 
Given these interviews and what they reveal about the diversity of desires and 
opinions of this group of women, I present the following questions: What becomes of 
other HIV-positive women who do not have access to support networks such as SPASDI?  
Do official pressures about ideal motherhood, coupled with the lack of public data and 
dialogue about diverse (and alternative) sexual attitudes and behaviors in Iran, mean that 
the HIV epidemic will reach more alarming levels? Or will clerical authorities and other 
religious and state figures popular among the regime follow a different route: that is, to 






Following the demise of the Pahlavi monarchy, the Islamic Republic, founded 
upon Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s doctrinal interpretation of Islamic government, 
commenced robust cultural campaigns to construct and foster a morally-guided space 
within which Iranians would interact and practice their faith in the spirit of “Islamic 
norms and principles.” Yet fundamental to this enterprise was the subduing of female 
sexuality through legal, political, economic and social methods of control. But what 
happens when scholars sidestep the barriers between these two periods, such as 
ideological foundation, and deconstruct the methods and tools of enforcement by locating 
their origins within the Pahlavi era? How then would one’s analysis of “post-
revolutionary Iran” transform if he or she were to present the country’s modernization 
reform programs of the 1960s as enacting a similar form of social control? Moreover, per 
the government regulation of sexuality, what can be understood about the politics of 
intimacy, if studied across an extended period of time covering the social policies of two 
regimes? 
What began as an inquiry about the image of a mutilated mannequin on an  
innocuous street in Tehran soon developed into a larger exploration of the historical and 
conceptual regulation of women—in particular, of female sexuality. The potential threat 
it poses in both public space and in heterosocial relations that are not Islamically-
sanctioned is a topic of great contention and public importance. The simultaneous threat 
and allure of women —even in their representations as mannequins and statues — have 
occupied pivotal places in the formulation and implementation of Iran’s social policy and 
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cultural reform agenda. The notion that merely gazing upon the physical features of a 
woman will lead to societal corruption (in the form of unrestrained, sexual explosion) has 
invigorated, in recent years, calls to rein in and reform deviant expressions and works of 
art deemed immoral.  No longer are depictions of women accused of dressing immodestly 
or of provoking desire tolerated for display. 
The body of a woman has become the visual and conceptual focal point of 
government-administered social and cultural reforms —regardless if their aim is to 
discourage traditional practice and custom or to eradicate deviance and corruption. This 
means that the moral jurisdiction of the state designates which bodies are modern, clean, 
pious, favorable, and worth memorializing. This also means that whatever potency the 
state possesses can be administered through vast manipulations and erasures of the public 
(social) memory, the public (social) body and the private (physical) body.  As such, 
bodies, in their many states of representation, compliance, and resistance, can be 
physically and publicly forgotten through legal and extra-legal structures, business 
development, compulsory hejab, landmark destruction, and, moreover, in the outright 
denial of their importance and value. 
In the introduction of this dissertation, I asked: how are bodily technologies 
constructed discursively and socially in Iran, and in particular, what values and 
perspectives are built into them, serving to dictate what kind of realities, lifestyles, and 
desires are both permissible and accessible? Indeed, the response to this inquiry is 
intricately formed, given the investigation of five unique sites, which bridge together 
Pahlavi-era state regulations to those of the cleric-led Islamic Republic. In most of these 
sites, the body is one of the ways through which sexuality is regulated; in others, 
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sexuality is disciplined through spatial cleansing. It is controlled through the dispersing 
and internalizing of positive ideals; moreover, it is restrained through compulsory 
forgetting, when ahistorical narratives are emphasized repeatedly in order to deny the 
practices and institutions of both the past and present. 
In this discussion of popular women’s magazine Zan-e Rouz, former red-light 
district Shahr-e No, temporary marriage or sigheh, public artworks depicting women, and 
a non-governmental HIV-AIDS organization in Tehran, bodily technologies act as the 
pivots and points of departure for how ulama, the media, government bodies such as the 
Supreme Council for the Cultural Revolution, as well as other political and social actors, 
facilitate the sexual and social control of Iranian men and women.  As the question above 
illustrates, promoting values is an essential strategy in assuring the efficacy of cultural 
campaigns designed to modify a person’s behavior, lifestyle, and point-of-view. 
Furthermore, the articulation and continual emphasis of these ideals and values, which 
are broadcast to a mass audience, is fundamental to promoting (and later 
institutionalizing) the triumph and endurance of one political authority over another.  
As elaborated in each dissertation chapter, positive ideals about sexuality, 
marriage, motherhood, and health are used not only to encourage changes in behavior, 
but also to accentuate the existence and ongoing significance of governmental red lines.  
They are drawn for the overall benefit of the general body politic. In the case of the 
compulsory hejab and the extension of this policy to statues depicting women in public 
squares, for example, red lines are demarcated by “societal standards.” Appealing to the 
ambiguous meaning of this phrase, state officials (and modern art museum directors) 
communicate the expectations of a religious society towards “erotic art.” In defense of, 
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and in deference to, “Islamic norms and principles,” mannequins, statues, and 
monuments are modified to safeguard the public, heterosexual gaze and to ensure 
propriety among Iranians. Yet, the outcome of this kind of strategy—especially when it is 
applied arbitrarily, as is the case of mannequins suggests— is the following: certain 
bodies go into hiding; they become absent; they are erased; or they resort to a kind of 
mutilation.  
In this exploration of bodily technologies, I trace their mutations from one form 
into another; their re-codings into ideological identities; and even their dismissal after 
periods of inefficacy. As one focuses on the intricate manner of their interactions, other 
mini-narratives and discourses emerge about the conceptualizations of public space, 
gender, sexuality, marriage, and health in state, religious, and academic discourses. 
Through this surfacing, one discovers the grey areas, so to speak, of formerly untold and 
peculiar collaborations between apparatuses of the state and the advertising industry or 
the global sex trade. In the latter instance, when investigating the prostitution policy 
during consecutive administrations, one identifies a tacit acceptance of the sexual 
exploitation of women in the domain of prostitution. This motif carries on well into the 
Islamic Republic even despite official government and clerical remonstrations to the 
contrary. 
Moreover, in the course of this analysis, there were connections made between the 
methods of enforcement and the technologies of reform— at times, their purpose and 
aims were somewhat indistinguishable from one another. Recall, for instance, the 
Pahlavi-era method of reform in the name of modernization and the Islamic Republic’s 
initial steps to encourage piety and modesty among its Islamic  revolutionary supporters.  
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In seeking the emancipation of its female citizens, Pahlavi reformers translated political 
and social liberation as the improving and refashioning of Iranian woman’s behavior, 
dress, social interactions, physical appearance, and pastimes. With Shahbanu at the helm 
of this reform, the project of cultivating a “modern” woman’s desires had found its 
human embodiment to promote them—in the figure of a sophisticated and fashionable 
Iranian queen who traveled the globe and, in more quiet moments, read books with her 
children. Although educational reforms were part of the modernization program, they 
were sidelined in the face of the growing influence of popular women’s magazines and 
television—emerging giants within Iran’s mediascape that helped advertise desires, both 
consumer and sexual, to a broader audience. After 1979, supporters of Ayatollah 
Khomeini working within both industries, slightly changed course; co-opting the rhetoric 
of reform form the previous regime, they began to encourage piety, motherhood, and 
revolutionary Islamic values for the modern Iranian woman. Promoting family values 
ground in Islamic discourse, they crafted a model Islamic character of womanhood, 
encouraging women to embrace this gendered, religious and political identity.  
In both cases, the reform agendas are united by a hegemonic conceptualization of 
women: first, that women are the boundary-making objects of the nation-state and 
second, that women are necessarily and naturally receptive to reform, guidance, and 
discipline from above.  Thus the very methods employed to promote reform among 
women are also being used to restrict certain expressions and ways of living. They are 
also used to subdue the fostering of specific social and political identities by outlining the 
behavior and appearance that constitutes as normative or religiously and/or socially 
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acceptable, separating from this group those considered deviant, backward, and/or 
morally reprehensible.  
In this dissertation, it is argued that even despite the change in regimes, from 
Pahlavi dynasty to clerical-led Islamic Republic, there are both ruptures and continuities 
in the regulation of sexuality. Though plainly stated, it illustrates the importance of 
identifying not just the political and social actors who seek to bring about a particular 
objective, but also the style and method of governance and its impact as it is felt and 
experienced by marginalized communities.  Analyzing the choice and method of 
regulation lends insight into the formation of heterotopic sites of inclusion and exclusion. 
Time and again, they are constructed, abolished, and restored in an effort to protect the 
status quo or ensure the safety of the greater public good. Yet this often happens at the 
expense of others; for those members of society thought to be perpetually “in crisis,” 
such as prostitutes, people living with HIV, and temporary wives, their social and 





Part I: Persian Sources  
 
“Afzayesh-e Ezdevaj-e Movaqat pa-be-pa-ye Qeimat-e Sekeh/The Rise in Temporary  
  Marriage on Pace with the Rise in Gold Coins.” Asrir-e Iran,  
5 Bahman 1390/ January 25, 2012.  Accessed January 27, 2012.  
http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/198672/ﺵﯼﺍﺯﻑﺍ-ﺍﻭﺩﺯﺍﺝ-ﺕﻕﻭﻡ-ﺍﭖ-ﻩﺏ-ﯼﺍﭖ-ﺕﻡﯼﻕ-
 ﻩﮎﺱ.   
 
“Ahamiyat-e Faza-ye Sabz va Ta’sir-e Un bar Ravan-e Ensan/The Importance of Green  
Space and its Effect on Human Mentality.” Parks and Green Space Organization 




Ali Mohammadi, Fariborz.  Danestaniha-ye Jensi va Rahnemudha-ye A’emeh-ye Athar/  
Sexual Knowledge and the Guidance from the Pure Imams. Tehran: Rastin,  
1387/2009.  
 
“Amar-e Vagh'ei-ye Mobtalayan be AIDS dar Iran/Real Statistics of AIDS Cases in  
Iran." Farda News, 7 Azar 1388/November 28, 2009. Accessed April 30, 2012.  
http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/96834/. 
Grand Ayatollah Saanei. “Amouzesh-e Ommumi dar Pishgiri az AIDS/Public Education   
about AIDS Prevention.” Fatwas.  Accessed June 1, 2012.  
http://www.feqh.org/fa/estefta/estefta46.htm. 
 
Azar, Shabnam. “Sikut-e felezi neylabakzan/Metallic Silence of The Flute Player.” Radio  
Zamaneh, 9 Mordad 1389/ July 31, 2010.  Accessed February 14, 2012.   
http://zamaaneh.com/morenews/2010/07/post_1349.html. 
 
“Bahman-e Mohasses: Pishro va Mardomgoriz / Bahman Mohasses: Pioneer and  
Misanthrope.” BBC Persian, January 29, 2010. Accessed February 12, 2012.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/arts/2010/07/100729_l11_bahman_mohasses.shtml. 
 
 “Bonyangozar-e Kayhan Dargozasht/ Kayhan Titan Passes Away.” BBC Persian,  
November 11, 2006. Accessed October 4, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/arts/story/2006/11/061125_mf_mesbahzadeh.shtml. 
 
“Behtarin Noskhe-ye Mobarezeh ba AIDS Din-e Eslam Ast /The Best Prescription in the  
Fight Against AIDS is Islam.” Fars News Agency, 15 Azar 1389/ December 6,  






“Barrasi-ye Naqsh-e Eslam dar Mobareze alay-he AIDS/ Investigating the Role of Islam  
in the Struggle Against AIDS.” BBC Persian, December 4, 2006.  




Bashirtash, Saied and Ebrahim Nabavi. “Shahr-e No Atash Gereft va Rouspiyan Koshteh  
Shodand/Shahr-e No on Fire and Prostitutes Killed.” Radio Zamaneh, 9 Bahman 
1387/ January 29, 2009. Accessed October 5, 2011.  
http://www.zamaaneh.com/revolution/2009/01.post_218.html. 
“Behtarin Noskhe-ye Mobarezeh ba AIDS Din-e Eslam Ast /The Best Prescription in the  
Fight against AIDS Is Islam.” Fars News Agency, 15 Azar 1389/ December 6,  
2010.  Accessed April 30, 2012. 
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8909151208.  
 
“Chalesh-e Vazir-e Behdasht ba Sazman-e Nezam Pezeshki/ Minister of Health’s  
Challenges with the Medical Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Afkar  
News, 21 Ordibehesht 1391/ May 10, 2012. Accessed  May 20, 2012.   
http://www.ghatreh.com/news/nn9805044/ﺵﻝﺍﭺ-ﺭﯼﺯﻭ-ﺕﺵﺍﺩﻩﺏ-ﻥﺍﻡﺯﺍﺱ-ﻡﺍﻅﻥ- 
 .ﯼﮎﺵﺯﭖ  
 
“Chare-ee joz Enhelal-e Khane-ye Cinema Nadashtim/ We Had No Choice But to  
Disband the House of Cinema.” Fars News Agency,  21 Azar 1390 /December 12,  
2011. Accessed February 13, 2012.    
http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13901121000539.    
 
“Comprehensive Chronology of Islamic Revolution Published.” Tehran Municipality,  




“Ezharat-e Ayatollah Javadi Amoli darbaraye Hamjesbazi-ye Qanouni dar Gharb/   
Statements of Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli about the West’s Legalizing  
Homosexuality.” Khabar News, 28 Farvardin 1391/ April 16, 2012.  Accessed  
April 20, 2012. http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/208221/culture/religion.  
 
Farman Farmaian, Sattareh.  Rouspigari dar Shahr-e No-e Tehran, 49/6/25 /Prostitution  
in Tehran’s  Shahr-e No, 49/6/25. Tehran:  Amouzeshgah-e ‘Ahli-ye Khadamat-e  
Ejtimaei, 1349 /1970.  
 
Freud, Sigmund. Ravankavi va Tahrim-e Zaneshouee ba Maharem/ Pyschoanalysis and  
the Incest Taboo, 3rd edition. Translated by Nasser al-din Saheb al-Zamani.  





“Gharb va Jonoub-e Tehran dar Sho’le-ye Atash/Western and Southern Tehran on Fire.”   
Ettela’at, 10 Bahman 1357/ February 10, 1979. Accessed November 9, 2011.  
http://i47.tinypic.com/14jxncl.jpg.  
 
 “Gozaresh-ha az Voqou-e ‘Dargiri’ dar Meydan-e Baharestan-e Tehran Hekayat Darad/  
Reports of Outbreaks in Tehran’s Baharestan Square.” BBC Persian, 3 Tir 1388/  
June 24, 2009. Accessed August 11, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/06/090624_nm_demonstraion.shtml.   
 
Hakim-Olahi, Hedayatollah. Ba Man Beh Shahr-e No Biyaeed. Vol. 2.  
Tehran:  N.p., 1326/1947. 
 
“Hormat-e Mojassamehsazi va Naqqashi / The Sanctity of Sculpting and Painting.”  
Kavoshi Now dar Fiqh-e Eslami 4 (Summer and Fall 1374/1995):  pp. 62-64. 
 
“Kahesh-e Senn-e Ruspigari/A Decrease in Prostitution Age.” Baztab-e Emruz, 24 Tir  
1391/ July 14, 2012. Accessed July 25, 2012. http://baztab.net/fa/news/10972/. 
 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah.  Sima-ye Zan dar Kalam-e Emam Khomeini/Women as  
Depicted in Imam Khomeini's Words. Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1
 369/1990.  
_______. Tahrir al-Vasileh, vol. 1, Chapter 129. 
 
_______. “Women’s Day Speech.” 25 Farvardin 1361/April 14, 1982. 
_______. Velayat-e Faqih: Hokomat-e Eslami/ Velayat-e Faqih and Islamic  
Government. Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1360/1981. 
 
M., Mina and Hassan Kh. Razha-ye Movafaghiyat dar Rabete-ye Jensi/ Secrets of  
Success in Sexual Relations. 3rd ed. Tehran: 1388/2009.  
 
Makarem Shirazi, Naser. “Comments on Exceptions of Sculptures and Statues.” Date not  
published. Accessed July 12, 2012. 
http://makarem.ir/websites/farsi/estefta/?mit=1121. 
 
“Mankan-ha-ye Sineh Borideh dar Vitrine-ha-ye Iran/ Cut-off Breasts of Mannequins in  
Iran’s Windowshops.” Radio Farda, 12 Azar 1385/December 3, 2006. Accessed  
June 5, 2012. http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f2_mancan/269913.html.    
 
“Mard-e Neylabakzan-e Ta’atr-e Shahr dar Kojast? / Where is the Flute Player of City 
Theater?” Rooznameh Aftab-e Yazd, 28 Aban 1386/ November 19, 2007.   






“Mard-e Neylabakzan, Hamchenan Montazer-e Mohasses Ast/ The Flute Player is Still  
Waiting for Mohasses.” Aftab News, 21 Esfand 1386/ March 11, 2008. Accessed  




Monfared, Afsaneh. “Baharestan.” Encyclopedia Islamica.com, date not published. 
Accessed July 5, 2012. 
http://www.encyclopaediaislamica.com/madkhal2.php?sid=2184. 
 
Montazarqha’em, Mehdi. Rouspigari dar Iran/ Prostitution in Iran. Tehran:  
Daneshgah-e Oloum-e Behzisti va Tavanbakhshi, 1384/2005.  
 
“Mo’arefi-ye Manteqeh-ye 11/ Introducing District 11.” Cultural Arts Organization for  




“Mo’arefi-ye Shoura-ye ‘Ali-ye Enqelab-e Farhangi/Introducing the Supreme Council of  
the Revolutionary Council.” Office of the Supreme Council of the Cultural  
Revolution. Accessed March 13, 2012.  
http://www.iranculture.org/fa/Default.aspx?current=viewDoc&currentID=1331. 
 
 “Mojassameh-ye Mard-e Neylabakzan Bazsazi Mishavad/ The Statue of Flute-playing 
Man Being Repaired.” Rooznameh-ye Iran, 13 Azar 1386/ December 4, 2007.  
Accessed February 14, 2012.  http://www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID=1531840.   
 
“Mokhalefan-e Ezdevaj-e Movaqat Cheh Migouyand?/ What Do the Opponents  
of Temporary Marriage Say?” Ebtekar News, Issue 949 (12 Tir 1386/ July 3,  
2007). 
 
“Namayesh-e Moushak-e Shahab-e Seh dar Meydan-e Baharestan-e Tehran /The  
Exhibition of Shahab-Three Missile in Tehran’s Baharestan Square.” BBC 
Persian, 3 Mehr 1387/September 24, 2008.  Accessed January 1,  2012.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/09/080924_mg-shahab3.shtml. 
 
Najmābādi, Mahmud.   Bala-ye Azim-e Nasl-e Bashar: Seflis va Souzak/ The Great  
Disaster of the Human Race: Syphilis and Gonorrhea. Tehran: Firdūsi, 1927. 
 
Naser, Bahonar and Homayoun Mohammadi. Gozargah-ha-ye Tablighat-e Bazargani az  
Aghaz ta Eslam/ The Passage of Commercial Advertising from the Beginning to  
Islam. Tehran: Pajouheshgah-e Farhang, Honar va Ertebatat: 1388/2009. 
“Navad va No Darsad-e Bimaran-e Jadid-e AIDS az Tariq-e Ravebet-e Jensi Mobtala  
Shodand/ 99 Percent of New AIDS Infections through Sexual Relations.” Fars  
News Agency, 9 Khordad 1391/ May 29, 2012.  Accessed June 3, 2012.  
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910309000837.  
 340 
“Negah-e beh Rouspigari dar Iran/A Glance at Prostitution in Iran/ A Glance at  
Prostitution in Iran.” Pyknet.net. Accessed August 10, 2011.  
www.pyknet.net/1384/jaftej/01esfan/62/pag/37ruspi.htm. 
“Negarani az Bazgasht-e Mojaddad Moj-e AIDS dar Zendanha-ye Iran/Worries for the 
Return of the AIDS Epidemic Wave Among Prisoners in Iran.” Emruz News, 13 
Esfand 1390/ March 3, 2012.  Accessed April 19, 2012. 
 http://www.emruznews.com/2012/03/post-9499.php.  
 
Osul va Mabani va Ravesh-ha-ye Ejraee-ye Gostaresh-e Farhang-e Efaf/ The Principles,  
Foundations, and Methods in Spreading a Chaste Culture. Shura-ye Aali-ye  
Enqelab-e Farhangi, 1376 Farvardin 14/ February 3, 1998. 
 
“Pari Bolandeh Kist?/ Who is Pari Bolandeh?” Mahitaabe (blog), 2010. Accessed  
July 15, 2011. http://mahitaabe.blogspot.com/2010/04/blog-post_25.html. 
  
“Qal’eh Shahr-e No 1965-1980/ Shahr-e No Quarter 1965-1980.” Iran Ministry of 
Culture and Art. Directed by Kamran Shirdel.  Tehran: N.p., 1980. 
 
“Rahandazi-ye Khane-ye Efaf baraye-e Tarvij-e ‘Sigheh’ dar Shahroud ba Estefadeh az 
Yek Veblog/ A Chastity House Established in Shahroud Advocating Sigheh via  
Blog.”  Al-Arabiya, January 8, 2011. Accessed November 20, 2011.  
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/08/132677.html.  
 
Sadeghi, Fatemeh. “Chera Hejab/Why the Hejab?” Meydaan.org, 25 Ordibehesht 1387/  
May 14, 2008. Accessed March 14, 2012. 
http://www.meydaan.com/Showarticle.aspx?arid=548. 
 
Sadr, Shadi.  Majmoueh-ye Qavanin va Moqararat-e Poushesh dar Jomhouri-ye Eslami- 
ye Iran/The Collection of Rules and Regulations of Dress in the Islamic Republic  
of Iran. Tehran: Ketab-e Nili, 1388/2009.  
 
“Salahshour: Cinema-ye Iran Fahesheh-khaneh Ast/ Salahshour: Iran’s House of Cinema 
is a Whorehouse.” Aftab News,   23 Mehr 23 1390/ October 15, 2011. Accessed 
February 14, 2014. http://aftabnews.ir/vdcepp8zwjh8xoi.b9bj.html.   
 
“Sarpoush bar Vaqiyati Oryan/ Covering Up the Naked Truth.” RadioZamaneh, 30 Tir 
1391/ July 20, 2012. Accessed July 27, 2012.  
http://www.radiozamaneh.com/society/khiyaban/2012/07/20/17202. 
 
“Sazeman-e Behzisti:  Bish az Panjah Darsad-e Kargaran-e Jensi, Zanan-e Mote’ahel  
Hastand/ State Welfare Organization:  More than 50 Percent of Sex Workers are 
Married Women.” BBC Persian, December 12, 2011. Accessed January 12, 2012.  





“Setiz ba Mojassameh/The Fight with Statues.”  BBC Persian, August 26, 2002.  
Accessed September 20, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/arts/020826_mj- 
mojassame.shtml.  
 
“Shahr-e No: Mazhar-e Fesad dar Qabl az Enqelab/Shahr-e No: The Symbol of Moral  
Corruption before the Revolution.” Tahrikh-e Moaaser-e Iran, 22 Ordibehesht  
1387/  May 11, 2008. Accessed November 21, 2011. 
http://bahman18.blogfa.com/post-11.aspx. 
  




Shahri, Ja’far.  Tarikh-e Ejtemaei-ye Tehran dar Qarn-e 13/The Social History of  
Tehran in the 13th (20th) Century.  Tehran: Rasa Publishing, 1368/1989. 
 
______.  Tehran-e Qadim/Old Tehran. Tehran: Moein Publishing, 1376/ 1997. 
 
“Sharayet va Zavabet-e Bargozari-ye Namayeshga-he Mode va Lebas dar Keshvar  
Eblagh Shod/ Conditions and Regulations on the Exhibtion of  Fashion and  
Clothing in the Country Announced.” Fars News Agency, 14 Sharivar 1387/ 
September 4, 2008. Accessed July1, 2012.  
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8706140288. 
 
“Sigheh:  Niyaz-e Mali, Mabna- ye Tahghir-e Zan-e Irani/Sigheh: Financial Need, the 
Reason for the Denigration of Iranian Women.” Gozaresh 215, no. 19 (Bahman 
1388/February 2009): pp. 10-11. 
 
“Tanforoushi baraye Afzayesh-e Keyfiyat-e Zendegi/Prostitution for the Purpose of 
Improving Quality of Life.” Salamat News, 22 Azar 1390/ December 2, 2011. 
Accessed January 20, 2012.  
http://salamatnews.com/viewNews.aspx?ID=38047&cat=12. 
 
“ ‘Tarvij-e Ezdevaj-e Movaqat’ va Mavan’e-e Shar-ei va Orfi/ ‘Promoting Temporary 
Marriage’ and Religious and Common Obstacles.” BBC Persian,  15 Khordad 
1396/ June 5, 2007.  Accessed September 11, 2011.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2007/06/070605_ka-short- 
marriage.shtml.   
 
“Tarvij-e Farhang-e Efaf va Hejab dar ‘Asar-e Honari Mored-e Nazar Gharar Girad/  
Encouraging a Culture of Chastity and Hejab in Works of Art Being Considered.” 
Mehr News, 17 Dey 1390/ December 24, 2011. Accessed March 13, 2012. 





“Tarh-ha-ye  Jayegozin-e Khaneha-ye Efaf?/Alternative Plans for Chastity Houses?”  
Women in Iran Website, 2 Mehr 1381/ September 24, 2002. Accessed November 
22, 2011. http://www.womeniniran.com/news/02-07-81/1-02-07-81.htm.  
 
Varvayyi, Akbar.  “Barrasi-ye Avamel-e Rouspigari-ye Kheyabani dar Tehran-e  
Bozorg/The Investigation of the Causes of Street Prostitution in Greater 
Tehran.” Ph.D diss., University of Tehran, School of Law and Political Science,  
2008. 
 
 “Vezarat-e Ershad Khaneh-ye Cinema ra Monhal Kard/ Ministry of Culture Dissolves 
House of  




“Yek Mohit-e Kamelan Farhangi Baraye Noh Hafte/ A Cultural Environment for 9  
Weeks.” Hamshahri News, 1388 Tir 22/ July 13, 2009. Accessed June 4, 2012.  
http://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news-85383.aspx. 
 
“Zanan va AIDS dar Iran: Az Enkar ta Paziresh/ Women and AIDS in Iran: From Denial 
to Acceptance.” Zanan 135 (Sharivar 1385/September 2006): pp. 50-55. 
 





Issue “Beh Atash Keshidan-e ‘Qal’eh-ye Shahr-e No’ va Koshtan-e Rouspeyan/ 
Shahr-e No Quarter Set on Fire and Prostitutes Killed.”( 9 Bahman 1357/ 
January 29, 1979) 
Enqelab Edition (10 Bahman 1357/ January 30, 1979)  
Issue 18 (14 Aban 1364/November 5, 1985) 
Issue (1 Dey 1377/ December 22, 1998) 
 
Kayhan 
Issue (12 Mehr 1337/ October 4, 1958). 
Issue 10755.  “Beh Hokm-e Dadgah-ha-ye Enqelab-e Eslami: Seh Zan va Chahar 
Mard Tirbaran Shodand/ The Islamic Revolutionary Courts Executed 
Three Women and Four Men by Firing Squad.” (21 Tir 1358/ July 12, 
1979) 
Issue 11053 (2 Mordad 1359/ July 24, 1980), p. 2. 
Issue  (23 Esfand 1361/ March 14, 1983). 
Issue, airmail edition (23 Bahman 1364/ February 12, 1986). 
Issue 10700 (20 Dey 1390/ January 10, 2012), front cover. 
Issue 19858 (29 Bahman 1388/ February 18, 2010). 
 
 343 
Zan-e Rouz/Today’s Women 
Issue 1 (1344/1966), cover page, “Introduction,” pp. 32-33. 
Issue 9 (Year 44) p. 32; Issue 650 (2536/1978).  
Issue 559 (Aban 2535/ November 1976), p. 18. 
Issue 595 (2535/1976), p. 22. 
Issue 597 (2535/ 1977), p. 8-9, 12-13. 
Issue 599 (Aban 2535/November 1976), pp. 18-19.  
Issue 638 (2536/1978), p. 24. 
Issue 657 (2536/1978), p. 91. 
Issue 681 (Khordad 2537/June 1978), p. 22. 
Issue 735 (1358/1980), pp. 52-53. 
Issue 748  (21 Dey 1358/January 11, 1980), p. 38-39, 42. 
Issue 750 (1358/1980), pp. 10-11, 56. 
Issue 757  Norooz edition (5 Esfand 1358/ February 24, 1980), pp. 28-29. 
Issue 851 (1361/1982) pp. 46-48. 
Issue 853 (Bahman 1360/February 1982), “Begoo! Begoo!,” p. 62. 
Issue 1041 (16 Farvardin 1365 /April 5, 1985), pp. 26-27.  
Issue 1045  (Azar 1364/November 1985), pp.  4-5, 52-53, 58. 
Issue 1093 (24 Aban 1365/November 15, 1986), p. 23. 
Issue 1098 (29 Azar 1365/December 20, 1986), p. 4. 
Issue 1112 (22 Farvardin 1366/April 11, 1987), p. 18.   
Issue 1117 (Ordibehesht 1366/ May 16, 1987), pp. 12-13, 26. 

























Part II: English Sources 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
 
______. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University  
Press, 1982. 
 
______. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California  
Press, 1993. 
 
______. “The 1953 Coup in Iran.” Science & Society 65, no. 2 (Summer 2001): pp. 182- 
215. 
 
______. The Iranian Mojahedin. New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1989. 
 
Abu-Lughod, Lila.  "Fieldwork of a Dutiful Daughter." Arab Women in the Field:  
Studying Your Own Society, ed.  S. Altorki & C. Fawzi El-Solh.  Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press,  
1988). 
 
Abu-Raddad, Laith.  “Characterizing the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Time for Strategic Action.” World Bank, June 2010.  Accessed 
April 14, 2012.  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,co
ntentMDK:22632787~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:256299,00.html.   
 
Afary, Janet.  Sexual Politics in Modern Iran.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2009. 
 
Afkhami, Mahnaz. “Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran: A Feminist Perspective.” In In 
the Eye of the Storm:  Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” edited by Mahnaz  
Afkhami and Erika Friedl, pp. 5-18. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994. 
 
Afkhami, Amir Arsalan. “From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of 
Addiction in Contemporary Iran.” In  Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, 
Politics, edited by Ali Gheissari, pp. 194-210. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
Afshar, Haleh. “Women, State and Ideology in Iran.” Third World Quarterly 7, no. 2
 (April 1985): pp. 256-278. 
Aghajanian, Akbar. “Family Planning and Contraceptive Use in Iran, 1967-1992.”




Ahmed, Leila.  Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
 
“AIDS Special Services:  Activities for AIDS Victims: Single Mother Families &  
Children.” SPASDI, August 1, 2010.  Accessed April 14, 2012.  
http://spasdi.ir/en/?p=52. 
 
Alavi, Nasrin. We are Iran. London: Portobello Books Ltd, 2005. 
  
Alcoff, Linda Martin. Visible Identities, Race, Gender, and the Self . New York: Oxford  
University Press, 2006. 
 
Alizadeh, Parvin. The Economy of Iran: The Dilemmas of an Islamic State. London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2000. 
Allam, Hannah. “Iran’s AIDS-Prevention Program among World’s Most Progressive.”  
Knight Rider, April 14, 2006.  
 
Altorki, Soraya and Camillia Fawzi El-Solh. Arab Women in the Field: Studying Your  
Own Society. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988.  
 
“American Social Health Association Records, 1905-2005.” Social Welfare History 
 Archives, University of Minnesota Libraries, 2002. Accessed December 10,  
2011. http://special.lib.umn.edu/findaid/xml/sw0045.xml. 
 
Amin, Camron Michael. “Selling and Saving ‘Mother Iran’: Gender and the Iranian Press  
in the 1940s.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001):  
pp. 335-361. 
 
_______. The Making of the Modern Iranian Women: Gender, State Policy and Popular 
Culture, 1865-1946. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002. 
 
Amnesty International.  Iran: End Executions by Stoning Report. London:  Amnesty  
International Publications, 2008. 
 
_______.  “Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report.” Amnesty  
International, February 1980. Accessed January 3, 2012.   
http://www.iranomid.com/en/ARCHVS/TheIRIReport.pdf.  
 
_______.  “Iran: The Last Executioner of Children.” Amnesty International, June 27,  
2007.  Accessed February 13, 2012.  
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=17401.   
 
Amuzegar, Jahangir. “Khatami and the Iranian Economy at Mid-Term.” Middle East 




Anderson, Stephanie. “Cliches of Australian Aborigines: Photography and Raciology,  
 Paris, 1885.” In Reading Images, Viewing Texts: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives,  
edited by Louise Maurer and Roger Hillman, pp. 13-30.  Berne: Peter Lang S.A.,  
2006.  
 
Ansari, Ali. Iran under Ahmadinejad:  The Politics of Confrontation. Abingdon: 
  Routledge, 2007.  
 
______. Iran, Islam and Democracy:  The Politics of Managing Change. London: 
Chatham House, 2006. 
 
______. “The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization'  
and the Consolidation of Power.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (July 2001): 
pp. 1-24. 
 
Apple, Rima. Mothers & Medicine:  A Social History of Infant Feeding 1890-1950. 
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.  
 
Arjomand, Said Amir. After Khomeini:  Iran Under His Successors. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press Inc., 2009.  
 
______. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
 
Arnold, Thomas. “Symbolism and Islam.” The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs 
54, no. 307 (October 1928): pp. 154-156. 
 
Arondekar, Anjali R. For the Record: On Sexuality and the Colonial Archive in India.  
Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.  
 
Avery, Peter, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds. The Cambridge History of Iran, 
Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, Volume 7. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Ayatollahi, Habibollah.  The Book of Iran:  The History of Iranian Art. Tehran: 
Organization for Islamic Culture and Communications & Center for International- 
Cultural Studies, 2003. 
 
Babayan, Kathryn and Afsaneh Najmabadi, eds. Islamicate Sexualities:  Translations 
across Temporal Geographies of Desire.  Boston: President and Fellows of  
Harvard College, 2008.  
 
“Biography: Part One.” Bahman Mohassess Foundation, 2012. Accessed February 13,  
2012.  http://bahmanmohassess.com/life/biography-part-one.  
 
Bakhash, Shaul. “The Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1989.” The Wilson Quarterly 
(1976-) 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): pp. 54-62. 
 347 
Barnes, DB. “Reproductive Decisions for Women with HIV:  Motherhood’s Role in 
 Envisioning a Future.” Qualitative Health Research Journal 19, no. 4 (April  
2009): pp. 481-491. 
 
Barnett, Tony and Alan Whiteside. AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and 
Globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.   
 
Barry, Kathleen.  The Prostitution of Sexuality.  New York and London: New York  
University Press, 1995.  
 
Bartlett, Allison. Breastwork:  Rethinking Breastfeeding.  Sydney:  University of New 
South Wales Press, Ltd., 2005. 
 
Bayat, Asef.  Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran. New York: Columbia  
University Press, 1997.  
 
_______. “Tehran: Paradox City.” New Left Review 66 (November/ December 2010):  
pp. 99-122. 
 
Behnoud, Masoud. “The Ideal Islamic State: An Unattainable Quest.” Abdolkarim  




Bell, Emma, Promise Mthembu, Sue O'Sullivan, and Kevin Moody. “Sexual and  
Reproductive Health Services and HIV Testing: Perspectives and Experiences of  
Women and Men Living with HIV and AIDS.” Reproductive Health Matters 15:  
29, Supplement: Ensuring Sexual and Reproductive Health for People Living with  
HIV: Policies, Programmes and Health Services (May 2007): pp. 113-136. 
 
Bell, Shannon. Reading, Writing, and Rewriting the Prostitute Body. Bloomington:  
Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
Blum, Linda. "Mothers, Babies, and Breastfeeding in Late Capitalist America:  The  
Shifting Contexts of Feminist Theory.” Feminist Studies 19, no. 2 (Summer 
1993): pp. 291-311. 
Bochner, Arthur. “Embracing Contingencies of Lived Experience in the Study of Close  
 Relationships.” Keynote lecture to the International Conference on Personal  
Relationships, Oxford University, 1990.  
 
Boroujerdi, Mehrzad.  Iranian Intellectuals and the West:  The Tormented Triumph of  
Nativism. Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1996. 
  
Bosworth, Clifford, E. Van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, and Ch Pellat. Encyclopedia of  
 Islam, Second Edition, Volume VII. London: Brill Academic Publishing, 1993. 
 
 348 
Bourdieu, Pierre.  Photography:  A Middle-brow Art.  Translated by Shaun Whiteside.  
Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1990.  
 
Bozorgmehr, Kayvan. “Head of Sociology Association of Iran announces: Drop in  
Prostitution Age in Iran.” Roozonline, June 15, 2011. Accessed January 12, 2012.  
 http://www.roozonline.com/english/news3/newsitem/article/drop-in-prostitution- 
age-in-iran.html.   
 
Bucar, Elizabeth. Creative Conformity:  The Feminist Politics of U.S. Catholic and  
Iranian Shi'i Women. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011.  
Butler, Judith. “Performative and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology  
and Feminist Theory.” Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (December 1988): pp. 519-531.  
 
______. Subjects of Desire. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
 
______.  “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire.”  In The Cultural Studies Reader, edited by 
Simon During, pp. 340-354. New York:  Routledge, 1993. 
______. Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge,
 1999. 
Carter, Pam. Feminism, Breasts and Breast-Feeding. New York:  St. Martin’s Press,
 1995. 
 
Chehabi, Houshang. Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation  
Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini. Ithaca: Cornell University  
Press, 1990. 
 
______. “Stating the Emperor’s New Clothes:  Dress Codes and Nation-Building under 
Reza Shah.” Iranian Studies 26, no. ¾ (Summer-Autumn 1993): pp. 209-229. 
 
Chelkowski, Peter J., and Hamid Dabashi. Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. New York: New York University Press, 1999.  
 
Cherifati-Merabtine, Doria. “Algeria at a Crossroads:  National Liberation, Islamization, 
and Women.” In Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim 
Societies, edited by Valentine Moghadam, pp. 40-62. London: Zed Books, 1994. 
 
Choay, Françoise. The Invention of the Historic Monument.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2001.  
 
Christensen, Janne Bjerre. Drugs, Deviancy and Democracy in Iran:
 the Interaction of State and Civil Society. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.  
 
 349 
Cichocki, Mark. Living with HIV: A Patient’s Guide.  North Carolina:  McFarland & 
Company, Inc., 2009. 
 
Crawford, Robert. “The Boundaries of the Self and the Unhealthy Other: Reflections on 
Health, Culture and AIDS.” Social Science & Medicine 38, no. 10 (1994): pp.  
1347-1365. 
 
Dabashi, Hamid. “In the Absence of the Face.” Social Research 67, no. 1 (Spring 2000):  
pp. 127-185. 
 
______.“Body-less faces: Mutilating Modernity and Abstracting Women in an ‘Islamic  
Cinema.’” Visual Anthropology 10, no. 2 (1998): pp. 361-380. 
 
______. The Green Movement in Iran.  New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011. 
 
______. Iran: A People Interrupted. New York: New Press, 2008. 
 
______.  Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest. Boston: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011. 
 
______. “Shirin Neshat: Transcending the Boundaries of an Imaginative Geography.” 
In The Lat Word, edited by Octavio Zaya.  San Sebastian, Spain, Museum of  
Modern Art, 2005. 
 
______. Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic                
  Revolution in Iran. New Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 2006.  
 
Dalla, Rochelle L. et al. Global Perspectives on Prostitution and Sex Trafficking. 
Lanham: Lexington, 2011.  
 
Day, Carolyn, Bijan Nassirimanesh, Anthony Shakeshaft, and Kate Dolan. “Patterns of  
Drug Use among a Sample of Drug Users and Injecting Drug Users Attending a  
General Practice in Iran.” Harm Reduction Journal 3, no. 1 (2006): pp. 1-5. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles.  Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert  
Galeta.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Translated by Eric Prenowitz.   
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.  
 
Doezema, Jo.  "Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution  
Dichotomy." In Global Sex Workers, edited by Kamala Kempadoo and Jo  





______.   “Loose Women or Lost Women? The Re-emergence of the Myth of White  
 Slavery in Contemporary Discourses of Trafficking in Women.” Gender Issues 
 18, no. 1 (January 2000): pp. 23-50. 
 
Douglas, Mary. “The Two Bodies.” In Natural Symbols:  Explorations in Cosmology,  
pp.69-87.  London and New York:  Routledge, 1996. 
“Dr. Minoo Mohraz Streses on the Prevention of Diseases such as HIV/AIDS for 
Maintaining a Healthy Society.” Tehran University of Medical Sciences Public 
Relations News,  December 7, 2011. Accessed June 1, 2012. 
http://publicrelations.tums.ac.ir/english/news/detail.asp?newsID=29111. 
 
Ekhtiar, Maryam and Marika Sardar. “Modern and Contemporary Art in Iran.” Heilbrunn  
Timeline of Art History.  New York:  The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000. 
 
Ellis, Carolyn, Michael C. Flaherty, and Michael G. Flaherty, eds. Investigating 
Subjectivity:  Research on Lived Experience. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 
1992. 
 
“Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS 2008 Update.” Islamic Republic of Iran,  
October 2008.  Accessed April 13, 2012.   
http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2008/full/EFS2008_IR.pdf. 
 
“Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections: 2004 
Update for Iran.” UNAIDS/WHO, pp. 1-14.  Accessed April 10, 2012. 
 http://data.unaids.org/publications/Fact-Sheets01/iran_en.pdf. 
 
Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, s.v. “rada” or “rida.”  
Entessar, Nader. “Criminal Law and the Legal System in Revolutionary Iran.” Boston 
College Third World Law Journal 8, no. 1 (January 1988):  pp. 91-102. 
 
Esfandiari, Golnaz.  “Iran:  Tehran Begins to Confront the ‘Time Bomb’ of HIV/AIDS.”  
RFERL, November 10, 2003. Accessed April 2, 2012. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1104954.html. 
 
______. “Iran Reportedly Removes World AIDS Day from State Calendar.” RFERL,  




Esfandiari, Haleh.  My Prison, My Home: One Woman’s Story of Captivity in Iran. New 
York: HarperCollins, 2009. 
 
______. Reconstructed Lives:  Women & Iran’s Islamic Revolution.  Baltimore: Johns  




Ewen, Stuart. Captains Of Consciousness Advertising And The Social Roots Of the  
Consumer Culture.  New York: Basic Books, 2001.  
 
Falah, Ghazi-Walid, and Caroline Rose. Nagel. Geographies of Muslim Women: Gender, 
 Religion, and Space. New York: Guilford, 2005.  
 
Fallahi et al. “Stigma, Discrimination, and the Consequences of HIV-AIDS for People 
Living with It in Iran.” Life Science Journal 8, no. 4 (2011): pp. 503-510. 
 
Farhi, Farideh. “Religious Intellectuals, the ‘Woman Question,’ and the Struggle for the  
Creation of a Democratic Public Sphere in Iran,” International Journal of  
Politics, Culture, and Society 15: 2 (Winter 2001): pp. 315-339. 
 
Farman Farmaian, Sattareh. Daughter of Persia: A Woman’s Journey from Her Father’s   
Harem through the Islamic Revolution.  New York: Anchor Book, 1993. 
 
Fathi, Nazila. “To Regulate Prostitution, Iran Ponders Brothels.” New York Times, 




Feizzadeh, A. “Evidence-based Approach to HIV/AIDS Policy and Research 
 Prioritization in Islamic Republic of Iran.”  Eastern Mediterranean Health 
  Journal 16, no. 3 (March 2010): pp. 259-265. 
 
Fendall, N. R. E. “A Comparison of Family Planning Programs in Iran and Turkey.”  
HSMHA Health Reports 86, no. 11 (November 1971): pp. 1011-1024. 
 
Fetterman, D. M. Ethnography: Step-by –Step. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks:  Sage, 2002. 
 
Floor, Willem. "Venereal Disease in Iran (1855-2005): A Public Affair." Comparative  
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26, no. 2 (2006): pp. 260-278. 
 
______.   A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran.  Washington D.C.: Mage  
Publishers, 2008.  
 
______. “The Art of Smoking in Iran and Other Uses of Tobacco.” Iranian Studies  
35, no. 1-3 (Winter, Spring, Summer 2002): pp. 47-85. 
 
Forest, Benjamin and Juliet Johnson. “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era  
Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow.” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 92, no. 3 (September 2002): pp. 524-547. 
 
Foucault, Michel and Jay Miskowiec. “Of Other Spaces.” Diacritcs 16, no. 1 (Spring 
 1986): pp. 22-27. 
 
 352 
Foucault, Michel.  The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.   
Routledge: New York, 1970.  
 
______.  The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New 
York: Pantheon, 1972.  
 
______. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Penguin Group, 1991.  
 
______. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure. Translated by R. Hurley. 
London: Penguin, 1985. 
 
______.  “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982): pp. 777- 
795. 
 
Fuch Ebaugh,  Helen Rose.  Becoming an Ex: The Process of Role Exit. Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1988.  
Garber. Marjorie. Vested Interests: Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety. New York:  
Routledge, 1997. 
 
Ghasemi, Shahpour. “Kayhan Newspaper.” Iran Chamber Society,  2006. Accessed  
December 14, 2011. 
http://www.iranchamber.com/media/articles/kayhan_newspaper.php. 
 
Goffman, Erving. “Embodied Information in Face-to-Face Interaction.” In The Body: A  
Reader, edited by Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco, pp. 82-88. Routledge: New  
York, 2005. 
 
_____. Stigma. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1991. 
 
Gholi Majd, Mohammad. Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran.  
Gainesville:  University Press of Florida, 2000. 
 
The Global Fund. “Who We Are.” The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Turberculosis and 
Malaria, 2012. Accessed April 30, 2012. 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/whoweare/. 
 
Grondahl, Paul. "Doctor Released from Iranian Prison." Times Union, June 13, 2011. 
Accessed March 20, 2012.  http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Doctor-
 released-from-Iranian-prison-I-struggle-1420477.php#ixzz1PXaIeC00. 
 
Haghayeghi, Mehrdad. “Politics and Ideology in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 1 (January 1993): pp. 36-52. 
 
Haeri, Shahla "Power of Ambiguity: Cultural Improvisations on the Theme of Temporary  
Marriage.” Iranian Studies 19, no. 2 (Spring 1986): pp. 123-154. 
 
 353 
______.  Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran.  London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd,  
1989.  
 
______. “Marriage and the State in Iran:  An Islamic Discourse on Female Sexuality.”  
Social Research 49, no. 1, Religion and Politics (Spring 1992): pp. 201-223. 
 
______.  “A Reply to Ziba Mir-Hosseini.” International Journal of Middle East Studies  
30, no. 3 (August 1998): pp. 471-472. 
 
Hakakian, Roya.  Journey from the Land of No. New York:  Crown Publishers, 2004. 
 
Hamilton, Margaret. “Opposition to the Contagious Diseases Acts, 1864-1886.” Albion:  
A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 10, no. 1 (Spring 1978): pp. 14-27. 
Hays, Sharon. The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood. New Haven:  Yale 
UniversityPress, 1996.  
 
Hirschman, Elizabeth C. and Craig J. Thompson. “Why Media Matter: Toward a Richer  
Understanding of Consumers' Relationships with Advertising and Mass Media.”  
Journal of Advertising 26, no. 1 (Spring 1997): pp. 43-60. 
HIV/AIDS in Iran (Cumulative Statistics) Tehran 2004 Report. Iran Center for Disease  
Management, Office of the Deputy for Public Health, Ministry of Health and 
Medical Education of the I.R. Iran, 2004.  
 
Honarbin-Holliday, Mehri. Becoming Visible in Iran. London: Tauris Academic Studies,  
2008. 
 
Hooshmand, Parvaneh. “Sexualities. Practices. Iran.” Encyclopedia of Women in Islamic  
Cultures: Family, Law and Politics 3,  edited by Suad Joseph and Afsaneh  
Najmabadi, pp. 384-386. Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2005.  
 
Hosseinkhah, Maryam.  The Execution of Women in Iranian Criminal Law:  An 
Examination of the Impact of Gender on Laws Concerning Capital Punishment in 
the New Islamic Penal Code. New Haven: Iran Human Rights Documentation  
Center, 2012. 
 
Howard, I.K.A. “Mut'a Marriage Reconsidered in the Context of the Formal Procedures  
for Islamic Marriage.”Journal of Semitic Studies 20 (1975): pp 82-92. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the  
Persistence of Traditional Values.”  American Sociological Review 65, no. 1, 
Looking Forward, Looking Back: Continuity and Change at the Turn of the 
Millenium  (February 2000): pp. 19-51. 
 
“Iran Anti-vice Chief in ‘Brothel.’” BBC News, April 16, 2008.   
 354 
    Accessed August 21, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7350165.stm.   
 
“Iran Crisis: Live.” The Guardian.co.uk, June 19, 2009. Accessed July 31, 2011.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2009/jun/19/iran-unrest. 
 
“Iran Crisis: Live.” The Guardian.co.uk, June 24, 2009. Accessed January 1, 2012. 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2009/jun/24/iran-crisis.   
 
“Iran Currency Exchange Rate History:  1975-2012.”  Farsinet.com. Accessed July 3, 
2012. http://www.farsinet.com/toman/exchange.html. 
 
“Iran-Iran: AIDS Awareness to Include Schools.” IRIN News, June 25, 2002. Accessed 
April 30, 2012. http://www.irinnews.org/Report/40944/IRAN-IRAN-AIDS-
awareness-to-include- schools.  
 
“Iran Intensifies Campaign against HIV.” Fars News Agency, November 11, 2008. 
Accessed June 1, 2012.
 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8709061775.  
 
“Iran Juggles with Taboos, Holds First of Prostitutes and Police.” Payvand.com,  
December 7, 2002. Accessed  January 12, 2012.
 http://www.netnative.com/news/02/dec/1032.html.   
“Iran Marks World AIDS Day.” Press TV, November 30, 2011.  Accessed June 4, 2012.  
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/213079.html.   
 
“Iran:  New ‘Morality Police’ Units Generate Controversy.” RFERF, July 25, 2002.   
Accessed June 14, 2012. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1100367.html. 
 
“Iran’s Youth Reveal Anger and Sadness.” BBC News, December 10, 2002.  
Accessed January 12, 2012. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2563413.stm. 
 
“Iranian Artist Bahman Mohasses Dies at 79.” Tehran Times,  July 3,  2010.  Accessed 
February 12, 2012. http://old.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=223931. 
 
 “IRIB Bans Smoking Scenes in Iranian Productions.” Mehr News, May 1, 2011.  
Accessed September 18, 2011.  
http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1226049.   
Gatens, Moira. Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. London and New





Gheissari, Ali and  Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji. “New Conservative Politics and Electoral 
 355 
Behavior in Iran.” In  Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics, edited by 
Ali Gheissari, pp. 275-298.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Giladi, Avner. Infants, Parents and Wet Nurses:  Medieval Islamic Views on
 Breastfeeding and their Social Implications. Leiden and Boston:  Brill, 1999. 
Gillespie, Alex and Flora Cornish. “Intersubjectivity:  Towards a Dialogical Analysis.”
 Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 40, no. 1 (2009): pp. 19-46. 
 
Grondahl, Paul. "Doctor Released from Iranian Prison." Times Union, June 13, 2011.  
Accessed March 20, 2012.  http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Doctor-
 released-from-Iranian-prison-I-struggle-1420477.php#ixzz1PXaIeC00.    
 
Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies:  Toward a Corporeal Feminism.  Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994.  
Herek, Gregory, Keith Widaman, and John Capitanio. “When Sex Equals AIDS: 
Symbolic Stigma and Heterosexual Adults’ Inaccurate Beliefs about Sexual 
Transmission of AIDS.” Social Problems 52, no. 1 (2005): pp. 15-37.  
“HIV Facts: The Basics.” National AIDS Trust, 2012.  Accessed April 20, 2012.  
 http://www.nat.org.uk/HIV-Facts/The-basics.aspx. 
 
Jahanpour, Farhang. “The Rise and Fall of the Tudedh Party.”  The World Today 40, no.  
4. (April 1984):  pp. 152-159.  
 
Jenkins, Thomas. “Emotional Prostheses: Bodily Technologies for Emotional  
Expression.” ThomasJenkins.net, 2008. Accessed September 9, 2011.  
http://www.thomasjenkins.net/prostheses/EmotionalProstheses.pdf. 
 
Jibouri, Yasin. “Uswat al-Aarifeen. A Look at the Life of Ayatollah Bahjat.” Ahlul Bayt
 Digital Islamic Library Project, 2005.  Accessed 15 March 2012. 
 http://www.al-islam.org/uswat_alarifin/.   
 
Kabbash, I.A. et al. “Needs Assessment and Coping Strategies of Persons Infected with  
HIV in Egypt.” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 14, no. 6 (2008): pp. 1-13.  
Kalkhoran, Sara and Lauren Hale. “AIDS Education in an Islamic Nation:  Content
 Analysis of Farsi-language AIDS-education Materials in Iran.” Promotion &
 Education Journal 15, no. 3 (2008): pp. 21-25. 
 
Kamali Dehghan, Saeed. “Homosexuals are Inferior to Dogs and Pigs, Says Iranian 





Kar, Mehrangiz. Crossing the Red Line:  The Struggle for Human Rights in Iran.  
 356 
Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishing, 2006.  
 
______.  “The Invasion of the Private Sphere in Iran.” Social Research 70, no. 3 (Fall  
2003): pp. 829-836. 
 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in  
Iran. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
 
______.Frontier Fictions:  Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press,  1999. 
 
______. “The Politics of Reproduction:  Maternalism and Women’s Hygiene in Iran,  
1896-1941.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2006): pp. 1-29.  
 
Kates, Steven and Glenda Shaw-Garlock. “The Ever Entangling Web: A Study of  
Ideologies and Discourses in Advertising to Women.” Journal of Advertising 28, 
no. 2 (Summer 1999):  pp. 33-49. 
 
Kaveh Golestan 1950-2003: Recording the Truth in Iran. Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje  
Canz Publishers, 2007.  
 
Keddie, Nikki and Yann Richard. Modern Iran:  Roots and Results of Revolution. New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.  
 
Kempadoo, Kamala, and Jo Doezema. Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and  
Redefinition. New York: Routledge, 1998.  
 
Khatib-Chahidi, Jane. “Sexual Prohibitions, Shared Space and ‘Fictive’ Marriages in 
Shi’ite Iran.” Women and Space: Ground Rules and Social Maps, edited by 
Shirley Ardener, pp. 112-134. Oxford: Bloomsbury, 1997. 
 
Khomeini, Ruhollah.  According to the Tahrir al-Vasilah of Ayatollah ‘Uzma Imam 
 Khomeini. Translated by Laleh Bakhtiar.  Tehran:  Foreign Department of Bonyad 
 Ba’that, 1986.  
 
______. “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology.” MERIP Reports, no. 88. 
 Iran’s Revolution: The First Year (June 1980): pp. 22-25. 
 
Khosrovani, Firouzeh. “Rough Cut,” Tehran:  n.p. 2007. 
 
Kian-Thiebaut, Azadeh. Les Femmes Iraniennes entre Islam, Etat et Famille.  




Kilvington, Judith, Sophie Day, and Helen Ward. “Prostitution Policy in Europe: A Time  
 357 
of Change?” Feminist Review 67, Sex Work Reassessed (Spring 2001): 
 pp. 78-93. 
 
Labi, Nadya. “Married for a Minute.” Mother Jones, March/April 20120. Accessed 
November 10, 2011. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/03/temporary- 
marriage-iran-islam. 
 
Lambek, Michael. “Taboo as Cultural Practice among Malagasy Speakers.” Man 27, no. 
2 (June 1992):  pp. 245-266. 
 
Lawrence, R.A. Breastfeeding:  A Guide for the Medical Profession. Princeton:   
Mosby, 1994.  
 
Lazreg, Marnia. Questioning the Veil: Open Letters to Muslim Women. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2009.  
 
______. “Feminism and Difference:  The Perils of Writing as a Woman on Women in  
Algeria.” Feminist Studies 14, no. 1 (Spring 1988): pp. 81-107. 
 
LeCompte, Margaret and Jean Schensul. Designing and Conducting Ethnographic 
Research. London: AltaMira Press, 2010. 
 
Lefebvre, Henri.  The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith.  
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991.  
 
Leiss, William, Stephen Kline, Sut Jhally and Jacqueline Botterill. Social Communication  
in Advertising:  Persons, Products and Images of Well-Being.  London:  
Routledge, 1997.  
 
Leslie, D. A. “Global Scan: The Globalization of Advertising Agencies, Concepts, and  
Campaigns.” Economic Geography 71, no. 4 (October 1995): pp. 402-426. 
Levin, David Michael. The Body’s Recollection of Being. London: Routledge, 1985. 
 
Levine, Phillipa. Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British 
Empire. London:  Routledge, 2003. 
Liamputtong, P.,  N. Haritavorn, and N. Kiatgying-Angsulee. “HIV and AIDS, Stigma
 and AIDS Support Groups: Perspectives from Women Living with HIV and
 AIDS in Central Thailand.” Social Science & Medicine 69 (2009): pp. 862-868.  
“National AIDS Trust Press Release.” National AIDS Trust, February 2011. 
Accessed April 20, 2012. http://www.nat.org.uk/News-and-
Media/PressReleases/2011/February/MORI%20survey%20%20knowledge%20an
d%20attitud  es%20to%20HIV.aspx.   
 
Maddah, Mohsen. “Breastfeeding Rates in Iran:  Why is There Such a Large Gap 
 358 
between Iran and Other Countries.” Journal of Human Lactation 24, no. 149 
(April 2008), doi: 10.1177/0890334408316087. 
 
Mahdavi, Pardis. Passionate Uprisings (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2009) 
 
______. “Who Will Catch Me if I Fall? Health and the Infrastructure of  
Risk for Urban Young Iranians.” In Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society,  
Politics, edited by Ali Gheissari, pp. 150-193.  Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
2009. 
 
Mahdavi, Shireen. “Women and the Shii Ulama in Iran.” Middle Eastern Studies 19, no.1  
(January 1983): pp. 17-27. 
 
Makhlouf Obermeyer, Carla. “Reproductive Choice in Islam:  Gender and State in Iran 
and Tunisia.” Studies in Family Planning 25, no. 1 (January-February 1994): pp. 
41-51. 
 
Marcus, Michelle I. "Dressed to Kill: Women and Pins in Early Iran." Oxford Art Journal  
17, no. 2 (1994): pp. 3-15. 
 
Massad, Joseph.  Desiring Arabs.  Chicago: University of Press, 2007.  
 
May, Tim. Qualitative Research in Action. London: SAGE, 2002.  
 
Maynard, Mary and June Purvis. Researching Women's Lives from a Feminist  
Perspective. London: Taylor & Francis, 1994.  
 
Maynes, Mary Jo., Jennifer L. Pierce, and Barbara Laslett. Telling Stories: The Use of  
Personal Narratives in the Social Sciences and History. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008.  
 
Mazo Karras, Ruth. “The Regulation of Brothels in Later Medieval England.” Signs 14,  
no. 2 (Winter 1989): pp. 399-433. 
 
McLarney, Ellen. “The Burqa in Vogue: Fashioning Afghanistan.” Journal of Middle  
East Women's Studies 5, no. 1 (Winter 2009): pp. 1-20. 
Mehrdad, Ramin. “Health System in Iran.” Japan Medical Association Journal 52, no. 1
 (2009):  pp. 69-73.   
 
Mehryar, Amir, Shirin Ahmad-Nia, and Shahla Kazemipour. “Reproductive Health in 
Iran:  Pragmatic Achievements, Unmet Needs, and Ethical Challenges in a  




Menon, Kesava. “Flesh is Weaker in Moralistic Iran.” The Hindu, January 27, 2001. 
 359 
Accessed December 2, 2011. 
http://www.hindu.com/2001/01/28/stories/03280009.htm. 
 
Mercer, Ramona. Becoming a Mother:  Research on Maternal Identity from Rubin to the  
Present. New York:  Springer, 1995. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Routledge and 
 Kegan Paul. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
______. “The Invisible and the Invisible.” In Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings,
 edited by Thomas Baldwin. London:  Routledge, 2004. 
______. “The Phenomenology of Perception.’” In Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic
 Writings, edited by Thomas Baldwin. London:  Routledge, 2004.  
 
Mernissi, Fatima. The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist’s Interpretation of Women’s 
Rights in Islam. New York:  Basic Books, 1991. 
 
Michels, Dia and Naomi Baumslag. Milk, Money, and Madness:  The Culture and 
Politics of Breastfeeding. Bergen & Garvey Trade: Westport, CT, 1995.  
 
Milani, Abbas. Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran 1941- 
1979 Volume 2. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008.  
 
Milani, Farzaneh:  Veiling and Words:  The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers.   
Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1992. 
 
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. “The Conservative: Reformist Conflict over Women’s Rights in 
Iran.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 16, no.1 (Fall 2002):  
pp. 37-53. 
 
______. “Divorce, Veiling and Feminism in Post-Khomeini Iran.” In Women and  
Politics in the Third World, edited by Haleh Afshar, pp. 142-170.  London:  
Routledge, 1996.  
______.  Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran. Princeton:  
 Princeton University Press, 1999.  
 
______.  Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law. London:  I.B. Tauris,  
2000. 
 
______. “Muslim Women's Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and  
Feminism.” Critical Inquiry 32, no. 4 (Summer 2006): pp. 629-645. 
 
______.  “A Response to Shahla Haeri's Review of Marriage on Trial, A Study of  
Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco.” International Journal of Middle East  
Studies 30, no. 3 (August 1998): pp. 469-475.   
Moallem, Minoo. Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism  
 360 
and the Politics of Patriarchy in Iran. Berkeley: University of California, 2005. 
 
“Modesty Discourses.” In Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures:   
Family, Law, and Politics, edited by Suad Joseph and Afsaneh Najmabadi, pp. 
494-498. Leiden:  Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005. 
 
Moghadam, Valentine. “Gender and Revolutionary Transformation:  Iran 1979 and East  
Central Europe 1989.” Gender and Society 9, no. 3 (June 1995): pp. 328-358. 
 
______.  "Hidden from History? Women Workers in Modern Iran."    
 Iranian Studies 33, no. 3/4 (Summer - Autumn 2000): pp. 377-401. 
 
______.  Modernizing Women:  Gender and Social Change in the Middle East.  Boulder:  
  Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
 
______. "Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women: Gender Politics in Iran and  
Afghanistan." Social Text  22 (Spring 1989): pp. 40-61. 
 
Moghissi, Haideh.  Women and Islam:  Social Conditions, Obstacles, and Prospects. 
  New York:  Routledge, 2005. 
 
Mohammadi, Mohammad Reza et al. “Reproductive Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior 
among Adolescent Males in Tehran, Iran.”  International Family Planning 
Perspectives 32, no. 1 (March 2006):  pp. 35-44. 
Mohammadpour,  Ali  et  al. “Coming  to Terms with  a Diagnosis  of HIV in  Iran:  A  
 Phenomenological Study.”  Journal of the Association  of Nurses in AIDS Care 
20, no. 4 (July/August 2009): pp. 249 – 259. 
 
Moin, Baquer.  Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1999.  
 
Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver  
Shi’ism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.  
 
Montazeri, Ali. "AIDS Knowledge and Attitudes in Iran: Results from a Population- 
based Survey in Tehran.” Patient Education and Counseling 57 (2005): pp. 199- 
203. 
 
Moore, Tami. “The Bartering of Female Sexuality.” In Global Perspectives on 
Prostitution and Sex Trafficking, edited by Rochelle Dalla, Lynda M. Baker, John 





Morovati, Sohrab.  "Iranian Police Declare War on Prostitution." Agence France Presse, 




Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. Oxford: One 
World, 2000. 
 
Mottahedeh, Negar. Displaced Allegories:  Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema. Durham:  
 Duke University Press, 2008. 
 
Movahed M. and Shoaa S. “On Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among Iranian Students 
(Case Study: High School Students in Shiraz City).” Pakistan Journal of 
Biological Sciences 13, no. 6 (March 2010): pp. 271-278. 
 
Naficy, Hamid. A Social History of Cinema, Volume 1:  The Artisan Era, 1897-1941. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 
 
Najibullah,  Farangis. “Iran’s Catwalk Ban is Only the Beginning.” RFERL, September 




Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “Hazards of Modernity and Morality:  Women, State and Ideology 
in Contemporary Iran.” In Women, Islam, and the State, edited by Deniz 
Kandiyoti, pp.  48-76. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. 
 
______. “Iran's Turn to Islam: From Modernism to a Moral Order.” Middle East  
Journal 41, no. 2 (Spring 1987):  pp. 202-217. 
 
______. Land Reform and Social Change in Iran.  Salt Lake City: University of Utah  
Press, 1987.  
 
______. “Power, Morality and the New Muslim Womanhood.” In The Politics of Social  
Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, edited by Myron Weiner and  
Ali Banuazizi, pp.  366-389. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994. 
 
______. "The Erotic Vatan [Homeland] as Beloved and Mother: To Love, to  
Possess, and To Protect." Comparative Studies in Society and History 39, no. 3  
(July 1997): pp. 442-467. 
 
______. Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and  
Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity. Berkeley: University of California, 2005. 
 
______. The Story of the Daughters of Quchan.  Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press,  
1998. 
 
Nashat, Guity. “Women in the Islamic Republic in Iran.” Iranian Studies 13, no. 1/4, 
Iranian Revolution in Perspective (1980): pp. 165-194. 
 362 
 
Nashat, Guity and Lois Beck, eds.  Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic.  
 Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2004. 
 
Nassirimanesh, Bijan.  “Proceedings of the Abstract for the Fourth National Harm 
Reduction Conference.” Harm Reduction Coalition, Seattle, 2002. 
Nast, Heidi J. and Steve Pile. Places Through the Body. London:  Routledge, 1998. 
 
National AIDS Committee Secretariat. Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report: On 
Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and 
AIDS. Ministry of Health and Medical Education, March 2012. 
 
______.  Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly  
Special Session on HIV and AIDS, Iran Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education. February 2010.  Accessed April 14, 2012.  
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports 
/2010countries/iran_2010_country_progress_report_en.pdf.   
 
Nead, Lynda.  Myths of Sexuality: Representations of Women in Victorian Britain. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishing, 1990. 
Nikman, Dr. Mohammad Hossein. “United Nations High-level Meeting on HIV/AIDS  
Statement.” (statement to United Nations from Acting Health Minister of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, June 8-10, 2011. New York).  Accessed April 12, 2012.  
http://www.un.org/en/ga/aidsmeeting2011/pdf/iran.pdf.  
 
Nobari, Ali Reza. Iran Experts. Stanford: Stanford University Press, Iran America  
Documentation Group, 1978. 
 
“Nokat-e Mohem darbare-ye Shir Dadan/Important Points about Breastfeeding.”  
MOHME, date unknown. Accessed May 13, 2012. 
http://bzhc.qums.behdasht.gov.ir/index.aspx?siteid=183&pageid=31393&pro=no
bak.  
Nolen, Stephanie. 28 Stories of AIDS in Africa. Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2008.  
 
Nu’mani, Farhad and Sohrab Behdad. Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution 
Matter? Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006. 
 
Olang et. al. “Breastfeeding in Iran: Prevalence, Duration and Current  




“One Person’s Story: Mr. Monir Taheri.” Abdorrahman Bouourmand Foundation, 2012. 
 363 
  Accessed August 15, 2011. http://www.iranrights.org/english/memorial-case--
 3246.php.   
 
“One Person’s Story:  Ms. Sakineh Qasemi.” Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, 
   2012.  Accessed August 15, 2011. 
http://www.iranrights.org/english/memorial-case-- 3246.php. 
Osanloo, Arzoo. The Politics of Women’s Rights in Iran.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009. 
 
Overseas Consultants, Report on Seven-Year Development Plan for the Plan 
Organization of the Imperial Government of Iran. Tehran: N.p., 1949.  
 
Oxford English Dictionary online, s.v. “archon.” Accessed September 12, 2011.  
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/10427?rskey=Wf7iu6&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
 
Ozbek, Muge. “The Regulation of Prostitution in Beyoglu (1875-1915). Middle Eastern 
Studies 46, no. 4 (July 2010): pp. 555-568. 
 
Paidar, Parvin. Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
 
Palmer, Gabrielle. The Politics of Breastfeeding. London: Pandora Press, 1988. 
 
Parkes, Peter. “‘Milk Kinship in Islam. Substance, Structure, History.” Social  
Anthropology 13, no. 3 (2005): pp. 307-329. 
 
Parsa, Misagh. Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. New Brunswick:  Rutgers  
University Press, 1989.  
 
Parvin, Parto and Arash Ahmadi. “Iran Sets Sights on Tackling Prostitution.” BBC News,  
July 26, 2012. Accessed July 27, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-18966982. 
 
“Photos: Tehran’s Brothel District Shahr-e-No 1975-77 by Kaveh Golestan.”  
Payvand.com, December 12, 2010. Accessed August 20, 2011.  
http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2010/12/10/photos-tehrans-brothel-district-shahr-e-
 no-1975-77-by-kaveh-golestan/.   
 
Polk, William R. “The Nature of Modernization: The Middle East and North Africa.”  
Foreign Affairs 44, no. 1 (October1965): pp. 100-110. 
 
Poovey, Mary. Uneven Developments:  The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian  
England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.  
 
“Postscript: Female Sex workers and Fear of Stigmatisation.” Sex Transmission Infection  
 Journal 81(2005): pp. 180-188. 
 364 
 
Honarbin-Holliday, Mehri. “Autonomous Minds and Bodies in Theory and Practice:  
Women Constructing Cultural Identities and Becoming Visible through Art.” In 
Women, Power and Politics in 21st Century Iran, edited by Tara Povey and 
Elaheh Rostami-Povey, pp. 53-72. London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2012. 
 
“Pour-mohammadi and the 1988 Prison Massacres.” Human Rights Watch, December  
2005. Accessed December 12, 2011.  
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran1205/2.htm. 
 
Power, Nina.  “Mannequins, Manners, and Mutilation.” Cabinet Magazine 301 (Summer  
2008): pp. 21-25. 
 
Prus, Robert C. Symbolic Interaction and Ethnographic Research:  Intersubjectivity and 
the Study of Human Lived Experience. Albany: State University of New York  
Press, 1996. 
 
Pugliese, Joseph. “Embodied Archives.” Journal of the Association for the Study of  
Australian Literature, Special Issue: Archive Madness 11, no. 1 (2011). 
 
The Qur’an. Translated by M.A. S. Abdel Haleem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
 
al-Qardawi, Yusuf.  The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. Oak Brook:  American  
Trust Publications, 1999. 
 
Rahbar, Ali Rowhani et.al.  "Prevalence of HIV Infection and Other Blood-borne  
Infections in Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated Injection Drug Users (IDUs) in 
Mashhad, Iran." International Journal of Drug Policy 15 (2004): pp. 151–155.  
 
Rahnema, Saeed and Haideh Moghissi. “Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of




Rahimi-Movaghar, A., et al. “HIV Prevalence amongst Injecting Drug Users in Iran: A  
Systematic Review of Studies Conducted during the Decade 1998–2007.” 
International Journal of Drug Policy (2011).  
 
Rahmati-Najarkolaei, F., Sh. Niknami, F. Aminshokravi, M. Bazargan, Ahmadi, A. 
Hadjizadeh, et al.  “Experiences of Stigma in Healthcare Settings among Adults 
Living with HIV in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Journal of the International 
AIDS Society 13, no. 27 (2010): pp. 1-11. 
 
Rajaee, Farhang. The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression.  Gainesville: University 
of Florida Press, 1993. 
 365 
 
Ram, Haggai. “Multiple Iconographies:  Political Posters in the Iranian Revolution.” In 
Picturing Iran:  Art, Society and Revolution, edited by Shiva Balaghi and Lynn 
Gumpert, pp. 90-101. London:  I.B. Tauris, 2002. 
 
Rasheed, Mina. “Iran: HIV/AIDS—More than a Social Taboo.” Payvand News, February 
2, 2009.  Accessed March 21, 2012. 
http://www.payvand.com/news/09/feb/1346.html.  
 
Razzaghi, Emran, Afarin Rahimia Movaghar, Traci Craig Green, and Kaveh Khoshnood.  
 “Profiles of Risk:  A Qualitative Study of Injecting Drug Users in Tehran, Iran.”  
Harm Reduction Journal 3, no. 12 (March 18, 2006): pp. 1-13. 
 
Recknagel, Charles and Azam Gorgin. “Iran: Proposal Debated for Solving Prostitution 
with ‘Chastity Houses.’” ParsTimes, August 7, 2002. 
 
Roberts, Nickie. Whores in History: Prostitution in Western Society. London:  
 HarperCollins, 1992.  
 
Rostami-Povey, Elaheh. “The Women’s Movement in Its Historical Context.” In Women, 
  Power  and Politics in 21st Century Iran, edited by Tara Povey and Elaheh
 Rostami-Povey, pp. 17-34. London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2012. 
Rowhani Rahbar, Ali et al. "Prevalence of HIV Infection and Other Blood-borne 
Infections in Incarcerated and Non-incarcerated Injection Drug Users (IDUs) in 
Mashhad, Iran.” International Journal of Drug Policy 15 (2004): pp. 151–155.  
 
Rubin, Reva. “Attainment of the Maternal Role. Part 1: Processes.” Nursing Research 16  
(Summer/Fall 1967): pp. 237-265. 
 
Sadeghi, Fatimeh. “ ‘Temporary Marriage’ and the Economy of Pleasure.” Translated by 




Sadr, Shadi. "The 'End Of Stoning': Islamic Republic Style." Huffington Post: The Blog,  
March 13, 2012. Accessed July 12, 2012. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shadi-sadr/iran-stoning_b_1335809.html. 
 
Saiedi, Shirin. “Hero of Her Own Story: Gender and State Formation in Contemporary  
Iran.” (PhD  diss., Cambridge University, 2011). 
 
Schayegh, Cyrus. Who is Knowledgeable is Strong.  Berkeley: University of California  
Press, 2009.  
 
______. “ ‘A Sound Mind Lives in a Healthy Body’:  Texts and Contexts in the Iranian  
 366 
Modernists’ Scientific Discourse of Health, 1910s-40s.” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 37, no. 2 (May 2005): pp. 167-188. 
 
______. "Modeling Marriage: Family Magazines in Iran." Bad Jens.com. September  
2004. 
 
______. “Criminal-women and Mother-women: Socio-cultural Transformations and the  
Critique of Criminality in Early Post-World War II Iran.” Journal of Middle East 
 Women's Studies 2, no. 3 (Fall  2006): pp. 1-21. 
 
Sciolino, Elaine.  “Love Finds a Way in Iran: 'Temporary Marriage.'” New York Times, 
October 4, 2000. Accessed September 12, 2011. 
http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/tmpmrig.htm.  
 
Sadeghi, Fatemeh. ““Negotiating with Modernity,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 28, no. 2 (2008): pp. 250-259. 
 
Sedghi, Hamideh.  Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling.   
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
 
Sedigh Deylami, Shirin. “Strangers Among Us: The Critique of Westoxification in Perso- 
Islamic Political Thought.” PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2008. 
 
______. “In the Face of the Machine:  Westoxifcation, Cultural Globalization, and the 
Making of an Alternative Global Modernity,” Polity 43 (2011): pp. 242-263. 
“Select Fatwas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi on Marriage and Family.” Islamopedia
 Online. Accessed June 1, 2012. http://www.islamopediaonline.org/fatwa/select-
 fatwas-ayatollah-makarem-shirazi-marriage-and-family. 
 
Shahbaz, Kurush.  “Iran’s White Revolution.” World Affairs 126, no. 1 (Spring 1963):  
pp. 17-21. 
 
Shahidian, Hammed. Women in Iran:  Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic, Volume 2  
Westport:  Greenwood Press, 2002. 
 
Shahraki, S.Z. Arzjani, and N. Ahmadifard. “A Systematic Study of the Impact of  
Urbanization of Tehran City on Agricultural and Garden Land Use.” Crop 
Research (Hisar) 37, no. 1/3 (2009): pp. 307-311. 
 
Shahshahani, Soheila. “History of Anthropology in Iran.”  Iranian Studies 19, no. 1 
(Winter 1986):  pp. 65-86. 
 
______. “Body as a Means of Non-Verbal Communication in Iran.” International 
Journal of Modern Anthropology, Thought Short Report (2008):  pp. 65-81. 
 
Shanley, Mary Lyndon. Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England.  
 367 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
 
Shaw, Rhonda. “Performing Breastfeeding:  Embodiment, Ethics & the Maternal 
Subject.” Feminist Review 78 (November 1, 2004),  
doi:10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400186.  
 
Sherkat, Shahla. “Telling the Stories of Iranian Women’s Lives.” Nieman Reports,  
Summer 2009. Accessed May 4, 2012.  
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101473/Telling-the-Stories-of- 
Iranian-Womens-Lives.aspx. 
Shilts, Randy. And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic.  
New York: Macmillan, 2007. 
 
“Shirin Ebadi Book Excerpts.” BadJens Iranian Feminist Newsletter, September 2004.   
Accessed June 1, 2012. http://www.badjens.com/ebadi.html. 
al-Serouri, A.W.  et al. “AIDS Awareness and Attitudes among Yemeni Young People
 Living in High-Risk Areas.” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 16, no. 3
 (2010): pp. 242-250.  
 
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle and Ali Mohammadi. Small Media Big Revolution:  
Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press, 1994.  
 
Sreberny-Mohammadi, See Annabelle. “Small Media for a Big Revolution: Iran.” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 3, no. 3, The Sociology of  
Culture (Spring 1990): pp. 341-371. 
 
Stearns, Cindy A. “Breastfeeding and the Good Maternal Body.” Gender and Society 13, 
no. 3 (June 1999):  pp. 308-325. 
 
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, and Robert Pear. “Wary Centrists Posing Challenge in Health Care 
Vote.” New York Times, February 27, 2010. Accessed February 28, 2012.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/us/politics/28health.html. 
 
Stolzer, J. “Breastfeeding:  An Interdisciplinary Review.” International Review of 
Modern Sociology 32, no. 1 (Spring 2006): pp. 103-128. 
 
Sturken, Marita and Lisa Cartwright. Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual  
Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
 








______. “Paraplegic Bodies: Self and Society.” (PhD diss., University of Auckland,  
New Zealand, 1996). 
 
Sullivan, Zohreh. “Eluding the Feminist, Overthrowing the Modern?  Transformations in  
Twentieth-Century Iran.” In Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the  
Middle East, edited by Lila Abu Lughod, pp. 215-242.  Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1998.   
 
Tadiar, Neferti Xina. “Filipinas ‘Living in a Time of War.” In  Body Politics, edited by 
Odine de Guzman, pp. 1-19.  Manila:  University Center for Women’s Studies,  
University of the Philippines, 2002. 
 
Taheri, Amir. “The Grand Old Man of Iranian Press Passes Away in America.” Asharq 
alawsat, December 14, 2006. Accessed October 4, 2011. http://www.asharq- 
e.com/news.asp?section=7&id=7333.   
 
Talattof, Kamran. Modernity, Sexuality, and Ideology in Iran: The Life and Legacy of a  
Popular Female Artist. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011.  
 
“Taleban dismisses statue outcry.” BBC News, February 27, 2011. A August, 30, 2011. 
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1192195.stm. 
 
Tamadonfar, Mehran. “Islam, Law, and Political Control in Contemporary Iran.” 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40, no. 2 (June 2001): pp. 205-219.  
 
Tavoosi, Anahita et al. “Knowledge and Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among Iranian 
Students.” BMC Public Health 4, no. 17 (2004). doi:10.1186/1471-2458-4-17. 
 
Tehran Municipality. “Fifty Ambassadors, First Secretaries Guests of Iran Arts Garden- 
Museum.” Tehran Municipality, June 26, 2012. Accessed July 1, 2012.  
http://en.tehran.ir/default.aspx?tabid=77&ArticleId=747. 
 
Tehran’s Baharestan Square, December 22, 2010. Accessed December 12, 2011.  
 http://www.panoramio.com/photo/45391444.  Photographer unknown. 
 
Tehran’s Baharestan Square, June 27, 2011. Accessed December 12, 2011.  







“The Body: The Complete HIV/AIDS Resource Fact Sheet, CD4 (T-Cell Tests).” The  
 369 
Body.com,  March 29, 2012.  Accessed April 14, 2012.  
http://www.thebody.com/content/6110/cd4-t-cell-tests.html#anchor251. 
 
“The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in Iran.” UNDP Iran, February 27, 2011. 
  Accessed April 12, 2012. http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/hivaids-tb-
 malaria/481-27-february-2011-the-prevention-and-control-of-hivaids-in-iran/. 
"The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in I.R. Iran, Phases 1& 2.” UNDP Iran, 2011.   
Accessed April 30, 2012.  
http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/component/content/article/403.  
“The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS.” UNDP Iran, February 27, 2011.  Accessed
 June 19, 2012. http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/hivaids-tb-malaria/481-27-
 february-2011-the- prevention-and-control-of-hivaids-in-iran.   
 
“Thirty Years Ago on This Day.” Radio Zamaneh, 8 Bahman 1387/January 27, 2009. 
Accessed September 11, 2011.
 http://zamaaneh.com/revolution/2009/01/post_218.html.   
  
Tizro, Zahra. Domestic Violence in Iran: Women, Marriage and Islam. New York:  
Routledge, 2011.  
 
Tober, Diane M., Mohammad-Hossein Taghdisi,  and Mohammad Jalali. "Fewer  
Children, Better Life" or "As Many as God Wants"?: Family Planning among 
Low-Income Iranian and Afghan Refugee Families in Isfahan, Iran.” Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly 20, no. 1, Medical Anthropology in the Muslim World: 
Ethnographic Reflections on Reproductive and Child Health (March 2006): pp. 
50-71. 
 
Tohidi, Nayereh. “Modernity, Islamization, and Women in Iran.” In Gender and National  
Identity:  Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, edited by Valentine M. 
Moghadam, pp. 110-147.  London: Zed Books, 1994. 
Torab, Azam. Performing Islam: Gender and Ritual in Iran.  London: Brill Academic  
 Publishing, 2006. 
 
UNAIDS, Global Report Fact Sheet 2010 Middle East and North Africa. UNAIDS. 
  Accessed April 14, 2012. 
http://www.unaids.org/documents/20101123_FS_mena_em_en.pdf.  
 
______. Islamic Republic of Iran Country Overview, 2009.  Accessed April 12, 2012.  
http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/islamicrepublicofiran/. 
 
UNAIDS/WHO. Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted 
Infections for Iran, 2004 Update, pp. 1-14. 
 
UNAIDS. Middle East and North Africa Regional Report on AIDS 2011.  Accessed  
 370 
March 5, 2012.  
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublicatio
n/2011/JC2257_UNAIDS-MENA-report-2011_en.pdf. 
UNICEF. “HIV and Infant Feeding:  The Facts.” New York:  UNICEF, 2002. 
______. “Infant feeding and HIV:  Risks and Benefits of Breastfeeding.” New York:
 UNICEF, 2002. Accessed April 12, 2012.
 http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/23964_infantfeeding.html.  
 
United States Department of State, 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report-Iran, Refworld- 
UNHCR website, June 19, 2012. Accessed July 12, 2012.  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOS,,IRN,,4fe30cc0c,0.html. 
 
Valentine, Gill. Social Geographies: Space and Society. Essex:  Pearson Education Ltd., 
2001. 
 
Varzi, Roxanne. “Iran’s Pieta:  Motherhood, Sacrifice and Film in the Aftermath of the  
Iran-Iraq War.” Feminist Review 88, War (2008): pp. 86-98. 
 
______. Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran.  
Durham:  Duke University Press, 2006.   
 
Vick, Karl. “AIDS Crisis Brings Radical Change in Iran’s Response to Heroin Use.” 
Washington Post, July 5, 2005.  
 
Walkowitz, Judith. Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
 
Warren, James Francis.  Ah Ku and Karayuki-san:  Prostitution in Singapore, 1870- 
1940. Singapore:  Singapore University Press, 2003. 
 
Watson, Keith.  “The Shah's White Revolution-Education and Reform in Iran.”  
 Comparative Education 12, no. 1 (March 1976): pp. 23-36. 
 
Weiner, Myron and Ali Banuazizi. The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan,  
Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994.  
Weiss, Gail. Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality. New York and London:  
Routledge, 1999.  
 
“Women, Girls, Gender Equality and HIV Fact Sheet.” UNAIDS, February 2012. 
Accessed March 1, 2012.  
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/factsheet/2012/2
0120217_FS_WomenGirls_en.pdf.   
 
World Health Organization. Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV Infection in Adults and 
 371 
Adolescents: Recommendations for Public Health Approach 2010 Revision. 
Geneva: WHO, 2010. 
 
______. International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes.  Geneva:  World 
Health Organization, 1981. 
 
Yazdi, CA., K. Aschbacher, A. Arvanta, HM Naser, A. Abdollahi, M. Mousavi, MR. 
Narmani, M. Kianpishe, F. Nicfallah, and AK Moghadam.  “Knowledge, 
Attitudes and Sources of Information Regarding HIV/AIDS in Iranian 
Adolescents.”   AIDS Care 18, no. 8 (November 2006): pp.1004-1010. 
 
Yeganeh, Nahid.  “Women, Nationalism, and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse 
in Iran.” Feminist Review 44, Nationalism and National Identities (Summer  
1993):  pp. 3-18.   
 
Young, Iris Marion.  On Female Body Experience: ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ and Other 
Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Youssefzadeh, Ameneh. “The Situation of Music in Iran since the Revolution:  The Role 
of Official Organizations.” British Journal of Ethnomusicology 9, no. 2 (2000):  
pp. 35-61. 
 
Zahedi, Ashraf.  "Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian  
Regimes.” Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 3, no. 3 (Fall 2007): pp. 75- 
98.  
 
Zamani, Saman et. al. "Prevalence of HIV/HCV/HBV Infections and Drug-related Risk  
Behaviours amongst IDUs Recruited through Peer-driven Sampling in Iran."  
International Journal of Drug Policy 21 (2010): pp. 493–500. 
 
Zargooshi, J.  “Characteristics of Gonorrhea in Kermanshah, Iran.” Sex Transmission 
Infection Journal 78, no. 6 (2002): pp. 460–461. 
 
“zur-kana.”  Encyclopedia Iranica, August 2005.  Accessed August 18, 2011.  
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zur-kana.   
 
 
Legal Documents  
 
“The Anti-Narcotics Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” November 8, 1997.  Accessed 
April 25, 2012. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c35b0a52.html.   
 
Dabir-e Shora-ye ‘Aali-ye Enqelab-e Farhangi/ Head of the Supreme Council of the 
Cultural Revolution, 5 Esfand 1363/ February 24, 1988. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Qanoun-e Mojazat-e Islamic/ Islamic Penal Code, 1991. 
http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf. 
 372 
Social Council of Tehran Province. “The Executive Bylaw concerning the Struggle 
against Mal-veiling.”  Article 3: A to D. 
Iran Ministry of the Interior. Mosavebat-e Comisiyon-e Siasatgozari dar Omour-e 
Ejraee-ye Mobarezeh-ye Farhangi ba Mazaher-e Fesad/ The Ratification of 
Policymaking Commission regarding Executive Affairs of the Cultural Struggle with 
Symbols of Corruption 6877, 19 Ordibehesht 1371/ May 9, 1992. 
“Preamble.” Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, December 3, 1979, amended July 28, 
1989. 
 
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. The Principles, Foundations, and Executing  
Methods in Developing a Culture of Chastity, 14 Bahman 1376/ February 3, 1998. 
 
______.  Ousul va Mabani va Ravesh-ha-ye Ejraee-ye Gostaresh-e Farhang-e Efaf/The  
Principles, Foundations, and Executing Methods in Spreading a Culture of 
Chastity. 14 Bahman 1376/February 3, 1998. 
 
______.  Qanoun-e Tarvij-e Taghziye ba Shir-e Madar va Hemayat az Madaran dar 
Doran-e Shirdehi/Law Encouraging Breastfeeding and the Protection of Mothers 
during Breastfeeding. Islamic Republic of Iran Judiciary, Family Law, 1374 Azar 
22. Tehran: Ganjdanesh Publishing, 1385/2006. pp. 295-298.  
 
______.  Qanoun-e Rahkar-ha-ye Ejraee-ye Gostaresh-e Farhange- Efaf va Hejab. 
“Policies and Solutions.” Objective 4, Supreme Council of the Cultural 




______.  Rahbord-ha-ye Gostaresh-e Farhang-e Efaf/Guidelines of Developing or 
Spreading a Culture of Chastity, 13 Dey 1384/ July 26, 2005. 
 
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Qanoun-e Samandehi-ye Mode va Lebas/ 
Regulations on Re-organizing Fashion and Clothing, 12 Dey 1385/ January 2, 
2007 and 20 Dey 1385/ January 10, 2007. Accessed July 4, 2012. 
http://honari.farhang.gov.ir/rules-rule7-fa.html. 
 
______.  Qanoun-e Samandehi-ye Mode va Lebas/ Regulations on Re-organizing 
Fashion and Clothing, 12 Dey 1385/ January 2, 2007 and 20 Dey 1385/ January 10, 
2007.  Accessed July 4, 2012.  http://honari.farhang.gov.ir/rules-rule7-fa.html. 
 
 
Islamic Republic of Iran Judiciary. Qanoun-e Tarvij-e Taghziye ba Shir-e Madar va 
Hemayat az Madaran dar Duran-e Shirdahi/Law Encouraging Breastfeeding and the 
 373 
Protection of Mothers during Breastfeeding. Family Law, 1374 Azar 22/ December 13, 
1995. Tehran: Ganjdanesh Publishing, 1385/2006. 
Islamic Republic of Iran Penal Code. Book 2. “Hadd Punishment for Adultery.” 
 
Qanoun-e Mojazat-e Ommumi/ Pahlavi Criminal Code, 1304/1924. 
Resolution WHA27.43.  Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health 






Ahmad-Nia, Shirin. Interview by author.  Personal interview.  Tehran, Iran, July 3, 2010. 
 
Alaie, Kamiar.  Interview by author. Telephone. New York, NY., June 26, 2012.  
 
A., Forough. Interview by author. Personal interview.  Tehran, Iran, August 10, 2011. 
Mansourian, Khosrou. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tehran, Iran, July 17, 
2011 and November 15, 2011. 
Sadeghi, Fatemeh. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tehran, Iran, October 1, 
2011. 
Salehi, F. (SPASDI social worker).  Interview by author. Personal interview. Tehran, 





Guidelines for Measuring National HIV Prevalence, UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on 
Global HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance, 2005.  Accessed April 10, 2012. 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/manual/2005/2005
0101_gs_guidemeasuringpopulation_en.pdf 
Islamic Republic of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, Declaration of Commitment. Office of the 
Under-Secretary for Health, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, and Centre for 
Disease Management, January 2006.  Accessed June 1, 2012. 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2006/2006_country_progress_report_iran_en.pdf.   
Islamic Republic of Iran Country Report: Monitoring of the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS. National AIDS Committee Secretariat, 




Islamic Republic of Iran Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Iran 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education, February 2010.  Accessed April 14, 2012.  
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2010c
ountries/iran_2010_country_progress_report_en.pdf.   
Iran Progress Report:  Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV and AIDS. National AIDS Committee Secretariat and Ministry of Health 
and Medical Education, March 2012. Accessed April 12, 2012. 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/progressreports/2012c
ountries/ce_IR_Narrative_Report.pdf.   
 “Monitoring of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and 
AIDS.” National AIDS Committee Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education, February 2010. Accessed April 10, 2012. 
http://www.unaids.org/fr/dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/2010progressreportssu
bmittedbycountries/file,33662,fr..pdf 
“The Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in I.R. Iran, Phases 1& 2.” UNDP Iran, 2011.  
Accessed April 30, 2012. 
http://www.undp.org.ir/index.php/component/content/article/403. 
 
 
